

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

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***Biographical Statement:**

Marcus A. Templar joined the United States Army in 1982 as a Cryptologic Linguist. He studied Czech, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Turkish at the Defense Language Institute, French at Dawson College in Montreal, and Russian at Berlitz. In addition, he speaks Bulgarian and Greek. As an intelligence officer he was appointed to various assignments in Balkan and Middle Eastern affairs. Now retired from the U.S. Army, Mr. Templar presently is a consultant on global intelligence issues. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Western Illinois University in history and foreign languages, a Master's degree from Northeastern Illinois University in Human Resource Development specializing in instructional design, and a second Master's degree in Strategic Intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College. He is a recognized Balkan expert.

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**THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
(NSS) AND ITS NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (NMS)**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) responds to the international and domestic events that directly or indirectly affect the national interests of our country. The NSS must remain flexible so that the United States can successfully confront the various and ever changing challenges it faces on a daily basis. In turn, our National Military Strategy (NMS) adapts to the national security objectives of the NSS.

Since world events and demands are constantly presenting new realities, a swift adaptation of objectives is necessary. Similarly, our country must constantly modify its NMS in order to meet

the objectives of the NSS. The national security objectives of the United States are dual faceted, one being the mission and the other the enterprise. Mission objectives are specific and short term. At the present, the most important objectives of our NSS are defeating terrorism at home and abroad, preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction, supporting democratic movements around the world, and aiding in the preservation of democratic states. A major part of our NSS is finding ways to neutralize dangerous targets and anticipate “strategic concerns and identifying opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision-makers.”¹

The enterprise objectives are more general in nature, falling under the strategic goals of the country that conform to U.S. laws protecting civil liberties. Arguably, they are the cause of our strategic policy resulting from experiences, farsighted ideas, present and future necessities, and are broader in scope and support, but are not limited to each of the mission objectives. To achieve our goals, we have strengthened our intelligence capability with expert personnel in all disciplines of intelligence along with the acquisition of appropriate equipment.

The Commission on America’s National Interests in their 2000 report names three types of national interests vital for the survival of the United States as a free and secure nation. It classifies the national interests as extremely important, important, and less important or secondary interests. According to this report, the vital or extremely important US national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad;
2. Ensure US allies’ survival and their active cooperation with the US in shaping an international system in which we can thrive;
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on US borders;
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and

¹ Director of National Intelligence, “*The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America.*” Washington, DC, 2006

5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.²

RAND Corporation President, Jim Thompson, explained, “[T]his hierarchy represents the extent to which the U.S. would be willing to expend its military power or national treasure in order to defend a certain interest.”³ Under this scope, the defeat of the war on terror domestically or internationally is vital to the United States and its allies, as are the democratic movements in Belarus, Russia, People’s Republic of China, Iran, etc.

The survival of friendly countries such as Israel and the preservation of democratic states like Ireland are extremely important to us, but one could argue is not as vital since it does not directly affect the survival of the United States, or does it alter the way of life of our citizens. The production, non-proliferation, and commerce of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), especially with or by rogue states and terrorist organizations, are of vital interest to us since our survival depends on their development and possible deployment against us. Finding WMD and destroying them is a key aspect of our national security strategy.

Our NSS has moved towards re-arranging our intelligence community to respond to all enemies, swiftly and decisively, without infringing on the rights of our citizens and their privacy. We have established new foreign intelligence relationships and have strengthened existing ones to help us meet global security challenges.

It is vital that our research produces scientific advantages and our counterintelligence protects our country effectively. Hiring more analysts with expertise in various disciplines of intelligence, improving collection methods, encouraging innovation and initiative in analysis, along with readily making available intelligence products on demand is all part of our NSS. By

² Robert Ellsworth and others, “America's National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America's National Interests, 2000,” July 2000, (The Commission on America’s National Interests, Nixon Center), URL <<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/nationalinterests.pdf>>, accessed 11 July 2007.

³ Ellsworth, "America," July 2000,

developing standardized security practices and re-defining our national security priorities, we have eliminated redundancy.

In the abstract of his thesis "*Psychological Means: The Neglected Instrument of Power in the U.S. Strategic Arsenal*," Herbert L. Altshuler, states:

In the international arena, nations identify the purpose of their national strategy in terms of national objectives. These are the ends sought by the strategy. Implementing plans are the ways, and the tools, weapons and instruments are the means. The arsenal of means available to each player in the game of international strategy economic, military, and socio-psychological instruments.[sic] These instruments are used alone or in concert with one another as the situation dictates, and some are not used at all.⁴

There are a number ways that we can achieve our objectives, mostly using financial, diplomatic, and military might. Some experts in the field believe that we should also use socio-psychological instruments, selectively or collectively, to achieve our strategic goals.

The War on Terror has created new methods of engaging the problem of terrorism, which does not confine itself to terrorist acts, but also to other illegal activities such as weapons trading, human trafficking, opium dealing, and money laundering. Individuals seeking their own personal fiduciary gains engage in the trade of illegal weapons, arming not only well-known terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'ida,⁵ Hamas, Hizbullah, etc., but also smaller al-Qa'ida inspired groups which is in direct collision with our NSS. We need to employ all instruments available to us in order for our country to accomplish its foreign policy as dictated by the NSS.

Resulting from the deployment of the U.S. military to Afghanistan immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the toppling of the Taliban⁶ government with the capture or expulsion of its members, valuable intelligence revealed a series of activities that were

⁴ Herbert L Altshuler, *Psychological Means: The Neglected Instrument of Power in the U.S. Strategic Arsenal*. Online Thesis. Carlisle barracks, PA: Army War College, 1988. Accessed on Internet at URL: <<http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA194088>>, 11 July 2007.

⁵ Arabic for "the base," "the HQ."

⁶ Arabic for "the students" [of the Quran].

systematically taking place directly targeting the United States. The exposure of weapons trading and money laundering among terrorist organizations with alleged or proven assistance of American adversaries put our power of diplomacy and financial control into effect. We have successfully pressured foreign governments and financial institutions to more effectively control the whereabouts of suspected terrorists in their own countries and have limited banking activities that have aided in the transfer of terrorists' funds.

Finally, our government has employed the socio-psychological factor by engaging in information operations that compete against a very sophisticated and protected media network, both printed and electronic. It is important for the United States to understand the biases and media methodologies of the Arab world in order to combat its effect on world opinion. Technology has opened doors that allow us to challenge and assess different views. The United States has thus far unsuccessfully attempted to use one socio-psychological instrument by establishing an Arabic speaking television station, al-Hurra,⁷ in Iraq. Some Arab audiences feel offended that the United States does not consider them as free people; others feel that our TV programming reminds them of the propaganda they used to hear from Radio Moscow during the Cold War.⁸

The purpose of the NMS is to materialize the NSS challenges conceived by the National Security Council and developed by the National Director of Intelligence as the means of implementation. There are four different challenges in our National Military Strategy: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.⁹

Traditional challenges, as a rule, relate to traditional forms of military might such as Army, Navy, and Air Force. This military arsenal is capable alone or, in a more formidable way, with our allies to withstand any challenge whether it is regional or global.

Irregular challenges cover asymmetric operations such as terrorism, insurgency (Iraq,

⁷ Arabic for "free."

⁸ "Palestinian Expatriate," *Al-Quds al-Arabi* London, England, Feb. 17, 2004. URL <<http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/1808.cfm>>, accessed 11 July 2007.

⁹ National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, America's Security in the 21st Century. URL <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005_ib.htm> , accessed 11 July 2007.

Afghanistan), religious fanaticism, political radicalism, or ethnic intolerance. Oftentimes, asymmetric operations require deployment to states that have little or no control of areas harboring criminal elements. Patience, insistence, and persistence are the assets of our asymmetric opponents and that is why our military must be able to deploy regular as well as special units whenever necessary. We must be able to utilize different modes of engagement, which requires cooperation, training, and flexibility. “Land-based pre-positioning has limited utility in supporting the new National Military Strategy. What is needed is a new strategic triad of airlift, sealift (including sea-based pre-positioning) and amphibious lift. Defense force structure and strategic mobility need to be built and funded hand-in-hand.”¹⁰

Catastrophic challenges are those that force us to live with the fear of a WMD attack. We live in an information age and the Internet is the most readily available provider of “how to” technology. Many of our security problems arise from porous borders and the lack of international and domestic controls over tamper-proof travel documents. Different spelling of names from languages with alphabets other than Latin (Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, etc.) causes confusion and mistakes. In a potentially catastrophic event, our military is prepared to take both a defensive and offensive position. If, or when, negotiations fail to produce satisfactory results, our military must remain capable of annihilating any rogue country engaged in the proliferation of WMD and be able to defend the security of our country from any attack.

Disruptive challenges cover the use of cyber or information operations be they biotechnology, energy weapons (electromagnetic radiation, typically lasers, or masers), or space (satellite war) attacks. Our adversaries seek out possible vulnerabilities that could put our country’s security in jeopardy. Our NMS covers this challenge by educating our appropriate armed forces personnel and allocating funds for the enhancement of old, and the development of new, defensive equipment.¹¹

¹⁰ Richard W. Kokko, *Strategic Mobility for the National Military Strategy*. Maxwell AF base, AL: Air War College, 1993. Accessed on Internet at URL <<http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA283281>>, 12 July 2007.

¹¹ National Security Space Institute, “*Air Force Space Today*,” Peterson AF Base, Tierra Vista, CA, URL: <<http://www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4933>>, accessed 12 July 2007.

Our NMS has to adhere to all international treaties, conventions, and domestic laws. Furthermore, the enforcing personnel are accountable to the Administration and the Congress. Christopher M. Maher articulates the matter of the NMS limitations in his thesis entitled “Combating International Organized Crime: A Proposal for Expanding our National Military Strategy and Amending Title 10 of the United States Code.” Although Maher's thesis deals with organized crime, he does enumerate some of the limitations our NMS encounters daily. In the abstract of his thesis, he summarizes:

After an ends-ways-means analysis this paper more specifically advocates: (1) Expanding the National Military Strategy to engage more directly the Department of Defense in the combating of international organized crime. (2) Assigning the United States Special Operations Command with a primary task of supporting the national effort to combat international organized crime. (3) Further amending Title 10 of the United States Code to authorize the direct, prescriptive participation of military forces in the combating of international organized crime, or in the alternative, repealing the Posse Comitatus Act.¹²

We can no longer define the U.S. national security interests solely in terms of direct military threats. After the attacks of 9/11, it became obvious that America is not facing only traditional or conventional adversaries, but also sophisticated and covert opponents. As a nation, we had to re-define our NSS and organize our defense in ways that respond competently to any potential attack; simultaneously, we had to re-define our NMS to meet our new NSS, adapting it to the new reality. Having both NSS and NMS proficiency harmonized, convincingly strong, and effectively deadly is an absolute must. Our present strategies meet that goal.

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¹² Christopher M. Maher, *Combating International Organized Crime: A Proposal for Expanding our National Military Strategy and Amending Title 10 of the United States Code*. Online Thesis. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, , 2001. Accessed on Internet at URL <<http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA390575>>, 13 July 2007.

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