



**RESEARCH PAPER**

**No. 107**

**JANUARY 2007**

**SERBIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

*Koturovic Darja*

**(Postgraduate Researcher-University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus))**

**RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES  
(RIEAS)**

**# 1, Kalavryton Street, Ano-Kalamaki, Athens, 17456, Greece  
RIEAS URL:<http://www.rieas.gr>**

## **RIEAS MISSION STATEMENT**

### **Objective**

The objective of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) is to promote the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration, international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as well as policy making on national and international markets.

### **Activities**

The Research Institute for European and American Studies seeks to achieve this objective through research, by publishing its research papers on international politics and intelligence studies, organizing seminars, as well as providing analyses via its web site. The Institute maintains a library and documentation center. RIEAS is an institute with an international focus. Young analysts, journalists, military personnel as well as academicians are frequently invited to give lectures and to take part in seminars. RIEAS maintains regular contact with other major research institutes throughout Europe and the United States and, together with similar institutes in Western Europe, Middle East, Russia and Southeast Asia.

### **Status**

The Research Institute for European and American Studies is a non-profit research institute established under Greek law. RIEAS's budget is generated by membership subscriptions, donations from individuals and foundations, as well as from various research projects. The Institute is autonomous organization. Its activities and views are independent of any public or private bodies, and the Institute is not allied to any political party, denominational group or ideological movement.

**John M. Nomikos**  
**Director**

**RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES  
(RIEAS)**

**Postal Address:**

**# 1, Kalavryton Street  
Ano-Kalamaki  
Athens, 17456  
Greece**

**Tel/Fax: + 30 210 9911214**

**E-mail: [rieas@otenet.gr](mailto:rieas@otenet.gr)**

**Administrative Board**

**John M. Nomikos**, Director  
**Ioannis Michaletos**, Analyst  
**Andrew Liaropoulos**, Analyst  
**Alkis Kornilios**, Information Officer  
**Anna Mavriki**, Secretariat Support

**International Advisors**

*Stivachtis Yannis*, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University  
*Evangelos Venetis*, University of Leiden  
*Konstantinos Filis*, Center for Eurasia Studies  
*Chris Kuehl*, Armada Corporate Intelligence Review  
*Charles Rault*, International Security Analyst  
*Andre Gerolymatos*, Hellenic Studies, Simon Fraser University  
*Shlomo Shpiro*, Bar Ilan University  
*Makis Kalpogiannakis*, Business Development Manager, Intracom  
*Dimitris Lidarikiotis*, Director, Spacephone SA  
*Erich Marquardt*, Power and Interest News Report

**Research Associates**

**Hamilton Bean**, Intelligence Studies  
**Konstantopoulos Ioannis**, Intelligence Studies  
**Paddy Mck Doherty**, Central Asia Studies  
**Zacharias Michas**, Independent Strategic Analyst  
**Nadim Hasbani**, Lebanon-Syria and North Africa Studies  
**Florian Taux**, East Asia Studies  
**Bjorn Fagersten**, European Intelligence Studies  
**Christian Kaunert**, European Union Politics  
**Aya Burweila**, Middle East, Islamic Studies  
**Maria Alvanou**, Terrorism Studies

**RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES**

**(RIEAS)**

**RESEARCH PAPER**

**No. 107**

**JANUARY 2007**

**SERBIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

***Koturovic Darja***

**(Postgraduate Researcher-University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus))**

***Introduction "We are all better than He"***

The SFR Yugoslavia conducted its foreign policy in a very "clever" way during the Cold war. Yugoslavia was neither pro-Western nor pro-Eastern oriented country, but it kept close relations with both blocks and also with the non-aligned movement.

The USA interpreted Tito's stance as being anti-Soviet, so it remained to develop friendly relations with Yugoslavia, despite its Communist ideology, in order to prop up an anti-Soviet regime bordering on three Warsaw Pact states. Yugoslavia accepted Western overtures, while at the same time maintained its distance from NATO and the western democracies. 1)

After the death of Tito in 1980, the fairytale of "I am Yugoslavian" was getting closer to its own end. And, different than other fairytales, it did

not have a happy ending. In each Yugoslavian republic nationalism was starting to grow and everyone suddenly recalled '*how extremely important nations they are*'. This phenomenon appeared as a consequence of the domestic policy of 'small tsars' such as Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic, which all believed that they could be "the new Tito", just in a smaller territory. Supporting the increased nationalism, they have created fertile ground for the future wars. However, these nationalist leaders were supported by certain Western countries and in this way they were able to implement their policies. This support (justified by national interests of Germany, USA, UK), has taken many lives... At the beginning, the USA largely ignored the rising tensions that were tearing the Yugoslav Federation apart. During the 1980s, Yugoslavia experienced a serious economic crisis, with rising inflation, increasing budget deficits, and a significant rise in foreign debt. Increased pressures from the IMF intensified the problems. The Albanian nationalism and economic decline provided ideal conditions for Slobodan Milosevic to rise in the Communist hierarchy of Serbia.1)

***The sad 90's or "travel Europe, and do not wait for us"***

Already in the 90's everything was clear – the previous Yugoslavia that was 'a melting pot', was boiling in hatred and nationalism. Just nobody was ready to believe it, or to accept it. Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian media were making the situation even worse, reporting only on one side of the story, manipulating people and supporting nationalistic leaders.

The protests against Milosevic started in the early 90's, however, they failed in large part due to the refusal of the United States and other Western powers to support the democratic forces. During the 1996 protests, the USA special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, successfully argued that the Clinton Administration should back Milosevic, in recognition of his role in the successful peace deal in Bosnia, and not risk the instability that might result from a victory by Serb democrats. 2)

In a way, the USA allowed Milosevic to remain in power far longer than he would have otherwise. The Reagan and Bush administrations failed

to respond to the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans. In 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, Secretary of State James Baker, repeated the support for the territorial integrity of a unified Yugoslavia. The Clinton administration blamed the Serbs and Milosevic for the wars in the former Yugoslavia and supported the Croatian and Bosnian governments. However, the West European powers were later entrusted to deal with the situation in Yugoslavia. 1)

As the new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica put it, "*The Americans assisted Milosevic not only when they supported him, but also when they attacked him. In a way, Milosevic is an American creation*".2)

### ***The 5<sup>th</sup> October 2000 – The rise of democracy and new foreign and security policy***

The relations between European Union and Serbia entered a new phase after the events in October 2000. Changing its foreign policy goals, Serbia decided to enter the Stabilization and Association Process, in order to become a member of the EU. The normalization of the relations has started through renovation of the political dialogue and cooperation with the EU, since the first visit of V. Kostunica (at that time President of FRY) to the European Council (EU Summit in Biarritz) on 12 October 2000. A month later, the relations are institutionalized and the preconditions for approaching the EU were created. During the official visit of Romano Prodi (President of EU Commission), the *Framework Agreement EU-FRY on Realization of the Program of the Assistance and Support of the EU for FRY* was signed in Belgrade on 25 October 2000. 3)

One of the key segments of the Stabilization and Association Process is the "*policy of conditionality*", which implies democratization, respect of human and minority rights, the rule of law, fulfillment of the international obligations and economic reforms, as the necessary conditions for the membership in the EU.4) As a part of this Process, Serbia is also a member of the CARDS Program (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization). In the beginning, financial resources from this program were used for the re-

creation of the institutions, economic and social reforms, strengthening of the civil society and technical assistance. After was emphasized its developmental component, so the resources were used as a support for the reform of the institutions (e.g. judicial institutions, Ministry of Justice, etc.).5)

The Foundation of the Consultative Task Force was of high importance for the first phase of the Stabilization and Association Process. It was working in 2001/2002, and its work on determining the condition of economy, law and politics in the FRY, resulted in mutual recommendations of the EU Commission and Yugoslavian government, which represented further directions for the reform process. Therefore, the dialogue was continued through the EPD (Enhanced Permanent Dialogue), admitting the progress in fulfilling the necessary technical conditions, which was confirmed by getting the positive *Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro* (EU Commission's decision, 25 April 2005).6)

Following the conference in Thessalonica, where it was concluded that Balkan states are welcome in the EU, providing that they fulfill the necessary conditions, Christopher Paten (EU Commissioner for Foreign Affairs) pointed out that the EU is not limited only on formulizing the political strategies, but it is also assisting the candidates in various practical ways. For example, EU introduced the so-called Asymmetric Trade Measures, and in this way unilaterally allowed the opening of its markets for the goods coming from Western Balkans. 7)

According to Goran Svilanovic, former Federal Minister of foreign affairs, the main objectives of Serbia and Montenegro in 2002 were transformation of political and economic system, re-defining of status of Serbia and Montenegro and enforcement of the new foreign policy conception. The priorities concerning foreign policy were better relations with neighbor countries, integration in EU and stable relations with big powers as USA, Russia, China. The relations with neighbor countries have started improving since 2000, which is very

important for creating a framework for regional stability and cooperation.8)

During the presidency of the *Process of Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe*, Serbia and Montenegro have signed a number of treaties with the neighbor countries, concerning matters such as social security and dual citizenship (with Bosnia and Herzegovina), cooperation in combating organized crime (with Croatia and Bulgaria), encouragement and protection of foreign investments (with Slovenia and Albania), etc.

This 'tranquilization of passions' among Balkan states is, on my opinion, one of the most important merits of the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, who was insisting on the concept of "*de-emotionalization*", implying that all of the problems can be discussed peacefully and professionally, in order to avoid provoking the excitement and anger of people. He was also emphasizing the importance of the regional cooperation <in order to demonstrate to the EU that we are capable to resolve our own problems> (Z. Djindjic).9)

The fact that the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan visited Serbia after 13 years, demonstrated that Serbia has returned on the map of international relations, that its foreign policy has changed, as well as the security issues. Another important visit in this year has been the visit of the delegation of Security Council, which supported the concept "standards before the final status" regarding the future status of Kosovo. It was supported that "Kosovo must be multiethnic and that all the nationalities should be integrated in the temporary institutions, before the decision concerning final status is made". 8)

However, the accomplishment of foreign policy objectives is highly dependent on the domestic policy and stability of the institutions. The slow adoption of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro was the main reason for postponing their membership in the Council of Europe. The non-defined relations between Serbia and Montenegro and their slow harmonization (especially in the economic sphere) have impeded the approximation to EU and delayed the signing of the

Agreement of Stabilization and Association with EU, as well as further negotiations regarding the membership in EU. Therefore, the EU Commission suggested (September 2004) the concept of “*double tracks*” for Serbia and Montenegro, so that they could conclude one Agreement on Stabilization and Association and two different trade annexes. The Agreement would contain the basic principles of association, the bodies that will be in charge of the association and other issues that are in mutual jurisdiction of Serbia and Montenegro, while the annexes would regulate the stages of trade liberation for each state separately. Since Montenegro became independent after the referendum in 2006, these states will approach the EU separately.<sup>10)</sup>

Adopting the Constitutional Charter, Serbia and Montenegro decided to keep mutual foreign policy. Therefore, it was necessary to re-organize the previous Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to the new state constitution. The new Ministry represents appropriate authority for the conduction of foreign policy, maintenance of diplomatic relations, development of cooperation within international organizations, and other responsibilities of Serbia and Montenegro as international subject. Through this re-organization, the new Ministry became an important factor in the international activity of the country, different than the previous Federal Ministry, which was frequently used as an instrument of for various political arguments and other domestic political “points” and understood as a “service-providing” body of diverse political centers.<sup>11)</sup>

The positive developments in various areas of domestic and foreign policy were frequently ‘covered by a shadow’ due to certain events. The year 2003 was marked with domestic problems. The Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was murdered in the entrance of the Government building.

As a consequence, the Parliament proclaimed the ‘*state of emergency*’ and the state entered in the most decisive combat with organized crime. The parties that were on power at that time consider these actions very successful, claiming that <the biggest network of drug

trafficking was broken>, while the parties that form the current Government claim that the '*state of emergency*' was also used against political opponents. Regardless to the point of view that may be taken, this period slowed down the approaching of Serbia to the EU and seriously damaged the country's image in the world.12)

However, the new Government since 2004 continued insisting on the European path of Serbia. The Parliament has adopted numerous systemic laws in accordance with EU standards, the Ministry of Defense, with Minister Z. Stankovic on its head, is conducting the essential reform of the army, and the Government finally understood how important it is to have a lobby company working for the interests of the state in the USA (the Minister for foreign economic relations recently signed a contract with the BGR company in Washington, considered to be very close to the President Bush). 12)

One of the most important achievements in 2006 is the recent adoption of the new Serbian Constitution. This democratic, modern Constitution finally abrogates *the social property* ("everything belongs to everyone, but only the few use it" – a very good tool for corruption), which is extremely important for foreign investments; it also abrogates the old concept of the "right to use" the land in the cities that was disabling the construction by foreign investors (because they would have the property on the building, but not on the land under that building); it stipulates the state to combat conflict of interests and promotes the 'cult' of private ownership. 13)

According to the President Boris Tadic, <the path of Serbia towards Europe is not a one-way street; the EU is also on a path towards Serbia, Balkans and South-Eastern Europe>. Discussing the reasons why Serbia is so slow in approaching the EU, Tadic mentioned the difference between "the first and the second Serbia" (implying in this way the difference between the pro-European oriented citizens with the other, very poor citizens who do not see that they would be any better in EU). 14)

### ***Security policy***

The main strategic objective of Serbia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is European and Euro-Atlantic integration, accession to the Partnership for Peace and NATO membership. These objectives are mutual for all Western Balkan countries, because the matter of security of these countries cannot be observed without having in mind the security of a region as a whole and a region in a European context. This was concluded on the Thessalonica Summit about European prospects in the Western Balkans. Thus, a firm commitment among countries of a region to enforce these new strategic objectives, to develop good neighborly relations, demonstrates the need to implement security sector reforms and adopt a joint approach to this problem. 15)

The Serbian army reform implies the reduction of the inherited apparatus which exceeds the financial possibilities and the needs of the country, different organization, civil control, and creation of more modern armed forces whose doctrine and training will enable them to oppose (together with other members of Partnership For Peace and NATO) all assaults on the integrity of the country and the overall stability of the world (to oppose attacks as terrorism, organized crime, illegal activities, etc.).16)

These changes have already started in the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, and they are continuing in Serbia, where the Minister of Defense is getting numerous acknowledgements (from the EU and NATO) for his work on this matter. Serbia has already initiated the cooperation with other countries in the areas concerning defense. For example, Serbian government signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Areas of Defense (9 November 2006) with Greek government.

Some of the achievements in this area were the adoption of new laws on the defense and army, the adoption of National Security Strategy, modification of the Military doctrine of Serbia and Montenegro, etc.

Due to the experience of the use of army, police and paramilitary units for diverse wrong objectives, it is necessary to conduct the reform of security sector in efficient, rational way, by putting it under civil

control. The new Law on Security Services (2003) placed the Military Intelligence and Military Security Service directly subordinated to the Federal Prime Minister. In this situation, the Parliament has a multidimensional role, because the Parliament adopts the laws compatible with European standards, participates in the development of a defense strategy, monitors the military spendings (through budget) and controls the security system through cooperation with competent ministries and institutions. 15)

It is also necessary to change the mentality of looking at the defense sector, in order to perceive them not as a privileged group, but as a group of professionals that are contributing the society and are accountable to the elected authorities of the state (the President, the Parliament) and in this way, also to the people who pay taxes and finance them.17)

According to George Katsirdakis, the army reform implies defense restructuring (active vs. reserve forces, conscription vs. professionalism and heavy static formations vs. light, flexible and mobile formations), as well as the changes of the defense capabilities (according to NATO standards), which include effective intelligence, communications and logistics, readiness and survivability and force protection. 17)

One of the institutions that addresses these issues is the Ministry of Defense. The MoD Reform Team was created in December 2003, it was based on an international treaty (signed by former Minister of Defense Boris Tadic and UNDP representative Francis O' Donnell) and its organization emphasized international dimension (for example, two advisors from UK, patronage of the UNDP program). The team was supposed to work based on the three basic premises: a) reform of the system is expensive, comprehensive and continuous process, b) it can not be completed only relying on internal resources, and c) reform of the defense system must be an integral part of broader social reforms, implying that the security sector should be placed under democratic civil control and public oversight. 18)

The mentioned social reforms are perceived in few levels: a) *normative* (e.g. systematization of the MoD and General Staff), b) *functional* (to avoid overlapping and to harmonize functions with those accepted worldwide), c) *information and technical* (modernization of procedures and internal information levels among institutions and bodies), d) *managing and developing human resources* (in the sense of employment, re-training, promotion, evaluation), e) *educational* (“reforms are not a threat, but a chance to work and live better”), and f) *cultural* (development of critical thinking and questioning among individuals). 18)

Regarding the reform of the Police and Secret Services and the role of the Committee for Security and Defense in the reform of armed forces, Zoran Sami (member of the Serbia and Montenegro parliament), stated that in the attempts to re-organize these services in order to be capable of doing their job without overstepping their authority or making a mess, it is necessary that “those who are well acquainted with the problems of the functioning of the police and state security, should, instead of just listening and keeping quiet, engage in resolution of the problems”. He also supported that the main problem for combating organized crime is the fact that the state security services “are displaying inertia and adapting much slower to new circumstances”. Also, because the crime in Balkans (such as drug-trafficking, sex-trafficking, etc.) has a cross-border nature, he emphasized the importance of the cooperation between Balkan states, not only verbal, but also in practice. 19)

From the aspect of the Security-Information Agency, essentially important changes are: a) elimination of all elements that could oppose the process of de-politicization of the Agency, b) creation of effective methods for internal and external control, c) establishment of the balance between the application of necessary measures and the respect of human rights, d) complete integration in the international security community, e) demystification of the Agency’s work, f) establishment of a codex of conduct for members of the civilian security sector, and g) creation of efficient and economically justified security system organization.20)

### ***The Hague Tribunal – crucial factor for foreign policy***

Another crucial factor that is delaying the approximation to EU is the “*question of all questions*”, meaning the cooperation with the U.N. tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. The famous question ‘Where is Ratko Mladic?’ is being asked since 2000 in every official meeting, visit, or conference and it is still unanswered. Serbia and Bosnia were excluded from the Partnership for Peace program because of their failure to arrest the two leading war crimes suspects, former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his wartime military chief, General Ratko Mladic.

Regardless to the number of conducted search-operations, they still haven’t been found, which caused strong critics from Carla Del Ponte (the Chief Prosecutor) and every-day pressures coming from the Hague Tribunal and EU. According to Olli Rehn (EU Commissioner of Enlargement), due to the fact that Serbia has not honored its obligations concerning the capture of General Mladic, the European Commission called off the negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro (3 May 2006).<sup>21)</sup>

However, it was highlighted that the EU confirms and supports the European perspective of Serbia, and that the negotiations will be continued as soon as General Mladic is arrested and extradited to the Hague Tribunal.<sup>22)</sup>

Regardless to the numerous objections, Serbian officials have managed, since 2004, to persuade a number of accused generals to “surrender voluntary” (although journalist’s rumors claim that the generals have got a substantial amount of money from the government, in order to surrender).

The cooperation with the Tribunal has significantly improved in certain aspects. Concerning the witnesses and documentation, the cooperation with the Tribunal in Hague is on the high level, due to the important actions of Serbian Ministry of Defense. Based on the Law on Cooperation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the International Crime Tribunal, the Council for Cooperation with the Tribunal was formed. This Council has provided the possibility for the representatives of the Tribunal to access the important state archives and documents regarding certain cases that are in proceedings before the Tribunal.

Due to these actions and the foundation of the Serbian War Crimes Prosecution Service (July 2003), Olli Rehn has supported the progress in the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, as well as the positive *“Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro”* in 2005.<sup>23)</sup>

### ***Kosovo: searching for the solution***

Is Kosovo an issue of Serbian foreign and security policy? According to the Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo is integral part of Serbia. However, as the current negotiations demonstrate, the final solution concerning its status may show that it is not something that Serbian politicians should ‘worry’ about. Why? Because Kosovo is becoming an independent state. However, even if it gains independence, Kosovo will remain the problem of security policy of Serbia, but also of other countries in the region. There are numerous reasons for this attitude.

Kosovo remains the main generator of the political instability and the center route of organized crime networks that are coming from Central Asia and reaching South America. It is also considered that these crime networks cooperate with diverse extremist and terrorist groups. Therefore, it seems that Kosovo represents a “paradise” for all criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, human and sex trafficking, weapons trade, etc.

If this situation is not resolved, Kosovo will remain the “black hole” on the map of Europe. <sup>24)</sup>

After the violence in March 2003, when numerous Orthodox Monasteries have been burned and destroyed, it became clear that these cultural and historical places must be protected. This matter is also a part of the current negotiations. Evangelos Kofos and Theodore Couloumbis have argued in favour of a plan to protect the Serbian Orthodox Monastic Community's heritage in Kosovo. This idea is an integral part of a comprehensive "future status settlement", which resulted from the careful discussion that was based on the paper of Kofos, represented at a conference on "Kosovo: Seeking a Sustainable Status" held in Thessalonica, on March 2005. 25)

German Marshall Fund of the United States, among others, supported this concept. This plan will be a component of the negotiations for the future status of Kosovo. The proposal supports Kai Eide's recommendations for the protection of Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions in Kosovo, the Contact Group's Guiding Principles for a settlement of Kosovo's Status, and Marti Ahtisaari's reconfirmation of the need to address this most important issue. 25)

Discussing the possible independence of Kosovo, Mauricio Gaspari, the new Italian representative in InCE (The Central European Initiative), pointed out that over-fragmentation is not helping the economic development of these countries and supported that these created *micro-states* will not be serious negotiators in international relations, regardless to their illusions.26)

The concept of "standards before the final status" seems to be relegated to the background, due to the fact that there hasn't been any improvement concerning the respect of human rights of the non-Albanian minorities, the attacks of Kosovars on the KFOR are continuing, the freedom of movement practically doesn't exist for Serbians in Kosovo, etc. Regardless to these facts, the pressures on Serbia to decide "*Kosovo or EU*" are continuing...

### **Conclusion**

The experience of the terrible mistakes in the 90's has obviously been 'a good lesson' for the decision-makers in Serbia. They demonstrate

awareness of the world politics and insist on the Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia. An adequate example is the recent event in Riga (Latvia) on November 29 2006, where NATO leaders invited Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the Partnership for Peace pre-membership program, but urged Serbia and Bosnia to fully cooperate with the U.N. war crimes Tribunal. 27)

NATO said that the three countries can offer "valuable contribution" to stability in the Balkans, and that their membership in the outreach program is important for the region. "We strongly support the ongoing reform processes and want to encourage further positive developments in the region on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration," said a communiqué issued at the end of the summit. 27)

However, Serbian foreign and security policy (as well as the domestic policy) are still burdened with many problems. Corruption represents a big problem that impedes further development, jeopardizes the credibility of the institutions (especially court) and influences foreign investors. Additionally, the inefficient public administration, although it seems as a domestic problem, also influences foreign policy due to its affects on the speed in the adaptation to the EU standards.

The problem of organized crime will probably be the top matter of security policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as well as the problem of international terrorism, and security services will have to deal with it in a more professional and independent way.

A significant obstacle for the improvement of Serbian foreign policy is the complete un-professionalism in the appointment of the ambassadors, which is usually conducted regardless to their references, based on the 'connections' with the political parties. In this way, these important representatives of the country, who usually do not speak the language of the state were they are assigned (frequently not even English language), or they are coming from completely different professions (medicine, literature, etc.), influence the image of the country and damage the realization of the foreign policy goals.

Due to these problems, as well as the insufficient economic assistance and the constant EU “policy of conditionality” the public “enthusiasm” concerning the membership in the EU has diminished.

**References:**

- 1) Robert Greenberg(2005). Balkans Overview: Need for a Regional Solution. <http://www.google.com>
- 2) Stephen Zunes (2004). Credit the Serbian People, Not NATO. <http://www.google.com>
- 3) <http://www.mfa.gov.yu>
- 4) Anastasakis, O. & Bechev, D. (2003). EU Conditionality in South-Eastern Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process. European Balkan Observer, Belgrade Center for European Integration. Vol 1, no.2
- 5) Miscevic, T. (2004). Serbia and Montenegro and European Union. Yearbook 2000-2003, International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, p.177
- 6) “Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro” European Commission, Brussels, 25/04/2005. <http://www.europa.eu>
- 7) Paten, C. (2004). Western Balkan: the Path Towards Europe. The speech in German Bundestag , European Affairs Committee, Berlin, 28 April 2004. In: International Politics, No. 1115, Belgrade
- 8) Svilanovic, G. (2002). The Continuance of the New Foreign Policy in Serbia and Montenegro. The speech on the press conference in Belgrade 26 December 2002. In: International Politics, No. 1108, Belgrade
- 9) Djindjic, Z. (2002). Serbia and its Neighbors. In: International Politics, No. 1107, Belgrade
- 10) Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria), Europe Glossary. <http://www.europa.eu>
- 11) Sahovic, M. (2002). Constitutional Charter and the Attitude of Serbia and Montenegro towards the World. Institute of International Politics and Economy, In: International Politics, No. 1108, Belgrade
- 12) [www.kurir.yu](http://www.kurir.yu)
- 13) [www.nin.co.yu](http://www.nin.co.yu)

- 14) Tadic, B. (2005). The speech in the Annual Assembly of the Association for South-Eastern Europe, Fryeburg. In: International Politics, No. 1117, Belgrade
- 15) Drljevic, M. (2004). The Role of the Parliament in the Security Sector Reform in the Countries of the Western Balkans. Ed. Miroslav Hadzic. Center for Civil-Military Relations & OSCE
- 16) Svilanovic, G. (2003). International Context of the Yugoslav Army Reform. In: Armed Forces Reform – Experiences and Challenges, Ed. Hadzic, M.. Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade
- 17) Katsirdakis, G. (2004). NATO and Defense Reform. In: Armed Forces Reform – Experiences and Challenges, Ed. Hadzic, M.. Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade
- 18) Mladenovic, M. (2004). Reform of the SCG Ministry of Defense: Course and Achievements. Ed. Miroslav Hadzic. Center for Civil-Military Relations
- 19) Sami, Z. (2004). The Role of the Parliament in the Security Sector Reform in the Countries of the Western Balkans. Ed. Miroslav Hadzic. Center for Civil-Military Relations & OSCE
- 20) Milivojevic, V. (2004). Reform of the Police and Secret Services. The Role of the Parliament in the Security Sector Reform in the Countries of the Western Balkans. Ed. Miroslav Hadzic. Center for Civil-Military Relations & OSCE
- 21) <http://www.eudelyug.org/en/news>
- 22) “Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans”, European Council, Brussels, 15 May 2006. <http://www.eudelyug.org/en/news>
- 23) “Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro”, European Commission, Brussels, 12 April 2005. <http://www.europa.eu/enlargement>
- 24) Kostunica, V. (2002). Building Democratic Institutions: The Condition of Strengthening the International Position of Yugoslavia. The speech on the 57<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UN General Assembly. In: International Politics, No. 1107, Belgrade
- 25) Theodore Couloumbis (2005). A plan to protect the Serbian Orthodox Monastic Community’s heritage in Kosovo
- 26) Gaspari, M. (2006). Illusions of the Micro-States. In: NIN, Belgrade. No.2913, p. 71

27) Knowlton, B. & Cooper, H. (2006). "Serb's letter persuades U.S. to drop opposition to Belgrade's special partnership with NATO". The New York Times, Published: November 30, 2006

### **RIEAS Publications:**

**RIEAS** holds a library and documentation center. The Institute regularly publishes Research and Occasional Papers as well as Special Reports and is interested in publication exchange schemes with similar institutions from abroad. RIEAS subscribes to a variety of academic journals such as Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Current History, Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, World Today, European Security, Economist, Business Week, etc. The specialized library holds more than 3000 books and has published more than 100 Research Papers.

We welcome short **commentaries** from young researchers/analysts for our web site (**about 700 words**), but we are also willing to consider publishing **short papers** (**about 5000 words**) in the English language as part of our publication policy. The topics that we are interested in are: **transatlantic relations, intelligence studies, Mediterranean and Balkan issues, Middle East Affairs, European and NATO security, Greek foreign and defense policy as well as Russian Politics and Turkish domestic politics.**

- Aya Burweila, "Libya After Rapprochement: Implications on energy security", RIEAS: Research Paper, No.105, (November 2006).
- Hamilton Bean, "Tradecraft Versus Science: Intelligence Analysis and Outsourcing", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 104, (November 2006).
- Ioannis L. Konstantopoulos, "Macroeconomic Espionage: Incentives and Disincentives", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 103, (November 2006)
- Andrew Liaropoulos, and Ioannis Konstantopoulos, "Selected Bibliography on Intelligence", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 102, (November 2006).
- Maria Alvanou, "European Responses to Islamic Terrorism Threat: The Italian Case Study", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 101, (October 2006).
- Andrew Liaropoulos, (2006), "A (R)evolution in Intelligence Affairs? In Search of a New Paradigm", RIEAS: Research Paper. No. 100 (June 2006).
- Andrea K. Riemer, (2006), "Geopolitics of Oil: Strategic and Operative Causes for the Iraq Intervention", RIEAS: Research Paper. No.99, (February).
- Andrea K. Riemer, (2005), "Nation Building: Concepts, Definitions, Strategic Challenges and Options", RIEAS: Research Paper. No.98, (November).
- Pine Roehrs, (2005), "Weak States and Implications for Regional Security: A Case Study of Georgian Instability and

Caspian Regional Insecurity", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 97, (October).

- Vassiliki N. Koutrakou, (2005), "Insights into the Post 2000 WTO- Inspired Development Policies Sponsored by the G 8 and the European Union", RIEAS: Research Paper, No.96, (June).
- Andrea K. Riemer, (2005), "The Kurds: Between Ankara and Baghdad in Search of Independence", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 95, (May).
- Yannis A. Stivachtis, (2005), "The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): Evolution and Challenges", RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 94, (March).
- John M. Nomikos, (2004), "Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP) and Post 9 / 11 Challenges", The Journal of Intelligence History, Germany.