

## **The European Union: Security Sector Reforms, Intelligence Cooperation, Foreign Espionage and Domestic Security Challenges**

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The development of EU security and stability area marked by legal modification, intelligence and security sector reforms, and policy making patterns energized practical reflections on the impact of intelligence sharing on law enforcement level. Globalization during the last decade resulted in an interconnected world and interconnected culture and societies across the EU project where numerous information seekers were seeking access to information technology. Notwithstanding all these technological developments, national security and intelligence cooperation within the European Union member state are in deep crisis-combined with the re-emergence of Muslim extremism, and white

supremacist attacks. National security challenges in Britain, Germany and France are becoming more and more compounded from cyber threats to biological terrorism.

These three states including some Eastern European states have been entangled in a mesh of ruthless and precarious intelligence war that has put on tribulation their secret intelligence infrastructure. Cyber and biological terrorism have forced the EU member states and Britain to take a step back and reconsider their concept of broader intelligence and security cooperation. In Britain the introduction of PREVENT Strategy and National Capability Review (NCR) could not overcome the surge of growing radicalization and foreign intelligence networks, but the UK government recently announced to make professional its foreign and security policy approach through a new government-wide review. The integrated review presents a generational opportunity to set direction for foreign and security policy following the UK's departure from the EU.

Intelligence and Security Committee in Britain published several reports on the performance of intelligence agencies and its own achievement during the last two decades, but October 2011, Ministry of Justice 'Justice and Security Green Paper' criticized the performance of Intelligence and Security Committee that the ISC knowledge of operational work of the agencies was limited, and its transparency was also weak. Other than the three intelligence and security agencies, the ISC examines the intelligence-related work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) (Cabinet Office), the Assessments Staff (Cabinet Office), the National Security Secretariat (Cabinet Office), Defence Intelligence (Ministry of Defence), Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (Home Office). Although the ISC is a committee of Parliament, it differs in certain respects from parliamentary select committees. Members of the ISC are appointed by Parliament and the Committee reports directly to Parliament.

Up till domestic security is concerned, terrorist attack in 2015, and 2016 in France, Germany and Britain pointed to the fact that the lack of professionalization of intelligence and security sector reforms in these states, caused misconception that intelligence sharing on law enforcement level was weak and controversial. Intelligence apparently provides important advantage to law enforcement agencies. Terrorist attacks in some EU member states; reforms and judicial activism left negative impacts on the professionalization and cooperation of intelligence. In these three states, notwithstanding their strong security infrastructure, intelligence agencies failed to intercept the exponentially growing networks of extremist groups, networks of foreign espionage, and unauthorised private and state sponsored intelligence surveillance activities in Markets, highstreets, Rail networks, and community level.

Among other things, Mosques, Churches, Gurudwaras, and Hindu Manders in Britain, Netherlands, France and Germany are the centres of national security intelligence information exchange between informants and state and private stakeholders. Intelligence agencies of South Asia, Africa, and the Arab world retrieve substantial amount of secret intelligence information in every Juma (Friday) prayer gathering, and other religious palces. Diplomats of several foreign embassies participate clandestinely and covertly in these religious gatherings to personally handle thier invaluable business, and instruct their informers on new directions. These diplomats sponsor espionage missions, and deploy women and men of their own communities living in Europe. State sponsor espionage and unauthorised intelligence surveillance in Britan, Germany, France has prompted complication and precarious national security threats. For that reason, consecutive consternation of across borders could not reflect in their strategies and security measures. The re-emergence of extremism and radicalization and attacks of white-supremasists on religious places are the most extensive danger the three states have ever seen due to massive increase in migrants that caused insecurity, and internal political and economic prssure. In February 2020, a white racist killed people including a pregnant woman in a German restaurant. German Chacellor Angela Merkel said: "Hate is a poison, racism is a poison". There were only 128 attampetes in 2018 in Europe. The New Jersey annual terrorism report HSNW, 26 Feruary 2020) noted: "The threat from white supremacist extremists is also high due to the number of threats, plots and attacks in 2019".

Majority of people who entered Europe used fake documents to hide their identity, because terrorists from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Africal arrived in the continent with new political and religious ideologies. In Britain, every year, successive governments outline new security plans, and strategies, but they have been unable to control the virus of sectarianism, extremism and radicalization. The police and intelligence agencies have numerous defencies in countering this hydra. In 2016, Germany introduced intelligence reforms. Mr. Thorsten Wetzling (June 2017) argued that reforms designed new streak in regard to the authorization procedures-now required for the surveillance of non-national data and the legal requirement for Germany's participation in international intelligence cooperation. In contraposition, recent reforms in the UK and France offer no such standard for non-national data, but complaints still exist about the UK and German intelligence agencies warrantless spying on citizens.

The most critical counterterrorism and intelligence sharing efforts within the EU project still need to be streamlined where law enforcement agencies have failed to share their national secrets. The Europol and Eurojust are in hot water due to their failure to repond to the exponentially growing threat of radicalization and extremism. One reason behid this failure is that intelligence and law enforcement agencies operate in opposit directions in a complex legal environment. More

worrisome is the most damaging intelligence failure in the EU member states. Moreover, there are so many hindrances due to which the EU member states cannot move ahead with a single voice. Speculations that the security assurance of all member states within the EU is mere a hyperbole as complaints of some Eastern European allies about the Brussels attitude raised several questions. Poland, Netherlands, Denmark, Moldova, and the Baltic States feel threatened due to the attitude of some EU member states.

The issue of security sector reforms in France and Germany, Britain, Romania and Poland is often discussed in print and electronic media, but in reality, their zeal and resolve are revolving around old mechanism. On 21 January 2015, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls presented a package of immediate reforms to address the issue of radicalisation and terrorism in his country, but unfortunately, the new counterterrorism measures did not prove effective to counter national security threats. A parliamentary committee that examined two terrorist attacks in 2015 stressed the need of streamlining intelligence infrastructure of France. The committee found incredible failure of the agencies to respond to the two terror attack positively. Among forty proposals, law makers urged government to merge some competing agencies in order to create a new national intelligence agency. All the same, these reforms, French agencies still looking panacea to the exponentially growing scourge of radicalization and extremism. To counter this hydra and foreign espionage and cyber terrorism, the government now using Artificial Intelligence tools.

In these news efforts, government created the code of internal security within the intelligence act, which meant to create the climate of trust between intelligence agencies and communities. The act stresses technical capabilities of intelligence infrastructure to harmonise the range of tools that intelligence can use according to the regime applicable to judicial investigation. The failure of French intelligence before the 14 July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice was mainly due to the lack of its coordination with law enforcement agencies to prevent the truck runner. French law makers had no option other than to call for a shake up of intelligence infrastructure of the country.

The consecutive failure of German intelligence agencies to intercept the lone wolves and religiously motivated Muslim extremists before they translate their ferments and resentment into a violent action has raised important questions about its national security and counterterrorism approach. The lack of predictable security management in the region is the nucleation of debate today. In Moldova and Georgia, security crisis and political fragmentation give EU more pain. Moldova's support for the EU integration is weak, while Georgia is also thinking on the same lines because their citizens still face the uneven visa regime within the EU member states. However, amidst this controversial engagement, German

intelligence spied on France, created the clouds of surveillance on US and Britain, while Britain spied on Germany, which prompted distrust.