

# From Da'wah to Jihad

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## The South African Case

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## Introduction

It has become increasingly evident that global jihad networks are using South Africa as a base for recruitment operatives, and financing and planning terror activity. More importantly South Africa has become a safe haven and hiding place for terrorists, exploiting the country's democratic values and post-apartheid sensitivity. South Africa, perhaps the only real Western country in Africa, with highly developed banking system and communications, and vast unprotected stretches of borders, serves as a source of attraction for terrorist organizations and individuals around the world.

The research will examine the transformation of Islamic charity, welfare and education in South Africa, under the concept of da'wah, into militant jihadi activity, both domestic and international. First, the study will explore the model and strategy of da'wah and jihad, and later apply it on the history and current events in South Africa. The development of Muslim society in South Africa and the formation of different terrorist organizations will be explored, as well as the South African response.

The research will try and answer whether South Africa is part of the 'evil axis', unknowingly or not, or it is aware of its reality and is taking measures to confront the threats by cooperating with the international community, led by the United States.

## South Africa – General Information<sup>1</sup>

### Geography

South Africa is located in the southern part of the African continent. The total area size of the country is 1,219,090 sq km which is divided to 1,214,470 sq km of land and 4,620sq of water. South Africa has 2798 km of coast line and 4,862 km of land border. Both land and maritime borders will be regarded later in the research as a crucial security issue. South



Africa's border countries are: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Both Lesotho and Swaziland are located within the South African borders but have independent regimes and territories.

### People

South Africa population stands on a total amount of 49,052,489 people. The population is divided to several ethnic groups: Black Africans 79%, whites 9.6%, colored 8.9%, Indian-Asians 2.5%. Regarding religion, the South African population consists of a majority of around 77% Christians. Other religions, including unspecified and none religious people, amount to the other 23% of the population. Muslims constitutes approximately 1.5% of the population and the Jewish population numbers less than 100,000 with a majority of Orthodox Jews.

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<sup>1</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The world fact book: South Africa*, N.D., <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> [accessed: 22/11/2009]

### Government

The Republic of South Africa is divided into nine provinces which are: Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Kwazulu-Natal, Northern Cape, Free State, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. Each and every province has independent legislature and councils.<sup>2</sup>

South Africa has three capital cities, and each contains a different governmental branch.

Pretoria is the administrative capital, Cape Town is the legislative capital and Bloemfontein is the judicial capital of the country.

Since May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2009 the South African president has been Jacob Zuma. The president functions both as the Chief of State and Head of Government, and is responsible for appointing the state cabinet. Regarding elections, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a term of five years.

The South African constitution was certified and signed by President Nelson Mandela in December 10<sup>th</sup> 1996 and was effective since February 4<sup>th</sup>, 1997.

The legislative system consists of two houses of parliament – the National Council of the Provinces elected to five-year term, and the National Assembly which is elected to a five-year term as well.

The judicial branch, which is based on the Roman-Dutch law and the English common law, consists of four types of judicial courts: Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeals, High Court and the Magistrate Court.

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<sup>2</sup> South African Government Information, *The land and its people*, N.D., <http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/landpeople.htm#intro> [accessed: 22/11/2009]

## The Da'wah – Jihad Concept

**Da'wah:** Propagation, call, based on non-violent means aimed to repair the Muslim society through education, preaching, and social welfare.<sup>3</sup>

According to Dr. Col. (res.) Eitan Azani, the Deputy Director of International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in IDC Herzliya, Israel, da'wah and jihad are the two sides of the same coin. Both da'wah and jihad serve the fundamentalist Islamic objective called the Ummah. The Ummah strategy's final aspiration is a sole fundamental Islamic nation to rule the world. According to this perception the Muslim world is divided into Dar al-Harb – the territory controlled by the infidels, and Dar al-Islam – the territory controlled by Muslims. In order to achieve this goal there are several steps:

1. Taking over pro-Western Muslim countries such as Egypt and Jordan.
2. Taking over neighboring countries to the Islamic states which have Muslim roots, like Turkey.
3. Finally, the realization of Ummah – taking over the world by fighting the West.

Hassan al-Banna, who was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, divided the da'wah strategy into three phases<sup>4</sup>:

1. Familiarization – Spreading the ideology of Islam to the people, through teaching and preaching and by using beneficial social services.

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<sup>3</sup> Dr. Eitan Azani, Presentation: *From Da'wah to Jihad: The Radicalization Process*, 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Hassan al-Banna, *The Message of the Teachings*, N.D.,  
[http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online\\_library/books/tmott/](http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/) [accessed: 24/12/2009]

2. Development – Selecting the believers who can “carry the burden of jihad” and prepare and train them spiritually and militarily to be obedient and with no sense of hesitation.
3. Implementation – Taking the relentless path of jihad to achieve the final objective.

The rapid growth of Islam around the world, and especially in Africa, is to a large extent due to the great birthrate within Islamic communities, and more importantly due to religious conversions to Islam. These conversions became very popular mainly because the intensive efforts of Muslim charity organizations since the 1970s. These organizations are using da’wah among the non-Islamic population in order to attract them to join Islam. They target unprivileged, poor rural communities, and replace state authorities’ agencies and services that cannot compete with Muslim funds, coming from wealthy Islamic states. When entering a new community the Muslim organizations qualify teachers and Imams (preachers) and establish majids (mosques) and schools (madrassas). Since the 1970s Muslims teachers and Imams has become more involved with charity and welfare activities. They are first trained in Africa and are later sent to receive advanced education abroad. Therefore, it is common to find radical forms of Islam within these organizations.<sup>5</sup>

In the next chapters the research will explore the establishment of da’wah roots and activity in South Africa, its development and its transformation into jihadi terrorism.

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<sup>5</sup> Moshe Terdman, *The Process of Islamization in the South African countries: Internal and Peripheral Influences*, October 13, 2008, <http://www.tapuz.co.il/blog/ViewEntry.asp?EntryId=1346860> [accessed 20/01/2010]

## History of Muslims in South Africa

As described by Ebrahim Mahomed Mahida<sup>6</sup> the history of Muslims in South Africa dates back to the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, when the first free Muslims, known as Mardyckers, were brought as a labor force to Cape from an Indonesian Island called Amboyna.

The first organized community of Muslims was established in 1694 by Shaykh Yusuf, who was banished from Goa to Cape by the Dutch. He resided in Zandvleit and attracted many fugitive slaves and exiles.

During the 18<sup>th</sup> Century many more slaves, exiles and convicts of Islamic Tradition were brought to South Africa by the Dutch. Those who remained in the Colony after the completion of their sentencing were responsible for the spreading of Islam, owing to their Islamic education and their enthusiasm to convert others.

The open practice of Islam was prohibited in South Africa until 1794, when free black Muslims purchased properties in Cape Town and the Auwal Masjid (Mosque) was constructed. It became a center for the Muslim community, and it still functions today. At that time, Muslims were allowed to pray in public for the first time by General Craig, although open practice of religion was still restricted by the Statutes of India. Those restrictions were finally lifted in 1804 when the Dutch allowed religious freedom.

By 1840 Islam became a blossoming religion, and Muslims constituted a third of the total population in Cape Town. In the following years numerous additional Masjids were built throughout South Africa.

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<sup>6</sup> Ebrahim Mahomed Mahida, *History of Muslims in South Africa – A Chronology* (South Africa: Arabic Study Circle – 1993).



In 1862 Abubakr Effendi was sent to Cape Town as a religious instructor by Uthmanli (Turkish) Government after a request by the Cape Parliament and the British Government. He was well-schooled in Islamic Law and adhered to the Hanafi School (the oldest and most liberal of the four Islamic Sunni schools of law<sup>7</sup>), although he had vast knowledge of all four schools of jurisprudence. Upon his arrival in Cape Town he established a school for higher Islamic theology and taught many young Muslims. In 1869 he completed his book Bayanuddin (The Explanation of Religion), which was the second publication written in Arabic-Afrikaans in South Africa. He also introduced the tradition of covering of head by Muslim women and the wearing of fez by men.

Islam continued to spread in the major cities of South Africa, and Muslims acquired many properties and lands, and set up schools, masjids and community centers. Several organizations were established in order to advance Muslim interests and tend to their social-economic level. One prominent organization was the Hamidia Islamic Society (HIS), which was established in Johannesburg in 1906, and had a major role in the resistance against injustice and racism in the country.

Up to this point Muslims in South Africa mainly focused on their internal issues, and Muslim organizations dealt with the needs of their communities, providing religious and social services. From the early 1920s strong roots of da'wah activity appeared in South Africa.

The first Ulema (a body of Muslim scholars or religious leaders) center in South Africa was founded in Johannesburg in 1923. Some of its declared objectives include protecting and promoting the religious rights of Muslims, respressing irreligious and unwanted elements in

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<sup>7</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, *Hanafi Islam*, N.D., <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-hanafi.htm> [accessed: 20/01/2010]

the Muslim community and provide Islamic teachings and guidance in prisons, hospitals and other institutes.

During the early 1930s dozens of Islamic educational centers were set up, and several social organizations were established to provide services for the Muslim community, which mainly focused on relief and assistance to the impoverished. Some attempts were made to unify all the welfare and educational organization into one body.

In 1945 the second Ulema organization in South Africa, the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC)<sup>8</sup>, was founded. In practice, it was a conservative political body. At first they partnered with the United Democratic Front (UDF) but renounced their affiliation after objections from the Muslim community, who suspected the UDF to have Zionist connections.

A major figure in the Muslim community in the 1950s and 1960s was Imam Abdullah Haron. His contributions to the Muslim community in South Africa include opening religious classes for children and adults and training imams. In 1957 he joined the MJC and became its chairman in 1959. Imam Haron strived to unite all Muslim organizations against what they claimed to be injustices by the White South African Government. He used his established network of imams, da'wah and business contacts to spread his ideas and connect with members of the Pan African Congress (PAC)<sup>9</sup>, in order to gain their support, as well as that

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<sup>8</sup> A non-profit organization dedicated to protecting Muslim identity and way of life, promote and support Islamic values and develop the infrastructure for the completing its objectives according to the Quran (Muslim Judicial Council, *About Us*, N.D., <http://www.mjc.org.za/index.php/aboutus> [accessed: 20/01/2010])

<sup>9</sup> Established in 1959 in order to promote unity among Africans and propagate a united national front on the principle of African nationalism (PAC, *1959 Constitution*, N.D., [http://www.pac.org.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=67&Itemid=147&limit=1&limitstart=0](http://www.pac.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=67&Itemid=147&limit=1&limitstart=0) [accessed: 20/01/2010]). It later became a more aggressive body, and affiliated itself with radical Islamic groups.

of the African National Congress (ANC)<sup>10</sup> against the South African Government. He also launched the Call of Islam in Cape Town in 1961, a body unifying different Muslim organizations. He was eventually arrested in 1969 by the Security Branch of the Government under Section 6 of Act 83 of 1967, and died in prison in the same year.

According to Moshe Terdman, a project manager for the research of Islam in Africa in IDC Herzliya Israel, during the same time organizations like the Islamic Propagation Center and the Islamic Missionary Society carried out extensive da'wah activity amongst non-Muslims in order to attract them to Islam and create an Islamic atmosphere by supporting da'wah training centers and other institutions for the propagation of Islam. Their ultimate goal was to achieve the Islamization of South Africa. Their activities have proven to be quite successful, as many unprivileged South African blacks from African townships embraced the way of Islam.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to acquiring properties, establishing educational institutes and focusing on charity work and welfare activities, in accordance with the da'wah philosophy, the South African Muslims also entered the Media by publishing the only Muslim newspaper in South Africa in the 1960s. 'Muslim News', which was published from Cape Town on a bi-weekly basis, had a circulation of 10,000 copies. Because of its anti-Government approach, the newspaper had numerous clashes with the South African Security Service. In the following decades many more Muslim publications appeared throughout the country.

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<sup>10</sup> Formed in 1912 as a South African liberation movement with the goals of uniting African people and create a unified democratic society. Led by Nelson Mandela, It was responsible for the democratic victory in the 1994 elections, putting an end to the apartheid regime (African National Congress, *What is the African National Congress?*, N.D., <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=../about/anc.html&title=About+the+ANC> [accessed: 20/01/2010]).

<sup>11</sup> Terdman, *The Process of Islamization in the South African countries: Internal and Peripheral Influences*.

Da'wah activities were pushed forward in the early 1980s by the Da'wah Movement of South Africa, which was originally founded in 1978 as Umlaas Marianhill Islamic Centre. The movement set a goal to continue the Islamization process in the country, and built 30 Islamic centers around South Africa in order to further spread Islam.

In accordance with the da'wah strategy, Muslims in South Africa have established an elaborate infrastructure of Muslim presence and activity, which includes charity and welfare organizations, educational institutes and religious Islamic centers. This fulfills the first phase of da'wah, the familiarization, defined by Hassan al-Banna and prepared the way for the emergence of radical Islamic activists and the forming of terrorist organizations.

1979 was a crucial year in the progress of da'wah into active Islamic militant activity. One important event was the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, and a call for jihad was made to Muslims around the world to join and fights along the Afghan people against the Soviets. The conflict granted military experience to Muslim jihadists who later returned to their home countries. Another major event was the Islamic revolution in Iran, which was a starting point for the effort to export the model of the revolution to other countries, one of which was South Africa.

## Domestic Terror Organizations

### Qibla

The Qibla Mass Movement was founded in May 1981 and originally set out to “propagate, implement and defend the right of the people according to Islamic injunctions, without fear or favor”<sup>12</sup>. According to Senior Searcher Anneli Botha<sup>13</sup> of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa the creation of the Qibla movement was inspired by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, and its main objective was to translate the successful model of the revolution to South Africa by transforming it into an Islamic state. The movement used the slogan: “One solution – Islamic revolution”.

Qibla operates as an exclusively South African organization, but is influenced and guided considerably by the Iranian intelligence services, and used as a tool to support the Islamic Republic and gather intelligence in South Africa on its behalf.

In accordance to its declared objective, Qibla sponsored Islamic unity in South Africa by playing a major role in the establishment of the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), which was founded in 1994 as an umbrella organization for hundreds of Muslim groups. This organization promoted the idea of Islamic unity as necessary step towards an Islamic revolution in South Africa.

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<sup>12</sup> Mahida, *History of Muslims in South Africa – A Chronology*, 119)

<sup>13</sup> Anneli Botha, *The Prime Suspects? The Metamorphosis of Pagad*, in *Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*, eds. Henri Boshoff, Anneli Botha and Martin Schönteich (Monograph No. 63, July 2001).

The leader of Qibla and IUC is Imam Achmad Cassiem, who has served as their president since establishment. At the age of 15 he fought in the armed resistance against the apartheid<sup>14</sup> regime in South Africa and was imprisoned on Robben Island at the age of 17. Casseim holds an extremist ideology regarding the need for violent actions as part of jihadist activity. During a February 2002 lecture he referred to Muslims by saying that “we cannot treat Qur’an like a supermarket and say I like salat, I like giving zakat, I like going on hajj, I like to fast during Ramadan but don’t talk to me about Jihad”<sup>15</sup>. In his lecture he also commented that “reconciliation between oppressor and oppressed is not possible because oppressed and oppressor are not brothers, they are enemies”<sup>16</sup>. As an answer to the actions needed to be taken against the oppressor he quoted the Prophet and said “prevent him from oppressing others”<sup>17</sup>.

Casseim has further explained Qibla’s ideology in his book “Quest for Unity”: “The essence of Jihad is sacrifice and it is necessary because a revolutionary is not merely an exponent of revolutionary rhetoric but one who attacks what is oppressive and exploitative in order to destroy and eradicate it”<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> See Appendix: Conflict Resolution in South Africa – Apartheid.

<sup>15</sup> Achmad Cassiem, *Muslims in South Africa*, February 23, 2002, <http://www.inminds.co.uk/muslims-in-south-africa.html> [accesses: 20/01/2010].

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Achmad Cassiem, *Quest for Unity* (Cape Town: Silk Road International Publishers, 1992), 68.

Since its establishment Qibla supported pan-Africanism and developed a relationship with the Pan-African Congress (PAC)<sup>19</sup>. PAC was founded in 1959 by a group of members who broke away from the African National Congress (ANC), due to different ideological and theoretical views. They rejected the idea of joint racial efforts and embraced the vision of Africa for Africans<sup>20</sup>. During the 1960s PAC was banned by the Authorities, and was forced to change its methods of activity. It built an underground military wing – Poqo, later known as APLA, and in the 1980s also built military training camps for APLA to use<sup>21</sup>.

According to T Lodge and B Nasson<sup>22</sup>, Qibla supported PAC members operating in South Africa. In return to Qibla's support, Qibla members were military trained in several Islamic countries such as Lybia, Iran and Sudan under the sponsorship of PAC.

An example of Qibla's association to PAC is the arrest of PAC and Qibla members in April 1986 in Athens Airport. They were previously trained in Lybia and were carrying firearms and explosives when apprehended. Later that year, Achmad Cassiem and another Qibla member, along with five PAC members, were arrested and charged on two dozen counts of terrorism, including attempted murder and possession of arms.<sup>23</sup> In addition, Qibla military

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<sup>19</sup> Gideon Shimoni, *Community and conscience: the Jews in apartheid South Africa* (South Africa: David Philip Publishers, 2003), 173.

<sup>20</sup> South African History Online, *Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)*, N.D., <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/organisations/pac/origins.htm> [accesses: 20/01/2010].

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> T Lodge and B Nasson, *All, Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s* (Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 1991), 197.

<sup>23</sup> Botha, *The Prime Suspects? The Metamorphosis of Pagad*, in *Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*.

operatives, who were trained in Pakistan during the early 1990s, joined Hezbollah's guerrilla warfare against Israel in South Lebanon.<sup>24</sup>

In order to expand their activities among Muslims, Qibla, still led by the Cassiem but now titled Amir (Leader), established a close relationship with another militant organization known as AZAPO – Azanian People's Organization. This group, founded in 1978, strives to unite all black people and liberate the oppressed and exploited Africans.<sup>25</sup>

Qibla activity primarily aimed to recruit and influence the underprivileged blacks of South Africa, and hence developed ties to pan-African organization like PAC and AZAPO, using them as a platform to further its cause influence and grow in power. In an interview held with A.T.<sup>26</sup> (his identity is classified), former chief security officer in the Jewish community in South Africa, he empowered the above statement and revealed that from the information he had Qibla was a strong organization with a great deal of influence in campuses around South Africa during the 1990s. In fact, it was Qibla who stood at the head of the pyramid, connecting all Islamist organizations and their activities, including anti-Semitic actions against the Jewish community and numerous violent actions against the government. He also reinforces the information regarding the military training of Qibla members by revealing an intelligence report by the South African Security Agency pointing to information about Qibla extremists sent to Sudan and Afghanistan for military training.

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<sup>24</sup> Josh Lefkowitz, *Terror's South African Front*, August 19, 2004, <http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=11758> [accessed: 20/01/2010].

<sup>25</sup> AZAPO – Azanian People's Organization, *Constitution*, N.D., <http://azapo.org.za/constitution.php> [accessed: 20/01/2010].

<sup>26</sup> A.T. (former chief security officer in the Jewish community in South Africa), personal interview, 18 November, 2009.



As part of Qibla's efforts to broaden its support inside the African Muslim community, it successfully taken control of the IUC's Radio 786 as a tool to spread extremist Islamic propaganda.<sup>27</sup> According to Professor Hussein Solomon from the University of Pretoria the South African Muslim media greatly contributes to the spread of radicalism.<sup>28</sup>

Qibla continues to advance its objectives, though not much is known about its structure and activities due to the organization's extremely secretive nature.

### *PAGAD – People against Gangsterism and Drugs*

According to Moshe Terdman<sup>29</sup> two main factors prepared the ground for the establishment of another prominent Qibla related organization. The first was the ideological and spiritual atmosphere created by Qibla, and the other was the increasing crime rate in the country. Thus, in December 9, 1995 PAGAD was established with the primary objective to serve as an anti-crime front. The organization started with a group of militant anti-crime activists and included members of neighborhood watch groups fighting against drug dealer and criminal gangs.

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<sup>27</sup> Lefkowitz, *Terror's South African Front*.

<sup>28</sup> Prof. Hussein Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad* in University of Pretoria – Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) Electronic Briefing Paper No. 15, 2008.

<sup>29</sup> Moshe Terdman, *Factors Facilitating the Rise of Radical Islamism and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa* in African Occasional Papers, ed. Reuven Paz (Global Research in International Affairs [GLORIA] Center, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements [Prism], Volume 1 [2007], Number 1 [March 2007]), 6.

Anneli Botha<sup>30</sup> counts four points of difference between PAGAD and other anti-crime organizations:

1. PAGAD is a vigilante group and many of its activities are illegal.
2. It does not cooperate with governmental law enforcement agencies.
3. It discards community police and anti-crime forums as being ineffective.
4. It views the authorities as unable and unwilling to effectively fight crime.

In its beginning, the organization constituted citizens concerned about crime, Muslim community leaders, Muslim Qibla extremists, and militants, who later comprised PAGAD's military wing known as G-Force.

One year after its establishment, a power struggle arose between PAGAD's moderate leaders Nadthmie Edries, Farouk Jaffer and Ali "Phantom" Parker, and Qibla fundamentalist radical militants, which ultimately led to a split. The three moderates supported non-violent actions, and objected to the Jihadist tendencies promoted by Qibla members<sup>31</sup>. They blamed Qibla for manipulating PAGAD in order to advance their hidden agenda and take over PAGAD through illegal and violent means.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Botha, *The Prime Suspects? The Metamorphosis of Pagad*, in *Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*.

<sup>31</sup> Center for Defense Information (CDI), *In the Spotlight: People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)*, November 14, 2005, <http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3211> [accesses: 20/01/2010].

<sup>32</sup> Botha, *The Prime Suspects? The Metamorphosis of Pagad*, in *Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*.

In the interview with A.T.<sup>33</sup> he claimed PAGAD used its neighborhood watch members to arm itself. Furthermore, it uses them to infiltrate the communities and spread its ideology. To emphasize PAGAD's violent methods, A.T. mentioned that in many occasions law-enforcement operative who tried to document PAGAD's demonstrations were beaten and disarmed by its activists.

After the split, as evidence of Qibla's control over PAGAD, Achmad Casseim, Amir of Qibla, started to participate in PAGAD meetings, and PAGAD shifted its focus from the authorities' impotency in dealing with crime to the necessity of Islamic revolution in South Africa.<sup>34</sup>

It is important to mention that PAGAD uses several front names, such as Muslim against Global Oppression (MAGO), Muslims against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) and People against Prostitutes and Sodomy (PAPAS), and its military branch is known as G-Force (Gun Force), which is suspected for carrying out terror activities while working in a structure of small cells.<sup>35</sup>

According to Angel Rabasa<sup>36</sup> of the RAND Corporation PAGAD and Qibla refer to the secular policy of the Authorities in South Africa as a threat to Islamic values. Furthermore, they believe that Islam is "the true meaning of the democratic principle of the 'people shall

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<sup>33</sup> A.T. (former chief security officer in the Jewish community in South Africa), personal interview, 18 November, 2009.

<sup>34</sup> Botha, *The Prime Suspects? The Metamorphosis of Pagad*, in *Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*.

<sup>35</sup> Terdman, *Factors Facilitating the Rise of Radical Islamism and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 6.

<sup>36</sup> Angel Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda: The outer rings of the terrorist universe* (California: RAND Corporation, 2006), 54.

govern”<sup>37</sup>. In their article ‘Gangs, Pagad and the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape’ Dixon and Johns refer to PAGAD as a fundamental threat to Democracy and point out that the United States and the South African Government views PAGAD as “an urban terror group threatening not just the State’s monopoly of the use of coercive force but the very foundations of constitutional democracy”<sup>38</sup>.

PAGAD modus operandi changed over its time of existence, while adopting a more aggressive approach in order to achieve its goal. Its activities can be divided into three periods. The first is the early years from its establishment to 1998. In this period PAGAD remained loyal to its original declared objectives and led campaigns against drug dealers. Although PAGAD seemed as a legitimate organization with values and justified goals, since 1996 it structured a line of covert activities and used illegitimate means in order to attack drug dealers and gangs.<sup>39</sup>

By early 1998, PAGAD has adopted Qibla’s anti-Government and anti-Western attitude. In February and June 1998 PAGAD G-Force members attacked police stations using pipe bombs. In August the same year the SAPS office, which was responsible for investigating PAGAD, suffered from an explosion on its doorstep. A few days later, following a missile strike by the US on Al-Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan, PAGAD members started to target US affiliated businesses and attacked several Western targets including the ‘Planet Hollywood’ restaurant.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Bill Dixon and Lisa-Marie Johns, *Gangs, Pagad & the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape in Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 2*, May 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Botha, *The Prime Suspects? The Metamorphosis of Pagad*, in *Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*.

In 1999 PAGAD completely abandoned its original objective and became an organization which performs indiscriminate acts of terrorism against restaurants and public places. Even though the number of attacks decreased dramatically, the level of sophistication and effectiveness increased. PAGAD started to use technological means such as cell-phone activated bombs and car bomb, and made use of domestic fertilizers as an ingredient in their bombs.

Similarly to other terror organizations, PAGAD utilizes a dual strategy. On the one hand, PAGAD leaders claim that PAGAD is not involved in violent attacks although they would not condemn such activities if they aid their objectives, and organize large legal activities. On the other hand, PAGAD allows its covert members to perform violent and illegal activities.

Some of PAGAD's activities include:

- On January 1, 1999 an explosive device detonated during a screening of the movie 'The Siege' at the V&A Waterfront shopping center, injuring two people. There had been Muslim protests prior to the screening because the movie portrayed Muslims as terrorists.
- On 24 December, 1999 a bomb exploded in a container outside a restaurant in Greenpoint. The Police received an anonymous tip, and the dispatched officers were ambushed when the bomb was triggered remotely by cell-phone. Seven officers were injured.
- One person was injured on January 12, 2000 when a bomb attached to a motorcycle detonated remotely by cell phone in front of the Wynberg Magistrates' Court. The explosion took place during a bail process for two PAGAD members arrested for

possession of explosives. On May 14, a key witness in the explosion was assassinated by gunmen who shot him in his house.

- A car bomb exploded outside the New York Bagels restaurant on June 10, 2000. Three people were injured.
- On August 19, 2000 five people were injured when a car bomb exploded outside the Bronx nightclub. Following the terror attack, the national leader of the executive board of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance (GLA) claimed that there had been threats on the GLA by PAPAS before. PAGAD nonetheless denied any connection to PAPAS.
- On September 7, 2000 a regional court magistrate, who was involved in several PAGAD cases, was assassinated near his home.
- Two key witnesses to a PAGAD terror case, who were enrolled in the witness protection program, were assassinated.

#### Structure<sup>40</sup>


Under the chairmanship of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim PAGAD established PAGAD United, which is responsible for nation-wide PAGAD groups and branches. The chief commander of PAGAD United is Aslam Toefy, who was elected by national representatives from each region. The hometown of PAGAD United is Cape Town, where the organization enjoys the majority of its supporters. The national structure enables PAGAD to spread its ideas, recruit more members and acquire firearms and explosives while increasing its strength against its opponents.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

It is important to mention that PAGAD's working committee and its departments are responsible for the legitimate activities, while the Security Council is responsible for planning and executing the violent illegal activities.

The following chart is an example of the Western Cape PAGAD organizational structure:



In order to provide better understanding of the organizational structure, the functions of each department are described below:

- **Secretariat:** Responsible for the administrative function and coordinating the organization's activities, such as meeting, rallies and conventions.
- **Legal department:** Involved in all legal matters of PAGAD members.
- **Social welfare department:** Active in schools and pre-schools in the field of anti-crime education, organizes group prayers and social events, and provides support to injured members as a result of PAGAD activity.

- Finance department: Managing PAGAD finances including investments and collections of donation money, and organizing fundraising events.
- Security department: The most powerful department. It is responsible for all covert activities. The department adopted the operational structure of independent cells. Each cell consists a special unit of the most well-trained members. In addition, the department is responsible for the protection of PAGAD members. As claimed by Jeremy Vearey, the commander of police intelligence co-ordination in the Western Cape, some members may be veterans of Islamic conflicts in places like Lebanon, Afghanistan and Bosnia,
- Media and public relations department: Manages all PAGAD media aspects like newsletters, pamphlets and press statements and serves as the media liaison.
- Medical unit: Assists PAGAD supporters injured during PAGAD activities, and is also responsible for the medical needs of imprisoned members.
- Education department: In charge of the curriculum for gangsterism and drugs studies, and provides classes on different subjects.

From 1996 until 2001 PAGAD executed 189 bomb attacks across South Africa. Since 2001 law enforcement authorities have taken severe actions against the leaders of the organization, and as a result PAGAD activity decreased significantly. Still, PAGAD remains active and was suspected of bombing the Cape Town International Airport. Two PAGAD members were arrested and charged of illegal possession of explosives.



## Global Terrorism in South Africa

By reviewing the domestic presence of radical Islamic groups in South Africa, such as Qibla and PAGAD, it is clear that South Africa has an extensive infrastructure for terrorism.

Although it is hard to prove any solid connections between South Africa terror organizations to global jihadi groups, there are some cases pointing to a certain relation between such groups.

As mentioned earlier, Qibla has tight connections to Iranian intelligence services and shares the same vision of Islamic revolution. To underline the alleged connection between Qibla and PAGAD and global groups, one can observe the anti-Western actions taken in South Africa in response to Western anti-terror operations and against US linked targets, such as the attack on 'Planet Hollywood' restaurant after a US missile attack on al-Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan (as mentioned before).

It is worth mentioning that even though Qibla possesses Shiite identity, its anti-Western activity often comes in support of the Sunni al-Qaeda organization. The fact that right after the September 11 attacks there was a recruitment campaign launched by MAIL in order to attract Muslims from South Africa to fight against US forces in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban, reinforces this concept<sup>41</sup>. Furthermore, a few months later in an interview with Qibla leader Achmad Cassiem, he claimed he had recruited via MAIL one thousand volunteers to join the fight in Afghanistan.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Terdman, *Factors Facilitating the Rise of Radical Islamism and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 6.

<sup>42</sup> Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda: The outer rings of the terrorist universe*, 40.

In addition to domestic terror organizations, there is a popular opinion shared by both academic figures and security services that South Africa has become a safe haven for terrorists from around the world. To reinforce this accusation it is necessary to explore the factors contributing to this perception.

- Civil rights: As a post apartheid country South Africa is extremely preoccupied with defending civil rights. Terror organization can exploit this fact in order to develop undetected networks of operations while being protected by rights of free speech, privacy etc. As stated by Dr. Eitan Azani<sup>43</sup>, global da'wah infrastructure uses the Western world's democratic values to educate its followers and guide them to jihad as part of the radical axis. This can be projected onto the former reason to emphasize the advantage of advanced civil rights in regards to terrorist activity.
- Permeable borders: The massive stretches of unprotected borders make up another crucial factor being used by terrorists. One incident that highlights this point was described in the lecture by Professor Hussein Solomon<sup>44</sup> in ICT counter-terrorism summit in 2008. He mentioned the case of a Durban businessman that was arrested after trying to cross the border from Swaziland to South Africa carrying the amount of 130 thousand dollars to his contact. He also points out that the individual had made that trip 150 times over a period of 18 months. Regarding the same incident,

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<sup>43</sup> Dr. Eitan Azani, Presentation: *From Da'wah to Jihad: The Radicalization Process*, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Prof. Hussein Solomon, Lecture on *Radical Islam in South Africa* during the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism – Terrorism's Global Impact, ICT 8<sup>th</sup> International Conference, IDC Herzliya, Israel.

Moshe Terdman<sup>45</sup> indicates that the contact man was an exchange bureau managed by a businessman with links to Islamist groups in Africa and the Middle East.

- Developed banking system: A Wall Street Journal report<sup>46</sup> revealed evidence of al-Qaeda presence in South Africa. Various Islamic organizations are mentioned in the report to launder money, smuggle gold and diamonds and transfer cash via South Africa's banking system. The report quotes Gideon Jones, the FBI-trained former head of the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the South African Police Force, saying that South Africa is "a perfect place to cool off, regroup, and plan your finances". To support this statement one can look to the case of Abd al-Muhsin al-Libi, aka Ibrahim Tantouche. He was a senior al-Qaeda member who established two charity organizations as a front for al-Qaeda. These organizations collected donations for orphans who never existed<sup>47</sup>. In January 2007 the UN Council accused two South African cousins – Farhad Ahmed Dockrat and Dr. Junaid Ismail Dockrat – of international terrorist activity linked to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin-Laden. This UN Council act was a result of the US Treasury Department suspicions that Farhad served as an al-Qaeda "facilitator and terrorist financier". According to the US he was responsible for the transaction of 400,000R to the al-Akhtar Trust in Pakistan, identified as an al-Qaeda front. The transaction was made through the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in 2001. Dr. Junaid was suspected

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<sup>45</sup> Moshe Terdman, *Al-Qaeda Inroads in South Africa* in African Occasional Papers, ed. Reuven Paz (Global Research in International Affairs [Gloria] Center, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements [Prism], Volume 2 [2008], Number 1 [March 2008]), 7.

<sup>46</sup> Robert Block, *In South Africa, Mounting Evidence of al Qaeda Links* in Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2002.

<sup>47</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

of recruitment of South Africans for training with al-Qaeda in Pakistan in 2004. He collaborated with Abu Hamza Rabi'a, who was operation chief for al-Qaeda at the time<sup>48</sup>. Abu Hamza was killed in 2005 by the US military forces during an operation against al-Qaeda in Pakistan.<sup>49</sup>

- Highly developed communication systems: Similarly to all modern countries, South Africa shares an advanced communication system, which allows the use of high-tech and cellular networks. The investigation on the July 7, 2005 bombings in London led to Haroon Aswat, a British citizen with connections to al-Qaeda who resided in South Africa at the time. He was arrested after the investigation revealed phone calls made between Aswat and every member of the suicide bombers in London, led by Mohammed Saddiq Khan.<sup>50</sup>
- Government corruption: In his article John Solomon states that “with lawlessness, government corruption and a wide-range of preferred terrorist financing methods available—minerals, gemstones, pirated products and narcotics—al-Qaeda could indeed partake in illicit and unregulated trade in southern Africa to sustain itself.”<sup>51</sup> Professor Hussein Solomon especially accuses the Department of Home Affairs, which allows illegally obtaining South African passports quite easily. These passports may be used eventually by al-Qaeda and its associates. For example, after the

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<sup>48</sup> Xolani Xundu, *UN links SA men to al-Qaeda*, Sunday Times, January 21, 2007.

<sup>49</sup> Terdman, *Al-Qaeda Inroads in South Africa*, 4.

<sup>50</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

<sup>51</sup> John Solomon, *The Danger of Terrorist Black Holes in Southern Africa*, March 19, 2007, <http://intelligence-summit.blogspot.com/2007/03/danger-of-terrorist-black-holes-in.html> [accessed: 25/01/2010]

London bombing the British authorities found genuine South African passports when raiding the residence of an al-Qaeda member.<sup>52</sup>

As shown the modern and developed infrastructure of South Africa appeals to global terrorist groups. In a study conducted by Richard Cornwell from the Institute for Security Studies, he argues that terror groups prefer to operate in advanced countries with open multi-racial societies, rather than in failed states with unstable infrastructure and poor finance and communication systems.<sup>53</sup>

The demand of the US from South Africa during the Bush administration to share information regarding domestic terror groups, such as Qibla and PAGAD, and international Muslim extremist groups like al-Qaeda, underlines the concern for the use of South Africa as a haven for terrorists. In addition, the US demanded to cut off funds to terror groups using the South African banking system to transfer blood money, and to tighten the security in airports and other points of entry to South Africa in order to prevent terrorists from entering the country.<sup>54</sup>

Another concern raised over the last few years is the transformation of South Africa into a hiding place for global jihadists. In an article by Karima Brown, she exposes that the South African government is deeply concerned by al-Qaeda members who uses Muslim schools

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<sup>52</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

<sup>53</sup> African Terrorism Bulletin, *Southern Africa: Strategic base for international terrorism?* (Organised Crime and Corruption Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS): African Terrorism Bulletin, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, September 2005).

<sup>54</sup> JJ van Wyk and Fred Khumalo, *Bin Laden's secret South African connection*, News24.com, September 23, 2001.

(Madrasas, known as Darul Ulooms) as a hiding place. The article also reveals the beliefs of the CIA about the presence of al-Qaeda leaders in South Africa.<sup>55</sup>

In 1998 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian citizen, who was responsible for the US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya the same year, was turned over to the US Federal Court in New York and was later convicted and sentenced for life in prison without the possibility of parole. Khamis Mohamed entered South Africa with a tourist visa only a week after the bombings. After entering the country, he pledged the South African authorities for shelter, identifying himself using a false name. Before being discovered, he succeeded to live peacefully in Cape Town for over a year while working at a local burger place.<sup>56</sup>

These cases – in addition to Haroon Aswat mention earlier, who supposedly sold Islamic CDs and DVDs in Johannesburg – suggest that the global terror network views South Africa as an attractive spot for hiding, regroup and maintain a relatively privileged life style, while simultaneously plan and execute terror activity.

The active aspect of global terrorist organizations in South Africa manifests itself in reports about terrorists camps located in the country. These camps are reportedly used to support terrorist activities and are linked to terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan who spent time in South Africa. In 1996 Israel sent a formal complaint to the South African authorities on the existence of five Hezbollah training camps on South African soil<sup>57</sup>. In 2007 an expose

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<sup>55</sup> Karima Brown, *SA fears al-Qaeda men hiding in local schools*, Cape Argus, October 4, 2004, Edition 1.

<sup>56</sup> Dr. J. Peter Pham, *Playing with Fire: South Africa's Dangerous Terrorist Liaisons*, October 17, 2007, <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101807.shtml> [accessed: 8/2/2010]

<sup>57</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

by James Sanders<sup>58</sup> revealed the existence of paramilitary training camps in South Africa.

The expose indicated that a Muslim school in Port Elizabeth contains a shooting range maintained by the Desai family who own the property. This covert training facility provides weapons training using AK-47s and R1 rifles, and a number of illegal handguns to its students. Also revealed was the process of constructing a future facility under the title of Islamic Boarding School, which could contain 72 students. The funds for its construction were linked to donations made to the Darul Uloom madrasah in Port Elizabeth, which used the same contact details and bank account of Nazier Desai, the head trainer in the mentioned training camp. Moreover, during March 2007 the coordinator of South Africa's National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) admitted the possibility of training camps used by terrorist operating in South Africa.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> James Sanders, *Paramilitary Training Camps in SA*, Molotov Cocktail Issue 1, March 2007.

<sup>59</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

## South African Response to Terrorism

The apartheid regime still casts a shadow over South Africa and influences its policies, including the one taken in regard to terrorism. Until 1994, when the ANC became a legitimate party and won the elections by the rule of majority, it was considered, like other anti-apartheid and other national liberation organizations, a terrorist organization. The transformation from terrorist to freedom fighter created a situation in which South Africa did not see eye to eye with other Western countries, led by the US, on the subject of global terrorism.

During the Apartheid regime, mainly in the 1960s, the country initiated a number of laws regarding internal security, including the Terrorist Act of 1967, which defined individual taking part in terrorist activities as criminal and permitted their unlimited detention. In 1996, during the post apartheid era, the Safety Matters Rationalization Act was passed and retracted some of the controversial security rules. South Africa has been trying to structure a solid anti-terror bill ever since.<sup>60</sup>

Following a large number of bomb attacks across South Africa in the 1990s, mainly in the Western Cape, the SAPS submitted an anti-terrorism bill for review by the Law Commission. In 2000 the bill was presented and introduced the idea of terrorist acts and terrorist organizations for the first time. It also included the authority to detain, question and hold suspects with relevant information. Obviously, the Human Rights Commission of South

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<sup>60</sup> Privacy International, *Terrorism Profile – South Africa*, June 17, 2004, <http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-66677> [accessed on: 10/02/2010]



Africa argued against the bill and claimed that it trampled civil rights and granted excessive power to the authorities.

Since the bill was presented many changes had been made in order to try and satisfy all parties, including human rights organizations, law enforcement authorities and the international community concerned about global terrorism. In 2004 the bill was put aside because of strong objection coming from the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU), who argued that the definition of terror activity was too vague and can be used in a way that would compromise constitutional rights and freedoms.<sup>61</sup>

After 9/11 the South African Minister of Safety and Security stated that:

While the world unites to condemn those dastardly acts in the United States, we have to skirt around the issue. We go around making promises to cooperate with everyone but our law stands, we cannot deal with terrorism. We are the only country that refuses to look terrorism in the face as a unique crime.<sup>62</sup>

In November 2004 the bill was finally adopted by the South African National Assembly. The bill, now called The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities, repealed some clauses from earlier versions which could have potentially criminalize certain protest actions and workers strikes. In addition to criminalizing terror activities and individuals who take action to support it, it also introduces means to enforce

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ranjeni Munisamy, *SA Puts Anti-Terror Law Back on the Agenda*, Sunday Times, September 23, 2001.

the bill. The bill at the same time tries to protect the constitutional values and answer the concerns previously made by human rights organizations.<sup>63</sup>

Professor Solomon argues that the 2004 bill, along with the Financial Intelligence Center Act of 2001, might seem as an effective strategy adopted by the South African government regarding counter-terrorism, but the actual South African policy does not correspond with these laws, and remains ambiguous at best.<sup>64</sup>

To support this argument one can remember the Dockart cousins case, mentioned earlier. The two cousins were listed by the UN Council as having links to al-Qaeda and supporting terrorism. South Africa's respond to this was an immediate request to delay the listing of the two, claiming that the civil rights of South Africans are to be defended. This reaction, as described by Moshe Terdman, puts South Africa far away from the common Western policy against terrorism.<sup>65</sup>

A prominent figure who greatly influences South African counter-terrorism policy is the former Minister for Intelligence Services (2004-2008) Ronnie Kasrils. Professor Hussein Solomon regards Kasrils as a controversial public figure. In October 2004 Kasrils denied the use of South Africa as an al-Qaeda base of operations but pointed out that there is a problem with the use of South African passports by al-Qaeda members. In contradiction, in August 2005 the same Kasrils stated that al-Qaeda might try to set up networks in the

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<sup>63</sup> IOL, 'Controversial' anti-terrorism bill passed, November 12, 2004, [http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set\\_id=1&click\\_id=13&art\\_id=qw1100254141804B236](http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=qw1100254141804B236) [accessed: 12/02/2010]

<sup>64</sup> Prof. Hussein Solomon, *South Africa's Ambiguous Response to Terrorism* in University of Pretoria – Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS) Electronic Briefing Paper No. 55, 2008.

<sup>65</sup> Terdman, *Al-Qaeda Inroads in South Africa*, 4.

country and attack its harbours<sup>66</sup>. In order to understand Kasrils' views regarding terrorism, it is important to go back to his personal history. Before becoming a member of the government, he was military trained in the Soviet Union and was a member of the South African communist party. Later he joined the ANC and was a member of its National Executive Committee and took great measures to try and lift the international boycott of Hamas. . In May 2007, acting as the Minister for Intelligence Services, Kasrils traveled to Gaza to support Ismail Haniyeh, an important Hamas member and the Palestinian Prime Minister at the time. During his visit he stated: "The analogy between apartheid and Israel's occupation of Palestine is often made. It is not the same thing. The occupation is absolutely worse". Dr J Peter Pham refers to Kasrils by saying that it cannot be expected to cooperate with this individual when dealing with terrorism.<sup>67</sup>

Another example of South Africa's reluctant stand in regard to terrorism is its refusal to cooperate with the United States African Command (AFRICOM), responsible for US military operations and cooperation with numerous African countries. The South African Defense Minister, who stood at the head of the opposition against AFRICOM, warned from foreign forces on African soil and even threatened other African countries not to cooperate with AFRICOM or they would suffer the consequences.<sup>68</sup>

South Africa's ambiguous and contradictory positions continue in the area of weapons of mass destruction. Although it abandoned its nuclear weapons programs freely, it seems South Africa has become a potential source for the proliferation of such technologies

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<sup>66</sup> Hussein Solomon, *South Africa's Ambiguous Response to Terrorism*.

<sup>67</sup> Dr. J. Peter Pham, *Playing with Fire: South Africa's Dangerous Terrorist Liaisons*.

<sup>68</sup> Terdman, *Al-Qaeda Inroads in South Africa*, 6.

needed to produce WMD and possibly transfer them into terrorist hands. In 2006 three South African members of the cabinet even traveled to Iran in order to offer natural uranium to support the Iranian nuclear ambition. This happened only day after the UN Security Council established a deadline to stop all nuclear research and development.<sup>69</sup>

However, some South African officials did recognize the threats terror posed and attempted to act against terror organizations such as QIbala and PAGAD. The Directorate of Special Operations (aka 'Scorpions') successfully impaired those organizations. An inter-agency task force was established under the supervision of South Africa's National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC) to monitor gather intelligence on individuals and organizations affiliated with global terror.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Dr. J. Peter Pham, *Playing with Fire: South Africa's Dangerous Terrorist Liaisons*.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

## Conclusion

In the era when the global threats of terrorism is greater than ever, it appears South Africa does not share the same level of concern as other Western countries, which are consistently developing new methods for international cooperation and counter-terrorism policies.

During the last few decades the South African government has maintained an ambiguous approach to dealing with individuals and groups involved with terrorism. As shown, the process of anti-terror legislation encountered many obstacles, mostly by politically driven opposition, partly with an anti-Western agenda.

Similarly to other Western and democratic countries, South Africa is challenged by the underlying flaws of democratic societies when facing terrorism. The ambition to defend the democratic values of freedom and civil rights often clashes with the will to gain actual achievements in the struggle against terror organizations, where some civil rights must be compromised. The democratic values can be used as a platform for those who wish to gain influence and power by spreading radical concepts.

South Africa is particularly affected by these flaws, as it is still traumatized by the apartheid regime. Much sympathy is given to radical Islamic organization due to the fact that the ANC, led by Nelson Mandela, was previously considered a terror organization. Nevertheless, in 1994 it led the revolution in South Africa and won the election, ending the apartheid regime.

Those who consistently use this example to gain favor and a kid-gloves treatment are the Islamic extremists, who have established a network of da'wah activity for decades. They have used anti-apartheid ideas as a platform to collaborate with Africanist mass movements

and exploited them in order to penetrate communities, particularly black and underprivileged townships, and attract them to Islam. This set in motion a process of Islamization and provided them with influence through a network of civil services, like mosques and schools around the country.

To better understand this course of action one can observe the case of the 2004 arrest of two South Africans during a fight with an al-Qaeda top operative in a safe house in Pakistan. One of the two arrested was previously a student of one of the Dockrat cousins, a known facilitator and financier for al-Qaeda<sup>71</sup>. They were suspected of planning multiple attacks on several Governmental, Western and public targets in South Africa<sup>72</sup>. This incident came as a warning sign for the use of Muslim schools in South Africa as recruitment sources for terrorist groups. Another phenomenon presented itself a year earlier, when it was reported that hundreds of radical students of madrassas in Pakistan entered South Africa's Islamic schools<sup>73</sup>. These cases also highlight the interest global terror organizations have taken in South Africa.

Even though South African authorities were successfully able to diminish the capabilities of domestic terror groups like Qibla and PAGAD, it is clear that they are still a part of the South African reality. Their contribution to the infiltration of global terrorist organizations to the country, such as al-Qaeda, is undoubted, and they have been able to connect with different militant movements around the world.

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<sup>71</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

<sup>72</sup> Terdman, *Al-Qaeda Inroads in South Africa*, 7.

<sup>73</sup> Solomon, *South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad*.

From the Israeli point of view, it is clear that South Africa plays a major role contributing to the anti-Israeli agenda, led by Arab interest groups around the world. The warm relationship between South Africa and Iran regarding the latter's nuclear ambitions led to a South African defensive approach of Iran's right to nuclear development. Moreover, South Africa has never officially condemned Ahmadinejad's declaration to eliminate the Israeli state. It also strengthened its relationship with Hamas, and even officially invited a Palestinian Hamas delegation to South Africa, trying to reinforce Hamas legitimacy in the international arena. To emphasize the Israeli concern, an official source from the Israeli Ministry of Defense<sup>74</sup> pointed out that Israeli Authorities do not tend to allow the export of military and security knowledge and technology to South Africa.

In 2001, South Africa hosted the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (WCAR). It became a racist event directed against Israel, and sponsored by Iran and other Arab countries. The conference introduced the 'Durban strategy', comparing Israel's policy to that of the apartheid regime and calling for its international isolation.<sup>75</sup>

With the upcoming Soccer World Cup taking place in South Africa – for the first time in history on African soil – it seems everyone is aware of the terrorist presence in the country and the threat it poses, but South Africa itself does not appear to act appropriately. While this global event can be an optimal target for terrorists, the benefits of using South Africa as a base of operations may overwhelm this opportunity. However, it does not mean that

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<sup>74</sup> A personal conversation with a classified source in the Israeli Defense Export Control Directorate, May 2009.

<sup>75</sup> NGO Monitor, *Durban Review Conference 2009*, June 15, 2009, [http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/durban\\_conference\\_0](http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/durban_conference_0) [accessed: 26/2/2010]

South African authorities must not actively join the international community and its struggle against terrorism.

The risk of not acting against global terrorist presence can be made clearer by the example of the 2005 London bombings on July 7. The suicide bombers were all British citizens of Muslim tradition, one of whom converted to Islam in 2000 by an extremist cleric. They were all influenced deeply by the da'wah activity and had gone a transformation from passive spiritual training to the forming of a radical Islamic cell<sup>76</sup>. Another instance was the 'Toronto 18' terrorism case in Canada, where 18 men were arrested for allegedly planning to execute terrorist attacks against a number of public and governmental targets. The men had trained in several terrorist military camps in Canada, and they had been indoctrinated by the preaching of radical Imams. Most of the men were Canadian-born, while others were immigrants.<sup>77</sup>

As shown, South Africa is in a crucial crossroads. It is currently an unknowingly participant in the global jihadi master plan. It has to decide whether to further adopt the current ambiguous counter-terrorism policy and support the radical Islamic axis, such as Iran and Hamas, or to join the international efforts to prevent the global terror from evolving. It must acknowledge that beyond the legitimate mask of Muslim charity and education, a greater evil may be lurking. It should not fool itself into believing that global jihadi groups are not exploiting it for financing, recruitment and training.

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<sup>76</sup> Dr. Eitan Azani, Presentation: *From Da'wah to Jihad: The Radicalization Process*.

<sup>77</sup> Rebecca Cook Dube, Canada faces 'jihad generation', June 6, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0606/p01s02-woam.html> [accessed: 26/2/2010]



## Appendix: Conflict Resolution in South Africa – Apartheid

### Definitions<sup>78</sup>:

**1. Apartheid** - racial segregation; *specifically*: a former policy of segregation and political and economic discrimination against non-European groups in the Republic of South Africa.

**2. Segregation** - the separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted area, by barriers to social intercourse, by separate educational facilities, or by other discriminatory means.

### The Conflict and its resolution

Since the seventeenth century South Africa was colonized by the English and the Dutch. The Dutch dominated decedents, known as Boers and Afrikaners, established new colonies in which diamonds were discovered. During the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the English invaded to the Boers lands as a result of the battle for the new resources and the invasion sparked the Boers War.

After England granted independence to South Africa in 1910 the Afrikaner National Party gained majority and started spreading a new policy which its goal was to establish the

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<sup>78</sup> Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary, **Apartheid**, N.D., <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apartheid> [accessed:1/12/2010]

domination of the white people using racial separation. The main idea behind the Apartheid was to control the economical and social systems in the country.

In 1948 the Apartheid laws were institutionalized, the laws included every aspect of life such as: marriage - prohibition of marriage between non-whites and whites, mandatory population classification to Whites, Blacks and colored. Jobs – White only jobs and more. In order to enforce the laws the government used rough punishments, arrest of opposition leaders and hard violence. During the 1960's the well known leader of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela was arrested among other leaders of the opposition and the ANC was outlawed.

Apartheid and the People of South Africa		
	<i>Blacks</i>	<i>Whites</i>
Population	19 million	4.5 million
Land Allocation	13 percent	87 percent
Share of National Income	< 20 percent	75 percent
Ratio of average earnings	1	14
Minimum taxable income	360 rands	750 rands
Doctors/population	1/44,000	1/400
Infant mortality rate	20% (urban) 40% (rural)	2.7%
Annual expenditure on education per pupil	\$45	\$696
Teacher/pupil ratio	1/60	1/22

Figure 1: Disproportionate Treatment circa 1978. Source: [Leo80]

In the 50's the South African government initiated a plan for total separation in the form of creating several independent "Homelands" for the Black people within the South African territories. The "Homelands" plan did not succeeded due to the small amount of land and resources given to those new stats.

It is important to mention that the international community condemned the Apartheid policy and the South African government. During the years several diplomatic efforts and sanctions were made in order to create pressure on SA to stop all segregation. It was only in 1983 that the SA government was convinced to establish new rule which allows non-white groups to participate in the elections. The new rule also separated the parliament to three different parliaments for each ethnic group. As a result of the separation and the understanding that this was only a virtual effort riots took place and SA went into official emergency situation in 1986.

In 1990 the new elected PM declared the failure of the Apartheid policy. All Apartheid laws were canceled and opposition groups leaders got released from prison including Nelson Mandela. The New PM started talks with Mandela in order to create legitimate democracy. Finally in 1994 South Africa the new elections took place and the ANC with Nelson Mandela as their leader won them and gained control over the new democracy of South Africa.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>The History of Apartheid in South Africa, N.D., <http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html> [accessed:1/12/2010]

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