



Research Paper

No. 185

March – April 2022

**Coup D' Etat or Sustainable Development for Africans:
A Military Perspective**

Saron Messembe Obia

**(Master of Science in Security Studies and Post Graduate Diploma in
Criminology and Security management from the Pan African Institute for
Development West Africa (PAID- WA))**

ISSN: 2241-6358

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES

(RIEAS)

1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece

RIEAS web site: <http://www.rieas.gr>

RIEAS MISSION STATEMENT

Objective

The objective of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) is to promote the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration, international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as well as policy making on national and international markets.

Activities

The Research Institute for European and American Studies seeks to achieve this objective through research, by publishing its research papers on international politics and intelligence studies, organizing seminars, as well as providing analyses via its web site. The Institute maintains a library and documentation center. RIEAS is an institute with an international focus. Young analysts, journalists, military personnel as well as academicians are frequently invited to give lectures and to take part in seminars. RIEAS maintains regular contact with other major research institutes throughout Europe and the United States and, together with similar institutes in Western Europe, Middle East, Russia and Southeast Asia.

Status

The Research Institute for European and American Studies is a non-profit research institute established under Greek law. RIEAS's budget is generated by membership subscriptions, donations from individuals and foundations, as well as from various research projects. The Institute is autonomous organization. Its activities and views are independent of any public or private bodies, and the Institute is not allied to any political party, denominational group or ideological movement.

John M. Nomikos

Director

RIEAS ORGANIZATION

Administrative Board

John M. Nomikos, Director
Nikos Prokopidis, Senior Advisor
Ioannis Galatas, Senior Advisor
Daniel Sanchez, Senior Advisor
Daniel Little, Senior Advisor
Zhyldyz Oskonbaeva, Senior Advisor and Eurasian Liaison
Yannis Stivachtis, Senior Advisor
Darko Trifunovic, Senior Advisor
Matthew Crosston, Senior Advisor
Eleni Kikiras Carter, Senior Advisor
Irene Vandaraki, Senior Advisor

Academic Advisor

Prof Anthony Ioannidis (PhD)

Research Team

Andrew Liaropoulos, Senior Analyst
Megan Palmer, Senior Analyst
Dionysios Dragonas, Senior Analyst
Leo Lin, Senior Analyst
Raagini Sharma, Senior Analyst
Evripidis Tantalakis, Senior Analyst
Pinelopi (Nely) Passakou, Senior Analyst
Vera Tika, Senior Analyst
Karen Wharton, Senior Analyst
Aya Burweila, Senior Advisor
Eleana Choutea, Senior Analyst
Lélia Rousselet, Senior

International Advisors

Richard R. Valcourt, Former Editor-in-Chief, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Prof Alba Popescu (PhD), National Defense University, Romania
Dr. Eyal Pinko (PhD), International Institute for Migration and Security Research, Bulgaria
Robert Ellis (MA), Turkey Analyst and Commentator on Turkish Affairs
Prof. Shlomo Shpiro (PhD), Bar Ilan University, Israel
Philani Dhlamini (MA), African Journal of Intelligence Studies, University of Zimbabwe
Erikh Kleinsmith, (PhD), American Military University (AMU/APU), USA
Vasilis J. Botopoulos (PhD), Rector and Managing Director, Webster University Athens
Prof. S. John Tsagronis (PhD), The Institute of World Politics, USA.
Ruben Arcos (PhD), Chair Intelligence Services and Democratic Systems, Rey Juan Carlos

University, Spain

Robert J. Heibel, Founder & Business Developer, Institute for Intelligence Studies, Merchyhurst University, USA

Prof. Joseph Fitsanakis (PhD), Coastal Carolina University, USA

Don McDowell (MAIPIO, CCA) Principal, College of Intelligence Studies (UK)

Keshav Mazumdar (CPO ,CRC,CMAS,ATO) Intelligencer , Certified Master Antiterrorism Specialist

Prof. Daniel Pipes (PhD), Director, Middle East Forum

Prof. Miroslav Tadjman (PhD), University of Zagreb and Former Director of the Croatian Intelligence Service

Dr. Philip H. J. Davis, (PhD), Director, Brunel Center for Intelligence and Security Studies

Col (ret) Virendra Sahai Verma, Former Military Intelligence Officer from India

Prof. Anthony Glees (PhD), Director, Center for Security and Intelligence Studies, Buckingham University

Prof. Peter Gill (PhD), University of Salford

Prof. Siegfried Beer (PhD), Former Director, Austrian Centre for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies

Prof. Artur Gruszczak (PhD), Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland

Prof. Jordan Baev (PhD), G.S. Rakovsky National Defense Academy, Bulgaria

Dr. Julho Kotakallio, (PhD), University of Helsinki, Finland

Prof. Iztok Podbregar (PhD), University of Maribor, Former National Security Advisor to the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Former Chief of Defense (CHOD), Former Director of the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency, Former Secretary of the Slovenian National Security Council.

Prof. Gregory F. Treverton, (PhD), National Intelligence Council

Julian Droogan (PhD), Editor, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University, Australia.

Prof Antonio Diaz, (PhD), University of Cadiz, Spain

Prof. Thomas Wegener Friis (PhD), University of Southern Denmark

Dimitrios Krieris (MA), Police Major, CEPOL Unit, Greece

Ron Schleifer (PhD), Ariel Research Center for Defense and Communication, Israel

Zijad Bećirović, Director, IFIMES International Institute, Slovenia

Prof Klaus Lange (PhD), Director, Institute for Transnational Studies, Germany

Mr. Stuart Allen, (ACFEI; ABCHS; ASIS; IEEE; AES;) President, Criminologist and Chief Forensic Investigator of covert recorded evidence, at The Legal Services Group, IMSI (USA)

Prof. Sohail Mahmood (PhD), International Islamic University, Pakistan

Ruth Delaforce (PhD), Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia

Prof Hussein Solomon (PhD), University of Free State, South Africa

Prof Rohan Gunaratna (PhD), International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore

Quantin de Pimodan, Author, Security Analyst, France.

Corrina Robinson (PhD), President, On Mission LLC, USA.

Paul S. Lieber (PhD), Joint Special Operations University, USA

Prof Marc Cools, (PhD), Ghent University, Belgium

Andres de Castro Garcia (PhD), University of Kurdistan Hewler (UKH) Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq

Prof Darko Dimovski (PhD), University of NIS, Serbia

Mr. Musa Khan Jalalzai, Author & Security Expert

Ioanna Iordanou, (PhD), Oxford Brookes University, UK

Prof Nicholas Eftimiades, Author, Pennsylvania State University – Harrisburg, USA

Aditya Tikoo (MA), Global Counter-Terrorism Council, India

Hriday Ch Sarma, (PhD), Caucasus - Asia Center, India

Research Associates

Marina Artemeva, Northern Caucasus Studies

William Tucker, U.S. National Security

Prem Mahadevan (PhD), Indian Counter Intelligence Studies

Christodoulos Ioannou (MA), European Intelligence Studies

Nikolas Stylianou (MA), Cyprus and European Studies

Konstantinos Saragkas, (MSc , LSE), ESDP/European Armaments Cooperation

Research Paper

No. 185

March – April 2022

**Coup D' Etat or Sustainable Development for Africans:
A Military Perspective**

Saron Messembe Obia

(Master of Science in Security Studies and Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology and Security management from the Pan African Institute for Development West Africa (PAID- WA))

ISSN: 2241-6358

Abstract

One of the leading words in Africa is ‘Pan Africanism.’ A word which has continuously been diminished by Neocolonialism and New World Order, due to authoritarian regimes in Africa. For several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d’état in Africa. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups and not the justification, neither if they exist good coup d’état. However, model uncertainty from scholars exposes large looms. There exist several potential determinants of coups, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing these coups. This paper addresses this problem from a military perspective, and review contemporary coups, as that of Guinea Conakry. It further analyses the role of the military in democratic transitions in Nigeria, so as to better understand the re-emergence of coups in Africa. The paper equally provides recommendations to avoid coup d’états and prone for sustainable development for African states.

Keywords: Coup’s d’état, African Union, Constitution, Boko Haram

Introduction

Security is one of the major challenges in Africa. Human security, which is marked by sectarian violence, terrorism, jihadist tendencies and the unconstitutional takeover, because of unscrupulous leaders in Africa refuse to

concede defeat by amending the constitution to prolong their stay in office. The recent events in Guinea Conakry, Mali and Burkina Faso by a small group of militaries is symptomatic of the reemerging pattern of coups d'état which have hit Africa in recent years.

It is necessary to out pin that, every coup d'état has different origins, causes and effects: most coups are due to constitutional amendment by president to remain in office, others are because of corrupt system and living standard of citizens. However, many African countries have also succumbed to military forces over the past five years, including Mauritania (August 2008), Guinea-Bissau (December 2008 and April 2012), and Niger (February 2010). This poses a series of questions: why are most African leaders ousted through coups? Is there any external factor linked to military coups in Africa? Is there a discernible pattern of which could help predict when military coups are most likely to occur? What are the measures that governments should be adopted?

A coup d'état is adopted from French language to describe the overthrow a government by a small group of military, police, or security forces, which might either be violent or through a swift transition. The action is usually considered unconstitutional, because of the illegal replacement of the existing government personnel, which eventually alters the state's fundamental social and economic policies. More so, other patterns can be carried out by small group's struggle to oust an established government. When it fails, it is considered "coup attempt," while extra-legal military or paramilitary infiltration in political affairs is called a "plot."

Since independence, Africa has experienced more than two hundred military coups, counting both successful and failed coup attempts (Habib Ben Barak & Mthuli Ncube, 2012). Political and economic conditions prevailing in different African countries and colonial influence have all played a part in fueling conflicts and coups in the region. The destabilizing factors have been many and varied, depending on the national context: warring factions seeking to gain power in the aftermath of independence (Biafra in Nigeria); established and stable states burdened by bad governance and by corrupt officials; autocratic regimes repressing any form of opposition but with sociopolitical discontent and instability seething below the surface. As foreign powers' quest for geostrategic influence and security, has in the past translated into shadow participation in African inter- and intrastate conflicts and in support to African dictators, thereby fanning the flames of violent dissent.

Theoretical Framework

Maintaining peace and security around the world and in Africa in particular remains a strategic challenge even with the involvement of international and regional actors. Several scholars have analyzed political conflict and the causes and outcomes of military coups d'état. Slater, and McGowan (1984) found that “states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence, and which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics.” These scholars equally concluded that, some measures of positive economic performance are highly stabilizing, such as employability rate, economic growth, and increase in export performance.

With regards to the internal factors leading to a coup, McBride (2004) and Collier and Hoeffel (2007) focused their analyses on the military machine. McBride assertion is critical in relation to 21st century military coups in Africa. He believes the military intervention in political affairs is mainly for reasons of personal greed and alienated to what they will gain once in office. Collier and Hoeffler pose on the interdependence between the risks of a coup (plotted, attempted, or successful) and the level of military spending at the time. They found that in countries with a low coup risk, governments respond by reducing military spending, whereas in countries with a high coup risk, governments tend to increase military spending.

Re-emergence of Military Coups

The previous sections, which were devoted to the trends of military coups in Africa continent, have provided a general overview of successful and failed military coups which was triggered by ideological motives, the quest to prolong stay in office by leaders and external forces. But the major and leading aspect in recent coups in Africa is constitutional amendment and socio-economic and security situation.

1-Constitutional amendment

Most of the coup's d'états registered in Africa between 2021-2022 are related to constitutional amendment, corruption, and de-humanizing situation of citizens in different regions or communities of the country. Most African presidents, wait for their mandate to come to an end before trying to amend the constitution, in order to prolong their stay in office. Others renew partnership with former colonial master in order to stand against all odds. However, the February 18, 2010, spill out several questions, when the democratically elected President of Niger,

Mamadou Tanja, was overthrown in a military coup. The action was implemented because of the President's decision to amend the Constitution in order to extend by three years his second five-year term.

2- Socio-economic and security situation

Sustainable development is the major agenda for most African states. Though leaders continue to exploit country resources (for personal use or enrich their family), neglecting the population, all these appeals for the rise of coups in Africa. For example, on August 6, 2008, a coup d'état led by military officers in Mauritania, saw President elect, Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, overthrown with response to the deteriorating social, economic, and security situation in the country. Meanwhile, in December 2006, an alleged military coup attempt failed against Madagascar's President, Marc Ravalomanana, who was running for another mandate. The latter was forced resign two years later (in March 2008), following a protracted power struggle with the opposition.

The myth of a good coup d'état

The colonial experience demurs a cancer to several African countries. Contrary to the globalization era, which is just a reconfiguration of the hegemonic system, through what scholars' term 'Neo-colonialism,' creating security alliances within the continent. Back in 2000, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), adopted the Lomé Declaration on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government, which examined four cases of unconstitutional change or democratic elections, which are, a military coup d'état; an intervention by mercenaries; a seizure of power by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; and a refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power after free, fair and regular elections.

The recent events in Mali and Burkina Faso, are not new, yet sanction of the AU which usually consist of suspending such countries is yet to be concretize. It is one of the legal prescriptions of African Union, as per Article 30, which stipulates that 'Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the African Union. But the major question is Does the Westphalia treaty of 1648 has an influence over this decision.

In 2003, AU witness a new dawn with the creation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), to deal with cases of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), among other issues. But with challenging security issues, such as terrorism and the quest for secession in several African countries, the AU is yet to provide lasting solutions. An example is the Nigerien President Mamadou

Tandja story. Despite his election, Tandja attempted to tighten his grip on the presidency in a blatant violation of Niger's constitution.

In August 2009, after ten years in office, he prone for a new constitution by referendum that extended his presidential mandate for three years in order to complete projects. Most African leaders in other to prolong their stay in office, usually suppress opposition parties and their leaders. President Tandja's prone for new constitution, led to his arrest on 18 February 2010, by the junta, (Conseil Suprême De Restauration De La Démocratie (CSRD)), and their agenda is making Niger an example of democracy and good governance, and to save the country and its population from poverty, deception, and corruption. Even citizens took to the streets of the capital Niamey in pro-coup demonstrations, appeal to CSRD considerable support for the coup. Though unconstitutional (the coup in Niger), nongovernmental organizations backed Tandja's ousting. An example is Ali Idrissi, who posed that, 'Deep down, we are cheering it. For us, it is a good coup d'état.'

Political scientists are yet to answer the two questions; was President Tandja dictator? Why was he not supported by international community? There is no doubt that the international community expressed tacit support for the coup, as most countries opted not to call for Tandja's restoration. However, they were resourceful, in providing positive steps that the CSRD and its leader Colonel Salou Djibo were taking for sustainable development in the country. The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William Fitzgerald said, 'the CSRD seems to be saying the right things, we've seen some encouraging signs.' The Christian Science Monitor, featured an article with the headline, 'Niger coup: Can Africa use military power for good?' while Newsweek asked, 'Is There Such Thing As A[sic] Good Coup?'

If the word 'good' simply refers to the institution of a durable democracy, the coup is not a formidable pattern for regime change. Drawing from historical facts of African coups, Nigerien people's enthusiasm and the tacit support of the international community will prove to be unwarranted.

Beyond the Niger case, a number of other African countries have recently seen such events in Africa; Guinea-Conakry, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Most of these coups and others around the continent ousted corrupt and autocratic regimes, though a number of scholars argue that such extralegal takeover has never succeeded in engendering durable democratic principles and ensuring sustainable development.

Exploring the 2021 coup d'état in Guinea-Conakry

Military transition is a path to legitimizing leadership in a constitutional manner. The five September, coup in Guinea Conakry, was orchestrated by a 41-year-old former French legionnaire (Mamady Doumbouya). The former posed that 'the army had little choice but to seize power because of the rampant corruption, disregard for human rights and economic mismanagement under the 83-year-old President Condé. "The president is with us, he's in a safe place," Col Doumbouya told French media after a historic coup d'état.

Profiling Col. Doumbouya

Col. Doumbouya is from the Malinké community, like the deposed president, and hails from Guinea's eastern Kankan region. During his 15-year military career, he served (missions) in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Central African Republic and gained insight in close protection in Israel, Cyprus, and the UK. The fellow "brilliantly completed" the operational protection specialist training at the International Security Academy in Israel, as well as elite military training in Senegal, the Unit Commanders Training Course at the Ecole d'application de l'infanterie (EAI – Senegal), Gabon, the Staff Officer Training Course (EEML Libreville), and the Ecole de Guerre de Paris, France.

The former equally served in the French foreign legion for several years, before Mr Condé requested his return to Guinea to lead the newly established elite Special Forces Group (GFS) in 2018. He was then based in Forecariah, western Guinea, where he served under the bureau of territorial surveillance (DST) and the general intelligence services.

The 'game' in Conakry began in October 2018, when the later desire to empower the Groupement des forces spéciales (GPS) from the Ministry of Defense. This event aroused mistrust of the power of Conakry. One of his character trait is the person always avoided confronting senior officers whose problematic behavior was pointed by his faithful Diané, as he preferred to stay clear of them. Meanwhile, potential putschists like Generals Edouard Théa and especially Aboubacar Sidiki Camara (aka "Idi Amin") were sent as ambassadors, the first to Angola and the second to Cuba in January 2019.

Doumbouya already had a mastery of the 'game,' for the fact that, Gendarmerie general "Idi Amin" appears to have been his mentor, when he was defense minister's cabinet director, and even introduced Doumbouya to Amara Camara, Guinea's ambassador to Paris, in 2012. Doumbouya informed the ambassador that

he wanted to serve his country. The former was then assigned to a post as an instructor within the BASP and then received by the President himself in Conakry.

President Alpha Condé ousting

Scholars tend to argue that, though security is a process, negligence is an aspect which is critical in the field of international security. As a leader (president) or military commander, the worse thing to do it to neglect or ignore intelligence report. One of the major reasons for successful putsch in Guinea Conakry was because the President decided to ignore the worrisome notes from his intelligence services, which reported the alleged remarks of Doumbouya, who had become extremely popular among his troops.

The disdain within the special forces was another sign. His affiliation with General “Idi Amin,” on diplomatic exile in Cuba and the risk of the GFS becoming the defense forces’ best-armed unit were strategic issues.

It would have appealed to the premier that, as from April 2020 onwards, Doumbouya and Diané’s were not in good terms, and it was even in the press. It was in the role of the military adviser to draw attention once more before presidential election, when the former refused to relocate the Special Forces base from Conakry to Kaleya, near to Forécariah, as planned.

Regarding security of the presidential palace of Sékhoutouréya, located on the peninsula of Kaloum, in Conakry, which was surrounded by a triple security cordon (before the coup) consisting of soldiers from the Bataillon Autonome de Sécurité Présidentiel (BASP), with based at Camp Makambo, in the Boulbinet district, only few kilometers away. Prior to the event of 5 September, a small detachment, who adhered to red berets and managing the three checkpoints along the avenue leading to the palace’s entrance gate, were already in the ‘game’.

The BASP soldiers were loyal to the President, though were not properly trained nor armed. According to French General Bruno Clément-Bollée, Sékhoutouréya was “one of the worst guarded palaces in West Africa.” Compared to how well protected other African presidential lodge.

From his (Mamady Doumbouya) base at Kaleya in Forécariah, in Lower Guinea, about 85km away, he controlled and commanded a column made up of about fifty trucks and pick-ups armed with 12.7mm machine guns and moved straight to Kaloum, where he made his entrance at around 8am.

After deploying, the entire Groupement des Forces Spéciales (GFS), around five hundred men, for the mission. A number of these soldiers, who were heavily armed, took up positions in front of the Makambo camp to prevent the Presidential

Guard reinforcements from leaving. Meanwhile, the special unit 8602 (trained by the French and Israelis) headed for Sékhoutouréya, along with an armoured vehicle and several mortars.

The ‘game’ was well coordinated, which could not be countered even with appeal from neighboring nations. Was it a ‘good’ coup? Is the new strongman a peace advocate? How sustainable is his agenda for the citizens of Guinea Conakry? Questions which political scientist and economist are yet to answer because of few months in office.

Role of the military in democratic transitions

History retains Nigeria, as one of the countries which has registered the highest number of coup d’états in Africa. Though irrespective of the destabilizing functions of the military institution in political transition and succession to democracy, most military officers have contributed to a large extent towards democratic succession in Nigeria. For example, the role of Mohammed /Obasanjo, and Obasanjo/Yar Adua regimes are proof of democratic succession.

However, the role of the military as an institution and officials including the head of state and civil society for democratic succession during Gen. Abubakar’s regime in 1999 is worthy to commend. The success in Gen. Abubakar’s transition to civil rule in 1999 owed partly to his administration, constituted of retired senior security officers, who were debriefed during his office (The Guardian, 1998: 4).

Adekanye (1999) pointed out that, several military officers prone for democratic governance in Nigeria. It is necessary to reveal that, military support for democratic rule, was closely join with pro-democracy groups such as National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) in pursuit for just cause of the country. More so, in the struggle against Abacha’s self-succession and quest for enthronement of civilian democratic rule, military machine found themselves earmarked for physical elimination by agents of Gen. Abacha’s regime. This claim was validated during legal proceedings and expositions in the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (fondly called Oputa Panel). These events laid background for civilian leadership (democratic rule) in (1999) fourth republic.

Most scholars do not subscribe to the above narrative, for the fact that, the Obasanjo administration from 1999 – 2007 could be because the elected President, retired Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo was one of them (army), who still gained and retained the privileges of the long tradition of ‘esprit – de – corp’. It has also been argued that the 1999 elections, pulled suspicion to the last military administration of Gen. Abubakar regime and the entire military institution would prefer having a retired General for succession, than a so called “bloody civilian.”

The successful leadership and support during the Obasanjo administration by retired Generals could not be underestimated, and that of the serving personnel in the army.

Critical enough to think that this ample support appeared to have evaporated during the Yara Adua/Jonathan regime. One will be fast to conclude that, the difficulties that President Jonathan had with fighting Boko Haram insurgency was lack of ‘esprit-de-cop’ from the Military. With contrary assumption that the office of the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (retired Gen. Muhammadu Buhari) in 2015 brought back the military rigor in the fight against Boko Haram, which political analysts attribute to the loyalty of serving military commanders to their retired colleague.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Security and leadership are all about strategy. Transition government in African history is simply to nest the new leader in to the ‘game.’ However, most transitional government, reconfigure the government in order to limit their ousting during elections, which entails electoral reform and constitutional amendment.

Drawing from the Malian situation, meaningful and comprehensive SSR is to take place, oversight actors and international partners will need to rethink why the process has so far been difficult to deliver. SSR may be unlikely in the coming months, sustained engagement at the strategic and technical levels remains possible and in fact, essential to ensure previous gains are not lost and new momentum for inclusive reforms can be created.

Though it is impossible to predict the onset, incidence, or success rate of a potential military coup, yet by addressing core economic and sociopolitical challenges, governments could mitigate the risk of such an event. In other words, good governance and policies that provide economic opportunities for all citizens and that create the enabling environment for poverty reduction may be the panacea to tackle political instability in Africa. Recommendations are therefore proposed to lay the foundations for a politically stable and prosperous future for Africa:

To provide sustained levels of economic development and prosperity. This will entail developing basic infrastructures; transportation, power, ICT, and water; reforming trade policies for increased income-generating opportunities for new enterprises; and reforming the financial system for increased access to means of production and export for an emerging Africa.

To provide equal educational, vocational trainings and economic opportunities for all citizens regardless of their social class and community. Boosting educational

and vocational opportunities will help to address the massive youth unemployment challenge currently facing Africa, which youth consider Europe as utopia. Policies to boost social inclusion and social protection, particularly for persons living with disabilities and in slum settlements in the cities, will help to extinguish the sparks of social unrest and military coups.

References:

Adekanye, B. (1999), *The Retired Military as Emergent Power Factor in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books PLC.

Afenaga, H. (1980), “Democracy Consolidates: Progress Report” *Times International*. Lagos: Daily Times Publishers, Jan. 14, 1980, pp. 8.

Akinterinwa, B. (1997), “The 1993 Presidential Elections Imbroglio.” (In L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, and O. Oyediran, -Ed. *Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida*, pp. 278-306). Ibadan: Vintage Publishers.

Arikpo, O. (1967), *Development of Modern Nigeria*. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin War Books.

At a glance. Actions of the African Union against coups d'état. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608822/EPRS_A TA\(2017\)608822_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608822/EPRS_A TA(2017)608822_EN.pdf)

Azikiwe, N. (1984), *Democracy with Military Vigilance*. Nsukka: African Book co.

Banjo, A.O. (1980), *The Potential for military Disengagement from Politics: A Nigeria case study 1966-1979*. Lagos: NIIA monography series.

Blondel, J. (1980), *World Leaders*. London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers.

Buhari, M. (1984), *Moment of Truth: Collected Speeches*. Lagos: Federal Government Printer.

Diamond, L., Kirk-Greene, A. and Oyediran, O (1997), *Transition without End: Nigeria Politics and Civil Society under Babangida*. Ibadan: Vintage Publishers.

Haruna, Y. (1988), “The Ubiquity of stability on the fragility of the theories of instability in Developing countries: The case of Nigeria’s second Republic Examined.” (In U.B. Uba –Ed. *Problems and Prospects*) Nsukka: NPSA Publication.

MILLER, A. (2011), Debunking the Myth of the “Good” Coup d’État in Africa. African Studies Quarterly | Volume 12, Issue 2 | Winter 2011

Obodumu, K (1992), “The Nigerian military and Leadership succession; A Materialistic Examination or the foundation of Nigeria’s Third republic.” (In B. Camron, A. Gboyega, and E. Osaghae, -Ed Democratic transition in Africa). Ibadan: CREU.

Ojibo, O. (1980), Nigeria Returns to Civilian Rule. Lagos: Tokin Co.

Olagunju, T. Jinadu, A, and Oyovbiare, S (1993), Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993). Ibadan: Safari Books and Spectrum Books Limited.

Owolabi, A.O. (1992), “The Military and Democratic Transition: An Analysis of the Transition Programme of the Babangida Administration.” (In B. Camron, A. Gboyega and E. Osaghae, -Ed. Democratic Transition in Africa) Ibadan CREU.

Perham, M. (1970), Reflections in the Nigerian Civil War. London: International Affairs April 1970.

Roberts, F.O. N. and Obioha, E.E. (2005), “Electoral Violence and The Role of Police in Nigeria”, in Onu, G. and Momoh, A. (eds) Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Lagos A-Triad Associates, Pp. 394-412.

Slingers, S.M. and Obioha, E.E (2015), “Interrogating the influence of prodemocratic police legacy on aspects of post-apartheid police system in South Africa.” Journal of Public Administration. 50 (2), pp. 397 – 406.

Suberu, R.T. (1997), “Crisis and Collapse; June-November 1993.” (In L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, and O. Oyediran, -Ed. Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida, pp. 307-329). Ibadan: Vintage Publishers.

Habiba Ben Barka & Mthuli Ncube. (2012), Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’Etat a Never-Ending Phenomenon?

E. E. Obioha. (2016), Role of The Military in Democratic Transitions and Succession in Nigeria. International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies. Vol 8, No 1, 2016 ISSN: 1309-8063 (Online)

Newspapers.

NewsWatch 13 Sept. 1993, pp. 15.

Sunday Times 29th January 1984 pp. 11

The Sunday Magazine (TSM, Lagos, vol 7, No 12, 14th July 1993 pp 25 and 26)

The Guardian, October 5, 1998, pp. 4.

The Guardian, 11th April 2000 Pp. 78.

The Guardian, July 18, 2000, Pp. 19.

Links

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58461971>

http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Africa_8/Guinea-The-secret-story-behind-the-fall-of-President-Alpha-Cond.shtml

<https://www.theafricareport.com/125796/guinea-the-secret-story-surrounding-the-fall-of-president-alpha-conde/>