Both these parties presided over the country's surrender to the lenders without a shot and led Greece to her gravest catastrophe since the Asian Minor Catastrophe of 1922.
For all intents and purposes, Greece is now a collapsed state, destroyed by a "bailout," designed by the EU and the IMF, in an effort to save Greece's lenders and shield "greater" Europe from Greek "contagion." Despite these efforts though, and the slow death imposed on the Greek people by their "friends and partners," it is again obvious that a Greek "disorderly" collapse is a most likely event -- and will destabilize Europe to the point of an uncontrollable crisis that will trigger global economic tumult of unforeseen proportions.
June 18, the day after the next Greek general election, will be thus "the day after the day after" which will decide whether Greece acquires a firm government friendly to the idea of continuing with the lethal "bailout" formula (more enormous loans on top of an unmanageable sovereign debt) or emerge a Greece under a left-wing administration, led by the political star of the day, Alexis Tsipras, who has already stated unequivocally that (a) Greece cannot continue with austerity, and (b) Greece won't accept the persistent shackles of the "bailout" agreement.
The prospect of Syriza, Tsipras's loose coalition of radical leftist parties, assuming the control of the country has sat badly with Germany and the rest of Europe's "central powers," which define "sanity" as the state of mind accepting Brussels/Berlin diktats without questions or protests.
Such an administration will be doubly inimical to the EU's German-inspired plans: first, it would obviously pose a key ideological threat to the whole edifice of the German demand of "freedom through austerity" (Strenge macht frei) not to mention the legitimacy of the "markets" taking over as the determinants of an independent country's liberty and sovereignty; and, second, it would challenge the very core of a "united Europe" controlled not by her original pronouncements of democracy, solidarity, and freedom but by the directives of "investment," "margins," "spreads," "rating houses," and "CDS."
Could then the unthinkable happen? Could Greece emerge on June 18 the most unlikely catalyst in a debilitating EU crisis of democracy, economy, principle, and liberty that began much earlier than the current Greek failure and was lethally reinforced by Europe's lukewarm, colorless, de-ideologized, and catastrophically limited "leadership?" The answer, unfortunately for both Greece and Europe, is "yes."
The prognosis for June 17 isn't what would please "the chanceries of Europe" as the Greeks are fond to say. Greek voters aren't convinced that the same, corrupt, failed, discredited, and morally repugnant old parties, the only ones that have barricaded behind the "bailout" in the failed hope of retaining some of their former power, can lead the country to even a marginally reasonable solution.
Greek voters have resoundingly rejected death by austerity; the furore that erupted after Christine Lagarde's unacceptable, arrogant, hard knuckles "payback time" comments is only one small indicator of how deeply feelings of hostility, animosity, and rejection, aimed at Greece's "saviors," currently run. It would be then rather optimistic to expect the Greek people to endorse again those who led the country straight over the cliff in a way that will produce a stable government.
Poll data appears to support the above estimate. Syriza and ND are running neck and neck, with Tsipras personally riding a wave of unexpected enthusiasm that has riled Greece's "partners" to such as degree as to trigger unabashed -- and quite "democratic" -- warnings by our European "friends" about which party Greeks must vote. (Even Mr. Cameron, leading the EU's most notorious Eurosceptic, found the time and the presumption to warn the Greeks similarly lest the UK is exposed to "market speculation").
What the Europeans, and other "friendly" observers, continue to underestimate though is the rage engulfing Greece and the almost guttural affect of the message put out by Tsipras. The majority of outside critics focuses overwhelmingly on the questionable conclusion that those put under the austerity knife will accept their demise without a fight; obviously, they have learned nothing, or the altogether wrong thing, from the May 6 election.
Are we then looking at a left-wing Greek government "hostile" to the West and European "orthodoxy?" If we accept Cold War criteria, yes. If we depend, rather, on a more pragmatic assessment of the entire European situation as it is today,Tsipras and his comrades may be a surprising, but, in the end, "rational" choice by those who have no hope in the freezing European hell -- and whose vision is constantly reinforced by a constant flow of doomsday prophesies and threats which, not surprisingly, emanate all from those who would lose the most if Europe's current "model" receives a keen ideological blow from the most unlikely quarters.
A destabilized Greece emerges as the most likely nightmare scenario to take over on "the day after the day after." The fear is that Lehman Brothers in 2008 will look like a tea party if they get this one [Greece's next move] wrong.
Now it is too late of course for the Greeks, but wouldn't be this the best time to begin analyzing how things deteriorated to this level by rationally and evenly distributing the responsibility for this disaster among those who reject their share for the destruction of Greece?