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So far Juliusz Piwowarski is the author of two monographs published abroad, eleven monographs published at Polish publishers and nearly a hundred scientific articles published at Polish and foreign scientific magazines. His main interests are security sciences, philosophy of security, social psychology, sociology, pedagogy, praxeology and science of morality conceived as a constituent of the first pillar of safety culture.



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FROM SECURITY SCIENCE TO SECURITY CULTURE

FROM SECURITY SCIENCE TO SECURITY CULTURE

Scientific Monography

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**FROM
SECURITY SCIENCE
TO
SECURITY CULTURE**

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The scientific monography

“From Security Science to Security Culture” by Juliusz Piwowarski and Darko Trifunovic

Studying security encompasses analyzing various aspects related to security, including threats, challenges, and responses. By studying security issues and their implications, this book develops a comprehensive understanding of them. Among the threats societies face are armed conflict, terrorism, and cyberattacks. To protect their interests and address these threats, the authors explore possible strategies and policies.

Additionally, the authors explore culture and information society, two interconnected concepts. As technology advances, the way societies access, consume, and share information has been revolutionized, influencing cultural practices in shaping societies. This publication aims to explore the relationship between culture and information society, highlighting the various ways in which they intersect and influence one another in the form of scientific security. It is important to note that security studies draw upon various theoretical frameworks and methodologies to analyze security-related phenomena. Both Dr. Piwowarski and Dr. Trifunovic employ diverse approaches to examine and interpret these security dynamics. Realist perspectives in security studies emphasize the importance of power and the pursuit of national interests, while liberal perspectives, on the other hand, focus on the significance of institutions, diplomacy, and cooperation in addressing security challenges. These authors expertly use the levels (scales) of security culture to include the level of social groups' safety culture, the level of national security culture, and international security culture. They argue that international collaboration and establishing norms and institutions can enhance security and reduce conflict.

The authors also believe culture plays a crucial role in the information society by shaping our values, beliefs, and behaviors. It encompasses the collective knowledge, traditions, customs, languages, arts, and social institutions that define a particular group. While the information society offers immense opportunities for cultural exchange and diversity, it also brings about challenges. Culture and information society are deeply intertwined, shaping and being shaped by each other in the modern world. Security studies is an interdisciplinary field that seeks to understand and analyze the multifaceted nature of security. It explores the threats, challenges, and responses that shape the security landscape and employs various theoretical frameworks to study security-related phenomena. By studying security, scholars and researchers aim to contribute to developing effective policies and strategies that can promote peace, stability, and the well-being of societies. In conclusion, this is an excellent book in bringing a greater understanding to this subject, and the author should be commended for their work.

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Piwowarski, Juliusz and Trifunović, Darko. *From Security Science to Security Culture.*

In *From Security Science to Security Culture*, authors Juliusz Piwowarski and Darko Trifunović add to the growing body of literature about security science, in particular, how security science can contribute to the development of a security culture. One of the challenges facing the development of security science as an academic discipline is that, in the view of some, security science as compared to the traditional disciplines, lacks validity.¹ Nonetheless, the topic has generated a cornucopia of books and articles discussing the nature and methodology of this emerging discipline. Smith and Brooks, for example, argue that Security Science allows the scientific method to be applied to security issues, indicating that logical thought can be applied to further the development of security science and enable security science to become an effective tool that can be applied to the protection of people, assets, and information.² Piwowarski and Trifunović add to this viewpoint and take it a step further by explaining the methods and steps by which security science can lead the way to the development of a *security culture*.

Emphasizing the growth of security science as an academic discipline in Poland and Serbia, the authors outline the process by which this evolution can take place. Noting the ongoing proliferation of security risks, they argue that security science provides the best method for amalgamating a variety of academic disciplines and social practices that can bring about the emergence of a security culture which can produce a unique discipline which may enable the creation of improved security risk assessments that can come from within a state or from sources beyond a state's borders. Interestingly, the authors argue that Security Science "... cannot be a sub-discipline, instead, all other social sciences can become a sub-discipline of *Security Science*."³

Drawing on a variety of sources ranging from the humanities to various social science disciplines, the authors emphasize the work of Professor Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School. They especially note the Copenhagen School's emphasis on the non-military elements of security assessment, which was a step away from the more traditional focus of security experts. This has allowed the emergence of this newly emerging academic discipline now known as Security Science.

Through what they call the Security Rhombus, the authors detail the process by which security science can drive a process that will produce, first, a security environment, defining and explaining in detail what brings about a security environment and its creation. Out of this will emerge a culture of security. The authors credit the Copenhagen School for expanding research to include a focus that

¹ Smith, Charles L. and Brooks, David J. *Security Science: The Theory and Practice of Security*. Boston, 2013, Butterworth-Heinemann, p.1.

² *Ibid.*

³ p. 24.

goes beyond nation-states. This, they assert, has created a more interdisciplinary approach to the study (or science) of security, so that research can range from human interactions, to national and then to international security. Ultimately, the authors demonstrate the essential importance of a national security culture as the foundation of an overall security culture. They conclude by warning, that, even with globalization, nation states would do well to focus on their own security resilience as a safeguard in the event of global catastrophe.

The authors have produced a thoughtful argument about the purpose and goals of the newly emerging academic discipline of security science. Piwowarski and Trifunović's support for and belief in the importance of security science is evident throughout the manuscript and emphasizes the importance, in their view, of the discipline and how it may transform and improve research into the varied aspects that challenge security professionals and those who study security issues. The emphasis on an interdisciplinary approach to studying security concerns, whether from an academic or professional level, is especially welcome as this approach may well be the best method of dealing with the proliferation of challenges to human security, whether from an individual, social, community/national or international perspective.

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A brief comment on the Culture of Security

The topic of the Culture of Security is often at the center of debate in recent years.

On the other hand, security in itself emerges forcefully as a need to which it is urgent to respond: citizens ask for it in every country and, more often than not, the response of politics is not able to satisfy this need.

For once, I do not believe that the fault lies entirely with politicians, but certainly, the fault lies with politics, understood as the collaborative dimension of the management of the common thing by citizens and in which politicians express themselves to represent citizens. It is this central aspect of politics, the cooperative and collaborative dimension, that is lacking in responding to the security needs that are increasingly manifested through an “irresponsible” delegation by citizens to rulers, and politicians.

The book by Juliusz Piwowarski and Darko Trifunović addresses precisely this theme and outlines desirable scenarios that emerge between the lines of a scientific approach that combines culture and security, trying to break the semantic “solitude” or mutual distance that often characterizes the two concepts.

Culture, in common sense, is generally referred to as the heritage of knowledge that everyone has acquired through study. Deepening the concept a little, we realize that culture is also part of our moral education, not only intellectual, and identifies us for the contribution we can bring to society, with the social role we occupy. For those whose culture is the subject of study, sociologists and anthropologists, it is constituted by the set of values and norms, behaviors and attitudes, knowledge and beliefs, manifestations of material and immaterial life that characterize the members of a given society, and that they transmit between one generation and another. Therefore, culture is the result of learning and stabilizes over time, becoming a specific trait of a community: it is a social and collective character, a relationship that weaves the interconnective tissue of society.

Security, in common sense, is perceived as a situation of non-turbulence, characterized by high predictability, without surprises or sudden changes, and, above all, not controllable. Security is a “given for granted”, which must be guaranteed to the citizen by the institutions that govern him, being a primary need such as food. Precisely because of this fundamental character, security is “disengaged”: it is not understood as the result of individual, strategic, and conscious commitment. So much so that every campaign to promote security is based not on practices that improve it, but on the fear of suffering harm and damage.

The fracture between Culture and Security manifests itself in the acceptance that a victim is, as a victim, not responsible for his damage: chance and bad luck, malice, and wickedness may have played on it, always excluding an assumption of responsibility for secure behavior.

The book we read makes explicit this relationship between Security and Culture, assuming the scientific gaze that describes both, leaving aside the common sense to which we are accustomed: we try to build a useful link between the two concepts, achievable with a strategic process, the result of which is the overall reduction of the vulnerability of a complex system.

The path taken by the authors is therefore not simple, it is a reflection to be discussed carefully, which must be confronted with a rapidly changing world thanks to increasingly widespread and pervasive technologies, daily and “wearable”, that seems to push in the opposite direction to what has been stated so far: technologies that absolve the individual from any responsibility, a third party outside of us who “has the ability” to make us safer, through no “fault” of our own. The process that brings “*From Security Science to Security Culture*” does not replace culture for science, but links both concepts through awareness and the strategic choice of action.

I share the view of the two colleagues and support it.

I strongly believe that security begins with assuming secure individual behaviors.

Collective security, that a community or a state has to provide, is the result of this assumption of mutual responsibility to behave safely and securely, each of us, in everyday life, for the inevitable relational effects that our every action has in society. My security also depends on the cumulative relational effects of my way of acting with others and, therefore, entrusting one’s security without worrying about securing oneself is a failed strategy. In this framework, the culture that we have defined as values and norms, not just practices, would push everyone to act for their security in a socially accepted reference context. At least to the extent that “*From Security Science to Security Culture*” is not only the title of a good book but also a project to be promoted.

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From Security Science to Security Culture **Juliusz Piwowarski and Darko Trifunović**

A review

The importance of the issue of Security Science and security studies has increased on the background of the geostrategic situation of the 21st century. The authors of the book Juliusz Piwowarski and Darko Trifunović point to the importance of the issue of security as a fundamental element of the world order in which the nation-state is the cornerstone of the international system. In this international system, Security Science gains special importance due to its ability to contribute to stability and security and, in cases of conflict, to contribute to the victory of the side that knew how to get the most out of Security studies that are part of Security Science.

Geopolitical trends and internal circumstances in different countries represent a constant source of potential security challenges and threats that exist in present-day complex conditions. The war between Russia and Ukraine and the growing competition between the US and China indicate that the importance of security in human existence is still the most important.

It seems that at the current stage of development of Security Science, it can be stated that it is a science due to its theoretical and practical foundations, subject matter, research purpose and historical conditions. The authors define Security Science as the science about the conditions of the state as an organized society, and not only any conditions, but conditions in which the state functions normally, and develops. These conditions and processes depend on internal and external risk factors and threats. Security as science uses all the general methods of the social sciences.

The authors explain in the book the connections between 3 key terms in the field of security: Security Science, Security studies and Security culture. The science of security is the basis for security studies, which are carried out with the study of scientific disciplines within the framework of the science of security.

The book makes a unique and innovative contribution in clarifying and explaining the concept of Security Culture, which they claim is a cornerstone in the broad and multidimensional field of the security.

Culture is a social phenomenon constituting a set of psychological dispositions that are transmitted in the area of a given human collective through social contacts and interpersonal relations, which in turn depend on the entire social system in which they occur.

The Security Culture is a phenomenon consisting of human creation and exploitation of the entirety of established non-material and material human achievements, as a source of non-military and military factors of self-defense, allowing coping with threats. The Security Culture is also a source of harmony

of society's activities in the process of its development, in three co-existing spheres: mental-spiritual (individual) social-organizational (collective) and physical (material).

The Security Culture is a phenomenon consisting of human creation and exploitation of the entirety of established non-material and material human achievements, as a source of non-military and military factors of self-defense, allowing coping with threats. The Security Culture is also a source of harmony of society's activities in the process of its development, in three co-existing spheres: mental-spiritual (individual) social-organizational (collective) and physical (material).

According to many scholars, the problem of security, examined at all scales of counteracting human threats, starting from personal through national, international and global scale, is always rooted in the phenomenon of culture.

Another main contribution of the book is the discussion of the connection between "Information Society" and Security Culture. The connection between "Information Society" and Security Culture operates in such a way that information is treated as a kind of strategic product, the circulation of which results in the development processes of contemporary national and supranational centers of civilization and these centers generate massively large amounts of information.

In conclusion, the book adds a new layer to the knowledge in the relatively new field of Security Science and contributes a significant discussion in the concepts of Security Culture and "Information Society" and the connections between them.

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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon defined as *security* is anthropocentric in nature. For who – if not the *anthropos*, i.e. human – has a conscious desire for *security*, which is why he tries to create this highly desirable state in his existence every day by many means. The experience, knowledge, skills and various abstract and material artifacts associated with this desire are human creations from which man stubbornly and consistently builds the edifice of *security culture*, that very special domain of culture he creates.

In Poland and Serbia, following the clues provided by the Hegel *spirit of the times*,¹ showing that the demand for *security* has a clear upward trend at present, it has been decided, as it seems right, that *Security Science* will maintain its disciplinary status and remain in the newly adopted scientific categorization.

Men have always wanted to create more secure conditions for the undisturbed continuation of their existence. That is why they have strived and continue to strive tirelessly to create ever more favorable conditions and to discover ever more effective methods that will enable them to effectively secure their existence and further development.

In keeping up with the efforts to satisfy their own needs, men will, in the author's opinion, continue to search for new possibilities to create ever more effective algorithms and means to ensure the highest possible level of *security* for themselves. These are tools appropriate to a given place, time and other currently existing circumstances. Interesting in this context of human activities is the question of whether in the current approach to the research on *security* issues and to the application of the effects of this research (following the implementation function of science), there has been any fundamental change concerning earlier times. The social reality of the 21st century indicates that as far as security is concerned we behave very much the same as before. The importance of security in human existence has not diminished. According to the author, there is only one difference these days, but a very important one.

The importance of the issue of security science and security studies has increased on a scale not seen before in the history of man. The science of security is the basis for security studies, which are carried out with the study of scientific disciplines within the framework of the science of security. Those scientific disciplines refer to the actors of the Security System and phenomena that are studied

¹ *Die Phanomenologie des Geistes (Fenomenologia Ducha)* – one of the leading works of all European philosophy by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). It was written in 1806 and published a year later, in 1807. It should be mentioned that the concept of *zeitgeist* was first introduced into the halls of science by another philosopher, Christian Adolf Klotz (1738–1771). He made this introduction in 1760. *The spirit of the times* signifies the climate of a given era.

from the domain of the Army, Police, Intelligence, and Private Security, as well as other phenomena, including the role of citizens in the national security system.

Today's *nations*, most often civil societies organized into *states*, and their elites have an increasing need for the results of scientific research into security issues. This research is extremely important in its praxeological aspect, which, however, cannot do without a theoretical layer, necessary to be applied in a specific research perspective. Paul Williams writes – "Security matters. It is impossible to make sense of world politics without reference to *it*. The concept saturates contemporary societies all around the world."² In modern theory, and increasingly so in practice, various methods, as well as operations, are described from the intelligence world. It is not enough to recognize certain phenomena, but one must be instructed in the content of particular educational subjects used in the teaching of intelligence and security courses. Only those who are well acquainted with Security Science are generally familiar with upgrading intelligence and security. These are operations such as intelligence information operations, hybrid actions as part of a particular war, or cyber security. Understanding high-ranking intelligence operations means knowing all segments of operational work, structures, and methods of intelligence services. Ignorance of fundamental principles or improper education can lead to significant consequences because; in intelligence and security work, every mistake can result in the loss of one or more human lives. Geopolitical trends and internal circumstances in different countries represent a constant source of potential security challenges and threats that exist in present-day complex conditions. With the progress of science and technological achievements, new techniques of attack and action have emerged, and with the new techniques of defense, deterrence of threats and risks has evolved.

Methodological assumptions

The publication presented here employs a **mixed-method approach**, which is co-created by the following methodological components:

1. **The method of critical analysis of texts** is based on the selection of literature relevant to the subject matter, with a certain hierarchy of importance. Among the three trends important for this paper, i.e. *Security Science*, *security studies* and *security culture*, only the first one has the status of an autonomous branch of science; the other two of these trends can be interpreted as sub-disciplines of the first one, even though *security studies* is a particular derivative from *international relations*, but also without the status of a branch of science.
2. **Monographic method** – a scientific monograph is an element that "binds" and aggregates holistically³ the author's research results presented to the Reader in this work.

² P. D. Williams, *Security Studies. An introduction*, [in] *Security Studies*, idem (ed.), Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków 2012, p. 1.

³ *Holism* – a philosophical conception of the development of reality – both of the sphere of nature and the social world, according to which the world is a hierarchical whole, composed of lower-

Research assumptions

In the design and conduct of the scientific research process, as opposed to thinking that is based on the reference to common knowledge, it is important to clearly define such elements as the object of research, the purpose of research and the accompanying questions reflecting the specific research problems. Because of the transdisciplinary nature of the studies on security issues, and for the attempt made here in line with the assumptions characterized by the *axiomatized theory*, the following *research claims and assumptions* were taken as a starting point:

1. The **genesis** of increasingly wide scientific interest in **the problem of security** has mainly **practical grounds**. Before researchers of security issues faced a difficult **challenge** dictated by **praxeological** considerations as to the efficient **implementation** of their achievements. It takes the form of a **necessity** to competently cross borders between traditional disciplines of science, starting with philosophy, psychology, or sociology and ending with natural, technical and economic sciences. It should be pointed out here that for years, defining the science of security or phenomena from this important field has been done by those for whom it was neither a profession nor a professional occupation. As a result of this situation, various views and theories have emerged that have not actually given a clear definition of Security Science.
2. It was assumed that the **security culture** is a phenomenon consisting of human creation and exploitation of the entirety of established non-material and material human achievements, as a source of non-military and military factors of self-defense, allowing to cope with threats; the *security culture* is also a source of harmony of *society's* activities in the process of its development, in three co-existing spheres: mental-spiritual (individual), social-organizational (collective) and physical (material).
3. It was assumed that the social phenomenon of *security culture* is a **social generator of security**, necessary for social activities. Some of the elites of power, detached from the rules of *social reality*, want to base their actions on ahumanistically treated spheres: bureaucratic, technogenic, legal and on the sphere of consumption, which allegedly closes the set of human needs.
4. It is assumed that the **culture of security** is a common denominator of various forms of implementing *security* in all spheres of our existence, including the creative sphere. The concept of *security culture* is also a *theoretical construct*, a multifunctional research tool. It allows for a good implementation of the exploratory function of theory – both in *Security Science* and in *security studies*.

order wholes, subject to dynamic, creative evolution, leading to the creation of newer and newer, qualitatively different wholes, which can no longer be reduced to the sum of their parts. John Smuts (1870–1950), a well-known British army officer, politician and philosopher, is considered to be the founder of *holism*. Cf.: J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, MacMillan, London 1927.

In *security studies*, the central object of research is the course and conditions of the **security process**, consisting of events, processes and other phenomena of the *security* sphere in its various object manifestations (the object aspect), referred to specific subjects (the subject aspect), from the standpoint of which *security* is analyzed.

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER

First objective – To clarify the meanings and explain the meaning of elementary concepts relevant in the context of:

- a) *Security Science*,
- b) relationship of this science with the stream of *security studies*.

Second objective – To expand the definition of the concept of *security environment* with justification of the need for this redefinition.

Third objective – To show the significance and essence of the scientific “interface,”⁴ which, both for people and for the efficient implementation of the theory’s functions,⁵ is the social phenomenon of security culture, also interpreted as a scientific model.

Fourth objective – To make this scientific monograph also fulfills the function of an academic textbook; in the author’s assumption, it is intended to show in an orderly, accessible way the foundations necessary for expanding knowledge and writing theses in the field of research on security issues.

The beginnings of systematic reflection of man on the vital issue of the phenomenon of *security*, which has been vital for him since prehistory, can be found in ancient spiritual works, such significant products of human thought as the *Mahabharata*, the *Lotus Sutra*, the *Confucian Dialogues*, the *Old and New Testaments* or the works of recognized masters of the mother sciences, philosophy. Those who perpetuated these works, the pillars of *security culture*, belonged to the

⁴ M. Cieślarczyk, *Wprowadzenie*, [in:] *Elementy teorii i praktyki transdyscyplinarnych problemów bezpieczeństwa*, vol. 2: *Bezpieczeństwo i kultura bezpieczeństwa w teorii, w badaniach naukowych i praktyce (Introduction, [in:] Elements of theory and practice of transdisciplinary security problems, vol. 2: Security and security culture in theory, research and practice)*, A. Filipek (ed.), University of Natural Sciences and Humanities in Siedlce, Siedlce 2014, p.7.

⁵ *Functions of science* – cf. J. Piwowarski, *Nauki o bezpieczeństwie. Zagadnienia elementarne (Security Science. Fundamental issues)*, University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Kraków, Kraków 2017, p. 69.

elite of cultures such as Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Euro-American.⁶ Their works are the foundation of *security efforts*.⁷

Since Antiquity, in addition to the social institution of family and its capital importance for the proper conduct of the structure of the construct that is a secure *social reality*, the importance of another *security subject*, which is the *state*, has been growing. Over time, the *state* has gained the role of a central *security subject* in human existence, a guarantor of efficient protection and defence against both war and non-military threats. Notwithstanding the above, human *security matters* have always been determined by:

- 1) mentality and spirituality, which is expressed through such elements as:
 - individual and group social consciousness,
 - religion and its individual and collective experience and its social implementation,
 - psycho-physical constitution,
 - group relations and interdependencies,
 - social bonding,
 - social capital
- 2) the military-political sphere; socio-political ideas are included in it, including those originating as far back as in Ancient Greece (thoughts of great philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus or Socrates and Plotinus), allowing us to pose a thesis that as early as in Antiquity politics and power were the subject of reflection of a mainly normative nature, constituting the foundation of the edifice of *security culture*.

The essence of security culture

The essence of security culture makes it a highly capacious “common denominator” or a kind of scientific-research “interface”. *Security culture* as a theoretical research model offers the researcher considerable exploratory power, also allowing for a combination of various scientific and research trends related to *security issues*. These issues are the content of a vital need manifested by a self-aware⁸ individual or collective *security subject*. As soon as we decide to conduct

⁶ S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 2011.

⁷ *Action* is a type of human conduct, with which the *subject* who is its author associates some meaning, sense; this formulation of the concept of *action* was popularised by Max Weber, today an elementary concept of the discipline of *sociology* and *Security Science*: “*Action* is the human behaviour when and to the extent that the agent or agents see it as subjectively meaningful; the behaviour may be either internal or external, and may consist in the agent’s doing something, omitting to do something, or having something done to him,” as defined in *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej (Economy and Society. An outline of understanding sociology)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2002, p.6; English version by Max Weber in *Economy and Society*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 2019.

⁸ *The self-perception theory* was created by Daryl J. Bem (1972) as a concept related to the *attribution theory*; the source of a *subject’s* self-knowledge is the observation of its own behaviour; through

research from the perspective of *social sciences* through a theoretical research model referred to as *security culture*, it would be sensible – and even necessary – to define it.

Security culture – the totality of established non-material and material human achievements, creating in a given place and time the potential of non-military and military components of broadly understood human resilience, protection and defence; it fulfills four functions through the entity:

- 1) **identification of active and potential threats *subject***
- 2) **maintenance the level of security it needs;**
- 3) **recovery of the necessary level of *security* when it has decreased;**
- 4) **increase of the level of *security*, if such a need is foreseen;**

***Security culture (sc)* safeguards, supports and stimulates the development of human individuals and social groups; *sc* is analyzed based on a division into three spheres:**

- 1) **mental-spiritual sphere:⁹ the individual dimension of *social reality*);**
- 2) **community-legal-organizational sphere: group scale of the social world;**
- 3) **material sphere: physical dimension of social reality.**

Engaging in **scientific research** obliges not only the researcher, but also every university-educated person to be clear in their reflections and to make fundamental, having philosophical genesis, **scientific assumptions**, which are not proved, but which constitute the necessary conditions for initiating processes of scientific-research nature, i.e. leading to the cognition of certain and verified knowledge.

It should be noted that there have been, and still are, places in the world where the word “security” is still a threat to people because it denotes oppression. This type of “security” is typical for totalitarian or strongly authoritarian states and the protection against external threats offered by imprisonment.

In practice, this type of “security” generates dangerous situations. Where it prevails, there is an almost universal feeling of insecurity and respect for human rights is often suspended or even ignored (!). The universal recognition of these rights is one of the greatest achievements of *security culture* in modern times.

Man’s aspiration to the value he needs and so desires, namely *freedom from threats*, seen from a holistic perspective, created based on a *theoretical model* such as the *culture of security*, is of particular importance not only for the populations of those countries in which totalitarian regimes have prevailed or still reign.

the process of *self-perception* the subject obtains information about itself; D. Bem made two assumptions in this theory:

¹⁾ *the subject* acquires knowledge about its competences, motivations and emotions by inferring them from its behaviour and the external circumstances in which it acts,

²⁾ perceptions of oneself and others follow a similar pattern; the *subject* acts as an observer who is controlled by external stimuli; *self-knowledge (self-perception)* is a behaviourist concept, which has a complex mechanism of formulating descriptive judgements and self-evaluations reduced to external observations – it is the single-factor theory.

⁹ C.G. Jung, *The Spirit in Man, Art and Literature*, Wydawnictwo KR, Warsaw 2011.

The fusion of the words *culture* and *security* into a single idiomatic concept, which is the *culture of security* – precisely this fusion of the two – thanks to the particular harmony of the different but complementary associations generated by each of the two concepts taken separately, triggers the effect of an exceptional power of security phenomena’s transmission and influence¹⁰:

1. *Security* and the indispensable attributes of security actions, such as respect, strength, decisiveness and extraordinary dynamism, are, under this fusion, devoid of association with the oppressiveness or violent brutality of these actions.
2. *Culture* and its attributes of permanence and stable, distinguished tranquillity meet the need of man for true protection and defence, because they offer him relief instead of danger, and authentic security, unencumbered by dictates.
3. *Culture*, functioning in this fusion, annihilates the erroneous but still emerging doubts in popular thinking as to whether it contains a sufficient argument of strength, which is necessary to counter many threats, especially the great ones coming from the social sphere, the natural sphere and the technogenic sphere.

Fundamentals of a research tool kit organization in *Security Science*. The aspect of basic science from which scientific disciplines are developed, especially those scientific disciplines that interpret the laws and processes of all actors of the national security system.

Aristotle (384-322 BC), the great ancient thinker and scientist, divided science, the sublime sphere of human activity, into three main streams that can still be identified today as follows:

- 1) *theoretical sciences*, which involve in-depth scientific reflection that is generalized into theory;
- 2) *practical sciences*, which deal with broadly defined issues of *action*¹¹ and interaction¹² occurring between individuals and social groups;
- 3) *conceptual sciences*, which address issues raised by the diverse products of human creativity.

These three scientific orientations correspond to the three leading ideas guiding the meaning of human existence,¹³ namely *truth*, *goodness* and *beauty*.¹⁴

¹⁰ *Transmission* here means complementary, often carried out in a hierarchical order, e.g. from master to pupil, social communication, teaching and independent creation of elements of social reality.


¹¹ *Action* – a type of human activity to which its originator attaches certain importance (*sense*); a similar concept of *action* as an elementary sociological term was given by Max Weber: “*Action* is the human behaviour when and to the extent that the agent or agents see it as subjectively meaningful; the behaviour may be either internal or external, and may consist in the agent’s doing something, omitting to do something, or having something done to him” in his *Economy and Society. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej (An outline of understanding sociology)*, PWN, Warsaw 2002, p.6.

¹² Vide: P.A.M. Van Lange, D. Balliet, C.D. Parks, M.V. Vugt, *Social Dilemmas: The Psychology of Human Cooperation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford H. Gintis, *Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents - a critique*, [in:] “*Journal of Socio-Economics*”, Vol. 33 (2004), pp. 697-717.

¹³ V.E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning* (foreword of H.S. Kushner), Beacon Press, Boston 2006.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Aristotle: Metaphysics Theta*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006; Jean-Pierre Changeux, *The Good, the True, and the Beautiful, A Neuronal Approach*, Yale University Press,

Fig. 1. Comte's theory of the hierarchy of the science



By comparison, the father of sociology, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), provided a dichotomous division between *theoretical sciences* and *practical sciences*. Within this typology, he also identified a further need to move down the levels to distinguish divisions with a higher degree of detail, which are now referred to as scientific disciplines.

Yet another typology of sciences was presented by Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915). He distinguished *nomothetic sciences*, i.e. *natural sciences* concerned with discovering general laws pertaining to the subject of study, and *idiographic sciences*. While the domain of *nomothetic sciences* is the formulation of universal laws of science, *idiographic sciences*, in contrast, describe and explain separate cases that are singular in nature.

* * *

The identity associated with the independence of a scientific discipline is a rather complex issue that cannot be resolved unequivocally and definitively.¹⁵ The history of scientific development has repeatedly shown that new research trends were often born at the intersection of the interests of scholars who belonged to different scientific disciplines that preceded the development of the new streams and brought innovations to the study.

Until recently, the study of security has been the subject of interest in various scientific fields, such as the *humanities* or *social sciences*, and in various scientific disciplines. These included, for example, *philosophy*, *legal sciences* with auxiliary sciences such as *criminology* and *criminalistics*, *sociology*, *psychology*, *political sciences*, *geopolitical studies*, *strategic studies* and, last but not least, *military* or *police sciences*.

London 2012; V. Cousin, *Lectures on the true, the beautiful and the good*, Appleton and Company Publ., New York 1890.

¹⁵ Vide: S. Scott, *Total Institutions and Reinvented Identities (Identity Studies in the Social Sciences)*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2011; K. Hyland, C.A. Chapelle, S. Hunston, S. Hunston, *Disciplinary Identities. Individuality and Community in Academic Discourse*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.

Scientists representing the field known as *social sciences* deal with a wide range of problems concerning the phenomena that appear daily in social organisms. Thus, for example, these are issues related to the history of human change and development, to material and non-material artifacts of human creation, or to the rules of functioning in social groups.

The scholars study social processes and phenomena from a variety of perspectives, analyze the relationships and interdependencies between individuals and groups in these processes, discover regularities that occur at various stages of personal and social human development, or identify differences in the *social world*¹⁶ and determine the causes and consequences of these differences.¹⁷

Security Science

First of all, let us recall what science is. *Science* is a branch of culture that is research-based in nature and generates socially expected outcomes of scientific inquiry conducted by scholars. Science is made up of assertions and hypotheses about the reality under study, its features and the laws that govern it, and the scientific theories built on the assertions and hypotheses about reality, substantially divided into fields and disciplines of its subject.

We should also reiterate what is meant by the term ‘scientific field’ or *scientific discipline* and what is supposed to constitute the subject matter undertaken within its scope. The term *scientific discipline* denotes a certain well-defined sphere of knowledge. It is practiced within the framework of activities carried out by scientific and research institutes and universities as the subject of scientific study, academic lectures, and practical classes.

The term science includes the system of knowledge about the object of scientific research, historical moment, objective reality, conscious application of scientific methods, diagnosing natural and social phenomena in the past and present, designing, forecasting, and predicting natural and social phenomena in the future, is expanding and deepening knowledge of natural and social phenomena from the past and present, and for their development in the future, changing working and living conditions and creating fundamental assumptions for a welfare society, maximizing the effects of applying science in practice.

Since ancient times, philosophy has been the only science that encompassed all human knowledge of nature, society, and thought, but from the 15th to the 18th century special sciences separated from philosophy: first mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, and then physics, chemistry, biology, geology, sociology, and psychology. The history of man is the history of conflicts and wars, in fact, the history of security. All these sciences have been used to a greater or lesser extent either to attack or to

¹⁶ A. Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1967.

¹⁷ D. Kennedy, *Exploring the Roots of Social Theory and Inquiry: Making Sense of Social Life*, Cognella Academic Publishing, San Diego 2017.

defend society and states. Security Science has always been present but the definition of Security Science in its full sense has begun recently¹⁸.

The field of social sciences is structured in ten scientific fields (economics, law, political science, information sciences, sociology, psychology, pedagogical sciences, social geography, social activities, and security and defence sciences) and sixty scientific branches.

A *scientific discipline* is a socially important part of science, formed and distinguished in terms of the subject of research and its research purpose (including education), a stream institutionally recognized as the basic unit of the typology of science. Again, it should be emphasized that the basis for formal recognition of a scientific discipline is the identification of its subject matter and purpose in terms of scientific analysis and practical implementation. In such a case, one may ask whether the subject of *Security Science* and its goal is what security researchers and professionals may emphatically call ‘security cognition’.

The problems addressed by scholars in security studies are specific fields of knowledge that cannot be confined within one separate discipline of science. *Security* not only can be but in practice must be and is the subject of exploration of various scientific disciplines. The point is that when a new discipline of science is established, an indication of what the *research subject* is is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the birth of that discipline. Thus, the identification of what constitutes the specific *research subject* and *purpose* of the scientific discipline being created and then formally recognized is a prerequisite for its creation.

Summarising the “discipline-forming” concept at this stage, one may be able to demonstrate a set of elements that enables the existence of a scientific discipline:

- 1) a specific **subject** of the research conducted;
- 2) a specific **purpose** of the research – e.g. based on an existing social need;
- 3) strong **integration** of the circle of researchers – theoretical and social aspects;
- 4) a coherent **methodology**, identifiable to the discipline;
- 5) existing **historical determinants**;¹⁹
- 6) a clear **social sense**: practical use in social reality.

The definition by which to define what constitutes a discipline, an important scientific category, presents the following:

A scientific discipline is a specific sub-area of certain knowledge, belonging to the scope of a given recognized and formally established field of science²⁰ – it is practiced in scientific institutes, universities, or other higher education institutions.

¹⁸ B.Todorovic, D.Trifunovic, *Security Science as a scientific discipline –technological aspects*, Security Science Journal, Institute for National and International Security, Belgrade, 2020.pp.9-20

¹⁹ Vide: J. Revel, *History and the Social Sciences*, [in:] *Cambridge History of Science: The Modern Social Sciences, Vol.5*, T. Porter, D. Ross, (ed.), Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 2003, pp.391-404.

²⁰ Cf.: A. Abbott, *Chaos of Disciplines*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001; A. Krishnan

Individuals directly involved in activities within a scientific discipline are experts in that discipline.

As far as Security Science is concerned, it belongs to the scope covered by the field of social sciences but also in the field of natural science. This science is a reflection of theoretically as well as practically organized and historically conditioned research activity that allows its representatives to obtain methodically verified and verifiable information resulting from a study that is of practical relevance to society and the state.

Therefore, the question of what security is will be asked again and again, despite the recognition of several definitions of this phenomenon. Each definition depends on the research approach adopted. Still, a concise definition arising from Security Science is required to determine the scope of studies for that discipline.

This search can be conducted from the following perspectives:

- 1) the formal-legal perspective, which comes down to the framework of activities of institutions legally empowered to provide security;
- 2) the behavioral perspective, related to the socio-cultural mechanisms of satisfying the need for security (*security culture*);
- 3) the functional perspective, where security is interpreted as a function of appropriate systems to contain threats for human survival and development, in line with the functions of the state, the *dominant actor and overarching implementer of security*.

Definition of Security Science

The word “security” itself:

Whether it is the Serbian word *bezbednost*, the Polish – *bezpieczeństwo*, the Latin *securitas*, the English *security*, the ancient Greek *asphalea*, or the Hebrew word *bitachon*, the meaning is the same. It describes the condition/s of the state as an organized society. And not just any condition/s, but a condition without danger, without decay, non-existence of fears, etc.

Security Science is the science about the condition/s of the state as an organized society, and not only any condition/s, but condition/s in which the state functions normally, and develops.

These condition/s and processes depend on internal and external risk factors and threats. Security as science uses all the general methods of the social sciences. However, Security Science differs from all other social sciences by special methods that are from the natural sciences.

These are data collection methods, processing, assessments, data analysis, and prediction methods. Security as a science is based on the following theories:

1. Theory of state
2. Theories of law.
3. Conflict theory.
4. Complex system theory.
5. Game theory,
6. Catastrophe theory.

Starting from Plato's *Ideal society in ideal states* to Thomas Hobbes and his description of the *natural state* of mankind and natural laws and treaties. Security can be viewed from several aspects, such as environmental security, nuclear, energy, economic, legal security, etc. Security is different from safety. In short, safety, refers to technical-technological methods and processes, while security refers to human actions.

The multi-faceted nature of Security

Security – a socio-cultural phenomenon which, from a transdisciplinary point of view, can be defined as a spectrum of the following four ontological, axiological, epistemological and social categories:²¹

- A. State** without socio-cultural threats – strictly speaking, it is a state characterized by the control of threats within the *national culture* to the satisfaction of a given *security subject*; it is a derivative of the security state calculated concerning time δt (instantaneous security δs):

$$\mathbf{S} = \frac{\delta s}{\delta t}$$

$$\delta s = \delta(\mathbf{P}-\mathbf{T})$$

t – time

δt – time increment

P – total power = Σ_p

T – total threat = Σ_{th}

- B. Instrumental** value enabling the *security subject* to satisfy *socio-cultural lower and higher needs*, with personal fulfillment at the top of the hierarchy;
- C. Development** process resulting from the influence of motivation on the *security subject*, based on the internal *socio-cultural need for development*, which is a *higher human need*, thanks to which individual and group security subjects the personal and social growth of the potential for autonomous defence is achieved;
- D. Social construct** – the way people perceive, explain and interpret the *social world* around them; security as a social construct is the result of the interaction of social interdependencies and interactions between the many *security subjects* that exist in a given social community, which is also a security subject on its own.

²¹ J. Piwowarski, *Transdyscyplinarna istota kultury bezpieczeństwa narodowego (The transdisciplinary essence of national security culture)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku, Słupsk 2016, pp. 336–337.

The threat, in general, can be defined as a challenging situation with a high probability of negative events for the subject, such as the loss (or damage) of one of the subject's values, such as health, life, dignity, freedom, work, property or peace.

To date, as far as the process of institutionalization of *Security Science* in Poland is concerned, a parallel process of identifying sub-disciplines has not yet been initiated. In the justification of the proposal, the research subject was subordinated to the general challenges faced by *Security Science* professionals resulting from the need for European states to build modern security systems.

The field of *social sciences*, *political sciences*, *social communication sciences*, *pedagogy*, *psychology*, finally, *sociology* and *anthropology* are closest to *Security Science*.

The *security subject* is the subject of research that explains the existence of *Security Science*. It has existed 'since time immemorial', even before a more profound need arose for targeted scientific research into the phenomenon of *security* within the solid framework of a distinct scientific discipline.

Therefore, one cannot suddenly conclude that only *Security Science* offers a basis for further practical activities in the field of building the social construct known as the *security environment* in the *social world*.

The problems raised require an approach that goes beyond the methodological possibilities of a single science discipline. The scholar needs to adopt a multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary research approach:

- *Multidisciplinarity*: allows the researcher to analyze the reality under study from the perspective of several scientific disciplines;
- *Interdisciplinarity*: requires the researcher or research team to have an extensive and extremely broad knowledge of several different scientific disciplines;
- *Transdisciplinarity*: requires the ability to make skillful cross-references to scientific theory, concepts, or methods that are used in other disciplines, intending to address research questions that arise within another, dominant scientific stream in a given research project.

Social sciences, and not only them, know and use the method of employing pieces of the output of disciplines other than the leading one, in such a case referred to as *auxiliary sciences*.

This also applies when *Security Science* draw from philosophy (including widely developed for example in Poland philosophy of security), history, geography (including geography of security), sociology, psychology (including psychology of security), or law.

Sub-disciplines and auxiliary sciences of Security Science

Each science has its material research subject and employs a particular aspect given which it examines matters under investigation, referred to as the *substantial*

subject of that science. The multifaceted nature that characterizes the *research subject* in *Security Science* is a reason for the challenge of defining its scientific essence. The argument that the subject of *Security Science* is security does not reveal much.

Due to the complexity of the concept of *security*, *Security Science* draws on the achievements of other disciplines of science, referred to here as auxiliary sciences.

The analysis of educational content made by Janusz Gierszewski at the faculties of *internal security* and *national security in Poland* leads to the conclusion that these sciences can be divided into three groups:²²

1. Scientific content that provides the methodological basis for solving specific security problems;
2. Scientific content with a focus on security, for example, international relations in the context of international security, sociology of disposition groups, and history of security;
3. Substantial scientific content – for example, the philosophy that defines the criteria of value giving ontological, epistemological, and axiological bases for the application of the functions of scientific theories, especially the exploratory and implementation ones, or the elements of security systems and real-world content, demography and related data to help assess demographic threats to national security.

* * *

The systemic typology of *Security Science* – its sub-disciplines and its auxiliary sciences – should be the result of conclusions from the theory of science and the mission of practicality of *Security Science*. According to the authors, *Security Science* should be accompanied by a methodologically systematized reflection on security, including (as in legal studies):²³

- 1) **general (fundamental) *Security Science***;
- 2) **detailed *Security Science* – security dogmatics**;
- 3) **sciences auxiliary to *Security Science***.

The classification proposed by Janusz Gierszewski groups all streams corresponding to scientific activity that can be described as community-based security research.

²² J. Gierszewski, *Problemy tożsamości nauk o bezpieczeństwie w perspektywie subdyscyplin i nauk pomocniczych (Problems of security science identity in the perspective of sub-disciplines and auxiliary sciences)*, [in:] J. Piwowarski, J. Gierszewski, *W poszukiwaniu tożsamości nauk o bezpieczeństwie (In search of an identity for security sciences)*, Difin, Warsaw 2018, p.107.

²³ Cf. J. Gierszewski, *Problemy tożsamości nauk o bezpieczeństwie w perspektywie subdyscyplin i nauk pomocniczych (Problems of security science identity in the perspective of sub-disciplines and auxiliary sciences)*, [in:] J. Piwowarski, J. Gierszewski, *W poszukiwaniu tożsamości nauk o bezpieczeństwie (In search of an identity for security sciences)*, Difin, Warsaw 2018, p. 101.; W. Kitler, *Organizacja bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Aspekty ustrojowe, prawno-administracyjne i systemowe (Organisation of the National Security of the Republic of Poland. Political system, legal-administrative and systemic aspects)*, Difin, Toruń 2018, p. 9.

1. **General Security Science** and its research subject may concern parts of knowledge related to the general understanding of security. Real and formal *security* claims can be made in this context from the perspective of various scientific theories, such as war and peace theory, the global geopolitical landscape, and international relations; the fundamental sciences would be theoretical.
2. **Detailed autonomous dogmatic Security Science**, - systems, security strategies, and research methodology; these streams should explore security issues from the research perspective characteristic of *Security Science*; it would be a set of sciences having a direct, specified subject of exploration as a meta-science of *Security Science*; the theoretical domain would indicate the subject and purpose of the research to avoid the accusation of teaching professional or expert knowledge, whereas security dogmatics would include intrasystem and comparative research.
3. **Sciences auxiliary to Security Science** – the selection of sub-disciplines should be based on the dogmatics of *Security Science*; these may be the socio-cultural, military, political, spiritual, health, economic, ecological, ontological, social, raw material, energy, technogenic, legal, cyber security and other spheres of security. These can be identified according to a functional criterion related to a particular Security system.

An analysis of the various security systems is incomplete if it does not make use of the output of appropriately selected *auxiliary sciences* – a group of security-related sciences that cannot be practiced alone. Basic *auxiliary sciences* include disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, economics, or political sciences; certain *auxiliary sciences* should already by definition present security issues impartially, excluding the value-laden function of scientific theory, while reflecting objective conditions concerning the level of security. On the other hand, other sub-disciplines, such as philosophy or psychology, are supposed to reach out to valuation, referring to recommendations coming from *social axiology*, in which the value function of a scientific theory is applied.

Although we receive a lot of information about threats, it is often fragmented, dispersed, and therefore unconnected, or narrowly specialized, and can only help to improve the effectiveness of the actions of the various actors established for protection against threats on an ad hoc basis. Sometimes the researcher lacks a systemic vision that would allow the information he or she possesses to be used within a universal, coherent, and transparent system with a teleologically appropriate theoretical foundation.

Today, research on security issues is taking place on such a scale and, importantly, at such a level that it leaves a deficit in the growing information needs of high-complexity security systems. Numerous complex tasks are carried out

within the *national security* supersystem, which functionally links these different systems. Security systems require up-to-date information that is relevant to the current situation in order to create processes and circumstances that produce a socially satisfactory state of security, enabling the protected entities to live, survive and develop undisturbed.

As a discipline within the group of *practical sciences*, *Security Science* are directly engaged in identifying and solving specific current security problems through directives that cause security systems to function effectively. It seems advisable to combine spheres of research in a task-oriented manner - for example, certain international security problems being tackled jointly by *political sciences* and *Security Science* researchers. Although the position presented is very significant and interesting, it is not accurate. The science of security is one and indivisible. There is no Security Science, just as there are no mathematical sciences, but mathematics is one science.

Security Science under the umbrella of Social Sciences

A clear distinction should be made between the term *science* and the term *scientific theory*. The former defines the autonomy of the subject, while the latter determines the logical structure of scientific work and its functions. A set of concepts can be defined for the research subject of *Security Science*, through which the researcher can build a coherent theory for the use of his/her study²⁴.

It can also be assumed that these *science* are related to everything that concerns threats and security defined as a sequence of successive states depicting a process serving the freedom of development of the *security subject*. The definition refers to the elements of the *security environment* – the *security subject*, *values*, *opportunities*, *challenges*, *risks*, *security culture* tools, *needs*, *development* and *threats* faced by that *subject*.¹²⁴

However, in such a definition, the *security subject* will be related to *Security Science*, but also to anthropology, psychology, culture, sociology, law, or management, which leads to the following conclusions:

1. *Security Science* categories will be defined with the help of other theories;
2. Only selected theories can be used in *Security Science*;
3. The concepts from *Security Science* can serve other *social sciences* disciplines that study some security phenomena/s.

Based on the subject criterion, one might want to reflect on the degree to which *Security Science* differs significantly from other *social sciences*. If *Security Science* applies elements of sociology, management, or other *social sciences*, integrative,

²⁴ It would also be quite correct to call security experts *asphalog*. The names of all sciences have their roots in Greek words. *Asphalog* is a word derived from the two Greek words *asfáleia* (ασφάλεια) and *logos* (λόγος) denoting security and science.

multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary research may be employed. Then, there is the question of the relationship between *Security Science* and other *social sciences and disciplines* that also study certain aspects of security.

The social sciences took into account several security phenomena because there were no scientists in the narrow scientific field of Security Science. There were no scientists who understood that security is a science that has its theoretical foundation as well as general and special methods. And that gap in science still exists today. There are few scientists from the narrow scientific field of Security Science.

Consideration can be given to how *institutionalism*, a persistently significant stream within the *social sciences*, can be used in *security studies*. But to understand security studies, first, it is important to know what is Security Science.

Following Thorstein Veblen's suggestion regarding the need for a unified social science made in his work *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899),¹²⁵ one might ask about the scope of meaning of the term *institution* in *social sciences*, or even investigate further what an *institution* is and what place it holds in *social theory* and consequently also in *Security Science*.

In this way, *Security Science* can make an important scientific contribution to the attempt of finding common ground between many disciplines that differ in the way they define the concept of *institution*. Formerly, the term referred mainly to elements of the state structure. Today, even in everyday language, the term often refers to more or less ordinary practices as formalized elements of our *social life*.

Perhaps as far as Security Science are concerned, these terms may be connected through a *social world* model, or – to be more precise – a model of a human, community, and state security system. For *Security Science*, this could mean not only analyses and creation of a security system based on the notion of institutionalism but also routine actions, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies, with any related activities as may be undertaken to provide security.¹²⁶

A very popular classification of internal theoretical trends within *institutionalism* was proposed by American sociologist William Richard Scott. He believed that the discussions within the institutional theory could be analyzed according to the three axes presented below:²⁵

- 1) the ontological structure of security systems;
- 2) the epistemological cognoscibility of security systems;
- 3) the axiological hierarchy of values in the security system.

The first stream of thought on *institutions* concerns what we consider to be most important in the operation of institutions. The other streams of studies on institutions focus on the elements recognized by particular authors of studies as

²⁵ R.W. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, London-New Delhi 1995, p. 34.

institution media. Third, analyses within institutionalism differ in the level of social life assumed in the context of institutional interactions. Academic discussions within *social sciences* based on institutional theory can be transferred to *Security Science*:

- 1) the first level than, would address what researchers consider highly relevant to the functioning of security systems in the ontological layer, in terms of the functioning of the system structure;
- 2) the next level should focus on the epistemological layer, i.e. on what is considered as improving the cognoscibility of the security system and as showing the limits and values of this cognition;
- 3) at the third level, the analyses should concern the social axiological layer as the basis for implementing the search for values and moral-ethical norms that should prevail in the security system.

Security system analysis can be undertaken on the assumption that an institution is to perform socially important cognitive, normative and regulatory functions for the security system.

Using Pierre Bourdieu's (1930-2002) *field theory* in *social sciences* to explore the issue of the social conditions of knowledge development, it can be predicted that the suppression of discourse on the identity of a discipline can cause disparities in the form of domination of some streams of research at the expense of others (favoring orthodoxy) and stagnation of *Security Science*.

The strengthening and the elevation (which is perhaps even better for science) of these *sciences* to the level of a discipline, obliges every security researcher to strengthen the theory in the following aspects:

- 1) defining the scope of the studies;
- 2) creating a map of terms and a matching theoretical base;
- 3) specifying the research methodology;
- 4) defining the internal structure of a discipline (field) of science and showing its relations with other scientific disciplines.

* * *

Summing up, research conducted so far confirms that security issues are present in the world of science and practice. The study of threat and security problems should transcend any isolation of the discipline of *Security Science* from what has existed and continues to exist and what is about to emerge in the practice and theory of security in its broadest sense.

It seems that at the current stage of development of *Security Science*, it can be stated that it is a science due to its theoretical and practical foundations, subject matter, research purpose and historical conditions. As a scientific, social and applied discipline it has great potential because it adapts the research problem to the needs of security. Both strengths and weaknesses can be identified.

The strengths of *Security Science*, which has been functioning in expert circles in Poland and Serbia as a separate discipline of science for a decade now, include:

1. The relationship between theory and practice, which is marked by the validity of the identification of the values and needs of *security subjects* as well as the challenges and risks faced by these *subjects*, the realism of description and exploration, or the liberation from the political science limit of the state-centric scientific research perspective;
2. Growing stock of culture in the range represented by the output of this *science*;
3. An active, growing faculty of security researchers and academic centers;
4. Slowly growing integration of representatives of *Security Science*;
5. Development of relations between *Security Science* experts and academic centers of other science disciplines;
6. As a need and a value, it has a serious role in social activity;
7. The research questions posed within the dogmatic and the proposed field of science.
8. The condition of the human person in the face of technological improvements in the environment.

A new scientific reflection on the issue of security within *Security Science* is taking the form of a separate sphere of studies, which has become an autonomous discipline and may in time become an autonomous field. *Security Science* is rich in knowledge about historical experiences, conditions, and patterns of buildings and the methods of providing security systems. It is of immense importance to convey the notions and values that are and can be offered by *security*.

The methodology features a pluralistic orientation, according to which *security* is the subject of research in various scientific disciplines, especially social ones, e.g. management, psychology, social psychology, anthropology, sociology, or political science. From this point of view, *Security Science* become a *field of science*, with its theories and general and special methodology. It is important to underline special methods and techniques of *Security Science* not coming from social science. That is why *Security Science* is very unique. All special methods enable security professionals and experts to create and produce Security Risk Assessments as well as to find out or allocate risk/s and threats coming from inside or outside the state. Special techniques used in *Security Science* should be emphasized. These are all the techniques approved by the Court, which are applied in security, such as the techniques of secret audio recording, video recordings, surveillance and other techniques used in intelligence work, but we indicate once again only with the approval of the Court or the Prosecutor's Office as it is foreseen national legislations.

The second, narrow scientific perspective is monism. Its proponents postulate the development of *Security Science* as an autonomous discipline with a predominantly practical nature. As we have already pointed out, the field of scientific

disciplines Security Science, in addition to auxiliary scientific disciplines, must also cover areas that concern the actors of the National Security System of a country, as it is foreseen by the general act National Security Strategy. This refers to the Army, Police, Intelligence, and Private Security, but also the role of the civilian population in the defense and protection of the state from all kinds of risks. Whether it is about scientific disciplines in certain cases or about skills taught at military or police academies remains open for some future scientific discussion. It is certainly wrong to consider that there are “military or police sciences”. This matter can only be considered as scientific discipline if they are at all under Security Science.

Additionally, proposed auxiliary sciences, such as security psychology, sociology or (security) philosophy, should be considered as fields for multidisciplinary research, belonging to one discipline of *Security Science* or as further sub-disciplines of psychology or sociology and philosophy. These *sciences* derive from both the *humanities* (philosophy) and *social sciences* (military sciences, international relations). Indicating this genesis is essential to understanding their hybrid specificity. Time will tell whether these *sciences* will become the basis for disciplines and scientific streams dealing with many aspects of security and whether one integrated theory can be built, combining all existing theories about the social world. It becomes clear that *Security Science* cannot be a sub-discipline, instead, all other social sciences can become a sub-discipline of *Security Science*. If the positivist perspective assuming the possible delimitation of different disciplines is adopted, it should be assumed that individual studies can be classified as belonging to one of the sciences or as multi-trans- and interdisciplinary. At present, it is important to seek strong anchoring points in *social sciences*, which also applies to *Security Science*, in order to stabilize the situation that determines the strength of identity, so as to be able to strengthen awareness of the anthropocentric, utilitarian purpose of practicing such studies, bearing the social responsibility that rests on the shoulders of security specialist or researchers.

SECURITY STUDIES – SUB-DISCIPLINE AND DISCIPLINE

***Security studies* in Poland have already been recognized as a scientific discipline. This discipline functions autonomously, within the domain of science, which is *social sciences*.** Within this discipline theoretical generalizations are created, based on which practical directives are formulated, and thus a multidisciplinary result is obtained, combining the development of aspects of security theory and practice.

In Poland, representatives of *Security Science* often refer to the output of *security studies* conducted within the sub-discipline of *international relations*, in political science. Such researchers include Jerzy Stańczyk, Józef Kukułka, Wojciech Kostecki, and Ryszard Zięba. But apart from them, there are also recognized foreign

researchers, for example, Kenneth Both,²⁶ Jack Snyder,²⁷ Hans Morgenthau,²⁸ John Mearsheimer,²⁹ Peter Katzenstein,³⁰ Barry Buzan,³¹ Emma Rothschild³² and many other internationally known representatives of security studies – a sub-discipline of political science.

This a completely wrong approach by political scientists or sociologists who wanted to become security experts at all costs. Whether it is a state or society at the national or international level, Security as a science monitors all processes and phenomena that affect internal and external risk factors. In other words, it is completely wrong to put security as a science within international relations. International security is derived from national, and international relations depending on the situation in the state and the conditions between the states in their mutual relations. International relations are in the domain of security science, not the opposite. In theory, there is even an opinion that *international relations* are not a science, as Stanley Hoffman claims, that it is a study program³³.

Buzan's concept of securitization is important but dangerous for the state because it gives decision-makers, mostly individuals, the opportunity to classify certain risks and threats in the so-called securitization. The form of the securitization act that supporters of this theory talk about is defined too narrowly, with the main focus on the speech of dominant actors (most often political elites), which imposes a kind of too-narrow interpretation that the process of securitization is ongoing only from the moment when representatives of certain political institutions communities (most often states) use dramatic discourse to mark certain objects as a threat. In this way, qualified institutions whose job is to work on threats and risks are excluded. The state reacts to threats with qualified institutions, not with individuals or politicians. This is a feature only of underdeveloped countries, and that is why Buzan's theory has no foundation, much less application, in countries with a high-security culture and developed intelligence and security services exactly those whose job is to allocate and counter the risk/s and threat/s to state.

On the other hand, the concept defined as security culture and its specific essence enables a transdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approximation of concepts

²⁶ K. Booth, *Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist*, [in:] *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, K. Krause, M.C. Williams (ed.), UCL Press, London 1997, pp. 83–119.

²⁷ J.L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica 1977.

²⁸ H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, New York 1993.

²⁹ J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 2001.

³⁰ *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), Columbia University Press, New York 1989.

³¹ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 1991, p. 370.

³² E. Rothschild, *What Is Security?*, [in:] "Daedalus" 1995, Vol. 124, No. 3, pp. 53–98.

³³ Stanley Hoffman, *International Relations – Critical Concept in Political Science*, Volume I, Rutledge, London, 2000, p.77

that originate from various streams in security studies. Incidentally, it may be added that even when we are confronted with the ambiguity of certain concepts coming from different streams in security studies, their ambiguity, of course often accepted with some reservations, but consummated in a culturalist approach, enables and builds up growth concerning the permeability of actions undertaken within the scope of the research process. Political studies, in turn, is a sub-discipline of Security Science, also inscribed in the field of social sciences.

At the end of the second decade of the 20th century, after the Great War, scientists, politicians, and the whole international community started to notice that there are military and political issues that cannot be solved based on social theories alone. Therefore, political science and its sub-discipline international relations emerged from social sciences and legal sciences. As Ernest Penrose believes, international relations have become the top sphere of human activity, measured on the scale of all mankind by a matter of life and death.³⁴

The year 1919 can be regarded as the beginning of this research, which already had an institutional form. It was then that the Chair of International Politics was established at Aberystwyth University. The Great War (1914–1918) gave politicians, authorities and citizens of the Central States and the United States much to think about in terms of the scale of threats to international and national security in the 20th century.

It was an inspiration to launch a new type of research in social sciences in the field of political science and its sub-discipline of international studies, creating a sub-discipline of international security studies. A nice attempt, but extremely wrong, by political scientists who tried in every way from their point of view to explain security phenomena and processes that certainly influenced key political events.

* * *

In Poland, a somewhat similar situation arose ten years ago. It was two decades after the spectacular (for many unexpected) dismantling of the totalitarian superpower that was the USSR. For Poles, as a civil society united strongly around the idea of Solidarity, at that time a ten-million organization, whose causative power greatly shook the communist regime, that political change brought about an important end – not only for Poland – to the export of Soviet totalitarian imperialism, which carried a permanent threat to many countries of the world.

The subject of research here is, for example, *social relations* that are established across *national* borders, and within this framework, *security studies* have been developed, which, despite the fact that their hermeneutics is conducted somewhat differently from that of the *Security Science*, can to a large extent be inspiring for the latter current of science.

³⁴ E. F. Penrose, *The Revolution in International Relations. A Study in the Changing Nature and Balance of Power*, Frank Cass & Co., London 1965, p.VI.

The culturalist approach recommended here results in the above-described elements becoming a part of the problem of the three dimensions of *security culture*, which allows for a complementary presentation of the *nature of national security culture* in three equally important aspects – individual, national and international. *The national security environment* is the effect of changes resulting from *development* or *regression* (qualitative changes) and *increase* or *decrease* (quantitative changes) of the potential of *national security culture*.

The *crisis of values*, which is now noticeable on a massive scale, affects the weakening of the strength of bonds of national communities and causes other accompanying negative social symptoms. These include such *social facts*³⁵ as, for example, the consumerist *lifestyle*³⁶ or *social atomisation*,³⁷ which destroy not only the creatively inspiring link between man and the world of *ideas*³⁸ but also spoil relations with other people and hinder contact with the sphere of *higher values*, negatively influencing the deepened reflexive perception of the interests of the organization that is the *nation-state* by the human individual. With the negative trends of today's post-modern period and the development of a *crisis of higher values* within today's societies, social dysfunctions are emerging with increasing force. These dysfunctions include egoism, greed, or human aggression³⁹. These and other social dysfunctions may develop into more serious threats to the quality of human existence in their *security environment*.

The result of the above is the progressive erosion of **value systems** and there is a dangerous decline of power in the energy *streams* of *national security culture*, starting with the basic *subject of security*, i.e. the *human person*,⁴⁰ the personal carrier of *national security culture* and its unique *nature*, typical of a given society.

³⁵ *A social fact* – is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint which is general over the whole of a given *society* whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations. – J.P. Wihbey, *The Social Fact: News and Knowledge in a Networked World*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, (Massachusetts, USA) 2019 E. Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, Polish version by K. Wakar, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2006, p.41; social facts are for example religion, law, morality or customs, sociology discovers and scientifically explains them – P. Sztompka, *Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa* (Sociology. Analysis of society), Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2002, p. 232.

³⁶ *Consumptionist lifestyle* – a set of attitudes based on demonstrating unjustified manifestations of the need to acquire material goods and services, based on the view that the level of consumption is the most important determinant of the quality of human life, generates unnecessary costs and social threats, related to the crisis in the sphere of higher values, which constitute an exceptional attribute of the representatives of the human species; A. Aldridge, *Consumption*, Polish version by M. Żakowski, Wydawnictwo Sic! Warsaw 2006, pp. 14–15.

³⁷ *Social atomism* – in social sciences it is a phenomenon of the breakdown of *social bonds*, resulting from excessive individualism, which is often accompanied by antisocial attitudes (egoism), and often means alienation of too many members of a given *society*.

³⁸ Cf.: R. M. Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences: Expanded Edition*, University of Chicago Press; Chicago 2013. E.D. Edmonds, *Big Ideas in Social Science*, Sage, Los Angeles–London–New Delhi–Washington 2016.

³⁹ Cf.: K. Lorenz, *On Aggression*, Harvest Book, San Diego–New York–London 1974.

⁴⁰ K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn* (*Person and Act*), Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, Kraków 1985.

AFFINITY OF SECURITY SCIENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES

The closest to the category of the Polish term *nauki o bezpieczeństwie* (*Security Science* (SSC)) is the English term *security studies* (SS) or in Serbian *studije bezbednosti*. However, after checking, it becomes clear that in the world of science, SS is a different scientific stream than SSC and that it is much broader than *international studies* (IS), a sub-discipline of political science, which, incidentally, also belongs to the sphere of *social sciences* – which is a contribution to justifying the affinity of these trends. The subject of research in the sub-discipline of *international relations* is, for example, “*social relations* that take shape across *national* borders (...)”⁴¹ and is undeniably interesting to *security studies*. When elaborating on particular threats and challenges to the security of the state, it is important to understand international relations from which threats can arise precisely from that geopolitical zone. That is why international relations are only a sub-discipline, unlike Security Science, which is far broader and more comprehensive. It should be noted, however, that the dynamic internationalization of the development of scientific exchange processes requires the use of the English equivalent of the name *Security Science* – similarly for the categories belonging to the conceptual network of these *sciences*, which the authors will do in a moment.

The formal distinctiveness of *security studies* is no hindrance to the fact that the practice in our *reality* shows in both SSC and SS research that international and transnational aspects of world events today often influence even small local issues, as diverse as the availability of information, energy-saving light bulbs, the *crisis of values*, fuel prices, or the *fashion for violence*⁴² inspired, among others, by the media and cinema. It is clear, without the need to verify it by means of an additional experiment that these two scientific currents do not exist in two different *social realities*, but in exactly the same social space.

⁴¹ I. Wyciechowska, *Stosunki międzynarodowe i ich uwarunkowania*, [in:] *Spółczesność i polityka. Podstawy nauk politycznych (International relations and their determinants, [in:] Society and Politics. Foundations of political science)*, K.A. Wojtaszczyk, W. Jakubowski (ed.), ASPRA-JR, Warsaw 2007, p. 583.

⁴² The combined technological and IT revolutions generate an egoistic-consumptive lifestyle, social atomism and aggressive attitudes, the good of others becomes of little importance and the mass media promote any kind of violence as originality. Daniel Goleman, for example, notes in the context of a certain “fashion” for violence that “despite their [children’s with above average IQ scores] intellectual potential, these are the children at highest risk for problems like academic failure, alcoholism, and criminality – not because their intellect is deficient, but because their control over their emotional life is impaired” – D. Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, Media Rodzina, Poznań 1997, p. 59.

Security Science, are a scientific field within which security researchers and professionals create theoretical generalizations and then form on their basis certain practical directives allowing for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary development of SSC theory and its implementation, i.e. building every day “security practice”. It is also worth noting that **Security Science** not only draw heavily on the rich heritage of **security studies**, but also their objective makes them a true “brother” of **security studies** of Anglo-Saxon origin.

It is possible to apply a culturalist perspective to the research work and make all the elements described above fit into the problems of the three dimensions that govern the *culture of security*: individual, group and material. This perspective makes it possible to study, for example, the essence of the influence of the *culture of national security* on individual, group, national and international scales. It is not possible to perform Security Studies without Security Science. The sequence moves in two directions. The first direction is from Security Science to Security Studies up to Security Culture on the end. Others, from Security Studies, Security System, and Security Management up to again Security Culture. It is quite clear that Security Culture is the ultimate good that we want to achieve through these two described paths. The described paths represent the Security Environment.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT⁴³

The security rhombus. Redefining the security environment

When we talk about the term *security*⁴⁴ and its etymology,⁴⁵ we take into account the fact that since as early as the time of ancient Rome it corresponds to the Latin term *securitas*. This category is explained by many *security* researchers as a combination of two Latin words: *se*, which means “without” (in the sense of *lacking something, without something*), and *cura*, which is translated as “fear”. The sum of the meanings of these words leads to a term used to describe *a situation*⁴⁶ in which *the absence of fear* is justified.

⁴³ Vide: J. Piwowarski, *Nauki o bezpieczeństwie. Kultura bezpieczeństwa i redefinicja środowiska bezpieczeństwa (Security Science. Security culture and the redefinition of the security environment)*, Difin, Warszawa 2020, pp. 23-36.

⁴⁴ C. Smith, D. J. Brooks, *Security Science: The Theory and Practice of Security*, Oxford (UK) and Waltham, Massachusetts (US) 2013. J. Piwowarski, *Bezpieczeństwo jako pożądany stan oraz jako wartość*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo jako wartość (Security as a desired state and as a value, [in:] Security as a value)*, University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Kraków, Kraków 2010, p. 56.

⁴⁵ *Etymology (root word)* - a part of linguistics; it studies the origin of words, the evolution of their meanings and the forms that certain terms take over time.

⁴⁶ *Situation* – a category of social science, introduced by William I. Thomas in 1928; it points to the subjectivity of assessing the circumstances in which a given individual or group (*security*) *subject* finds itself.

Explaining the term *security* from the semantic perspective,⁴⁷ Janusz Gierszewski in his monograph *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne (Social Security)* pointed out that “this polysemantic notion is variously defined, perceived and used in different contexts (...) it means, above all, an objective state consisting in the absence of *threats*.”⁴⁸ The term is primarily intended to denote a situation (resulting in a certain state) of a person or a group of people in which there is no need to make any effort to create protection, care, increased supervision, or control for themselves, nor is there any need to counteract the effects that this situation may cause.

For example, the security anthropologist Stanislaw Jarmoszko referred to the first of the questions asked by representatives of *Security Science* in the following way: “(...) the original [for the word *security*] *piecza* [care] is as much as a *concern, solicitude, diligence, endeavor*. In the Old Polish language, it also meant *consideration, taking into account, reckoning with someone or something, diligently watching, observing, controlling, caring, worrying*, thus indicating its connections with specific entities.”⁴⁹

Meticulous research led Jarmoszko to further discoveries. This researcher made them by tracing the history of the etymology of the term *security*. The term *piecza* could also mean some *trouble, or suffering*, for example, physical pain, directly associated by someone with the sensation of burning. In this context, “*bez pieczy*” meant being free from worries or pain. Let us recall that *danger* and its opposite come from the three interpenetrating spheres of human existence – natural, social and technological. Humans create an *environment of security* for themselves there. This concept should then be further explained.

A security environment is also a zone in which there are various conditions causing danger to arise less frequently than outside and in which it is neutralized faster, more frequently and more effectively than outside.

Returning to the present in our reflection on *security*, let us note that the Constitution, the primary act of law in the Republic of Poland, defines the *security of the state* (the central *subject of security*) through the *security of its citizens*.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Semantics* (gr. *Semantikós*, meaning) – a branch of linguistics, within the framework of which researchers refer to meanings and relations of sign form to content in the synchronic and diachronic view of language.

⁴⁸ J. Gierszewski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Studium z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego (Social Security. A study in national security)*, Difin, Warsaw 2013, p.7. See also: *Bezpieczeństwo w teorii i badaniach naukowych (Security in theory and scientific research)*, B. Wiśniewski (ed.), Police Academy, Szczytno 2018.

⁴⁹ S. Jarmoszko, *Antropologia bezpieczeństwa. Kontury naukowej tożsamości (The Anthropology of Security. Outlines of scientific identity)*, University of Natural Sciences and Humanities in Siedlce, Siedlce 2015, p. 33; cf: *The Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from the Frontline of Policing, Counter-terrorism and Border Control (Anthropology, Culture and Society)*, M. Maguire, C. Frois, N. Zurawski (eds.), Pluto Press, London 2014.

⁵⁰ More on this topic: Waldemar Kitler, in his work *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System (National security of the Republic of Poland. Basic categories. Determinants. System)*, Academy of National Defence, Warsaw 2011, pp. 16–22.

Article 5 of the Constitution thus identifies the *state* with the *collective of citizens* living there, i.e. the *nation* in political terms. The *nation* is the collective *subject of security*, the sovereign who *de facto* creates the *state*.⁵¹

Let us explain that so far, as a result of the author's deliberate treatment, the fundamental concepts such as *subject, value, threat* and *security* have been left mainly to the intuition of the Reader.

The author believes that a scientific theory internalized by a researcher or a student should not suppress the intuitive dispositions of a human being, however, a scientific approach requires verification of the effects obtained with the help of this ability and a clear definition of the concepts used, which will take place in the further part of the work presented here.

The need for security, as well as the *Security Science* which is to help us satisfy this need, **can only be created** in such an ontological-epistemological⁵² environment which is determined by the existence and functioning of the three components indicated below (and the terms which correspond to them). The field of this environment is determined by the figure, which the author defines as a *triangle of security*, which is formed by the following elements:

1. **Subject** – *an entity* existing at the place and time of its existence and actions.
2. **Values** – the **goods** that are important to this entity at a given place and time.
3. **Threats** to the possession of *values*, which the *subject* possesses, and to the achievement of further *values* by the *subject*, the need for which is felt.

Re 1. Def.: Subject – is a human individual or social group possessing either an individual or collective consciousness and self-awareness, a unique identity, and the full capacity to act deliberately and sovereignly.

Re 2. Def.: Value – is an abstract or material good that is important to a given subject, a clearly defined, expressed and valuable idea or item which is the object of important needs of individuals and groups, strongly influencing the choice of methods and means used by these subjects (simply put – it is a valuable, desirable good and an object of human striving, a source of meaning for human thinking and acting).

Re 3a. Def.: Threat – is a conscious or unconscious unfavorable situation of a given *subject*, whereby there exists a significant risk of losing (or negatively affecting) the non-material and material *values* possessed by the *subject*, or losing opportunities for further *growth* (regressing), which would allow the subject to obtain more needed *values*. (Note: the same risk may be less significant or insignificant for a different *subject*).

⁵¹ Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 78, item 483), art.5.

⁵² *Ontology* – the science of being, the way someone or something exists, also the system of concepts and relations between concepts in a given sphere of knowledge; *epistemology* – explains the object, content, methods, criteria and processes of human cognition.

Re 3b. Def.: Security is the opposite of threat.

A particular situation in which the full *securitological triangle* would not appear, i.e. there would be, for example, only its first two elements (the *subject* and the *goods* important to it) and there would be no need to manifest concern for *values* because they would always be satisfied without obstacles and without threats, is known from the biblical description of the place called paradise.

If once, in a certain time and place of reality, there would be the “**certainty of the absence of threats**” (the *ideal type*⁵³ of *security*, also its pre-definition), then there would be no need to obtain the opposite of *danger* and thus it would also exclude the need to conduct research on the phenomenon we call *security*, which does not exist in such a case. **Note**— at this point, an important conclusion for further consideration should be indicated: **If a society does not feature a (complete) security triangle, the need for security cannot manifest!**

Therefore, in formulations concerning security, “*certainty*” (*absence of threats*) should be replaced by another word appropriate to the real world, and that is “**probability**.”⁵⁴ The real *environment* and the events or processes occurring in a specific place and at a specific time give rise to situations that in our objective perception are far from ideal. These are *threats* to the possession of goods we need – material and even more important *values* of non-material nature, such as *truth*, *goodness*, *beauty* and *righteousness*⁵⁵, *efficiency*⁵⁶, and *trust*⁵⁷.

It is then that the idea of *security* arises in the human mind, as a result of feeling the need for opportunities that will allow us to free ourselves from the dangerous network of *threats* – but **the need for security alone is not enough**.

The need only serves to awaken motivations and related actions aimed at creating an *environment* where, for many different cases, the probability of situations opposite to *hazard* increases. This is the need that humanity has attempted to satisfy for thousands of years by inventing and **perpetuating** certain elements in this *environment*.

⁵³ *An ideal type* – Max Weber’s abstract model having features relevant to a given social phenomenon; such a *type* does not exist in a pure form in reality; an *ideal type* serves the purpose of comparing the form of a given social phenomenon with its abstract model, e.g. the system of running an office to the *ideal type of bureaucracy*.

⁵⁴ Cf.: M. Cieślarczyk, *Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania problemów bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa (Theoretical and methodological bases for researching problems of state security and defence)*, Podlaska Academy, Siedlce 2000, p. 22.

⁵⁵ *Integrity* – occurs in *social relations*, consists in determining the fulfilment of one’s word by the *subject* and the observance of socially recognised norms, even when others do not perceive or even expect this behaviour; cf. N.M. Hall, *Civic Righteousness and Civic Pride*, Free Press, New York 2016.

⁵⁶ M. S. Archer, *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory*, New York 1996.

⁵⁷ Cf.: F. Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity*, Free Press, New York 1996; R.K. Sprenger, *Trust: The Best Way to Manage*, Cyan Communications, London 2004; G. Hosking, *Trust: A History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014.

These elements are knowledge, skills, experiences, morale and proper and effective methods and means of action, which help us to achieve the goal discussed here. These achievements, which are part of our culture, constitute a **security culture**.

The phenomenon of security can only arise in a concrete ontological-epistemological environment comprising clearly defined elements and categories which represent it (i.e. the terms corresponding to these elements). The field of basic conditions forming this *environment* is outlined by an abstract onto-epistemological figure which the author calls the **security (culture) rhombus**.

The security rhombus comprises the four interconnected elements listed below⁵⁸:

1. **SUBJECT** – understood to refer to a **security subject**, existing at a particular point in time and space and under the influence of natural and social conditions, which also constitute elements of the environment and its effect;
2. **VALUES** – a concept defined earlier (re. 3a), in relation to the components of the *security triangle* (**goods** relevant to the *subject*);
3. **THREATS** – a concept defined earlier (re.3a), in relation to the components of the *security triangle*;
4. **SECURITY CULTURE** – a generator of social energy, characteristic only for the human species, which is wielded by a given group or individual *subject* and which gives it resilience and a broadly understood ability to defend itself against *threats*.

Re 1a. Def.: Security is a favorable situation of a *subject*, consisting in the existence of a significant probability for it to maintain the possession of intangible and material *values* important to it and to maintain the possibility of undisturbed *development*, allowing it to obtain further *values* it needs.

Re 1b. Def.: Subject of security – an individual or group entity, existing at a given time, place and in the field of natural and social conditions and impacts as elements of its environment, being the *subject* of events and processes during which it comes into mental or sensory contact with the potential or active *destruction* of the possibility of maintaining and expanding (*development*) the possession of *values* important to it, considered from the perspective of its *security*, i.e. in terms of satisfying its needs to obtain a satisfactory degree of control over *dangers* or freedom from them.

⁵⁸ J. Piwowski, *Romb (kultury) bezpieczeństwa. Redefinicja środowiska bezpieczeństwa*, “Kultura Bezpieczeństwa” (*The security (culture) rhombus. Redefining the security environment*, 'Security Culture'.) 2020, No. 37, pp. 30–46.

Re 2. Def.: Value is a specific *good* that has a certain meaning for the *subject* – this concept was already defined earlier (re. 2), in relation to the elements of the *security triangle*.

Re 3. Def.: Threat was already defined in relation to the components of the *security triangle* (re. 3), however – as will be seen below – the definition is not necessarily the only existing rigid rule, hence the alternative version of the **definition** quoted below:

A threat to a subject's security is a significant probability that the subject will lose its ability to maintain and increase its possession of values that are important to it and to its existence through self-development.

Re 4. General definition: Security culture (SC) is the totality of established material and intangible human achievements, forming, in a given place and time, the stock of military and non-military components of broadly defined human resilience, protection and defence; it fulfills *four functions* through the entity:

- 1) identification of active and potential threats *subject*
- 2) maintenance of the level of *security* it needs,
- 3) recovery of it (when compromised) and
- 4) the increase of it (when it's needed); *security culture* secures and stimulates the development of human individuals and social groups; *security culture* is examined based on a division into the following spheres: (I) mental-spiritual (the individual dimension of the *social reality*), (II) communal-legal-organizational (the group dimension of the *social reality*), and (III) material (the physical dimension of the *social reality*).

Note – in the author's opinion, the significance of the following thesis should be underlined:

If the triangle of security is fed by the fourth, onto-epistemological element – the culture of security, creating the security rhombus, only then will there be a possibility to conduct activities for the fulfillment of the need for security of this subject (protection and defence against the *threat* to maintain and increase the possession of important *values*).

Thanks to the thought process carried out in this way, an abstract figure was created, which the author referred to as the *security rhombus*. As noted, this figure delineates the area in which the *security environment* of a given *security subject* is shaped.

As the authors have already signaled, the premature provision of too many ready-made formulations may lead to the risk of escaping into mental and volitional convenience, and to the creation of a certain degree of reluctance in the Reader to assimilate the definitional layer of theory necessary for the researcher.

Before the need to obtain solid theoretical support in a well-defined and explained net of notions intensifies for the Reader, let us once again take a look at

the “nuclear” presentation of elements creating possibilities first for the emergence of the need for *security* (in the field of the *security triangle*), and then for the birth of the phenomenon of *security* (in the field of the *security rhombus*) and the formation of the *security environment* and its rich problems.

The individual and group *subjects of security* (1), the *values* which are important to them (2), the *threats* (3) to the possibility of preserving these values and the freedom to acquire them further, and the *culture of security* as a socio-cultural system (4), as a potential for counteracting events and processes which may deprive these *subjects* of the possession of *values* or limit their *development* which brings them further *values* – all these elements of the *security rhombus* “work” every day in a specific *environment*, not in an ecosocial vacuum.

In a given environment, several *security rhombi* crystallize, composed of the defined components and of the social, physical, or other interdependencies linking them in one way or another.

These *security rhombi* function and interact in different ways in this *environment* and, let us repeat clearly, they are generally more or less, directly or indirectly interdependent. The primary purpose of every *security subject* is to influence in every manner the *environment* it exists in so that it can modify it in a way that results in an *environment* that is both favorable and which constitutes something more – a *security environment* that is one which both passively and actively protects the *subject* from various *threats*.

The security environment, a narrow approach – *White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland*

The Polish pioneer of research into security issues, Tadeusz Hanausek (1931-2002), proclaimed that if there is any possibility of minimizing or eliminating *threats* by deliberate human action, then security management, as a systemic form of opposing various threats, is highly advisable for man.

If this action becomes possible, it should gain strong support from scientific and research circles and a theoretical basis, strengthening the effectiveness of the practice of *safety*⁵⁹ actions.

This is an accurate forecast by Hanausek from 2001. It can be noted that it preceded by a whole decade the formal establishment in Poland of a new stream of science, which is *Security Science*, officially recognized as a scientific research discipline in 2011⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ T. Hanausek, *Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem – nowa dziedzina nauki (Security management – a new field of science)*, [in:] *Bezpieczna ochrona majątku (Secure asset protection)*, LIPORT LFK, Kosice 2001, pp. 36–39.

⁶⁰ In Poland, the *Security Science* were established as a scientific discipline of *social sciences*: Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 8 August 2011 on fields of science, scientific disciplines and artistic disciplines (Journal of Laws 2011 No. 179, item 1228 and Journal of Laws 2011 No. 84, item 455).

This suggestion seems to have been aimed at activating the society. In its context, the role of national elites, mainly scientific and political figures, their affirmations and attitudes to take care of the national *security environment* are important.

The glossary of terms used in the *White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland* contains the following definition of the *security environment*.

DEFINITION – from *The White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland*

The *security environment* of a given *security subject* comprises its “internal and external, military and non-military (civilian) security conditions (the conditions for the realization of the interests of the given subject in the field of security and the attainment of the goals designated by such entity in this regard), characterized by using four basic categories, i.e.: opportunities, challenges, risks and threats”.

The constituents of the *security environment* listed in the definition are explicated in the *White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland* as follows:

- [1] “***Security opportunities*** – circumstances independent of the subject’s will (phenomena and processes in the *security environment*) conducive to the pursuit of interests and achievement of the subject’s objectives in the field of security.
- [2] ***Security challenges*** – problem situations generating decision dilemmas faced by the *subject* in resolving *security* issues. If *challenges* are not properly addressed or responded to, they may, in effect, transform into actual *security threats*.
- [3] ***Security risks*** – are possible negative results of the actions of a given *security subject*.
- [4] ***Security threats*** – are direct or indirect destructive occurrences on a *subject*. The most classic factor of the *security environment*; is a distinction is made between potential and real *threats*; subjective and objective; external and internal; military and non-military; crisis and war; intentional and accidental (random)”⁶¹.

Extended definition of the *security environment* category

The concept of the *security rhombus* and accepting the premise that the shape is the “nuclear” *necessary and sufficient condition for security to manifest both have a range of consequences. The result is the need to ontically expand the narrow definition of security environment for the purpose of certain analyses.*

⁶¹ *Biała praca pracy w polskiej perspektywie (White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland)*, National Security Bureau, Warsaw 2013, pp. 247–248.

The justification for this thesis lies in the fact that the narrow definition lacks the elements necessary to ontically complete the scholarly picture of the *security environment*, a deficiency identified based on the existence of these elements in the culturalist and eco-social concept of the *security rhombus*.

The approach presented here refers to the holism of *social ecology*. Taking into account the fact that the basic typology of *hazards* encompasses *internal* and *external threats*, the author rejects approaches that refer to the *security environment* as the surroundings of a *security subject*. This may appear true to individual and small-sized group *subjects*. A subject located in e.g. a forest will feel a strong sense of dread caused by the environment and will attempt to create a *security environment* for itself by building a fire, for example. However, the interior of the *subject* also generates *hazards*, even latent, yet still existing, resulting in the somatic effects of stress, which can be observed on the outside.

The interior and the exterior of a *security subject* also constitute parts of its *security environment*, which is why, when analyzed from this holistic research perspective, *security environments* also comprise entire *security subjects*. The theory is a universal construct that is supposed to function both in relation to individual and collective *security subjects*, e.g. *nation-states*. In relation to the latter *subject*, nobody would probably give in to the illusion that its *security environment* is its *surroundings* and that the existence of the issue of *internal threats* and thus *internal security*, analyzed not only in the case of the state, can be ignored.

In its essence, the holistic, **socio-cultural (culturalist) perspective** of *Security Science* leads the author to expand the definition of the *security environment*. **Social ecology (human ecology)** is a **social science** that is of utility for inter and trans-disciplinary *Security Science*, including in relation to research on the *security environment*. The discipline analyses the spatial organization of human communities and the mutual influence of the spatial organizations of such collectives and the behavior and actions of individuals. As an example, Florian Znaniecki, when referring to cities (which can in general terms be assumed to constitute a type of *security environment*), describes them as a “non-spatial, humanist whole which manifests in human experience and action. Humans [*security subjects*] may inhabit an urban area and thus consider themselves its ‘residents’; the spatial conditions influence their life; [...] they are not only bodies, but also experiencing and active *subjects*, and [...] it is not that they are in the city [...] – the city is within the sphere of their common experience and actions, they create it in the form of an extremely complex social structure [*security environment*]”⁶².

⁶² F. Znaniecki, J. Ziolkowski, *Czym jest dla Ciebie miasto Poznań? Dwa konkursy (What does the city of Poznań mean to you? Two competitions): 1928/1964*, PWN, Warsaw - Poznań 1984.

The security environment in the author's broad view and its elements:

1. **1. Security subject** and its three related factors: **1b) time, 1c) space: the location and conditions** in which the *subject* exists, **1d) influences and interrelations**. The interior of the *subject*, its exterior (boundaries) and its environment holistically constitute a *security environment*, similar to a researcher who, as a participating observer of reality, is an element that contributes to it. The unclear nature of this may lead those with less experience with interpreting the definition of *security environment* to erroneously separate the *security subject* from its environment, which results in an abstract separation of this *being* from its *environment*, so distinctly in fact that the *surroundings of the security subject* are conflated with its security environment (this has also occurred in the relevant literature, and such sources are easy to find). This non-holistic interpretation of the important sphere of reality which is the *security environment*, an interpretation that is far removed from the *socio-cultural* approach and social ecology, may lead to being unable to conduct the full scope of security research. This approach precludes researchers from studying *internal threats* (which are also *security environment* constituents) or dismisses *internal threats* as part of the studied *security environment*. This would be a valid approach if the interior of *subjects* was not considered an integral part of their *security environments*. The author believes that a *subject's security environment* is the sum of its interior, exterior, surroundings, and the elements listed below. **The theory of Security Science should be universal and useful for both individual and collective security subjects, a human individual or a state, for example.** In order to achieve *cognitive enhancement*⁶³, let us deliberately refer to socially-important *common knowledge*, which informs our everyday actions. A man landing, for example, on an unknown planet, will consider this **environment**, which demands high attention, as his current **(threat and) security environment**. When looking at a screen that displays the astronaut's movements in the form of a glowing dot, we may (erroneously) disregard *internal threats*. This is not just a theoretical speculation. For example, the action of the administration, seen from a *security* perspective, often erroneously ignores the internal component of the personal dimension of human *security*. The culturalist and eco-social perspectives prevent that error from occurring due to a holistic approach whereby a *subject* is an integral part of its *environment*, including its interior, boundaries, exterior and the

⁶³ *Cognitive enhancement* is a factor related to expanding, increasing and developing human intellectual abilities, including cognitive processes, emotions and senses. Cf.: N. Bostrom, A. Sandberg, *Cognitive enhancement: methods, ethics, regulatory challenges*, "Science and Engineering Ethics" 2009, 15(3), pp. 311-341. It may involve various types of actions aimed at improving and expanding the base range of human mental abilities, i.e. increasing IQ and awareness, enhancing creativity or memory, or expanding human perception. Cf.: A. Sandberg, N. Bostrom, *Converging cognitive enhancements*, [in:] "Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences" 2006, 1093(1), pp. 201-227.

- three conditions: **1b) its time of existence/action, 1c) the space and spatial conditions** in which the *subject* exists and **1d) the influences and interrelations** (not only social) in which the **subject** is “submerged”.
2. **Values** are also an element of the *security rhombus* and a broad definition of *security environment* must also include them. In terms of the practical function of science, it is worth putting forward the thesis that directing action is infeasible without first giving central importance to the phenomenon of *value*. Both *values* and *Security Science* feature trans-disciplinary connotations. Clyde Kluckhohn (1905–1960) wrote: **values are concepts which are either concrete or possible to arrive at, referring to that which is desirable, typical of an individual or group, and that which influences the choice of available means, measures and goals when one has to act**⁶⁴.
 3. **Threats** to a *security subject* are situations involving the probability, conscious or unconscious, of losing (or damaging) the possession of *values* that are important to it or losing the possibility of its own development, allowing it to gain further, valuable *values* it needs; in short: **threats** are potential or active *destructive actions* against the possibility of maintaining and increasing through *self-development* the possession of *values* important to the subject.
 4. **Security culture** is another element of the *security environment*, constituting a complete socio-cultural system, which does not exist in the narrow definition of *security environment* (and the typology of its constituents). It encompasses all recorded human achievements enabling subjects to deal with *threats*.
 5. **The needs and development of a security subject** are also elements of the *security environment*, which are not covered by a narrow definition of the *environment* that is unique to humans. **The need** is the reverse of *value* – this factor gives rise to the *security subject*’s motivation to **develop** and act in pursuit of its interests. The analysis of the social functioning of the phenomenon of *security* leads to a conclusion that is important for the application of *Security Science* as regards the close relationship between *values* and *needs* and between *development* and *security culture*. The author’s thesis, helpful in this consideration, is that **the subject, striving for the satisfaction of certain values out of the need to obtain them, through motivation and attitudes is subject here to the influence of values on its action and development, values (as determinants of the choice of individual and common goals) are therefore components of the security culture.**
 6. **The opportunities of a security subject** are situations conducive to the realization of interests and achievement of goals chosen by the *subject*, with connotations to the sphere of *security*.

⁶⁴ C. Kluckhohn, *Values and Value – Orientations in the Theory of Action. An Exploration in Definition and Classification*, [in:] *Toward a General Theory of Action*, T. Parsons, E. Shils (eds.), New York 1962, p. 395. See also: *Theories of Action and Morality: Perspectives from Philosophy and Social Theory*, M. Alznauer, J.M. Torralba (eds.), Georg Olms Verlag AG, Zurich - New York 2016.

7. **Challenges** for the *security subject* are situations, which raise the need to consider and make difficult choices, which are related to the *security subject's* decisions and subsequent actions concerning its development and, consequently, its *security*.
8. **The risks of a security subject** are the possibility, assessed in percentage terms, of the occurrence of negative effects for this *subject* as a result of taking certain actions
or – **8b) the uncertainty of a security subject**, resulting from the feeling (assumption) of the probability of the occurrence of unspecified inconveniences and obstacles

Culture and its importance for a human being part, which is the *security culture*, are considered in *cultural ecology*, which is a sister stream of *social ecology*⁶⁵, as an instrument of non-biological adaptation of a human being to the *environment* of his existence, ensuring his survival, desired stabilization and replication of the social system, optimization of existential efforts, as well as development, while the adaptation of *culture* (including adaptation to the requirements of *security culture* with eco-social conditions) should be considered as a creative and most significant process in the course of cultural changes and crystallization of a concrete shape of the **socio-cultural system**.

Culture is an established, integrated *social system*, consisting of various developmental and adaptive processes marked by creativity. These processes enable man to influence the *natural world*, the *technical sphere* and the world of social relations and to adapt to the conditions of these worlds. They also allow him to raise the level of organization in terms of systems serving his *security*.

As an efficient system of development and adaptation, *culture*, and even more so its particular subsystem – the *security culture*, enables the *society* it creates to persist, survive, and recreate the social matrix of itself as a socio-cultural system. It also has a strong influence on such elements as improving methods, means and conditions for the quality of existence, resilience, protection and defence of human beings and the values they possess and acquire.

This is done through the endogenous influence of the mechanisms of the *culture* and *security culture* system, which determine such important factors for human survival and development as the continuity of the transmission of experience, skills and knowledge to younger generations, technological flexibility and the consolidation of wisdom and knowledge in the symbolic codes that are the domain of *culture*.

⁶⁵ F.R. Steiner, *Human Ecology: How Nature and Culture Shape Our World*, Island Press, Washington 2016.

SECURITY CULTURE FROM THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Analogies in the functioning of phenomena: *culture* and *security*

Nowadays, *social sciences* have put *culture* on the pedestal it deserves – in the author’s opinion – and *security studies* are now following in their wake. As Ulf Hannerz declares⁶⁶, “*culture* is everywhere”, Mahmood Mamdani⁶⁷ adds that “*culture* is a matter of life and death”. It is also known that *culture* “is to be reckoned with”, as pointed out by Samuel Huntington in his work *Clash of Civilizations*⁶⁸ which has had a widespread impact around the world.

Despite the criticism, the adoption of several *security scales* in security studies by the *Copenhagen School* was a breakthrough in *security studies*, which finally allowed not only the *state* to be identified as a *security subject*. From that time on, security subjects began to function on an equal footing in security studies, from their individual (personal) and group scales to the international scale, which made it possible to efficiently associate the issue of *national security culture* with the issues of constructing *security culture* on an international or geopolitical scale. As a result, *security* conditions are analyzed holistically, as one “spectral” phenomenon, which can also be described as *comprehensive security*⁶⁹.

In his work, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, Ralph Linton gave the following definition: “A *culture* is a configuration of learned *behaviors* and *results* of behavior whose component elements are shared and transmitted by the members of a particular *society*”⁷⁰. *Culture*, as the totality of the recorded, accumulated and enriched, mental and material achievements of *societies*, conclusively, often even imperceptibly, influences the “results” studied by security researchers and professionals⁷¹ – *social facts* and *artifacts*.

In *security studies*, we are concerned with such *social facts* and *artifacts* which belong to the *nation’s* heritage of a rather special *nature*⁷², divided into marked *sectors*. This particular heritage and its *nature* make it possible, through the functioning of the elements belonging to its *sectors*, for *society* (*the nation*) to counteract various

⁶⁶ U. Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*, Columbia University Press, New York 1992.

⁶⁷ M. Mamdani, *Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics and Rights and Culture*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2000.

⁶⁸ S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Simon and Schuster, New York 2007.

⁶⁹ M. Schmid, *The Concept of Comprehensive Security: A Distinctive Feature of a Shared Security Culture in Europe*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 2007; <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a475775.pdf> (accessed: 24/12/2011).

⁷⁰ R. Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, Appleton-Century Co, New York 1945, p. 31

⁷¹ Ibidem.

⁷² F. W. Guldenmund, *The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research*, “Safety Science” No. 34, 2000, pp. 215–257.

threats, starting from political and military threats, through threats to its identity, to threats to raw materials, health and economic conditions of its existence.

According to many scholars, the problem of *security*, examined at all scales of counteracting human threats, starting from personal through national, international and global scale, is always rooted in the phenomenon of *culture*⁷³. New problems of *security* appear on the background of formation or changes of *culture* – whether local, in the dimension of whole *societies (nations)*, or on a large scale referring to whole *cultural circles*, such as Euro-American, Orthodox, Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, African or Latin American. The different civilizations existing on Earth and the characteristics of these cultural circles were given by Samuel Huntington with his concept of the “clash of cultures”, concerning the disjunctive alternative between the cooperation of cultural circles and the total confrontation between them⁷⁴.

Representatives of the research community of *security studies* recognize and apply culturalist research methods and models, as indicated by current examples in the literature. For example, scholars John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen believe that because of the problems following the US intervention in Iraq, which concerned the consolidation of US-China relations, or the war with terrorism, scholars and politicians today are becoming more willing to refer to issues of identity and culture⁷⁵.

For example, in the views represented by Stanisław Ossowski the notion of *culture* was associated mainly with the conscious, non-material aspect of human existence. For instance – such social phenomena as *national bonds* and *national consciousness* or others, described as a *legal culture*⁷⁶ – appear as a result of the existence of individual and group imaginations and convictions of *activity subjects (security subjects)*. Stanisław Ossowski, who as a versatile scientist represented humanistic orientation in research concerning the phenomena of the *social world*, perceived the fundamental differences, to which it was absolutely necessary to draw attention (in spite of the existence of certain similarities) in the once frequent attempts at comparisons that had been made between natural sciences and social sciences since the times of August Comte⁷⁷.

⁷³ Cf.: L. W. Zacher, *Jednostkowe i społeczne konteksty i wyzwania dla bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego (Individual and societal security contexts and challenges, [in:] National Security Research Methodology)*, P. Sienkiewicz, M. Marszałek, H. Świeboda (eds.), vol. 3, Academy of National Defence, Warsaw 2012.

⁷⁴ S.P. Huntington, *Wojna cywilizacji? (War of civilisations?)*, “Res Publica Nowa” No. 2(65), February 1994.

⁷⁵ J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C. S. Gray, E. Cohen, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Polish version by W. Nowicki, Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków 2009, p. 88.

⁷⁶ R. Kirkwood-Paterson, A. Dundes-Renteln, *Cultural Law: International, Comparative, and Indigenous*, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York 2010.

⁷⁷ S. Ossowski, *O osobliwościach nauk społecznych (On the peculiarities of social science)*,

Culture is a social phenomenon constituting a set of psychological dispositions that are transmitted in the area of a given human collective through social contacts and interpersonal relations, which in turn depend on the entire social system⁷⁸ in which they occur. In his definition, S. Ossowski expressly exposes the creative domination of mental cultural factors (*1st and 2nd pillar of culture*) over the material substance used for the processes of *culture* formation, which is at the same time indifferent to this particular sub-area of its resources that forms various *sectors* of *national security culture*.

From the definitions of *culture* quoted above, after careful analysis, it follows that the phenomenon of *security* has much in common with the phenomenon of *culture*. *Culture* is a “fixed human achievement”, i.e. a dichotomous, non-material and, at the same time, material entity, which has managed to survive so far, requiring a specific effort to create, discover or build and protect this resource in order to it to be taken over by the successors of its creators.

This established heritage of the *society (nation)*, in turn, as Alain Touraine says⁷⁹, determines the creation of changes in the *entities* that previously contributed to its creation. An “oscillator of social energy” is functioning here, operating in two directions: *society-culture* and *culture-society*. It is also possible to discover facts that clearly indicate that both social phenomena, both *culture* and *security*, function in a very similar manner, in addition to intersecting:

1. **Space and time** are two coexisting parameters that are of parallel significance for *culture* and *security*:
2. **Physical space** is a place necessary for “areas of culture and security” and “areas of threat” to emerge and manifest. At the same time, this *space* allows the achievements of *culture* (including the *national culture of security*) to be disseminated and spread to new territories.
3. **The parameter of time** is the frame of reference in which the process of constructing a *culture of security* takes place on a given territory, which is equivalent to the *process of development* of individuals, social groups and entire *nations*. This development also determines their multi-aspect potentiality, and

Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1962; cf.: Sidney Dekker *Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability*.

⁷⁸ S. Ossowski, *Z zagadnień psychologii społecznej (From the field of social psychology)*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1967; **The social system is created by the whole mutual relations and interactions between the elements constituting the society – individuals, social groups, organisations, institutions aiming at the realisation of their needs and interests in accordance with the accepted social norms; the social system includes the nation as a whole and its subsystems, e.g. the systems of law, the state apparatus, the political system, religious associations; the social system also defines the spheres of activity of the society, e.g. education, politics; the functioning of the social system depends on the mutual relations between the subjects comprising it and on the degree of social awareness of the members of a given nation.**

⁷⁹ A. Touraine, *The Self Production of Society*, Polish version by A. Karpowicz, Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, Kraków 2010, p. 27.

- therefore the level of resistance and how these subjects respond to *threats*, thus influencing their level of *security*.
4. In other words, the ongoing process of *cultural* and *security development* in a *society*, at a given time and in a given territory create systems for countering *threats*. Using the above definition, one could say that, within a certain scope (the scope of the *culture of national security*), the *process of the development of natural culture* can even be considered analogous to *security*.
 5. *Culture* and *security* are not only a kind of “**added value**” in every *society*. They constitute its autonomous *self-defense* potential, which exists in the *subjects* (including the *state*) belonging to a given *nation*. This *self-defense* operates in the sociocultural, military, political, economic, ecological, legal-organizational, health-social, technogenic, or cyber sectors. This is enabled by creating, collecting and recording knowledge, skills and social competencies by members of *society* using all types of physical devices – the artifacts which a given *nation* possesses.
 6. *Culture and security* in relation to *subjects* functioning on the territory of a *state*, down to the personal scale, constitute a mechanism that significantly impacts the way of thinking, methods of acting and attitudes manifested by *security subjects*. This in turn is enabled by such factors, as the **patterns and codes of the culture** which match a given *situation*, processes drawn out in time, or *events*, which take place at points in time. All of these bring with their various needs, values, challenges, opportunities, risks and threats.
 7. Both phenomena, **culture** and **security**, generate specific **dichotomies of effects** that manifest themselves in both non-material and material spheres belonging to people’s *social world*, such as those that underlie identity and self-awareness.
 8. Both *culture (sociocultural system)* and *security (security system)* can serve as a **theoretical models** with explanatory power and applications sufficient to be applied in *security studies*.

The *culture of national security* is characterized by the existence of a strong base element, which serves as the foundation for the locally dominant way of thinking about one’s own place in the *environment of security* and the relations with its remaining participants. This function is fulfilled by the accumulation of national historical experience, which entrenches a specific *system of norms and practices*, acting as a kind of prism through which changes in the security environment are perceived, being at the same time a source of modeling behavior and its main directions (national interests and values). Historical experience, determining through *norms* the spectrum of possible strategies of action, gives legitimacy to the choices made within this framework.

The existence of a correlation between *culture* and *security* can be linked to a specific direction of the behaviour of *security subjects*. This analogy can be defined as a disposition, i.e. a deep, long-lasting interpretative structure, modeling the formulation of basic national interests and constituting the existence and perceived distinctiveness of *national security culture*. The impact of *culture* as a social construct on the level of *national security* seems rather indisputable.

Security Culture and organization culture

It seems that *security culture* in some American and English universities, the content corresponding to security research has a concept known as the *security culture*. Referring to the category of *security culture* is encountered in the world among a considerable number of researchers of the capacious issues covered by the discipline of *Security Science* or related to it transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary research of security problems.

These authors include Nick Pidgeon, the author of *Safety Culture and risk management in Organizations*⁸⁰, or Swedish researcher Sydney Dekker, a tireless promoter of *safety culture* in Organizations⁸¹. Other promoters of the practical use of *Security Science* with a culturalist inclination include John S. Carroll, author of *Safety culture as an ongoing process*⁸², James Reason, *Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice* and Dominic Cooper, *Towards a model of safety culture*⁸³.

Another *safety culture* researcher is Stian Antonsen from Norway, author of *Safety Culture: Theory, Method and Improvement*⁸⁴. Theory, Method and Improvement. In his work, S. Antonsen presents reflections on various relations that occur between the *culture* and safety of an organization. These relationships are, in Antonsen's view, inseparable from the development of *safety culture* as a substrate for an organization's *safety environment*. In his view, this is undoubtedly one of the "hottest topics in *safety research*" and accompanying practical measures to improve the *safety* status at work in such companies where the level of risk is estimated to be high, for example in the oil industry or in aviation.

Such scientific considerations indicate that, for practical purposes, analyses of *safety culture* require a specific segmentation of research spheres. The question of the scientific usefulness of the category of *safety culture* for research conducted by security researchers and professionals, according to Leszek Korzeniowski, is

⁸⁰ N. Pidgeon, *Safety culture and risk management in organizations*, "Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology", No. 22, pp. 129–140; N. Pidgeon, M. O'Leary, *Man-Made Disasters: why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail*, "Safety Science" No. 34, 2000, pp. 15-30.

⁸¹ S. Dekker, *Just culture: Balancing safety and accountability*, Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot–Burlington 2007.

⁸² J. S. Carroll, *Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as opportunities for enquiry and change*, "Work & Stress" 1998, No. 12, pp. 272-284.

⁸³ M. D. Cooper, *Towards a model of safety culture*, "Safety Science" 2000, No. 36, pp. 111-136.

⁸⁴ S. Antonsen, *Safety Culture: Theory, Method and Improvement*, Ashgate, Burlington 2009.

confirmed: “by Zohar”⁸⁵. An American researcher Dove Zohar introduced his own concept into the literature on the subject, which can be treated as an equivalent of the concept of *security culture*. The concept of D. Zohar is about the category he uses – *security climate*. This researcher is the author of the article entitled *Safety Climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications*⁸⁶.

A team of researchers from the State University of Illinois, led by Hui Zhang, comparatively examined the substantive scope of one hundred and seven articles containing the phrases *safety culture* and *safety climate*⁸⁷. The result of the meticulous comparative analysis was the finding of equivalence of the two examined categories – with one minor reservation. This observation boiled down to the mention in the publication by Hui Zhang, Terry von Thaden, Guyan Sharma and Alyssa Mitchell, *Safety Culture: a concept in chaos?*, that the term *safety climate* used by Dove Zohar “includes more psychological aspects than security culture”⁸⁸. In order to avoid further doubts in this case, the Authors conclude – both concepts, in terms of subject matter and research methods, are part of *Security Science*. Therefore, the above-mentioned research categories, containing specific interpretation codes of *security culture*, can be successfully applied in the *Copenhagen school* to the scientific analysis of any *sector of national security culture*.

On the other hand, *organizational culture*, which is clearly related to the ordering of certain processes (and thus to safety), is formed by a set of norms, values and beliefs characteristic of a given organization, to which employees adhere and which determine the way of life (functioning) of human individuals and groups in a given organization.

This *culture* forms the shape of the organization’s “personality”, expressed in different types of artifacts – linguistic, behavioral, or physical⁸⁹. It is shaped by several factors related to the specific characteristics of a given organization, the characteristics of its members, and the external environment. *Safety culture* is a phenomenon that intertwines with *organizational culture*. It is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and behavioral patterns that determine commitment to safety management activities and influence the style and effectiveness of that management. In any organization, its *culture* consists of a set of psychological, social and organizational factors related to the safety management system.

⁸⁵ L. Korzeniowski, *Securitologia. Nauka o bezpieczeństwie (Securitology. The science of security)*..., p. 39.


⁸⁶ D. Zohar, *Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications*, “Journal of Applied Psychology” No. 65, 1980, pp. 96-102.

⁸⁷ Cf.: M. A. Griffin, A. Neal, *Perceptions of safety at work: A framework for linking safety climate to safety*, “Journal of Occupational Health Psychology” Vol. 5 (3), 2000, pp. 347-358; M. D. Cooper, R. A. Phillips, *Exploratory analysis of the safety climate and safety behavior relationship*, “Journal of Safety Research” Vol. 35, No. 5, 2004, pp. 497-512.

⁸⁸ H. Zhang, D. A. Wiegmann, T. L. von Thaden, T. L. von Thaden, G. Sharma, A. A. Mitchell, *Safety Culture: a concept in chaos?*, “Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings” No. 46 (15), 2002, pp. 12-25.

⁸⁹ E. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Jossey-Brass Publishing, San Francisco 1986, pp. 12-13.

 FACTORS AFFECTING ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE



Source: A.K. Koźmiński, W. Piotrowski, *Zarządzanie. Teoria i praktyka*, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1995.

Factors related to an organization's culture also significantly influence its??? *safety culture*. A higher *safety culture* can certainly be observed in *safety systems* where organizational culture processes have been implemented.

A holistic approach to security culture research

The Copenhagen concept makes it possible to analyze the *established heritage* of *societies (nations)*, seen from the perspective of *security (culture)*, in intellectually "extracted" *sectors* and scales of *security subjects*, from individual through social, national to international. Building on *constructivism*, the *Copenhagen School* has also adapted elements of the achievements of other security theories, both in relation to the "microcosm" of the human individual and to the "macrocosm" of *nations* and their *states*.

The Copenhagen School aggregates several methods useful in *Security Science* (or *security studies*). It brings together developments in the fields of idealism, realism, conflict and peace studies, the critical stream, constructivism and the *Cultural Turn* that accompanies constructivism in *security studies*. This method, after the above-mentioned analyses, requires a return to the synthesis of research results in order to obtain a complete assessment of the level of *security culture* possessed by the studied *security subject*.

The Copenhagen School, like *constructivism*, is intended by its representatives to be a kind of bridge built between the *realistic* and *idealistic (liberal) theories of security studies*. At this point it is worth making a recapitulation, allowing us to recall the “spectral” picture of the components of the holistic scientific approach of the creators of the discussed stream of *security studies*.

Idealism – through idealism, the *Copenhagen School* recognizes such irreplaceable determinants of *security* as *ideas, values, social norms* (including *natural law* representing *moral norms* and *positive law*⁹⁰) and *harmonious cooperation*. The importance of all of these for *security*, although intangible in nature, is unquestionable. In other words, it is not true that intangible elements are something indeterminate to the *nature of security culture*⁹¹. On the contrary, they are important for the existence of positives and negatives, let us call them “ways of using matter” by man. Idealism, now transformed into liberalism, brings together views on state-society relations in which domestic politics, individual human rights and the protection of private property are important. Liberals advocate the application of moral and ethical standards and international law to relations between *nation-states*, noting the need to harmonize the interests of these *states*. Idealism emphasizes the importance of strengthening education, the development of *civil society*, economic development and institutional reform. This current of modern thought influences the *nature of national security culture* through ideas introduced into Western culture by Immanuel Kant, a thinker from Königsberg. In addition to Immanuel Kant (*comprehensive idealism*, eighteenth century), Charles Louis Montesquieu (eighteenth century), John Locke (*political idealism*, seventeenth century), Adam Smith (*economic idealism*, eighteenth century), Thomas Paine (one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, eighteenth century) and Woodrow Wilson⁹² (nineteenth/twentieth centuries) can be considered the main pioneers of idealism/liberalism in *security studies*. Today, scholars such as John Stuart Mill, Ludwig von Mises, Isaiah Berlin, John A. Hobson, Leonard Hobhouse, Milton Friedman, Robert Keohane, Reinhold Niebuhr, among others, are relevant to this field. Contemporary representative works

⁹⁰ *Ius Naturale* – *natural law* can also be regarded as a *social construct*, without necessarily referring to its supernatural origin – as in Parsons’ concept of the *religion of mankind (religion of morality)*. Hugo Grotius, who is the creator of the modern version of *Natural Law*, believes that it is a moral code expressing the unchangeable human nature, and learning about this code is possible through a detailed knowledge of the *social nature of man*, including the analysis of the factors of the *second pillar of security culture*; W. Piwowarski, *Socjologia religii. Antologia tekstów (Sociology of Religion. An anthology of texts)*, Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, Kraków 2007, s. 12.

⁹¹ R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville–London 1996.

⁹² W. Wilson, *The New Freedom. A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People*, Garden City Doubleday, Page & Company, New York 1913.

of this trend are *Two Concepts of Liberty* by I. Berlin⁹³ and the work of R. Niebuhr entitled *Moral, Man and Immoral Society*⁹⁴.

Realism in *Security Science* exposes the crucial role of the *state* in *security studies*. It also identifies the anarchic nature of interstate relations, which has implications for *international security* and *national security* issues. Modern realism developed after the Second World War, and its origins can be found in the English thinker Thomas Hobbes (16th/17th centuries) and the Italian Niccolò Machiavelli (15th/16th centuries). The main theorists of modern *realism* include Edward Carr⁹⁵, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Kenneth Waltz and Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski. Scholarly works representative of the *realism* trend includes Hans Morgenthau's⁹⁶ *Struggle for Power and Peace*, Stephen Walt's⁹⁷ *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*, and the work of the founder of *power transition theory*⁹⁸, Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski, entitled *World Politics*⁹⁹. Representatives of *realism*, such as Randall Schweller, see that "the multifaceted processes of the state's internal policy form a sort of transmission process, which channels reactions to external forces [...], mediates, directs or corrects them"¹⁰⁰.

Constructivism (social constructionism) – is a research current that has managed to emerge in the *social sciences* from sociology, with inspiration from philosophers. It became widespread with the increasing popularity of postmodern theory. It is based on the conviction that people perceive the *social world*¹⁰¹ through the prism of the *culture* built by society, attributing specific meanings to what is perceived at a given moment, and therefore it is impossible to observe objective reality in isolation from the meanings and contexts given to *social reality*. *Constructivism* is also sometimes referred to as a *non-classical sociology of knowledge*. *Constructivism* is based

⁹³ I. Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Polish version by D. Grinberg, [in:] *Dwie koncepcje wolności i inne eseje (Two concepts of freedom and other essays)*, J. Jedlicki, (ed.), ResPublica, Warsaw 1991.

⁹⁴ R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics*, Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville–London 2007.

⁹⁵ E. H. Carr, *The New Society*, Macmillan, London 1951, p. 111 and next.

⁹⁶ H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill Inc., New York 1993.

⁹⁷ S. Walt, *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*, "International Security" No 9(4), 1985, pp. 1–43.

⁹⁸ R. L. Tammen, J. Kugler, D. Lemke, C. Alsharabati, B. Efirid, A. F. K. Organski, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*, Seven Bridges Press, Chatham House, New York 2000.

⁹⁹ A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, Knopf, New York 1968.

¹⁰⁰ R. L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006, p. 6.

¹⁰¹ Cf.: A. Schütz, *O wielości światów. Szkice z socjologii fenomenologicznej (On the multiplicity of worlds. Sketches from phenomenological sociology)*, Polish version by B. Jabłońska, Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS Kraków 2008.

on the assumption that *reality* is “socially constructed”. This theory was greatly influenced by the work of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*¹⁰², published in New York in 1966. Constructivists, however, without losing sight of the achievements of *realism* and *idealism*, criticize realists for reifying such notions as the *nation-state*, *national interest*, or *state power*. Realists are objectively given, independent of consciousness, while constructivists show their social basis, as the *interest of the state* consists of strands of the historically and culturally variable (conditioned) identity of the *nation-state*. Constructivists have recognized the underlying components of the nature of security culture, going back to its social basis. This strand presents a general theory of society for which *security* is an *instrumental value*¹⁰³ serving the continuity of social development. *Constructivists* “drawing on a combination of sociological approaches and critical theory, (...) argue that the world is constituted socially through intersubjective interaction; that agents and structures are mutually constituted; and that ideational factors such as *norms*, *identity*, and *ideas* [combining the *1st* and *2nd pillar of the culture of national security* in problem theory] generally are central to the constitution and dynamics of world politics”¹⁰⁴. The leading representatives of *constructivism* include, for example, Alexander Wendt¹⁰⁵, Nicholas Onuf¹⁰⁶, John G. Ruggie¹⁰⁷, and Friedrich Kratochwil¹⁰⁸. A work that is representative of constructivist thought and at the same time corresponds to the subject matter of this paper is a book by Peter Joachim Katzenstein entitled *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*¹⁰⁹.

Conflict and peace research is another strand of *security studies* that has a polemological-irenological orientation, but is often treated as two separate strands of research: *war research* (polemology), and *peace research* (irenology). They transferred very important threads, rarely present in the

¹⁰² T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, MacMillan Publishing Company, New York 1967; P. L. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Anchor Publ., New York 1966.

¹⁰³ K. Booth, *Human Wrongs and International Relations*, “International Affairs” No. 71(1), 1995, pp. 103–126.

¹⁰⁴ *Studia bezpieczeństwa (Security studies)*, P.D. Williams (ed.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2012, p. 60.

¹⁰⁵ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.

¹⁰⁶ N. Onuf, *Constructivism: A User's Manual*, [in:] P. Kowert, V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, M. E. Sharpe, New York–London 1998.

¹⁰⁷ J. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, Routledge, London–New York, 1998.

¹⁰⁸ F. Kratochwil, *Religion and (Inter-) National Politics: On The Heuristics of Identities, Structures and Agents*, “Alternatives: Global, Local, Political” 2005, No. 30, pp. 113–115.

¹⁰⁹ P. J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York 1989.

former security research methods, which are also non-military aspects of security, to the Copenhagen School. Theories of armed conflict can be divided into two types. The first is the micro-scale and subjectivist theories, where human nature is the source of war. Macro-scale and objectivist theories, on the other hand, are based on a realist approach or systems theories. A figure symbolizing the first trend is Theodore Roosevelt (ruled in the years: 1901-1909), a believer in the expansive nature of the US historical mission. The personal symbol of the second trend is Woodrow Wilson (ruled in the years: 1913-1921), referring to the universal democratic values that the USA should promote in the world, based on international law, on the peaceful cooperation of *nation-states*, on the construction of a new world order in the spirit of idealism, morality, consent between the *subjects of national and international security*, which are *states*.

Critical (security studies) emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. Critical concepts are intertwined with *social constructivism*, the research aims at using the perspective reaching to the primary causes of both phenomena – *threat* and *security*, which lie in the course of historical processes that underlie them. Stephen M. Walt's work entitled *One World, Many Theories*¹¹⁰. Stephen Walt recognized idealism, constructivism and realism as the three pillars of universal *security theory* (these are theoretical equivalents of the nsc pillars); together with the *Copenhagen school*, they form the critical quadrangle – the *Welsh school* (security as emancipation), the *Paris school* (securitization in politics), the *human security school* (human security in a broad sense). Fatalne, ale bioraće! The *critical current*, which was framed by the *Copenhagen concept*, aroused the conviction about the significance of social discourse and social construction of the phenomenon of *security culture*.

The cultural turn in security studies. Initially, in the 1990s, the *cultural turn* was related to the problems of *strategic culture* and *organizational culture*. Later, the need to study security in the context of culture, anthropology, sociological reflection, or literature was also recognized.

This *cultural turn* was characterized by interdisciplinarity, which was initiated in Europe as a concept competing with the powerful approach to *security studies* dominating in the USA. Of relevance here is Peter J. Katzenstein's academic work on the *culture of national security*, entitled *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*¹¹¹.

The above *résumé* leaves no doubt that such an aggregated, *established body of security research* is a theoretical tool derived from the *social sciences* to explore the

¹¹⁰ S. Walt, *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*, "Foreign Policy" No. 110, pp. 29-46.

¹¹¹ P. J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*...

potential of *national security culture*, leading to an understanding of this potential across sectors and four social scales of *security subjects*.

For, as Alain Touraine notes, “*the cultural model establishes sets of variables, systems*”¹¹². A. Touraine also points out that, as applied in *social sciences*, “*the cultural model requires the use of social resources and the implementation of the principle of order*”¹¹³.

Both of these established elements of the *nation's* achievements show their materialization in the *security sectors*, the concept of which was developed by Barry Buzan and his colleagues, and which is interpreted here by the author as *sectors of national security culture*. At this point in the present study, the holism of the “Copenhagen” *security sectors* introduces a balance whereby Buzan’s *sectors*, in addition to the *1st* and *2nd pillar of national security culture (nsc)*, also begin to encompass the material area, represented in the theory of the problem by the *3rd pillar of national security culture*.

Let us emphasize that thanks to the *Copenhagen school* the reduction of *security research* to the role of *nation-states*, so far treated as homogeneous *subjects of security*, was abandoned in the state-centric approach to the research on this problem. The term *Copenhagen School* is associated with the methodology adopted while directing scientific work conducted at the *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute COPRI*, founded in 1985 and currently (since 2003) incorporated into the *Danish Institute for International Studies*.

By the way, in Poland *international relations* are not included in the ministerial list of areas of science and scientific disciplines¹¹⁴. Some security researchers or geopolitical scientists even consider that the theory of *international relations* and the scientific exploration of reality conducted by their means is based on “controversial premises”.

In their view, *international relations* theory escapes the rigours of scientific verifiability. They claim that *international relations* are an attempt to describe reality by overinterpreting facts and manipulating history.

As Przemysław Mikiewicz points out, “*the theory of international relations* conceived as an attempt to objectively discover the alleged laws and mechanisms governing international life is doomed to balance between a cliché and absurd”¹¹⁵.

¹¹² A. Touraine, *The Self Production of Society*, p. 69.

¹¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 71.

¹¹⁴ Regulation of Polish Minister of Science and Higher Education of 8 August 2011 on the areas of knowledge, fields of science and art, and scientific and artistic disciplines (Journal of Laws of 30 August 2011, No. 179, item 1065, as amended).

¹¹⁵ P. Mikiewicz, *Między banałem a absurdem: istota teorii stosunków międzynarodowych (Between the banal and the absurd: the essence of international relations theory)*, [in:] J. Dyduch, P. Mikiewicz, S. Rzeszółtko, *Krytyczne wprowadzenie do teorii stosunków międzynarodowych (A critical introduction to international relations theory)*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum, Wrocław 2006, p. 172.

It can also be noted that the predictive function of *international relations* has failed when it comes to predicting the fact of the superpower collapse – the Soviet Union.

However, one must also objectively admit that the directions and research currents that have been initiated in this sub-discipline of political science do a good job of fulfilling the tasks that should be fulfilled by the *functions of theory* in the discipline of *Security Science*.

The very name *Copenhagen School* comes from the phrase used by Bill McSweeney in 1994 when reviewing the scientific papers that emerged as a result of the scientific research conducted by Barry Buzan's team¹¹⁶.

The theoretical output contained in this European concept, emerging with the participation of an international team of researchers, should be divided into the following four segments:

1. Scales of security subjects (subject approach):
 - a) *individual* – an individual human being,
 - b) *group* – human collective (conventional for a given place and time, most often within a nation, small or medium social group),
 - c) *national* – a large human collective, society-nation,
 - d) *international*.
2. Security sectors – sectoral analysis of the security issue (object approach).
3. The concept of securitization – the theory of politicization, enabling the use of emergency measures in the name of security (subject approach).
4. Regional security complexes – the theory of linking the *national security* of a group of *nation-states* (object approach).

¹¹⁶ Barry Gordon Buzan (born on 28.04.1946), professor of *international security studies* at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen. From 1988 to 2002 he was project director at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). From 1995 to 2002 Professor of International Studies at the University of Westminster. In 1993 he was Visiting Professor at the International University in Japan, from 1997 to 1998, he was Visiting Professor in Sweden. He was President of the British International Studies Association (1988-1990). From 1999 to 2011, he was coordinator of the academic research project of the English School of International Security Studies, from 2004 to 2008, editor of the *European Journal of International Relations*. In 1998 Barry Buzan was elected a Member of the British Academy. He was at the London School of Economics until 2012. Buzan together with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde created *the theory of security sectors, regional security complexes and securitization theory*, which are the main elements of *the Copenhagen concept of security studies*.

The Copenhagen Research Group with figures such as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver¹¹⁷, Jaap de Wilde¹¹⁸, came to meet the growing interest of political circles in the problem of how the phenomenon of *security* functions in world politics, at the same time causing significant changes that affect the *national security* of individual *states*. Interest in broadening the spectrum of *security studies* grew after the end of the Cold War.

When the Cold War confrontation between East and West came to an end, it was time to dig deeper and at the same time take a broader look at the causes of the threats that man and the organizations he creates face in his existence. The nature of the image of *national security culture* from the “pre-Buzan period” was predominantly created from a *realist* perspective. It was now to become more holistic.

The notion of holism was introduced in the 1920s by Jan Smuts¹¹⁹, author of the work entitled *Holism and Evolution*. This trend applies to the theory of development, according to which the essential feature of the world is its holistic, organic character. Holism is a trend successfully exploited in the methodology of social sciences, because social phenomena, including safety culture, are subject to rules that cannot be reduced to regularities concerning their separately treated components.

According to Dariusz Czywilis, a long-standing barrier in conducting *security studies* has been the reluctance of many researchers to go beyond the commonly used understanding of the concept of *security*, if only through a *holistic approach*, which, however, was finally proposed in the constructivist approach of the creators of the *Copenhagen School*¹²⁰.

¹¹⁷ Ole Wæver (born 17.09.1960) Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. He is one of the founders of the Copenhagen School. Before becoming a professor at the University of Copenhagen, O. Wæver was a research fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (1985–99). His research interests include international relations theory, conflict studies, Danish security and defence policy, security theory; Wæver was a member of the government’s Commission for Security and Disarmament Affairs from 1993 to 1995. He is a member of the editorial boards of the Journal of International Affairs and Security Dialogue, among others.

¹¹⁸ Jaap de Wilde (Jacobus Hubertus, born 17.05.1957) was Professor of International Security Studies at the University of Groningen, from 2007 he was Head of the Department of International Relations in 2008 and 2012. From 2001 to 2007 he was Professor of European Security Studies in the Department of Political Science, VU University Amsterdam, and from 1995 to 2007 researcher in European Studies at the Centre for European Studies (CES), University of Twente. From 1993 to 1995 he worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).

¹¹⁹ *Holism is a view in the theory and methodology of the social sciences that rejects methodological individualism, proclaiming that each social phenomenon forms a holistic system*; J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, Mac Millan Co. Ltd., London 1927.

¹²⁰ D. Czywilis, *Pojęcie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w ujęciu teorii konstruktywizmu*, “Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego” (*The concept of international security in terms of constructivist theory*, ‘International Security Yearbook’), University of Lower Silesia in Wrocław, 2007, p. 269, http://www.rocznikbezpieczenstwa.dsw.edu.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/wydawnictwo/RBM/RBM_artykuly/2007_20.pdf (accessed: 14/09/2014.).

It can be considered, in the author's opinion, that only the concept of the *Copenhagen School*, together with the applied constructivist approach, gave this kind of scientific view of the *security* phenomenon, which is characterized by comprehensiveness and holism. Let us add that it is precisely this research perspective that meets the demand associated with a particular attribute of *Security Science*, which is *transdisciplinarity* and the associated *holism*, necessary at the synthesis stage in this branch of science.

Holism is also linked to the theory of the *development process*, whose existence is identified with security and understood as a process. The holistic theory recognizes that an essential feature of the world is its holistic nature. Cultural anthropology applied to *security studies* makes the associated *holism* inspire a holistic view of *national security culture* and causes a careful study of cultural factors and the functions that the nature of security culture plays in the various *sectors of national security*.

The programmatic complementarity of the scientific interpretation of a wide spectrum of security problems has resulted in the *Copenhagen School*, as it is argued, structuring the *security* phenomenon on three levels – the human individual, *society (nation)* and the international level. However, in reality, we are dealing with four levels of research in *Security Science*, referring to *the scale of the individual, the scale of small and medium-sized communities (e.g. families and neighbors and local communities), the national scale (society) and the supranational scale* (not necessarily only of an international character).

The adoption of such a structure in *security theory*, created by B. Buzan's team at COPRI, resulted in the elimination of a major gap that had existed in previous *security research*. This gap consisted of the lack of a theoretical link between *national security studies* and *international security* issues. This was due to the centuries-long influence of the Westphalian order¹²¹ on the course of relations between *nation-states*, in which the *state* was the only respected *security subject*.

In addition, it should be noted that the departure from the state-centric approach to security studies indirectly sealed the end of a rather bleak period that lasted for 50 years of the 20th century (from the late 1930s to the end of 1990), an era that saw the triumph of large-scale, dehumanized, and by all means inhumane "social engineering", characteristic of 20th-century totalitarianism and the accompanying dangerous mindset of some of the great ruling figures of the time. The merit of B.

¹²¹ The year 1998 marked the 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Peace treaties often become milestones in the processes of history, and the Peace of Westphalia, seen from this point of view, was certainly a unique event. The signing of the Peace Treaty in 1648 put an end to the troublesome Thirty Years' War in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia sanctioned the application of the principle of state sovereignty. This meant that each of the signatories to the treaty recognised the territories of the other parties and could not interfere in their internal politics. A new Europe was born, a continent of sovereign states.

Buzan is that, with his holistic approach to *security studies*, he has filled this gap and exploited it in a creative way.

Barry Buzan considered that *security*, using the perspective of *security studies* adopted here, which can be applied to the question of *Security Science* without any obstacles, is a fundamental concept and only the process of *mapping* it takes the researcher into the sphere of international relations¹²². One thus gets the impression that the breakthrough made by Buzan's team has led, among other things, to a complete reversal of the scientific perspective applied to *security studies*.

The author believes that one may even risk stating that B. Buzan and his team have *de facto* turned the hitherto current of *international relations* into a sub-discipline of *security studies*. As noted at the beginning of the description of the *Copenhagen School*, Barry Buzan's theory is a complementary combination of elements of *idealism*, *realism (neorealism)*, and *constructivism*. Therefore, four levels (*scales*) of security culture can be derived: the level of the individual's safety culture;

- 1) the level of social groups' safety culture;
- 2) the level of national security culture;
- 3) the level of international security culture.

Between the first and so far "second" (here already the third) level of security (or *scales of security*) is the *scale of security culture of social groups*, i.e. smaller communities than the *society* forming the *nation* (primary groups, i.e. families and secondary groups – for example, professional groups or local communities).

Thus, one can assume, for the constructivist approach to the phenomenon of *national security culture*, its four-level structure: *individual – social group – society (nation) – the international community*. In any case, since the conception of the *Copenhagen School* was presented, the different levels of security – personal, social, national and international – have been one of the fundamental elements also for many other research streams of security issues.

The adoption, as Buzan defines it, of *security scales*, from the individual to the international scale, makes it possible to combine the issues of *culture* with *national security*, and by linking these concepts to the existence of all mankind, it makes it possible to analyze *national security culture* holistically, as a spectral, multi-threaded phenomenon – i.e. *comprehensive security*¹²³.

Sectoral analysis of security culture

Sector analysis is another breakthrough in *security studies*, perhaps even more significant than the slightly earlier constructivist breakthrough in *security studies*.

¹²² B. Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for...*

¹²³ M. Schmid, *The Concept of Comprehensive Security: A Distinctive Feature of a Shared Security Culture in Europe*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 2007.

However, it can be considered that the *Copenhagen school* with its innovations introduced to the discussed research problem, which also inspired representatives of *Security Science*, crowns the securitological achievements of *constructivism*, from which it originated. By introducing a new concept of *security sectors*, which had not yet been used in security theory, B. Buzan wanted to overcome the limitations inherent in *security research*, based on its previously used dichotomous division into *national security* and *international security*.

B. Buzan and his team aimed at broadening the meaning of the definition (redefinition) of *security*. So far researchers dealing in *security studies* have traditionally narrowed down the object of their study. They have ignored the significant achievements of security sociologists, criminologists, security anthropologists, philosophers of security, praxeologists, psychologists, polemologists and irenologists. It has been assumed that the term *security* should only denote issues that *de facto* have become stuck at the sharply-defined borders of the set of possible threats. War and the death it brings (in this context actually the “death” of the state) as well as peace and the geopolitically understood survival of the *state* were the limits of this compartment and the main problems of scientific cognition for security studies before the Copenhagen opening of the borders of *security studies*.

That approach made it impossible to study military and political causes of internal and external disorders which afflict the processes of the development of a *nation* and its *state*, causes which turned out to be broader than expected. When one manages to look at these processes holistically, one can see that they involve a spectrum of different *security subjects*, which can be classified into four scales – individual/group/nation/world and processes in established *security sectors*. In *grand theories of security*, everyday actions of humans and current processes resulting from the need to do “grassroots work”¹²⁴, which is necessary to develop a *culture of security* at personal, collective and national levels, were, if not “off the radar”, then certainly a secondary concern.

It can be considered that the former *great theories of security* degraded the problems associated with, for example, common or organized crime, the problems of the crisis of values resulting in a lowering of the culture of trust and demoralization, poverty, disease and other phenomena straining the edifice of the *culture of national security*, becoming the causes of threat development.

Such issues could of course be addressed using already existing solutions involving the enforcement of laws and public order, but doing so usually resulted in

¹²⁴ The term *grassroots work* is used metaphorically to express the idea of self-sacrificial economic, educational and cultural efforts for the benefit of people which forms the basis of a nation; the idea was popularised by Polish positivist writers and journalists; I use the term to refer to building a culture of security from the ground up, i.e. starting with the beliefs and attitudes of all individuals forming a given collective, before moving on to research solutions on a broader scale, and even then remaining open to constant, parallel applications of personal and family-oriented securitological approaches as the basis for the *culture of security*.

costly and generally inefficient “fights against the effects” of negative phenomena, without actually addressing their real causes, which did not allow to nip them in the bud. Such an approach had to reduce, at individual and social levels, the effectiveness of the implementing function contained in the *theory of security*, as well as deteriorate the quality of the predictive function. This meant that it was *de facto* forgotten in *security studies* that it is better to prevent threats, starting at the social *micro-scale*, than to counteract them when they have already developed strongly.

Security research from the “pre-Buzan” period is associated with the domination of those researchers who leaned mainly towards a hard global *realism*, without taking into account the popular message of trying to *think globally and act locally*¹²⁵. This situation was the result of influences characteristic of the period of the Cold War, when the memory of earlier conflicts, especially powerful ones with global reach, was still vivid. This self-limitation of *security studies* was finally broken in an unprecedented manner that focused on a holistic approach. This research breakthrough was the result of the work of the research team led by Barry Buzan – the creator of the *Copenhagen school* methodology.

The approach used by Buzan’s team demonstrated that parallel to *national security* and the integral nature of the *nation-state* – the role of which in the creation of the resources of the *culture of national security* was never disputed by Buzan – the need for the *security of identity* and *cultural conditions* of a given *community* – even local community – can and should be discussed, as well as the scope of security which constitutes a significant need of every individual human being.

In such cases, *threats* can assume even relatively inconspicuous forms which do not always affect the physical existence of humans, but which are still significant, seeing as, should they be left unmitigated, they might bring about e.g. a regime change, an effect which is not as inconspicuous as its causes could have seemed. Let

¹²⁵ *Think globally, act locally: glocalisation*, is an effect of globalisation which resulted from the friction between locality and globality; it encompasses global production of goods, services, ideas, values, information and actions, which take into consideration the local needs to a degree which allows for the acceptance, assimilation and finally treating as one’s own the products and behaviours which make their way to local communities; glocalisation is the adaptation of global products and actions to the needs of local communities; originally, the term referred to the economy, denoting the application of global strategies to local conditions; the term was transplanted to the field of *social sciences* by Roland Robertson, who defined glocalisation as the adaptation of global actions to local conditions; the essence of such actions can be expressed using the phrase: “*think globally, act locally*”; according to Arjun Appadurai, the author of *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation*, Polish version by Z. Pucek, Ed. Universitas, Kraków 2005, the model of how the world functions is determined by the actions of the centre and its peripheries, as described by Immanuel Wallerstein (*Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991), and is insufficient to determine the new, global situation of *culture*, as it does not take into consideration the localisation of factors which penetrate from the peripheries to the centre; new *cultural forms* adapt to local needs and customs; complex processes of interpreting and adapting global content take place, as well as hybridisation.

us emphasize one more time – in order to end the persistence of the above limitations in security studies, such researchers as Barry Buzan, Jaap de Vilde or Ole Wæver have applied an epistemological methodology on a micro/macro scale, starting from individual security through the security of social groups, national security, going to international security, and finally – touching upon the global dimension of the security phenomenon.

In his article *New Patterns of Global Security in the twenty-first century*¹²⁶, B. Buzan included a list of concepts he distinguished – the spheres of security defined as *security sectors (cultures)*.

In the Copenhagen School, in its initial proposal that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the following sectors of *national security culture* were identified:

- 1) the political sector;
- 2) the military sector;
- 3) the economic sector;
- 4) the socio-cultural sector;
- 5) the ecological sector.

This is an extremely important part of B. Buzan's concept, which, together with the three scales of security, constitutes a distinctive feature of the *Copenhagen school*. The researcher, consistently adhering to a holistic research formula, claims that the analyzed *five sectors*, which are *de facto* sectors of *security culture*, do not operate separately, but in isolation from each other. Each describes an area comprising a given group of issues related to *security*, as well as the method of setting priorities, and all the above-mentioned spheres are strongly connected by a network of interrelations¹²⁷. This in turn, after the stage of analysis, imposes on the researcher the obligation to return to the synthesis of previously analyzed issues, in order to obtain correct conclusions, having a holistic, often transdisciplinary character.

It should also be noted that the creators of the *Copenhagen School*, while searching for some "golden mean" during their research, strongly emphasized the importance of the *socio-cultural (identity)* sector for the output that determines the level of *national security*, which makes their idea close to the concept of *national security culture*. As Wojciech Kostecki put it, "It was in this [*socio-cultural*] field that they saw the greatest problems"¹²⁸, focusing mainly on two *subjects of security* – *society (nation)* and the *nation-state*. The author of this paper, in the concept he created, presents ten sectors of national security culture, as an extended, culturalist option of the Copenhagen school (which could be described as the Kraków school), with a description and discussion of selected elements of these national security culture sectors.

¹²⁶ B. Buzan, *New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, [in:] "International Affairs" Vol. 67, pp. 431-451.

¹²⁷ Ibidem, p. 433.

¹²⁸ W. Kostecki, *Strach i potęga. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku (Fear and Power. International security in the 21st century)*, Wydawca Poltext, Warsaw 2012, p. 106.

1. The military sector of national security culture. During the Cold War period, the established body of work of *societies* forming the *military sector of national security culture* almost completely overtook *security studies*. At that time, it was mainly concerned with the arms race, the study of its controllability, and the problems of the balance of powers. Today, the military factor no longer plays a dominant role in the creation of *national security culture*, but the military sphere of the *nsc* builds the state's resilience in the event of an armed conflict or the threat of a state of war. Activated *military threats* have the maximum scale of intensity (as highlighted in the diagram below on the number of World War II casualties)¹²⁹ in relation to most other known threats, except for the effects of major cataclysms, which are associated with periodically increased activation of natural forces¹³⁰.

COUNTRIES THAT LOST THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE

data in millions, percentage of population loss in brackets

USSR	China	German Reich	Poland
27	10,3	7,2	6
(13,8%)	(2%)	(10,4%)	(17,1%)
Jews*	Japan	Yugoslavia	Romania
5,8	2,68	1,62	0,9
(32,2%)	(3,7%)	(10,8%)	(4,5%)
France	Greece	Great Britain	Italy
0,5	0,49	0,46	0,45
(1,2%)	(7%)	(0,95%)	(1,1%)
Hungary	Netherlands	USA	Finland
0,38	0,26	0,3	0,1
(3,8%)	(2,9%)	(0,35%)	(3,7%)

* The number contains deaths of Jews in all warzones; the percentage is derived in relation to the whole population of Jews from all over the world and estimated at around 18 mln before the war.

Source: Calculations based on information from books: N. Davies, *Europa walczy*, Znak 2008 and P. Darmann, *Statystyki II wojny światowej*, Aka 2011.

¹²⁹ http://wyborcza.pl/alehistoria/1,144823,17844725,Ile_milionow_zginelo__Ofiary_II_wojny_swiatowej.html, (accessed: 28/06/2013).

¹³⁰ For example, 2010 was a year of cataclysms; natural disasters killed 300,000 people, economic losses amounted to 130 billion dollars, according to the German insurance company Munich Re; earthquake in Haiti - death of 222,000 people, severe heat in Russia - about 56,000 deaths from fires and poisoning of the atmosphere and high temperatures, earthquake in Chile - 2,700 dead, economic losses approx. 30 billion dollars; in Pakistan 1760 people died in floods, material losses 9,5 billion dollars; storm Xynthia, in Western Europe – 6.1 billion dollars in losses; <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/225352/Rok-2010-rokiem-katakliizmow-sily-natury-zabily-300-tysiecy-osob/> (accessed: 21/06/2013).

Military threats can affect all elements of the *security subject* that is the *nation-state*, posing a significant threat to the survival of the *nation* and its *state*. The *nation-state* in some sense is also a social construct, if we identify it with the *society* existing in it, which has the right to believe that “the state - is us”¹³¹, i.e. the *society* organized into a *state*. The emergence of a threat attributed to the *military sector of the nsc* may cause very serious difficulties in fulfilling the basic, constitutional¹³² duty of the state to protect the security of all its citizens at a satisfactory level. Directing the potentiality of the *military sector of the nsc* indicates that “the values to be protected [based on the potentiality of this *sector*] are territorial integrity and the defence of the territory [of the *state*] against external aggression of a military nature (external sovereignty)”¹³³. The areas of research and action taken by the *nation-state* in the *military sector of the nsc* include the defensive and offensive potential of the *nation-state* and the intentions included in its policies. As B. Buzan notes, when it comes to a *state's internal security*, *military threats* can negatively affect the sphere of social and individual interest¹³⁴. In Europe and in Poland, the intensity of the problems experienced in the first *sector of the nsc* diminished after the end of the Cold War, so resources and activities in this sphere were directed towards strengthening and building the European security complex¹³⁵, together with NATO¹³⁶, the political-military alliance of the states of Western Europe, the United States of America, Canada and Turkey. This in turn leads us to the issue of the functioning of the *second sector of national security culture*, which is related to the political sphere.

2. Political Sector of Security Culture. The political *sector of security culture*. The political sector of national security culture is based on human achievement that allows it to address challenges to the security policy of the *nation-state*. These challenges are external aspects and stimuli for the development of *national security culture*. For example, the transformation of the international order, which took place at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, can give rise to new international situations. These create threats to *national security*, including internal threats to the stability of political systems of *nation-states* and external threats to *national security*. From the perspective of the *political*

¹³¹ Cf.: P. Buhler, *Power in the 21st Century*, Polish version by G. Majcher, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warsaw 2014 (*State as a social construction*), p. 103.

¹³² Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 5 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item 483).

¹³³ K. Żukowska, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Przegląd aktualnego stanu (International Security. An overview of the current situation)*, IUSatTAX, Warsaw 2011.

¹³⁴ B. Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for...*, p. 119.

¹³⁵ Cf.: for more on the *security complex* see W. Kostecki, *Europe after the Cold War. The security complex theory*, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 1996, p. 217–218.

¹³⁶ M. Marszałek, *System zarządzania kryzysowego NATO jako przedmiot badań dyscypliny nauk o bezpieczeństwie*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego ((NATO crisis management system as an object of research of the security sciences discipline, [in:] National security research methodology))*, P. Sienkiewicz, M. Marszałek, H. Świeboda (eds.), vol. 3, Academy of National Defence, Warsaw 2012.

sector of national security culture, the internal threat concerns the issue of *internal security of the state*, integrally connected with public order and governance, with the stability of the political system of the state and with its organizational and economic efficiency (*praxeological function of the state*). This, in turn, is significantly related to the quality of political elites that bring together the leading representatives of society. That is why any threats to the quality of the *nsc*, which arise as a result of errors in the policy of the *nation-state* in the field of education and the *educational function* implemented within it, will negatively affect the potential of the *society* from which the elites are drawn. In other words, the quality of the educational and upbringing policy of the *state* contributes to how high the intellectual and moral potential of the *society* is, and thus the level of quality of its representatives considered as the elite, which influences the internal and external policies of the *state* and has an authority adequate to its quality. *Social authority* is a necessary element for leaders to gain wide public support needed to raise the *national security* potential of the *state*. This brings us to the third, perhaps the most important in the view of the *Copenhagen School*, *sector of national security culture*.

3. The socio-cultural (identity) sector of national security culture. According to Barry Buzan, the issues of the socio-cultural *sector of national security culture*, which can also be referred to as the *identity sector of the nsc*, are the established achievements of *society*, which are responsible for the level of dynamics of development processes, the protection of national culture and *identity*, including traditions, the national language, religion and customs¹³⁷. The issues of this *sector of the nsc* include the issues of the sense of identity among the citizens of the *state*¹³⁸ and the important *social consciousness* for its potentiality. In line with the terminology of this work, socio-cultural security should not be confused with *social security*, also known as societal security. The *nsc* sector refers primarily to issues of *national identity* and the established achievements of *society*, rather than to so-called societal politics. When discussing the *identity sector of the nsc*, it is necessary to devote more space to characterizing its functioning through the prism of looking at the role of national elites, in particular political elites. “Healthy” elites are important for a *state* responsibly building its *national security culture*. The quality of elites is a function and at the same time a proxy for the quality of *social consciousness* and the moral and intellectual level of a given *society*¹³⁹. Representatives of national elites, in turn, can and should provide

¹³⁷ B. Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for...*, p. 19.

¹³⁸ Cf.: John Paul II, *Pamięć i tożsamość. Rozmowy na przelomie tysiącleci (Memory and identity. Conversations at the turn of the millennium)*, SIW “Znak”, Kraków 2005; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Polish version by A. Szulżycka, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2001.

¹³⁹ “The intellectual salon died. It has been replaced by VIP lounges in expensive restaurants, intimidating mortals accidentally wandering nearby. This change [...] is an illustration of the cultural shift that has taken place over the last two decades. A change of codes, attitudes and aspirations of a narrow circle of people constituting the elite of society. The tape affair – regardless of its political baggage – is an eloquent proof of this change. [...] At the end of 1998, on the tenth

examples and are attributes of authentic social elites. It should be stressed that the functioning of these elites should take place in such a way as to strengthen democratic values in the internal politics of the *state*, and not to threaten them. The state, the nation, the army and other *subjects of action*, specific social and professional groups, depositaries and creators of *nsc* development, also need elites – Jerzy Szacki says that “the elite are people who are distinguished by their ability to compete with others, not superior in any absolute sense of that word”¹⁴⁰. The political elite in a democratic *nation-state* comes by-election. This means that it has been granted social legitimacy based on the culture of national security, manifested through the level of *political culture* (which is part of the *2nd pillar of the national security culture*) accompanying the democracy of a particular *nation-state*. This is how the ethical-intellectual circle closes in the *socio-cultural sector of national security culture* - through the oscillator of social energy, operating on the line of *society-national elites*. This shows one way in which the two *sectors of national security culture* - political and socio-cultural - intertwine. The *identity sector of the nsc* is also the source of many other components of the potential referred to as *social capital*¹⁴¹, which influences the level of the whole *national security culture*, manifested in good governance and state effectiveness¹⁴², allowing for high indicators of *social cohesion*¹⁴³. *Social capital* is a sociological-economic concept, thus also introducing us to the *economic sector of national security*

anniversary of the Liberal Congress, Tusk gave [...] a speech about the “leisure class”. He took this notion from Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class [1857–1929], written a century earlier. [...] The American scholar passionately condemned those who with financial speculation multiply the wealth they have inherited, do not produce anything, but live off the fruits of other peoples’ labour. [...] This in turn was to demoralise the lower classes, instilling aspirations that impede *social development*. According to Veblen, the *leisure class*, only seemingly delighted in high culture, in fact [...] excels in [...] contempt for the working people, [...] finally in politics. In the late 1990s, Tusk included parliamentarians and ministers, local government officials and civil servants, members of the supervisory boards of state-owned companies and trade unionists filling posts in these companies among the *leisure class* of the Second Republic of Poland. An army of a hundred thousand parasites bloated with privileges, preying on the *state*, living off the hard work of ordinary citizens”; <http://polska.newsweek.pl/co-sie-stalo-z-polska-inteligencja-polska-klasa-polityczna-afera-podsluchowa-afera-tasmowa-newsweek-pl,artykuly,342526,1,2.html>, (accessed: 8/08/2020); Cf. T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Polish version by J. and K. Zagórcy, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1971.

¹⁴⁰ J. Szacki, *Historia myśli socjologicznej (The history of sociological thought)*, vol. 1, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1983, p. 395.

¹⁴¹ J. Piwowarski, *Kapitał ludzki i kapitał społeczny w rozwoju regionalnym. Podejście sekuritologiczne (Human capital and social capital in regional development. A securitological approach)*, [in:] *Význam ľudského potenciálu v regionálnom rozvoji – 2*. “Ročník. Zborník príspevkov z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie”, September 2011, Dudince, Slovenská republika, pp. 22–24.

¹⁴² D. Halpern, *Social Capital*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2005, pp. 170–197; J. Field, *Social Capital*, Routledge, New York 2008.

¹⁴³ *Spójność społeczna* – Social cohesion - provides an opportunity for society to ensure a relatively high quality of life for its members. It also prevents social exclusion and poverty. It is also about creating *solidarity* in society so as to minimise exclusion through social assistance, not necessarily public prevention. Cf.: J. Bruhn, *The Group Effect. Social Cohesion and Health Outcomes*, Polish version by A. Plisiecka, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Psychologii Społecznej, Warsaw 2011.

culture. One of the first researchers to derive the genesis of social capital from the phenomenon of culture is Robert Putnam. The pioneer of this approach can also be considered the French thinker and politician Alexis de Tocqueville, whose work was one of Putnam's sources of inspiration¹⁴⁴. Concerning the important role of social capital in *the sociocultural sector of the nsc*, it is important to note that it depends on the potentiality of a *nation*, referred to as *cultural capital*. It is a concept created by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002)¹⁴⁵, as the sum of knowledge, skills, experiences and cultural values, acquired and accumulated by *subjects* participating in social life. According to Bourdieu, *cultural capital* takes three forms: *embodied form* – dispositions of the body and mind of *individual subjects*, including good manners, knowledge of high culture, cultural conventions, which correspond to the *1st pillar of the nsc, institutionalized*, and therefore *social form* – education and social competences, confirmed by school diplomas (*2nd pillar of the nsc*), *objectified form* – owned physical *cultural goods*, art products, technical devices, etc. (*3rd pillar of the nsc*). *Cultural capital* as a factor in the development of *individual security subjects* and the entire constituent *nation*, if properly used, then *de facto* constitutes a *trichotomy of security culture*. It can transfer to the development of the two other forms of *nsc* indicated by P. Bourdieu, which are *social capital* and *economic capital*. According to the French sociologist, resources belonging to the *3rd pillar of the nsc* are the easiest to exchange, as it is connected with acquiring material goods, whose production cycle is relatively short. Accumulation of institutionalized, social *cultural capital (3rd pillar of the nsc)* requires greater expenditures and long-term processes. *Cultural capital* in an individual, *embodied form (1st and 3rd pillar of the nsc)* is its most stable type, and its accumulation may even take place over many generations. It is, therefore, the most difficult to accumulate, but also losing this element of *nsc* is the most difficult. As P. Bourdieu maintained, *cultural capital* is one of the basic challenges on the way to social advancement and a helpful potential in the accumulation of *economic capital by a nation*.

4. The financial and economic sector of the national security culture.

Marshall Sahlins, an economic anthropologist, in his work *Culture and Practical Reason*, wrote significant words: “Any cultural order constructed by material powers presupposes the existence of a cultural order of those powers.”¹⁴⁶ It can be assumed that, since the time of the great geographical discoveries, there has been a relentless development of networks of economic interdependence and accompanying financial ties throughout the world. This development was boosted after the end of the Second World War and became even more vigorous after the end of the Cold War. Such cooperation carries enormous prospects for development in the area of the *third pillar*

¹⁴⁴ R. D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, Polish version by P. Sadura, S. Szymański, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warsaw 2008.

¹⁴⁵ P. Bourdieu, *The forms of capital*, [in:] *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, J. Richardson (ed.), Greenwood, New York 1986, pp. 241–258.

¹⁴⁶ M. Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason*, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1976, p. 39.

of national security culture. In reality, however, the vectors of these opportunities may be either positive or negative, and the scale of change achieved in the age of globalization may exceed the expectations of its authors. In the first case, we are dealing with economic growth, accompanied by the development of the quality of goods and services – with the comprehensive development of the *economic security culture sector of nations and their states*. In the second case, often unexpectedly, there is an increase in threats to the *nsc sector (3rd pillar of the nsc)*. We are then dealing with the development of economic *insecurity*¹⁴⁷. The Great Depression of the interwar period, which began in 1929 and was centered in the USA¹⁴⁸, showed the *nations* of the world how quickly the material dimension of the *security culture* could diminish in the interconnected *financial and economic security* systems of individual *nation-states*¹⁴⁹. This Great Depression, a gigantic depression of the world financial sector, began on 24 October 1929, “Black Thursday”, on the trading floor of the New York Stock Exchange, and from there spread across the entire globe. The economic collapse then affected all the countries of the world and their economies as a whole. It manifested itself in a prolonged and deep decline in industrial production, mass unemployment, and hyperinflation, and caused major political changes¹⁵⁰. Sectors of *security culture* intermingle and influence each other. One of the indirect effects of the Great Depression was the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany (1933). This controversial, but most likely also psychopathic¹⁵¹ German leader first disrupted the balance in the areas of the *political and military security sectors*, and then the other *security sectors* as well, leading to a global conflict between 1933 and 1939, threatening the development of humanity in all *sectors of the nsc*. Much later, in 2008, the great financial crisis began again in the United States, once again causing negative consequences in the *economic sector of the security culture* on a global scale. Financial crises, according to the American economist Frederick Mishkin¹⁵², are linked to disruptions in the *culture* of the financial market. Through a system of global linkages, they result in repercussions, causing a decline in the value of assets in the farthest corners of the world and weakening the condition of financial and many

¹⁴⁷ Cf.: B. Kosowski, *Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne poszkodowanych po wystąpieniu zdarzenia katastroficznego w świetle badań empirycznych*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego (Economic security of victims after a catastrophic event in the light of empirical research, [in:] National security research methodology)*..., vol. 3.

¹⁴⁸ P. Johnson, *A History of the Modern World: From 1917 to the 1990s*, Puls Publication Ltd., London 1992, pp. 310–350.

¹⁴⁹ Cf.: S. T. Kurek, S. Kurek, *Model kształtowania bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego państwa*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego (A model for shaping the economic security of the state, [in:] National security research methodology)*..., vol. 3.

¹⁵⁰ A. Fergusson, *When Money Dies*, Polish translation by W. Turopolski, Wydawnictwo StudioEMKA, Warsaw 2012.

¹⁵¹ M. H. Kater, *Hitler's Psychopathology by Norbert Bromberg, Verna Volz Small*, “Journal of Interdisciplinary History”, Vol. 16 (1/1985), p. 141–142.

¹⁵² F. Mishkin, *The economics of money, banking and financial markets*, HarperCollins, New York 1995, p. 223.

other institutions belonging to particular *sectors of national security culture*. In the context of these events, which have their background in the globalization of the world banking system, which is increasingly affecting the *economic sector of the nsc*, a new theoretical model of the financial crisis has emerged. This model was constructed by the American economist Hyman Philip Minsky¹⁵³. In his theory, he assumed that bank customers (members of *national societies*) generate, concerning the reality (at the level of individual, social and structural financial capacities), an excessive number of credit applications, which is followed, as a result of the fight for customers, by an excessive number of approvals for granting credits in banks. This irresponsible action, which constitutes a breach of the principles of the *1st and 2nd pillar of the nsc*, made precisely in the area of the *economic sector of national security culture*, in time causes a strong destabilization of the financial system. In further development of this situation, banks stop the stream of credit, inhibiting economic development – an indispensable factor for the development of the *3rd pillar of national security culture*. This is explained by H.P. Minsky, while today's *economic security* increasingly depends on the financial and economic interdependence between *nation-states* and global financial institutions¹⁵⁴. The consequence of this is the creation of mechanisms to counteract tendencies leading to short-term but non-perspective benefits. Edward Halizak pointed out the factors that are necessary for maintaining *security* in the functioning of the international financial and economic system:

- a) classical balance of powers expressed in mutual access to the market of a partner or partners,
- b) participation and position on world markets and access to technology and capital,
- c) long-term perspective as an immanent feature of changes¹⁵⁵.

¹⁵³ Cf.: H. Minsky, *Stabilizing an Unstable Economy*, McGraw-Hill, New York 2008; W. Nawrot, *Globalny kryzys finansowy XXI wieku*, Ed. CeDeWu, Warsaw 2009, p. 15; The G20 is the most important informal structure in the global economy; its objective is to ensure long-term sustainable global economic and financial development. Established in 1999, it brings together 19 of the world's major economies and the European Union, including both highly developed countries (Australia, France, Japan, Canada, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy) and emerging economies (Saudi Arabia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Russia, Turkey). In addition, representatives of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and significant global organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other international institutions, which include the European Commission or the Financial Stability Board, participate in the work and meetings of the G20 – source: https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/zagraniczna_polityka_ekonomiczna/globalne_wyzwania_makroekonomiczne/institucje_miedzynarodowe/ (accessed: 08/08/2014).

¹⁵⁴ E. Halizak, *Ekonomiczny wymiar bezpieczeństwa narodowego i międzynarodowego*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku (The economic dimension of national and international security, [in:] National and international security at the end of the 20th century)*, D. Bobrow, E. Halizak, R. Zięba (eds.), Fundacja Stosunków Międzynarodowych „Scholar”, Warsaw 1997.

¹⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 85–86.

In simplest terms, threats to the *economic sector of the nsc* are caused by human greed associated with gaps in moral competence, and lack of ethically deepened professionalism, indispensable for safe movement in the economic sector. These threats are often accompanied by the adverse phenomenon of a speculative bubble. Performing a *stabilizing function in the economic sector of the security culture* with the help of regulators created by *nation-states* shows their important role in strengthening the *national security culture*. “The economic determinant of *security* is closely connected with the economy [of a *nation-state*], that is, with fundamental values such as the standard of living of citizens, civilizational development, educational and cultural development, and also ensures the functioning of other *security* categories in material terms. Therefore, in addition to external economic relations, the internal factors of the economic system and the structure and manner of its functioning are of fundamental importance. This follows from the fact that the national economy creates the material base of security in its various areas”¹⁵⁶. Practical sciences, which include *Security Science*, in addition to theoretical preparation aim to show a specific case study. For the *economic sector of national security culture*, the current case study may be the economic situation of Greece. It may cause unforeseeable consequences for the European Union as a “domino effect”, reducing the certainty of the absence of threats to the *economic sector of national security culture* in those *states* which belong to the European community¹⁵⁷. The subject scope of the *economic sector of national security culture* is extensive and, as already shown, also includes international aspects¹⁵⁸. The issues identified with the *economic sector of nsc* are linked to the energy aspects of economic security. The scale of these issues is another area deserving scientific exploration as a new, separate sector in the expanded concept of *security culture sectors*. In addition, the issues of the *energy sector* are related to the acquisition of raw materials for industry and, regardless of threats to raw material security, these aspects relate directly to the *ecological sector of national security culture*.

5. The ecological sector of national security culture. Increasing the level of the *culture of ecological security* is related to the rising level of awareness of modern man regarding threats resulting from the excessive exploitation and usage of natural resources. This exploitation often takes place without consideration of the future results of such actions. Reflection on the *ecological sector of national security culture* and the implementation of its content are essential both for current and future development, in the context of the need to ensure the survival of humanity. Despite the abundance of resources available in our ecosystem, operating under the assumption that its potential is inexhaustible or self-replenishing would lead to significant

¹⁵⁶ W. Pokruszyński, J. Piwowarski, *Teoria bezpieczeństwa (Security theory)*, University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Kraków, Kraków 2014, p. 129.

¹⁵⁷ M. Lynn, *Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt*, John Wiley&Sons, New Jersey 2011.

¹⁵⁸ Cf.: I. Cucu, *The National Security and Economical Development*, “Strategical Impact” 2008, No. 3.

threats. At their worst, ecological threats may result in humanity's extinction, or at least the downfall of numerous *nation-states*. **According to the author, the key premise for reflecting on security problems today, not only on the ecological sector of national security culture, is to pay attention to the role of *nation-states*.** As it is known, the passenger liner Titanic, once considered unsinkable, sank after its hull was pierced by an iceberg, probably because the arrogance generated by the opinion of its unsinkability caused the staff to neglect to close the watertight bulkheads in order to prevent the entire hull of the ship from being flooded. An analogous effect is threatening the earth's ecosystem, even though the development of knowledge belonging to the *ecological security culture* is beginning to result in a new kind of human awareness. This consciousness is perhaps approaching the mentality affirmed by the French monk, philosopher, and anthropologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, creator of the concept of Catholic evolutionism, which is close to ecological thinking and also pantheistic in nature¹⁵⁹. Ecological thought also includes themes that are related to designing the human environment in such a way as to prevent the emergence of threats. An advanced formula related to the *sector of ecological security culture* is the idea of *sustainable development*¹⁶⁰. It requires the complementarity of *nsc sectors*, led by *socio-cultural*, *ecological* and *economic* sectors¹⁶¹. In the author's opinion, the concept of *sustainable development* should be treated as a theoretical tool that is effective when putting into practice the *holistic approach* to implementing the *Copenhagen interpretation of security culture* and erecting the construct of the *national security culture* in a complementary fashion. Influencing the consciousness of humanity via sustainable development (*ecodevelopment*) should lie at the foundation of all effective measures within the *ecological sector of security culture* (the *1st* and *2nd pillar of the national security culture*). This should imply appropriate actions aimed at achieving harmony with humanity's natural environment, shaping modern civilization accordingly to include our current needs and the needs of future generations, as well as the needs of the remaining parts of Earth's ecosystem. The development of such an attitude is not the sole merit of the *idealistic* current – it is also a realistically understood necessity, which for owners of production facilities is an ecological-security logical version of *Kant's categorical imperative* that should translate into human motivations appropriate from the perspective of *nsc* (*1st pillar of nsc*), supported by legal systems (*2nd pillar of nsc*). It is important to remember that human groups used to gather into *communities*, which could advance and become true *societies* only after they have developed their own systems of legal norms, after having established a *system of values* (*1st* and *2nd pillar of nsc*) based on moral norms and social patterns developed

¹⁵⁹ P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Christianity and Evolution*, Mariner Books, New York 2002.

¹⁶⁰ G. Zabłocki, *Rozwój zrównoważony – idee, efekty, kontrowersje* (*Sustainable development – ideas, effects, controversies*), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2002.

¹⁶¹ Cf.: B. Poskrobko, *Teoretyczne aspekty ekorozwoju* (*Theoretical aspects of sustainable development*), "Ekonomia i Środowisko" No. 1 (10), 1997.

by these communities. Adopting a hierarchy of values and developing a legal system generates such *sectors of the culture of national security* as the *socio-cultural* and *legal* sectors. Admittedly, the *Copenhagen School* and the analysis of the *sectors of national security culture* based on this concept, at its very beginning, did not distinguish the *legal security sector*, but the genesis of the legal protection of *social relations* has its origin in the *socio-cultural sector of the nsc*. In addition, at the time of its promulgation in the *Copenhagen School*, the catalog of *sectors* was treated by its creators as an open set.

6. The legal-administrative sector of national security culture. The threats that can be identified in this area of human achievement are the effects of faulty lawmaking, i.e. mistakes of the legislature, inconsistency and “legal laxity”, i.e. over-regulation, bureaucratism and “clerical arrogance”¹⁶² as well as the negative effect of rule that was described by the German sociologist Robert Michels (1876–1936). This mechanism is known as the *iron law of oligarchy*¹⁶³. According to Michels, no organization, once the number of its members exceeds a certain number, can prevent the formation of a parasitic pseudo-oligarchy that appropriates numerous privileges and power at the expense of society. The entire *social world* can be subject to this mechanism, so it is similar to a cataclysm, but often more dangerous because it grows undetected. The more massive an organization becomes, the faster this pseudo-oligarchy is created within, and the faster the extent of its influence increases. Wise leaders are absolutely necessary from the viewpoint of the functioning of any organization’s structure, its durability and its effectiveness. Such figures often emerge spontaneously and over time gradually become high-class professionals who consolidate their position and make it independent of the will of the masses of people. This is also where the not-always-safe interface between the *nsc political sector* and the *nsc legal-administrative sector* arises and operates. The pseudo-oligarchy operating at this junction may create danger as a result of attitudes characterized by a lack of commitment to serving the *common good*¹⁶⁴ of the *nation* and its *state*. The discussed contact of these circles – politicians and administration – with their moral weaknesses, may cause threats to the safeguards established in the *culture of national security* by the Monteskian tripartite separation of powers. The administration is an essential element of the *2nd pillar of the nsc* in any modern *nation-state*. The administration in a *nation-state* has sovereign powers. Sometimes, however, due to its bureaucratic nature and the accompanying dehumanization, instead of improving the service it provides, which is vital to the existence of *society*, it can be a source of very serious aberrations and damage to the

¹⁶² M. Kulesza, M. Niziołek, *Etyka służby publicznej (Public service ethics)*, Wydawnictwo Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warsaw 2010, p. 238.

¹⁶³ R. Michels, *Political Parties; a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Free Press, New York 1996.

¹⁶⁴ W. Kitler, *Pojęcie dobra wspólnego (The concept of common good)*, [subchapter in:] Idem, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System (National security of the Republic of Poland. Basic categories. Determinants. System)*, Academy of National Defence, Warsaw 2011, p. 85, 86.

*culture of national security*¹⁶⁵. Typical dysfunctions that become active in bureaucrats carry serious threats to the *legal-administrative security sector*, which the *national security culture* should remove. These are, according to Robert Merton, as follows:¹⁶⁶

1. *learned helplessness* – a phenomenon that manifests itself when bureaucratic skills start to fail in unusual situations. This is the case, for example, when former heads of offices try their hand as entrepreneurs, often with a mistaken belief in their high causative power;
2. *professional deformation* – causing, sometimes even involuntary, a departure from the attitude of impartiality necessary in administration; however, sometimes the possession of specialist knowledge in a given area makes the officer consider that are more important than others, which, objectively speaking, are equally important;
3. *professional psychosis* – public officers, falling into a professional routine, develop certain negative tendencies, based on prejudices or antipathies; a transparent example here is the so-called Lucifer effect, also known as the Zimbardo effect¹⁶⁷;
4. *misidentification of ends and means* – the means, among them the officer's powers and habits of formalizing certain issues, become an end in themselves, distracting from the main goal of bureaucracy, which is to serve society. This confusion threatens the development and growth of the common good of the nation;
5. *exuberant conformism* – which is a tendency to be submissive to the pseudo-elite, being an expression of the loss of moral backbone¹⁶⁸;

¹⁶⁵ The authors R. Batko, M. Kosterka, in the article *Rola mediów w budowaniu kapitału symbolicznego: przykład sektora publicznego w Polsce*, "Zarządzanie Mediami" (*The role of the media in building symbolic capital: the example of the public sector in Poland*, 'Media Management') vol. 3(1), 2015, pp. 21–43, state: Elżbieta Isakiewicz in the article *Stan zamrożenia (Frozen state)* ["Tygodnik Powszechny" No. 3236 (19) 2011] describes stories of acquitted entrepreneurs who lost their good reputation and their companies. Today they win lawsuits against the state, damages are paid from citizens' taxes, and officials who destroy the culture of security and the common good remain unpunished, unconcerned about their fate. A drastic example is the arrest and imprisonment of Krzysztof Porowski for two and a half years, after seven years of trial he was acquitted and applied to the court for 26 million zlotys of compensation. "For 24 months he was not allowed to see his loved ones, he was transported to successive detention centres, denied access to medical treatment and isolated from his defence lawyers" (http://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/1,103085,11549179,Znany_biznesmen_chce_26 mln odszkodowania_za_dwa_lata.html [accessed: 11/09/2015]). [...]. The website www.mafiaurzednicza.pl49 features materials telling stories about the unlawfulness and impunity of officials. Similar messages are conveyed by the publicist programmes broadcast on the Polsat television station in the cycle *Państwo w Państwie* (State within a State) ("We stigmatise and expose clerical pathologies. We want to help entrepreneurs in their uneven fight with officials").

¹⁶⁶ R. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Polish translation by E. Murawska, J. Wertenstein-Żuławski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2002, pp. 258–261.

¹⁶⁷ P.G. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, Random House, New York 2007.

¹⁶⁸ Cf.: B. Szacka, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii (Introduction to sociology)*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2003, pp. 212–214.

6. there is a disadvantage of bureaucrats that Merton did not mention, but which is no less dangerous than the others - it is the “clerical arrogance” indicated by Michał Kulesza¹⁶⁹.

Parkinson’s widely known opinions should be counted among the resounding voices that criticize the numerous dangers stemming from the absurdities that can arise due to deficiencies in the functioning of bureaucratic structures¹⁷⁰. The real – and not only statistical – result of administrative action is a real increase in the potential for the *common good* as a result of the actions carried out by *state* functionaries. This can be achieved through genuine action, such as that which causes a reduction in the number of crimes, offenses and other irregularities, with a concomitant increase in the efficiency (making it easier) of the proceedings conducted in order to settle numerous human matters, and with the maintenance of a high motivation for comprehensive activation of the public service’s assistance¹⁷¹.

7. The raw material sector of national security culture. The sphere of supplying the *nation-state* with raw materials is a very sensitive sector of national security culture. The industrial development of mankind in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries caused a huge increase in the demand for raw materials, here treated by the author collectively, ranging from food and drinking water through minerals and other raw materials for the industry to those substances that constitute energy carriers¹⁷². It may be noted that previously, on the scale of a *country* and its accumulated processing, raw material and energy issues were not given as much attention as they are today. Today, the development, and therefore the security of *nation-states*, is already inseparably linked with the *raw material sector of the nsc*. The history of the European Union began with a common energy policy. The functioning of the European Coal and Steel Community between 1952 and 2002 is the result of linking together the two extremes of the entire *raw material security sector*. The category referred to as *strategic raw materials* have been identified as a group of natural resources that have to be imported due to their scarcity in a given country. If a certain raw material is considered essential for production in situations of higher necessity and its quantity is limited, it can be classified as a *strategic raw material*.

For different *nation-states*, due to the variation in the degree of their affluence, the following elements can be considered as classification criteria for the definition of *strategic raw materials*: a) possession and acquisition for the needs of the *nation-state* of an adequate amount of raw materials for industry and resources for energy;

¹⁶⁹ M. Kulesza, M. Niziołek, *Etyka służby publicznej (Public service ethics)*, ..., op. cit., p. 238.

¹⁷⁰ C. N. Parkinson, *Parkinson’s Law*, Buccaneer Books Inc., New York 1957.

¹⁷¹ R. Merton, *Social Theory...*

¹⁷² Cf.: S. Kozłowski, *Gospodarka a środowisko przyrodnicze (Economy and environment)*, PWN, Warsaw 1991; *Międzynarodowe bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w XXI wieku (International energy security in the 21st century)*, E. Cziomer (ed.), Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Kraków University, Kraków 2008.

b) acquisition for the needs of the *nation-state* of raw materials in places where normally exploitation is unprofitable; c) identification of the types of raw materials that do not occur in the territory of the country and the resources of its allies; d) identification of the evident deficiencies of the *nation-state* in terms of raw materials and energy.

The modern scientific and technological revolution, viewed from the perspective of the need to build the capacity of the *nsc sectors*, has influenced the growing importance of the industry. However, it is still raw materials that power the gears of the national economy. There are few countries in the world that can say that they have the raw material reserves to be able to function independently and for long periods of time when, for example, there is a need for defence operations. Natural resources are distributed in quite an uneven manner across the globe. This implies international dependencies. All of the earth's natural resources, including its drinking water supply, which is of great importance to *national security*, are constantly being depleted. The regional situation concerning stocks of cereals and other wholesome foodstuffs is also not always stable, and it is not at all certain today what kind of "surprises" the use of modified or "improved" foodstuffs will bring to a man decades after their introduction into use. Given such dilemmas and the challenges they pose, it is important to be prepared for the possibility of crises, as well as *national security* threats, in which the old, classical "war for land" may unexpectedly be replaced by a war for drinking water or, say, rare minerals such as cassiterite or coltan, now highly demanded by microchip manufacturers¹⁷³. The *national security culture* in the *raw materials sector* should be built particularly carefully. Its basis, optimal and forward-looking raw materials management, should have a strategy characterized by transparency, including a sufficient number of possible choices.

8. The technogenic sector of national security culture. "According to Aristotle, technology is the skill of creation by which the anticipated product is achieved"¹⁷⁴. As early as ancient Greece, attention was paid to the necessary human cognition – *episteme* and *production* – *techne*. The development of this *social heritage*, which forms the *technogenic sector of the national security culture*, has been instrumental, even since the agrarian revolution, in the creation of such essential elements of the *security environment* as housing, means of transporting people and goods by land, water and air, means of communication, satellite systems, many types of clothing with various functions, armaments, commerce, food production,

¹⁷³ *Coltan* – a mixture of columbite and tantalite, tantalum ore; this rare mineral (metal ore) makes it possible to produce special miniature condensers, without which there would be no mobile phones or smartphones; the other ore, *cassiterite*, consists mainly of tin, used in the motherboards of mobile devices; **few people know that there is a bloody history of exploitation, violence and a death toll in the Democratic Republic of Congo.**

¹⁷⁴ M. Golka, *Cywilizacja współczesna i globalne problemy (Contemporary civilisation and global issues)*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2012, p. 169.

medical devices, and many other elements, such as those which make it possible to obtain an impressive amount of energy and to transmit it over a distance to billions of consumers. According to French sociologist Jacques Ellul, *technology* is the totality of all rationally used means and systems that allow a man to increase his efficiency in achieving his planned goals¹⁷⁵. The development of the *technogenic sector of the nsc* which is a human response to the natural factors of the environment not only surrounds *security subjects* but also permeates them. This response aims to control nature, but in doing so creates a new kind of environment that is indifferent to humans. In addition, the environment of material artifacts pushes the awareness of man's relationship with his natural environment into the background. According to sociologist Marian Golka, "Technology should be seen in the [broader] context of other spheres of human activity. First of all, it should be considered as one of the spheres of broadly understood *culture*. After all, it is a set of activities and their products, which function in the social life on the basis of certain patterns, traditions and functions. [...] It is even acknowledged that technology is a specific manifestation of applied science"¹⁷⁶. Technology, from the historical point of view, creates a new *sector of nsc*, which grows out of the socio-cultural potential, and probably that is the only reason why Manuel Castells sums up its manifestations with the words – "technology is society"¹⁷⁷. Lewis Mumford goes even further, writing that "since the 17th century, the machine has become a substitute for religion"¹⁷⁸. With time, however, the man began to abandon his idolatrous fascination with technical devices. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote as early as in 1879 about the dangers the machine poses to the spheres which, according to the theory of the problem of this work, belong to the *1st and 2nd pillar of the security culture*. F. Nietzsche pointed out that "the machine abases us. The machine is impersonal, it deprives the piece of work of its pride, of the individual goodness and faultiness that adheres to all work done by a machine – that is to say, of its little bit of humanity"¹⁷⁹. On the other hand, in the second half of the 20th century, Thomas Merton noted that an imbalance had emerged between the rapid development of the technogenic sphere and other spheres of human existence¹⁸⁰. However, the modern scientific and technological revolution, looking at it from the perspective of using it to raise the *potential of national security*

¹⁷⁵ J. Ellul, *Technika – umiejscowienie zjawiska*, [in:] *Technika a społeczeństwo (Technology – locating the phenomenon, [in:] Technology and society)*, A. Siciński (ed.), Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1974; Idem, *Le système technicien*, Calman-Levy, Paris 1977.

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem, p. 173.

¹⁷⁷ M. Castells, *The Network Society*, Polish version by M. Marody et al., Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2007, p. 23.

¹⁷⁸ L. Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*. Polish version by E. Danecka, W. Adamiciecki, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1966, p. 40.

¹⁷⁹ F. Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, Polish version by K. Drzewiecki, Wydawnictwo Zielona Sowa, Kraków 2003, p. 238.

¹⁸⁰ T. Merton, *Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander*, Polish version by Z. Ławrynowicz, M. Maciołek, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 1994, p. 106.

culture, has influenced the growing importance of industry in the creation of new factors for the supply of *nsc pillar*. Traditional sectors, once decisive for the level of *state power*, associated with heavy industry, have given way to modern departments such as electronics, chemistry, industrial biology, microelectronics, and information technology. Technological innovations have led to significant savings in raw materials and energy. They also lead *societies* to gain advantages and to develop and increase the power of their *national states*, provided that technology can be controlled and societies can be prepared in time to develop a *culture of national security* in terms of skills in using the benefits of technology. However, things are very different in the world. The environmental disaster related to the accident at the Chornobyl nuclear power station can be taken as an example. Further human development, also taking place under the sign of biotechnology, prepares new challenges, chances, serious – according to the author – risks and threats for humanity, which is reflected, for example, in Francis Fukuyama’s work *The End of History and the Last Man*¹⁸¹. In Poland, in turn, Łukasz Kamiński wrote a book entitled *Nowy wspaniały żołnierz (Brave new soldier)*¹⁸². It shows the possibilities of implementing new biotechnological scientific achievements in the war of the 21st century, which can create progressively subjectivized biocyborgs out of individual *security subjects*. However, it should be strongly emphasized that technology cannot threaten man on its own. This happens only when and if people (not machines!) begin to allow aberrations to appear in the fields of influence of the *1st and 2nd pillars of the nsc* (on individual or social group scales). When acting incorrectly or negligently, which is not only common but also *trendy* these days (so-called “freedom from”, e.g. duty), or if harm is done deliberately – the misused technology becomes a tool for creating dangers. There may also be dangers that constitute “diseases of facilitation”, as noted by Józef Bańka¹⁸³. Marian Golka, a sociologist of culture, notes what can be treated as an important and positive thing in the context of the four components of the *security environment*. Namely, “the homeostatic possibilities of technology [or, more precisely, possibilities of the human-technology system] seem promising so far. Both the entire technical system [which is the *technogenic sector of the national security culture*] and, above all, man [...] function in an erratic but relatively stable equilibrium. [...] Considering that homeostasis is such a stable functioning of a system, which aims at its continuance and development, we observe – Golka writes further – that it is thanks to technology that contemporary social systems continue and develop¹⁸⁴. The level of *security*

¹⁸¹ F. Fukuyama, *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*, Polish version by B. Pietrzyk, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2004.

¹⁸² Ł. Kamiński, *Nowy wspaniały żołnierz. Rewolucja biotechnologiczna i wojna w XXI wieku (Brave new soldier. The biotechnology revolution and war in the 21st century)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2014.

¹⁸³ J. Bańka, *Cywilizacja – obawy i nadzieje (Civilisation – concerns and hopes)*, Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Warsaw 1979, p. 178 and others.

¹⁸⁴ M. Golka, *Cywilizacja współczesna i globalne problemy (Contemporary civilisation and global issues)...*, p. 189.

culture in the national technogenic sector has a huge impact on many aspects of human security, including the sphere of *cybersecurity*, which has emerged relatively recently. The main threats here are the seizure, obstruction, disruption and distortion of information and all other processes based on digital support¹⁸⁵.

9. The cyber sector of national security culture. As the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells¹⁸⁶ points out, the world and the *nation states* that exist in it, together with their *societies*, in aspects that belong to virtually all *sectors of the nsc*, are today conditioned by new information technologies¹⁸⁷. This is the latest development that man can be proud of. Today, however, there are already occurrences that *threaten cybersecurity*. Due to the nature of *cyberspace*, they are multinational and independent of the existence of national borders. This situation can cause serious damage to all sectors of *national security* because, as said earlier, nowadays they cannot do without the use of elements provided by the use of cyberspace. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the *nation-state's* counteraction to the harmful practices that can be encountered in cyberspace to enhance international cooperation and transparency in this field. At the same time, in the internal aspect of *national security*, by adapting people and resources, it is necessary to systematically raise the level of *national security culture* in this sector. In this essentially global *sector*, individual *nation-states*, despite all their *power*, can often do little to improve *cyber security*. “The European Commission, together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has published (Brussels, 7/02/2013) a *cybersecurity strategy* alongside a Commission proposed directive on network and information security (NIS). Previous efforts by the European Commission and individual Member States have been too fragmented to deal with this growing challenge”¹⁸⁸.

- a) „There are an estimated 150,000 computer viruses in circulation every day and 148,000 computers compromised daily.
- b) According to the World Economic Forum, there is an estimated 10% likelihood of a major critical information infrastructure breakdown in the coming decade, which could cause damages of \$250 billion.
- c) Cybercrime causes a good share of cyber-security incidents, Symantec estimates that cybercrime victims worldwide lose around €290 billion each year, while a McAfee study put cybercrime profits at €750 billion a year.
- d) The 2012 Eurobarometer poll on cyber security found that 38% of EU internet users have changed their behavior because of these *cyber-security* concerns:

¹⁸⁵ Cf.: M. Stone, *Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis*, “Security Discussion Papers” 2012, Series 1, Spring 2009, http://geest.msh-paris.fr/IMG/pdf/Security_for_Buzan.mp3.pdf.

¹⁸⁶ M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Blackwell Publ., Malden-Oxford 2009.

¹⁸⁷ M. Castells, *The Network Society*.

¹⁸⁸ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_pl.htm (accessed: 26/01/2015).

18% are less likely to buy goods online and 15% are less likely to use online banking. It also shows that 74% of the respondents agreed that the risk of becoming a victim has increased, 12% have already experienced online fraud and 89% avoid disclosing personal information.

- e) According to the public consultation on NIS, 56.8% of respondents had experienced over the past year NIS incidents with a serious impact on their activities.
- f) Meanwhile, Eurostat figures show that, by January 2012, only 26% of enterprises in the EU had a formally defined ICT security policy¹⁸⁹.

In any case, facing new challenges, risks, and threats, but also new opportunities to increase the pace and quality of the development process, *nation states* together with their *societies* have entered the era of the *global information society*.

The information society operates in such a way that information is treated as a kind of strategic product, the circulation of which results in dynamizing the development processes of contemporary national and supranational centers of civilization¹⁹⁰. These centers generate massively large amounts of information.

For example, according to John Naisbitt, the first world economy, which is now the United States of America, produces information on as massive a scale as it once did with vehicles coming off production lines¹⁹¹. However, at the same time, we should note, following the thought of Manuel Castells, that today's "information economy is a socio-economic system distinct from the industrial economy [...] as a result of the shift to an IT-based technical paradigm"¹⁹². Marian Golka adds that "an indispensable element, and probably also the cause of the emergence of the *information society* was, however, the creation and development of the Internet"¹⁹³. This allows today for low costs of information transfer irrespective of the distance, modeling of real processes by means of virtual reality, but also the blurring of boundaries between what is public and what is private in human existence, weakening the role of the trusted "arbiter" – of one's own mind in favor of the processing of information by an electronic machine, the flood of information and (consequently) the diminishing possibilities of optimal selection of information, the existence and propagation of distorted information, disinformation and the difficulty of verifying its authenticity...¹⁹⁴. In this completely

¹⁸⁹ *EU Cybersecurity plan to protect open internet and online freedom and opportunity. Press release, Brussels, 7 February 2013, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_pl.pdf (accessed: 12/03/2014).*

¹⁹⁰ K. Szaniawski, *Informacja (Information)*, [in:] *Filozofia a nauka. Zarys encyklopedyczny (Philosophy and science. An encyclopaedic outline)*, Z. Cackowski, J. Kmita, K. Szaniawski, (eds.), Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1987, pp. 224–251.

¹⁹¹ J. Naisbitt, *Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives*, Polish version by P. Kwiatkowski, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 1997, p. 35.

¹⁹² M. Castells, *The Network Society...*, p. 105.

¹⁹³ M. Golka, *Cywilizacja współczesna i globalne problemy (Contemporary civilisation and global issues)...*, p. 205.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 209-211.

new situation on the threshold of the cyber-information revolution, the challenge of building a new *cyber sector of national security culture* should be taken up with all seriousness. In the author's opinion, despite the global nature of the *information society* phenomenon, it is absolutely necessary to create a national cyber-security system, taking advantage of international cooperation, in order to prevent the possibility of a *Titanic effect* when a global cyber-disaster occurs. This is why the European Union has developed, and will probably continue to develop, a cyber-security strategy that addresses cyber threats from the smallest scale. "The cybersecurity strategy entitled *Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace* reflects the European Union's comprehensive vision on how best to prevent and respond to disruptions and attacks. The strategy aims to promote values such as freedom and democracy and to ensure the secure development and growth of the digital economy or network economy"¹⁹⁵. Specific actions are today focused on enhancing the resilience needed by the state in the field of cybersecurity of information systems, reducing cybercrime, and strengthening the EU international cybersecurity and cyber defence policy"¹⁹⁶. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, Vice President of the European Commission until 2014, noted that „For cyberspace to remain open and free, the same norms, principles and values that the EU upholds offline, should also apply online. Fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law need to be protected in cyberspace. The EU works with its international partners as well as *civil society* and the private sector to promote these rights globally". Concluding the outline of selected issues of this *nsc sector*, the author recalls that the 1991 Gulf War was called "The First Information War"¹⁹⁷, due to the significant role and number of information systems used. This marks another temporal caesura that we assign to 1991, related to the *nsc sectors* as seen in their international aspects. Piotr Sienkiewicz, in turn, notes that the abovementioned Internet, which plays a key role both in the *cyber sector of national security culture* and in the global information system, "is sometimes seen as the most important innovation since Gutenberg [...]. It is a phenomenon, a contemporary phenomenon, which contains ambiguity, duality, and positive and negative features at the same time. *Cyberspace* is such a contemporary phenomenon"¹⁹⁸.

10. The social-health sector of national security culture. Social security, and with it the protection of citizens' health, is one of the offerings that characterize the modern, democratic *nation-state*. Today, it guarantees the fulfillment of its citizens' social needs resulting from various risks and threats, which in effect take on a social character. These include unemployment, disability, poverty and many

¹⁹⁵ D. Tapscott, *The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril In The Age of Networked Intelligence*, McGraw-Hill, New York 1997.

¹⁹⁶ *The EU cyber security plan...*

¹⁹⁷ Z. Campen, *The First Information War*, AFCEA, New York 1992.

¹⁹⁸ P. Sienkiewicz, *Bezpieczeństwo cyberprzestrzeni*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego (Cybersecurity, [in:] National security research methodology)...*, vol. 3.

other unfavorable events causing difficult random situations. The realization of the social and health security objectives assumed by the *state* is possible thanks to various social, legal and institutional tools. These are, for example, collective social insurance, the public institutional system of the national labor market and social assistance, rehabilitation of the disabled, creation of favorable conditions for aid NGOs and protection of the health of the *society*. When analyzing the social and health security of all citizens of a *nation-state*, its issues should be considered in the following three aspects:

- a) the individual aspect (*1st pillar of the nsc*), concerning the individual *human being*, consists in the provision of personal security in the case of individual citizens who, finding themselves in a difficult random situation, can expect from their *state* such assistance measures as will equalize their chances for persistence, further survival and, in time, for possibly taking up the challenges of their development and regaining their autonomy; this aspect, from the necessity of the element of cooperation, is strongly and directly connected with the next, social aspect;
- b) the social aspect (*2nd pillar of the nsc*), consisting in ensuring social order through a coherent system of rights applicable in cases of the vulnerability of citizens or threats to human life and health;
- c) the material aspect (*3rd pillar of the nsc*), consisting in ensuring the necessary means of subsistence for the citizens of the state, either by creating conditions for work in the state or by securing a system of social benefits, ensuring effective health protection, equal opportunities in education, etc.

In an in-depth look at the established heritage that is the *national security culture*, an important sub-area of the *social-health sector of the nsc* is the health policy pursued by the *nation-state*. According to the assumptions made by the World Health Organization (WHO), operating within the framework of the United Nations, it is a branch of social policy referring to “decisions, plans, and actions that are undertaken to achieve specific health care goals within a *society*. [...] It defines a vision for the future which in turn helps to establish targets and points of reference for the short and medium term. It outlines priorities and the expected roles of different [social] groups, and it builds consensus and informs people”¹⁹⁹. Increasingly structured research on the conduct of *health policy* in many countries was undertaken as early as in the 1970s. Human health was recognized as a value treated as a *public good*²⁰⁰, and the principle of joint responsibility of all citizens of

¹⁹⁹ *Health policy* – [in:] Health topics (on-line); World Health Organization, (accessed: 03/02/2013).

²⁰⁰ *Public goods* – these are goods (values) that are characterised by the fact that there is no option in the nation state to exclude them from consumption and at the same time they are not competitive in the context of consumption; public goods are usually defined by representatives of economic sciences as social goods; Cf. R. G. Holcombe, *A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods*, “Review of Austrian Economics” No. 10 (1), pp. 1–22.

a *state* for financing health *care* expenditures from the state budget resources was applied. Many *nation-states* have adopted the method of financing citizens' health care through universal insurance. This is a form of joint responsibility raised to the level of social solidarity, a component of the *2nd pillar of nsc*. The high positioning of health as a value for every human being and the simultaneous attribution of social importance to it make health an object of interest not only for the *entities* directly concerned at a given moment but also for the *state*. Therefore, the notion of health policy was included in the framework of a broader health and social policy. In Poland, the *health policy* is the responsibility of the Minister of Health²⁰¹. The individual tasks included in the *state* strategy concerning the health *care* of the citizens are implemented at all levels of state administration and in the local self-government units²⁰². The elements of the *health policy* are also discussed at the conferences of ministers of health of the European Union²⁰³ member states. Irrespective of the economic dimension of the health potential as a component of human capital (and thus the power of the *state*), the state policy which concerns the *sector of the health and social security culture* has a moral dimension, simultaneously concerning the *1st, 2nd and 3rd pillars of the culture of national security* both on the part of those in power and on the part of ordinary citizens (the governed). The former should take care of the effective use of *state* funds in the *social-health sector of the national security culture*, while the latter should take care of the responsible, and therefore fair, use of the benefits of their country's *health and social policy*.

Note that *social policy* issues are also regulated at the international level. It has been observed that providing social rights to employees is one of the factors of social and economic development in a *nation-state*. They are necessary for the increase of productivity of society, as well as for the unification and systematization of laws regulating the safety of human life. International social standards have emerged in Europe, which has allowed for high-level legal regulation. This has happened mainly through normative acts adopted by the Council of Europe, which are collectively known as the Charter of Social Rights. This Charter consists of the following international treaties and documents: European Social Charter of 18 October 1961²⁰⁴, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter of 5 May 1988, Protocol

²⁰¹ J. Graliński, *Polityka zdrowotna. Kreowanie polityki zdrowotnej Ministerstwa Zdrowia (Health policy. Health policy-making of the Ministry of Health)*, "Zdrowie Publiczne" No. 111 (1), 2001, pp. 57–63.

²⁰² J. Łuczak, *Polityka zdrowotna państwa (National health policy)* (presentation). Materials from the conference Program Prewencji Pierwotnej Nowotworów (Primary prevention programme for cancer) (on-line); Ministry of Health of the Republic of Poland, Chief Sanitary Inspector, Maria Skłodowska-Curie Institute – Oncology Center in Warsaw, 5 May 2008 (accessed: 03/01/2013).

²⁰³ J. Gołąb, *Europejska polityka zdrowotna (European health policy)*, Forum in Krynica Zdrój, Polish Ministry of Health, 7 September 2011.

²⁰⁴ The documents mentioned here are available in: *Stosunki międzynarodowe po drugiej wojnie światowej (International relations after the Second World War)*, developed by R. Czarkowski, E. Czarkowska, WSHGiT, Warsaw 2000.

Amending the European Social Charter of 21 October 1991, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter of 9 November 1995 and the Revised European Social Charter of 3 May 1996. The system created in Europe through these documents has become a complete source of social rights²⁰⁵. Constantly updated through additional protocols, the European Social Charter has become a “European model” for social relations²⁰⁶. The European Social Charter is a document that does not impose a uniform policy for the implementation of certain solutions on countries, but only indicates goals and objectives, leaving each *nation-state* free to decide internally the extent of their implementation. **According to the authors, the strategic assumption and at the same time the conclusion of the discussion on the whole complex of sectors of national security culture is to draw attention to the new mission of the nation-state, which it should undertake in the time of globalization.**

As mentioned earlier, the Titanic, once considered unsinkable, after colliding with an iceberg is said to have sunk because human arrogance caused the staff to neglect to close the watertight bulkheads in order to prevent the entire hull of the ship from being flooded. In the age of globalization, despite the diminishing role of *nation-states*, going too far in this direction may result in an indefinite number of *national security subjects* experiencing a global repetition of the case that we may call for the purposes of this reflection the “**Titanic cases**” or the “Titanic syndrome”, and therefore reinforcing the *nature of the nsc* in such a way that the *nation-state* can achieve full resilience and preparedness that will allow it to effectively prevent the occurrence of such a global effect in its own midst.

²⁰⁵ *Europejska Karta Społeczna*, [in:] *Podstawowe dokumenty Rady Europy z dziedziny polityki społecznej* (*The European Social Charter*, [in:] *Key documents of the Council of Europe in the field of social policy*), developed by R. A. Henczel, J. Maciejewska, Wydawnictwo Scholar, Warsaw 1997, pp. 18–36.

²⁰⁶ Zob. R. Blanpain, M. Matey, *Europejskie prawo pracy w polskiej perspektywie* (*European labour law from the Polish perspective*), Wydawnictwo “Raval”, Warsaw 1993, p. 60.

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