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## **STRATEGIC MILITARY DECEPTION**

*Prerequisites of Success in Technological Environment*

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## **FOREWORD**

This is a study of deception, mainly in warfare as well as in peacetime and its application in military environment in technological era. Deception is a newcomer issue in international literature, regarding international and military affairs, as concerns about role of deception in military have waxed and waned since the end of World War II yet in next pages we attempt to elaborate how it has been working in several situations throughout the years from both theoretical and empirical perspective and what the conditions for a successful deception operation are, especially in the era of advanced technology.

Concerning methodology, firstly, we do a brief historical flashback to mention the timelessness character of deception in military operations, from ancient times until today. Then, we make reference in theories of strategy and how deception is implicated to the strategic planning. Next, we make an introduction to a general theory of deception, terminology, its principles and forms, the deceptions process, as well as the factors that enhance the percentage of success in conflicts. In the final section of theory, we present the concept of countering deception and whether is feasible to detect a deception campaign and prolong a surprise attack and, also, we mention some basic current trends in technology, examining their application and role in military operations and, especially in deploying deception campaigns.

In the second part, we try to see how the theory is implemented in practice. We use two examples where military deception occurred: The Operation Barbarossa and the Yom Kippur War. In these case studies we try to understand how Germany and Arabs made extensive use of deception practices in order to achieve tactical surprise in battlefield and gain strategic advantages over their enemies.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Deception is almost everywhere in life. In military affairs, business, sports even in our interpersonal relations. For example, in basketball, a player can feint that will pass the ball to his teammate and puts the ball in. In trade, someone maybe will try to sell us an i-Phone that is just a copy and not the original and we buy it, without knowing how to discern the real one. In nature, the chameleon changes its color to suit its environment, making itself invisible to the predators. That is a classic example of camouflage. In chess, a player can offer a decoy to his opponent by sacrificing one piece to gain an advantage. Even in our daily routine we deceive each other. Often people lie to a friend or make up a story to avoid an awkward situation. We can see deception even in art. In the movie 'The Game' one man set up a prank to his brother , as a birthday present, so successfully, that the victim considered it as a real situation.. Deception is not, exclusively, connected with the war and business, but it has many applications in many fields. However, we are going to have a thorough look in how

deception interacts with war and strategy and what the challenges are in the technological era.

To begin with, deception is not a principle of war, although deception operations have been used in wars in past as well as in peacetime throughout the years. It is better to assume it as a compound of intelligence or, as many writers and analysts claim, of counterintelligence. More or less, the specter of deception is present in intelligence procedure and operations.

By intelligence, we, usually mean, the pieces of information gathered about the enemy, using secret and clandestine methods, such as covert action, as well as the protection of the government's secrets by denying information to hostile intelligence agencies. The intelligence services are preoccupied with collection, analysis, dissemination and interpretation (intelligence cycle) of data as well as to protect the country from respective rival penetration by concealing and denying vital pieces of information, a practice broadly known as counterintelligence.<sup>1</sup> So, deception can be considered an innermost piece of an intelligence campaign, since it aims the target's intelligence analysts and policy-makers, while we can rank it, at the same time, in counterintelligence process, as the intelligence analysts are the main receivers of deception operations and they are to counter and forestall them.

There are three levels where the deception is implemented. Firstly, we have the strategic level, where deception takes place in a governmental framework and it concerns the high-levels of government, the procedure of decision-making and the authorities that formulate strategy. Next, it is the operational deception, where the theory is translated into practice. The operational level is about conduction of deception operations in war and how the strategy and national interests can be implemented in warfare. Finally, the tactical level of deception includes more technical methods and practices in battlefield, such as camouflage, document forgery, jamming and, generally, a variety of ruses.<sup>2</sup>

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## **CHAPTER 1: ON DECEPTION**

### **1.1 FLASHBACK IN HISTORY**

Deception has been a part of warfare from the dawn of history. At first it fell to individual commanders to develop tactical deception on the battlefield. It was not until the modern era that deception was organized at a high strategic level, as part of entire campaigns or wars. Doing a brief historical flashback, we can stress that deception has been around and it is as old as war or politics. Many examples from ancient times to nowadays indicate the temporal character of deception. We can find an employment of deception in Ancient Greece with the Trojan horse to be a classic deception ruse. Also, in ancient China many generals used to resort to deception ruses.<sup>1</sup> Joshua used operational deception tricks in the battle of Ai in 1200 BC. He had a considerable portion of his forces hidden in the rear of Ai. When the city's troops began an attack, Joshua ordered a retreat, which made the hostile forces come after him which led the Joshua's troops emerged and conquer the land of Ai.<sup>2</sup>

Charles Oman commented that Emperor Leo was in favor of deception practices and ruses, such as ambushes or fictitious retreats in battlefield, like Joshua did in Ai, as well as he aimed to gain advantages over the enemy without battles, but using indirect methods, such as deception tricks.<sup>3</sup>

The transition in the era of nations, as the result of the French Revolution, apart from the change in the way of conducting of war with, national armies to be in the front part of stage instead of mercenaries, increase the incentives to resort to tactical deception practices. Napoleon based its military warfare, to a great extent in maneuver and numerical superiority.<sup>4</sup>

Later, during the American Civil War Stonewall Jackson made good use of deception during the American Civil War. In 1862, following a series of harrying attacks along the Shenandoah Valley, his army marched in secret to attack McClellan at Richmond, Virginia. Jackson spread rumors that he was heading in a different direction, and even sent engineers to survey the fictional route. His army was kept under strict orders not to talk about, or even know, where they actually were, or were headed. The Union and the southern Confederacy are engaged in several clandestine operations, with spies from both parties to make use of espionage, covert actions or decoded telegrams.<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, the World War I offers a variety of deception operations. In September 1918, before the Battle of Megiddo (1918) the Egyptian Expeditionary Force commanded by General E. Allenby masked the movement of three cavalry division from the eastern end of the front line to the western end on the Mediterranean Sea, where the successful infantry breakthrough was exploited by the mounted divisions. These divisions moved under cover of darkness to naturally camouflaged areas in olive and orange groves behind the front line. Meanwhile, the remaining

mounted division, reinforced with infantry, maintained the illusion that the valley was fully garrisoned.<sup>6</sup>

Also, the Second World War abounds on examples and battles, where deception operation are employed. The Allies' successful landings in Normandy's coasts were a product of extensive use of diversion. The Allies diverted, with success, the German's attention from Normandy, using disinformation, to other possible targets of attack, such as Pas de Calais, Greece and Scandinavia. This made Hitler maintain a large number of troops in Norway, rendering the Normand land defenseless. In addition to this, they induce him to believe that an invasion to Normandy was implausible, something Hitler believed even after days of invasion.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, England use deception again against Hitler. Operation Mincemeat was the British' try aimed to persuade Hitler that, instead of Sicily, their actual intention was to launch an attack in Greece and Sardinia. Using disinformation and forged documents that were delivered to German echelons, they achieve making Hitler to reinforce the alternative targets except Sicily, the actual British objective. Again, in the armored Battle of Kursk in 1943, where the Soviet employed deception to conceal their offensive capabilities and preparation as well as diversionary operations, display of fictitious battalions and propaganda.<sup>8</sup>

Deception continued to be a part of several military operations and conflicts after the end of the World War II until nowadays. During the Cold War, the USSR was making attempts to conceal crucial data from the Americans about the Soviet ballistic missile program (ICBMs) and its military application, using diplomacy to protect the program from reconnaissance, with success, as the American intelligence community had difficulty to gain accurate and adequate information about the program.<sup>9</sup>

We can find late examples of deception in recent military history. Argentina resorted to deception during the conflict with England in Falklands Islands, with the latter to misjudge several intelligence warnings about the Argentinian's intentions.<sup>10</sup> General Norman Schwarzkopf resorted to deception during the Gulf War in 1991, when he launched a seaborne attack on Saddam Hussein's left side of his navy, while he attacked at the same time in his right side, destroying the Iraqi forces.<sup>11</sup> In recent years, Iraq tried to conceal from USA the existence of weapons and mass destruction.<sup>12</sup> Nowadays, terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, protect their capabilities and possible preparations from hostile surveillance and intelligence to achieve surprise, as well as criminal groups, like Mafia or drugs-cartels in South American to avoid detection from police.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Mahmud Ahmadinejad has proclaimed, until today, that the Iranian nuclear program is designed for peaceful purposes, trying to appease USA's worries and conceal, maybe Iranian intention to use nuclear weapons as a bargaining weapon.<sup>14</sup>

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## 1.2 STRATEGY AND DECEPTION

This chapter examines the role of deception in the shaping of strategy and how it can be a vital part in warfare. Firstly, we have to state some fundamentals about strategy. A most acceptable definition is the art of distribution and applying of military means to achieve its policy objectives, especially with the use of all means available, both military and non-military, such as diplomacy, coercion or embargo; that is we call grand strategy. The matter is whether the employment of deception is efficient in such a large strategic framework and how it can be affiliated in shaping grand strategy in different strategic military doctrines.

Deception offers the leader multiple advantages when he had to deal with an unfavorable situation. For instance, if a commander must launch an attack in an area where the deployment of military preparations is difficult to hide, passive deception may counterbalance this weakness. In terms of quantity, deception permits an inferior army to concentrate superior forces at the decisive point through the device of notional threats, leading the enemy to disperse its own troops, breaking the principle of concentration of forces, giving, the same time, the weaker side to achieve superiority at its point of choice, overcoming this handicap. Even for the numerical superior side, the use of such a ruse facilitates the achievement of decisive results at a lower cost by reducing the opponent's resistance at the key point.<sup>1</sup>

Also, deception offers solutions in both offensive and defensive types of warfare. Regarding offense, deception facilitates the achievement of surprise in place, time and strength, such as launching an attack earlier than expected and in a place that the enemy does not prepare to counter. Also, deception provides opportunities for the defense. Inducing the enemy into attacking at an area where one has a superior defensive position is one parameter of employing deception, although this outcome is not common. However, the British succeeded in luring Rommel to pursue his attack into Egypt long after he had passed the culminating point of victory, running out of supplies, while the British, fully informed by Ultra, were dug in, anticipating his attack.<sup>2</sup>

The first who tried to include intelligence and, particularly, deception into strategy planning was Sun Tzu. The Sun Tzu's preference for deception stems from his indirect approach towards the enemy. The indirect approach proposes the bypass of powerful enemy points and avoid the fatter forces, which is a practice of lesser resistance.<sup>3</sup> In the framework of grand strategy, the indirect approach means bypassing the enemy in the direction of military struggle against incidental opponent, postponing the main blow.<sup>4</sup>

One of the components of the indirect approach, Sun Tzu presented, is a broad perspective that includes a large variety of non-military means to gain advantage over

the enemy, such as diplomacy, posing the use of force in a second place and the deception methods and the value of information in the first one.<sup>5</sup>

The most famous quotation Of Sun Tzu is that: ‘all warfare is based upon deception’. His preference in information and deception has its roots in his theory of the ideal victory, which comes quickly, without fighting but by making the enemy’s forces to yield and, if possible, to switch sides rather than be annihilated.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, according to Sun Tzu, deception must be practiced in warfare as well as in peace, rendering it a more political rather than strictly military weapon. For this reason, a military and intelligence operation should be used not only in the tactical and operational level but also in strategic, so as to prepare the army well enough to achieve surprise.<sup>7</sup>

Sun Tzu elaborates the concept of deception claiming that, in conjunction with information gaining, is the key to achieve tactical surprise in battlefield. The basic idea is making the enemy believe exactly the opposite about our real intentions and capabilities. Particularly, combined with information gained by spies about the enemy’s battle order, we will able to discern the rival order, while, at the same time, we will conceal ours. As a result, we will be able to concentrate our troops, while the enemy’s perspective will remain divided leading to numerical superiority in a nice secluded area.<sup>8</sup>

The means of deception vary. They fluctuate from simple tricks and diversion to secrecy and concealment of the real situation combined with display of a fictitious one that presented as the real. A key factor that Sun Tzu points is the manipulation of the enemy’s perception by making him believe what we want to believe. This is feasible only if we are aware of the enemy’s expectations, thoughts and, generally, strategic military and political mentality.<sup>9</sup> How a state can achieve that? With the use spies who gain data about the enemy so as the generals and political leadership can use against the hostile forces.<sup>10</sup>

In the heart of Sun Tzu’s and, to a great extent, of the eastern strategic thought is to subdue the enemy without fighting. This is the ideal victory and a strategic triumph. If a prince or a state decides to go to war, this must be end quickly and with the least possible cost, as the long term wars tend to be pernicious, as they demand investments in personnel and money. Sun Tzu advises the each leadership, both political and military, to support its strategy and plans in warfare in decoys. For example, if we are weak towards the enemy we must pretend that we are superior in order to deter it from aggressive behavior or when we are capable of harming the enemy, we should feign incapacity of doing so.<sup>11</sup>

The Sun Tzu’s faith on deception serves the concept of strategic and tactical surprise, which verifies the doctrine of winning without fighting. So, there is a strategic domino: we use deception to achieve surprise which is the part of winning without

bloodshed.<sup>12</sup> Deception and surprise are also features of strategy of Byzantine Empire. Emperor Maurice pinpoints the usefulness of deception and surprise, especially against a superior, concerning the army and economy, enemy.<sup>13</sup>

From this strategic perspective, we can assume that deception is considered an integral part of the indirect approach to war, that is to avoid a war of attrition and gain, quickly, decisive advantages over the enemy with as low cost as possible. This makes sense, especially if the force gap between the war players is big. For instance, Maurice and Leo III the Isaurian were fervent fans of deception. This is something that should not be appeared strange as the wealth of the empire counterbalanced the military and strategic inferiority to its neighbors.<sup>14</sup> In terms of numbers, deception campaigns tend to reduce and ease the costs of attrition as well as the amount of casualties. Firstly, deception, and consequently surprise, requires much less expenditure in money, staff and military equipment, exactly because it does not aim to wear down the enemy, but strike like a thief. The limited time deception operations take place lead to a significant increase in enemy's casualties and to a respective reduction in penetrator's ones.<sup>15</sup> For example, according to surveys, when the Allies used deception against Germany in Normandy landings suffered 133,326 casualties, followed by 83,825 casualties from Britain and Canada while these numbers skyrocketed to 418,791 and 107,000 respectively when deception was substituted by conventional warfare.<sup>16</sup> Another example is 'Window' program that Royal Air Force introduced in 1943 to bombard Hamburg. A later assessment concluded that the cost of £770 subtracted only 1.7 % of the raider bomb tonnage capacity.<sup>17</sup> Then, we can assume that Sun Tzu's theory about how deception can multiply the chance of winning a war has timeless character. This cost-benefit analysis is useful to understand the Eastern strategic thought especially if the one player is inferior to the opponent is strategic and military chessboard. Taking the typical example of Operation Bodyguard, we can assume that the Allies did live up to Sun Tzu's expectations, turning the German's attention out of Normandy and striking in place and time that Hitler did not expected, due to the western superior intelligence.

Deception is not a principle of war, but along with intelligence, composes the surprise, which is one of the war principles. So, it can be deducted that a state cannot win a war only by using deception, not even by surprise, as it former it acts as a force multiplier. This theory goes along with Carl Von Clausewitz' perspective of war and strategy. Prussian general follows the direct approach that is the direction of the war effort against the centroid rival respective one. In the level of grand strategy, the direct approach recommends the war effort against the main enemy.<sup>18</sup> Clausewitz goes further his arguments combining the direct war effort with the strategy of annihilation, which aims to the destruction of the hostile forces with a decisive battle. The strategy of annihilation gives a narrow emphasis on the use of military means, whereas other

means, such as diplomacy, economy or intelligence, are of minor importance and they are not the military leader's a major concern.<sup>19</sup>

The basic Clausewitz' argument about the ideal type of war is that the most effective way to achieve the military and political objectives is the enemy's disarmament in a major battle and the decisive outcome is a product of the maximum concentration of the force at the decisive point of engagement with the center of gravity to be the enemy's army. Clausewitz, in contrast to Sun Tzu, praises the use of brute force to achieve the political goals and win a war. The maximum available force should be used from the outset to achieve decisive results in the shortest possible time.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, Clausewitz does not share Sun Tzu's interest about the value of deception in strategy and warfare. He gives little, if any, basis to deception and surprise, although the latter is considered a war principle. It appears that Clausewitz points out that deception is only useful and feasible on tactical level, having impact on the enemy's moral, while he considers difficult, if not impossible, achievement of surprise in strategic level. Conversely, the surprise and the employment of ruses and diversion tricks are more likely to be effective due to the fact that time and space are on a smaller scale. Also, he states that, often, the deception is the frail party's main, and in some cases unique, weapon; the more the weakness the more attractive the resort to deception is. Not only that, but deception methods can be proved counterproductive for the objectives, because deception operations detach forces which are needed at the decisive point in battlefield, so the number of personnel, equipment and money invested for the main effort are reduced significantly. So, here, deception acts at the expense of strategy planned by the political and military leadership.<sup>21</sup>

Clausewitz' lack of interest in deception may be caused by the lack of technology breakthroughs, advanced communications and the long distances. Clausewitz believed that the vast distances between two opposites sides hampers the transition of information and as a result, what data we may collect about the enemy's capabilities and plans can rendered useless, as they can modified before the military and political leadership have access to them. Therefore, a deception campaign is doomed to fail, as the bit we try to feed the enemy will arrive too late to be productive, while the enemy would develop its forces and be prepared for a decisive battle. Eventually, the deception operations will result in surprise, something that despite being a principle of war, little, if any, impact is going to have in the outcome, perhaps only in the enemy's moral or by offering minor tactical advantages in battlefield.<sup>22</sup>

Here, we have two different approaches of strategy, concerning deception. The eastern strategic thought bases the strategic planning on intelligence, information superiority and deception operations aiming to surprise and avoiding bloodshed through a straight battles, while the western strategic approach focuses on decisive battles , as the political interests and objectives are served and achieved through decisive battles and,

in any case, the frontal conflict are of vital importance. However, we have to highlight some useful parameters which can help us to elaborate the interdependence between deception and strategic surprise doctrines:

- Deception is not a principle, but a component of surprise, which is a principle of war. So, we talk about a force multiplier in a lower exceptional scale. In any case, a state cannot win a war based only in deception operations, although they may have significant strategic value.<sup>23</sup>
- Deception is the frail state's medication. The weaker side tries deception to surprise the enemy, something that is impossible by straight battle. In this case, the leader can base the war planning in surprise, because he has no many alternatives. In the best case, he can avoid a disaster.
- It is a cheap solution. Machiavelli states that if we can gain an advantage with both fraud and force, we should choose the latter, since with less investment we can achieve the same objective.

Both Clausewitz' and Sun Tzu's approaches are not panacea. To what extent deception can be a useful tool during warfare as well as peacetime it is more a matter of time and circumstances. History shows that states and leaderships, in coordination with the highest echelons, adjust the theory in their special features. The Allies used Operation Bodyguard to invade Normandy. Hitler employed deception to invade the USSR. In first case, the diversion ruses helped the Allies to make a decisive step against Germany, whereas the Operation Barbarossa did not help Hitler to conquer Moscow, something that proves that the outcome of a war did not depends exclusively on deception operations.

To sum up, the shape of strategy is a dynamic procedure, which can be modified according to time, place and enemy. Different countries have different objectives and the role the deception is going to play depends on every single military doctrine, the different challenges the leaders must deal with as well as imponderable factors, such as technological breakthroughs or changes in international status quo.

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## **1.3 TERMINOLOGY AND DECEPTION PRINCIPLES**

### **1.3.1 BASIC CONCEPTS**

Military deception is an aspect of intelligence and strategy used occasionally by states against their enemies. In this chapter we present some concepts and principles of deception in order to make clear and formulate a solid view about its nature, its role in international security and military operations and war as well comprehend if, eventually succeeds. We introduce basic terminology, theoretical concepts and views as well as references to historical case studies to illustrate how deception works.

Deception can be characterized as both art and science, like Clausewitz states about the war. We can typically define it as the try to make the enemy believe something that is not true, inducing misperception. The state, via intelligence services, presents the enemy a distorted reality of a situation to gain a competitive advantage.<sup>1</sup> Barton Whaley uses the term ‘Stratagem’ to define deception as “information to manipulate the behavior of others by inducing them to accept a false or distorted presentation of their environment”. Usually, deception operations aim to surprise in battlefield, although surprise can be achieved without the employment of deception. So, deception occurs when a state uses deception and intelligence operation to achieve their objectives against their targets.<sup>2</sup> In particular ‘strategic deception’ affects the major policies of a government and aims at its highest echelons of the political and military chain of command. So, the use of cunning in battlefield or a diversion trick to turn a platoon away from a main spot of attack is tactical and operational deception. However, the sum of actions aiming at the highest levels of governments can make up the strategic character of deception, part of which can be a variety of ruses or misleading an intelligence agency.<sup>3</sup>

Deception can be employed by states, either democracies or authoritarian regimes, or non-state and illicit actors, such as terrorist organizations and preliminary groups.<sup>4</sup> From tactical and operational perspective, deception practice can be used for example by a sniper who wants to conceal his firing position, a platoon, the commander of which aims to hide a large movement from one area to another, a commander of battalion who orders a feign retreat and attacks anew in the rear of the enemy.<sup>5</sup> Democracies make use of deception, usually in wartime, although they are quite capable of employing in during peacetime. For instance, Great Britain used deception effectively during war and peace during last century. Also, India and Israel employed deception methods to develop nuclear arsenal, as well as USA which use deception operation systematically, especially in peacetime. Authoritarian and totalitarian

regimes rely on deception before the outbreak of hostilities or to protect a weaponry infrastructure from a constitutional supervision or to dodge from it presenting it as something non-threatening, set up for peaceful purposes, such as a potential use of treating diseases. Characteristic examples are the cover German rearmament and Germany's supervision by the Inter-Allied Control commission, the UNSCOM experience in Iraq since 1991 or the development of Iranian nuclear facilities. We will make an extended reference to non-state actors lately, as they are special actors and the way they employ deception is slightly from the respective that nation use.<sup>6</sup>

We see that depending on type of governance, the states have different objectives; however we can categorize them in those of wartime and peacetime.

In wartime, more or less, the objectives of strategic deception are specific. Surprise is the most common, as a whole operation and does rest on a deception campaign. For example, the deception effort the Allies made to divert Germany's attention away from the actual location of the Normandy's amphibious invasion was the barometer for the invasion itself. Similarly, in wartime deception can serve a concealment of military preparation or large transportations and, generally, activities related to operational issues. On the other hand, in peacetime the objectives are more vague and varied and they concern, mainly, issues of foreign policy, For example, a state can play with intentions and capabilities depending on what it tries to succeed. It can feign strength to deter the enemy to attack in the face of a loss and follow an aggressive policy or to appease the other side, exploiting, later, this frailty to achieve surprise.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in the absence of hostilities, nations employ deception to cover up a violation, for example, of an arms control treaty, like Germany did during its cover rearmament.<sup>8</sup> Also, leaders use deception for domestic purposes, such as the Operation Trust, a counterintelligence operation, undertaken by the State Political Directorate (GPU) of the Soviet Union. The operation ran from 1921 to 1926, with the Soviets to set up an anti-Bolshevik resistance organization, the cover story of which was to call the organization 'Moscow Municipal Credit Association'.<sup>9</sup>

We distinguish three dimensions of deception:

- *Concentration of force in space.* One aspect of deception is to divert the enemy's attention for a point of vital importance (for example for the actual location of an imminent attack) to a secondary of minor significance, making him to concentrate the troops to this alternative. The Germans helped the Allies to deceive themselves by causing them to concentrate their troops in northern France on the Belgian border instead of Ardennes.<sup>10</sup>
- *Economy of force.* The objective here is to make the adversary waste his resources on secondary alternatives or, even, on fictitious targets. During the battle of Britain, the British made the Germans launch strikes to fictitious airfields and

factories, that in reality did not exist, by setting up phony targets and interfering with German electronic navigational aids.<sup>11</sup>

- *Surprise*. The deception aims to dull the opponent's senses and create the impression that no offensive plan is being undertaken by the deceiver. When two or more states are already at war it is much more difficult to launch a surprise attack out of the blue. On such occasions, the deceiver may attempt to create impression of routine activity by very gradually conditioning the adversary to a particular repetitive pattern of behavior. Another way of moving large concentrations of troops towards an attack, without alerting the adversary, is to simulate those preparations as drills. Concealments reinforced when even the forces of the deceiver are misled that they are about to fall in action, like the USSR did in Manchuria in 1945 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.<sup>12</sup>

There two types of deception; active and passive. In active deception we feed the enemy with information, either true or fictitious, and we try to make sure that these data are picked up by the target. On the other hand, passive deception occurs when a state tries to conceal vital information from the potential victim and protect important data that indicate the real capabilities and intentions, from penetration, so as to increase the cost of detecting the deception campaign.<sup>13</sup>

### **1.3.2 PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION**

There are some principles that we should take into account that help us to form the foundation of deception in general.

#### **TRUTH**

Michael I. Handel states: "More one has a reputation for honesty, the easier is to lie convincingly". In other words "Honest people/states can deceive the best".<sup>14</sup> It may sound strange, but truth is fundamental principle that many states take into account when a deception operation is undertaken. We stated before that deception is the deliberate attempt to manipulate the perceptions of the target and real data can contribute to this. According to Handel, accurate information fed to enemy should be 90% of the total amount of information the adversary collects. The intelligence services must feed the enemy with corrected data but so late that, in the end, they will be operationally useless and these pieces of information must be considered to be gained independently by the rival intelligence collectors. To put it simply, feed the target with what he already knows or will, anyway, obtain. In that way, the deceiver achieves two objectives that help in a later stage, the target to espouse false information as true. Firstly, it increases the target's confidence in his sources of information. It does make sense that a leader trusts his intelligence employers who do their job well, that are to gain information of the real situation and what they observe

is, indeed, real. So, there is a trust relationship between political and military intelligence authority. This bond, consequently, helps to reinforce the victim's expectations and perceptions. There is no reason for a leader not to trust his spies that give him an accurate representation of the adversary's reality. If the data are in line with target's preconceptions, they are going to be adopted with little, if any, suspicion. So we can say that the truth is the substructure of a lie and target expects that deceiver will act as he expects; honestly and truly.<sup>15</sup>

## **DENIAL**

Strategic deception is, often, referred as Denial and Deception (D&D), although the concept of denial is not considered, by many authors and analysts a component or principle of deception. However, it can ensure, to a certain extent, that a deception operation will not be exposed and come boomerang. Denial refers to the attempt to block all the information channels by which the adversary can obtain data and important clues that indicate a country's actual situation. Although deception and denial are separate terms, they are closely intertwined. In order to present a target a distorted reality, a state must conceal facts and withhold information about the true situation. Deception is a kind of sport: to win the trophy we must score more goals than the opponent and, by definition, this does mean that we must defend effectively, not allowing the rival team to score. For instance, the deception masterpiece 'Fortitude' premised the Allies would conceal any documents, observation and data that would reveal their true intention to invade Normandy instead of Sicily or Crete. It makes sense that the first priority was to secure and protect that deception operation from detection. What if Hitler knew that Normandy was going to be invaded? What would be the strategic and operational value of the misdirection trick of Operation 'Fortitude'? So, before a deception operation is undertaken, the deceiver blocks the target's access to real data that the latter may distort, use and exploit either to detect the operation or, next, to use it against its predator and try, anew, to deceive it.<sup>16</sup>

## **DECEIT**

Apart from concealing the truth, it is equally essential to reveal the fiction, a distorted reality, what we called in intelligence literature 'simulation'. There are many ways to construct such a story and deliver it to the other side, but we should keep in mind that the ultimate goal is to benefit from the target's actions, that is to make the victim act in the way we desire, so feedback makes, eventually, a deception campaign either successful or waterloo.<sup>17</sup>

## **MISDIRECTION**

We mentioned that deception yields surprise, that means an onslaught in a time and place that the enemy does not anticipate. So, what the deceiver has to do is to divert the potential victim's attention from the actual point of attack. Misdirection is a

regular feature and method of deceiving and achieving surprise. We can distinguish two variants of deception that contacts the technique of misdirection. The first variant termed ‘A-type’ or ‘ambiguity-increasing’ and aims to confuse the target’s ambiguity about a situation by presenting the target with at least two alternatives. The deceiver insures that the alternative candidates for attack are more than plausible so the victim cannot ignore them and marshal the forces in each alternative, making the actual point vulnerable. A striking ‘A-type’ example is Operation Bodyguard. The Allies presented a series of invasion threats, such as Scandinavia, western and southern France, Italy and the eastern Mediterranean. This forced Hitler and his generals to hold the forces in Norway and the Balkans, where they were not actually needed, at least to a great extent.

The second type called ‘M-type’ or ‘misleading’. Contrary to ambiguity, in this case the deceiver tries to reduce the target’s ambiguity and offers him a particular wrong alternative to make him quite certain, decisive and wrong. Operation Fortitude comes again under this category. The Allies tried to hide their intention to invade Normandy under a fictitious larger invasion at Pas de Calais. The Germans took the bait and postponed reinforcing the Normandy’s front.<sup>18</sup>

There is no any formula to indicate which of the two approaches is better. It is more prudent to say that depends on every each situation. ‘A-type’ can lead the target to inaction and indecision about what to consider the real enemy’s intention. Inaction may keep the target inert, providing him the chance to gain time and, probably after a while, detect the deception operation. On the other hand, ‘M-type’ requires a target to be absolutely sure of the false alternative and the possibility to pick the desired one is reduced. For Barton Whaley, the optimum stratagem offers three optional choices. In that case, if the primary or baited alternative fails, the sheer uncertainty or ambiguity of the remaining alternatives guarantees a more-or-less even the chance that the victim will still make the wrong choice.<sup>19</sup> An elaborating example is a coordinated set of deceptions surrounding OVERLOAD, the cross-Channel invasion in 1944. In that case, the overall intentions of the Allies’ grand strategy were shielded by operation Bodyguard, the general cross-Channel was shielded by Fortitude I and the tactics of Normandy were hidden by the follow-up operation Fortitude II. This subterfuge increased the chance that even if strategic surprise is lost, the tactical one would be remained.<sup>20</sup>

Whatever approach a state chooses to divert target’s attention, the lies must be plausible and the real alternative implausible to reduce suspicion. Whatever forms of cunning the deceiver uses, it should protect and conceal the preparations of the actual operation. Two classical practices of diverting attention is the feint and the demonstration. A feint is a limited objective attack, made at a place other than that of the main effort and involves physical contact with the enemy. Demonstrations, on the

other side, are a show of force that threatens an attack at another location but does not make contact with the enemy. The demonstration is executed by an actual or simulated massing of combat power, troop movements, or some other activity designed to indicate the preparations for or the onset of attack at a point other than the main effort.<sup>21</sup>

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## 1.1 THE ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS

In this section we examine the role that perceptions and biases play in a deception ploy. Deception is a mind game between the deceiver and the target and the way that target interprets the incoming information is of high importance. The deceiver usually tries to achieve a desired impact upon the thinking of the adversary, from the lowest levels of intelligence analysis to the high ones of decision-making process. To achieve something like this, the deceiver should follow some requisite paths, such as understanding the target's way of thinking and acting. As Sun Tzu states 'know the adversary'. We go over the different kind of biases and the impact they have on deception.

Perceptions and biases affect the way that an intelligence analyst and the decision makers consider and analyze information, data or current and upcoming events.<sup>1</sup> This is something unavoidable and this exactly the deceiver wants to exploit. Perception, by definition, concerns the construction of reality and environment (political, military, and financial) rather than observation of world and recording facts. This construction based on beliefs, stimuli provided by our senses, past experience, culture, norms and for this reason become exploited and manipulated by others.<sup>2</sup> One cannot manipulate the facts; the facts are what they are and there is no doubt for it. But the deceiver can exploit the adversary's way of thinking, presenting a distorted reality, because perceptions are something subjective and not an objective true. Manipulation of perception is not something new and, in most cases, has been effective to the full. So, we have to refer to the most important biases and perceptions and how they affect the deception planning and operations.

As we said before, perceptions can be based on cultural features. Cultural biases are result of interpreting and judging situations and practices in terms to one's own culture, habits, morals and customs and affect the way of thinking in strategic level as well as how a deception is employed. The most vociferous differentiation is the Chinese way of strategic and military thinking versus the respective Western one. China has been using deception for over two millenniums. This is easy to explain if we consider that its strategic thought depend on intelligence, information and deception practices aiming to avoid the direct battle and defeat the enemy in a more sophisticated way with use of spies and ruses. On the other hand, USA, the main representative of Western strategic thought, has distaste for deception methods and operations. Instead, it supports the use of technology and the overwhelming force in battlefield. Therefore, it is beyond a doubt that deception plans require an overall understanding of the target's culture. The deceiver, therefore, will choose what information and data will feed the target in order to conform target's cultural features and be adopted.<sup>3</sup>

In a more practical view, biases are common in organizational level, especially where there are large bureaucratic organizations. For example, the division between bureaucracy and labor creates barriers to the free flow of data. In their deception model, Daniel and Herbig make reference to gatekeepers in intelligence agencies. Gatekeepers are supposed to facilitate and expedite the flux of information to the superiors. If the deceiver knows who the gatekeepers are and how they work, he can exploit them to deceive the target, by provided false information or data. Besides, gatekeepers themselves may facilitate the deceiver if they withhold information for personal interest, for example to avoid a controversy with their boss.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the deceiver can presume upon competition between different organizations and manipulate this rivalry by feeding one agency information that increase its credibility at the expense of the other. Also, we ought to refer the coordination process, which affects the final stage of intelligence analysis. For instance, if a military organization dominates the process, there will be a military-oriented view in data analysis. This has two consequences. It reflects the might of the most powerful organization or agency at the expense of the professional judgment and the analysts ignore clues of political or economic or other identity, becoming unable of looking at the whole picture with a different perspective.<sup>5</sup>

Deception literature provides us two main categories of biases: the perceptual biases and the cognitive. The first set of perceptual biases is consisted of the concepts of expectations, ambiguity and changing resistance. To begin with, every country, and especially its intelligence agencies and decision makers, have some certain patterns of expectations that a deceiver, usually, aims to exploit them. Target's expectations of events derive from past experiences, cultural norms or even personal traits and they differ according each situation, since different circumstances provoke respective range of expectations.<sup>6</sup>What the deceiver takes advantage of is the adversary's tendency to see and perceive what he expects to perceive. It is true that the deception tee is going to analyze and consider the incoming pieces of information and data according to his expectations. The state A expects that the state B is going to attack in a specific way or launch an attack in a specific location. We can assume, then, that data, proofs or any other clues consistent with these expectations are adopted easily, as it takes much less time and effort to recognize an expected phenomenon than an unexpected one. The result is a distorted, in target's mind, reality according to which the deceiver will act in the way presented to the target. Past experience, usually, leads us to consider the facts in certain ways, as we know how and what to look for and renders us captive to a particular way of thinking and examining the facts.<sup>7</sup> The patterns of expectations is so deeply rooted in target's mind that he is incapable to change view in front of discrepant information that do not fit its prejudices, creating an erroneous sense of confirmation regarding our perceptions and credit. There is a

sway about the bulk and the kind of data we evaluate. Also, there is an intense quest of information that support our beliefs and, in the same time, we try to avoid any information that contradicts them. For this reason, the target may stop the research for further clues if the initial data are consistent with its preconceptions. Conversely, if the initial process does not produce supporting information, the target go on trying to find supporting evidence and reject the earlier contradictory information.<sup>8</sup>

As easy it is to form perceptions, it is so difficult to change. Once we form a view about an event or a situation and we shape a certain expectation about it, we are biased to perceive it in the same manner even though the object may change or even the initial stimuli and facts that led us to perceive a situation in a specific manner may be proved false. It is not only difficult to change our view in the face of a situation, but we are unable to conceive it just from a different perspective. Thus, there is not only resistant to change, but resistant to slight modification of view and this is the result of how an organization, an agency and decision makers treat the incoming information. When the incoming information and data are not consistent with our expectations and beliefs (in this case the target's expectations) there are two alternatives endpoints. The target will reject the inconsistent data and information or it is going to assimilate them in the existing image it has formed. Unfortunately, the assimilation of contradictory information into a pre-shape aspect of events is a barrier to reconsider possible changes that may occur during the evaluation of data and look at them from a different perspective.<sup>9</sup>

The insistence to a certain view is more intense when the initial form of a picture is ambiguous. Even if there are ambiguous and vague data and, we are inclined to form a hypothesis about what we are seeing. The key fact is that the longer we exposed to this ambiguity and vague picture we have observed and adopted the surer and confident we become about it, and as a result, this confidence influences our perceptions and expectations. So the next logical assumption might be that if the early picture becomes clear and explicit, we will finally be able to reconsider it and change our view of the initial and incorrect one. This is may sound logical, but in practice is, in most cases, impossible. The additional data that clarify the original blur are assimilated in the existing belief making impossible a reconsideration of the situation anew, although the later preview is totally different from the start. This is happens, because it is easier to reinforce existing preconceptions than change them. So, the additional contradictory information are just conformed into the existing image, strengthening our confidence and expectations.<sup>10</sup>

Deception operations that follow the above concepts, rarely fail. Changing the target's perceptions should be avoided, unless the target considers seriously the alternative hypothesis and then the deceiver feeds the adversary with respective information. Reinforcing existing expectations is translating into feeding the target information

about an attack in a time and location that he expects us to do and finally we achieve a surprise attack in the place and time actually intent to. In other words, the actual act must be presented implausible and the expected alternative plausible. The tendency to assimilate contrary information into existing perception is a medicine to offset the consequences of potential security leaks. Leaks of information that can be exploited from the target to detect deception or uncontrolled channels from the deceiver is something that can't be totally excluded, but they can go unnoticed from the rival agencies since they are not comply with target's beliefs. Also, the deceiver must ensure that the messages are transmitted to the target are clear and unquestionable to him. The target's procedure of interpreting and analyzing the incoming data may be different for the deceiver's respective one, so the latter must be aware of target's thinking and make the messages conform with its expectations, so any mistakes or miscalculations from the target not to have serious impact on deception ploy.<sup>11</sup>

Apart from perceptual biases, there are the cognitive biases which concern the estimation of probabilities, the evaluation of evidence and the attribution of causality. Estimating probabilities of events is something unavoidable, especially in intelligence analysis, which is a dynamic rather a static procedure. Usually, people estimate probability of events by recalling similar ones that took place in past under similar circumstances. The same is true in deception. We estimate the probability of successful deception by recalling historical examples of deception under similar circumstances. Events that are more likely to happen are come to mind more easily than unexpected ones and according this judgment we try to predict future behavior. However, the factors that contribute to this recall may be not based on rational thought but on emotional factors. The ease, with which come to mind, is influenced by vividness or how recently we have been exposed to them. For example, Soviet assessments that Germany will exercise aggressive imperial policy and it is going to develop its economic and military power to suppress its neighbors are based on vivid memories of the Second World War. In this case, the emotional factors, such as vividness, are not related with correct probability and our judgment based on the most available event. Many times we are unable to estimate the likelihood of low probability events and then the only tool is imagination. But an assumption, even of an unlike event, that based on imagination instead of a thorough and detailed analysis, probably will lead to underestimation of true probability.<sup>12</sup>

Another practice to estimate probabilities is 'anchoring'. We use a starting set of assumptions as an initial step for making a judgment and then, depending on the incoming variety of information, this judgment is adjusted. The new data assimilated to the first thought but the final crisis must be closely intertwined with the initial and not diverse from it. Intelligence analysts face dynamic situations. Whereas it must be a combination between changes of situations and changes of estimation, what happens

is that thinking is anchored and changes slightly in a narrow range. The principle that perceptions resist changes is verified again.<sup>13</sup>

Overconfidence is another problem that intelligence analysts face. Sometimes, we overestimate how much we know and this is may be proved wrong about how much we really know. Intelligence analysts are prone to fall in this misperception because organizational and emotional incentives influence them when, for example they write a report or analyze incoming data or when they try to figure out an initial blurred situation.<sup>14</sup>

The intelligence analysts and policy-makers can be victims of the above theoretical thoughts. For instance, the tendency to recall past successful examples of deception leads the target to seek deception where there is no such think and becomes more alerted. Also, the deceiver can, gradually, build up another availability and feed it to the target; the cry-wolf syndrome. The deceiver provoke an alert to the target making what it is necessary to imply several consecutive times an imminent attack whereas in fact it does not plan to do such a thing. In this way, he makes the target more sceptical and creates the memory of false alarms.<sup>15</sup> As we have intoned, the perceptions resist changing and for this reason it is preferable to reinforce target's existing perceptions than to change them. It may be called 'irony' that impressions resist change even if the evidence that form them is discredited. Initial judgments about the situation to persist even after the evidence that created those impressions are discredited. The most satisfactory answer presented to be the tendency to seek causal explanation. We try to find a causal linkage between the facts that lead to explanation and explanation itself. The stronger the linkage between the evidence and its antecedents, the stronger the impression that evidence creates. What avoids analysts and decision makers to reconsider the situation is the causal linkage itself. Supposing the evidence may be discredited, the causal linkage remains plausible and the interesting is that it may be seen sufficient enough to imply the existence of any event even in the absence of the now-discredited evidence. There is availability here as the causal linkage comes easily to mind.<sup>16</sup>

The deceiver can exploit the target's tendency to evaluate the evidence according to the above theoretical view. The target is oversensitive to consistency and it is more confident if the conclusions are drawn from a small and highly consistent set of information and data rather than a larger but less consistent one. Deception can be effective even with a small amount of information fed to the target as long as the target does not receive contradictory information, despite the fact that, as we have stated before, impressions tend to persist even after the evidence that created them is discredited, so security leaks can be counterpoised. For this reason, the deceiver must control as many information channels as possible to reduce the bulk of discrepant information available to the target.<sup>17</sup> Searching for causality is common in intelligence

analysis but can also lead to serious misunderstandings. There is a tendency to seek for causation and deny the randomness.<sup>18</sup> Leaders or, even, intelligence analysts are preoccupied to a causal explanation looking for patterns that are actually absence, imposing causal explanation to a random sequence of facts. We judge the adversary's and generally the other's state behavior in terms of nature or personal traits and our one in terms of constraints or special circumstances of situations. For example, a leader may be prejudiced that the adversary is devious and malevolent so it is logical to think that it is likely to engage in a deception. In this case, deception is intrinsically satisfying as a causal explanation.<sup>19</sup>

## References

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2. Ibid., 33-34
3. Bennet and Waltz, 72
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5. Bennett and Waltz, 75-76
6. Daniel and Herbig, 33-34
7. Ibid., 34-36
8. Bennett and Waltz, 79, 101
9. Daniel and Herbig, 36-39
10. Ibid., pg. 39-40
11. Ibid., pg. 42-44
12. Ibid., pg. 44-46
13. Ibid., 46
14. Ibid., 46-48;
15. Ibid., 48-49
16. Ibid., 56-60;
17. Ibid., 50-54;
18. Ibid., 54
19. Ibid., 59-60

## 1.5 DECEPTION CHANNELS

Information channels are an integral piece of deception planning. When we refer to channels, actually we refer to the means that carry the information we intend to feed the enemy. In other words, if we want to send data to another country, we need a respective mean of transport; this is the channel. In deception, these means are of different kinds and of different function but all have in common that a piece of information must be reached the target. In this section, we mention the information channels that be used for a deceiver to feed the enemy with information and data, as well as some features of them to figure out how they work.

As everyone probably imagines, intelligence channels are one of the most obvious mean to transmit information to the intended targets. Intelligence channels are separated into two subcategories: human channels (HUMINT) and technical channels (TECHINT). To begin with, in human intelligence channels belong mostly agents and double agents. A common practice is that the deceiver uses double agents to pass information in adversary's intelligence community, such as false signals or fake documents. This is relatively simple and difficult to detect. For example, it is difficult to identify a spy in our community that is loyal to our enemy.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, satellites, space systems or computer are more technical methods, through which information are delivered to the target. With respect to technical intelligence collection, deceivers can use decoys or fake radio transmissions to pass incorrect data on to opponents. These channels, especially in nowadays, are extremely specific and accurate but, also, they are quite expensive and sensitive to countermeasures as well as are easier to identified, at least in comparison with human sources. The detection of these technical means is more likely as there is technological evolution and the states evolve their equipment. However, defensive systems are very expensive (antiballistic missiles) and this is not necessary at the expense of the deceiver, if we consider that every reaction is followed an overreaction. The enemy takes countermeasures to protect, for instance their satellites, so we take respective measures to overcome this problem and have access to them.<sup>2</sup>

Another information channel is propaganda. Propaganda can serve the purposes of strategic deception. Propaganda attempts to influence the target's beliefs, in general, and aims to influence the populace at large. There are three kinds of propaganda. The first one is the white propaganda, where its source is revealed and known to the public (radio service), the black propaganda, where the source is concealed (intelligence agency plants an article in a newspaper) and the gray propaganda, where the source is neither proclaimed nor effectively hidden (output of known front groups). Propaganda is used as a channel to pass information to population of the target. To achieve this, the deceiver can use traditional means, such as magazines, newspapers and media or

more contemporary methods, such as Internet and e-mails, where the sources are relatively unseen to the public. The advantage of the latter method is that it is more difficult to refute this kind of propaganda than to refute it when it is spread by more traditional means. Moreover, propaganda gains more credibility by the rival government its origin is known in an adversary. Then the target is more confident about what he observes and does not feel uncertain. Sophisticated leakers within governments are readily able to use the news media to propagate their own “spin” on events.<sup>3</sup>

A less clandestine channel, through which a deceiver can deliver information to intended target, is diplomacy. We can say that diplomacy is useful in bargaining between countries and diplomats are considered to be credible and respectful. This enhances the importance of diplomacy as information channel, if we consider Handel’s quotation that ‘Honest people deceive the best’. A diplomat can pass false information and signals to the opponent government. Bilateral and multilateral relations are a common phenomenon in international politics and take place very often, so the communication between the states is easy and frequent. What makes the diplomacy useful as a deception channel is credibility. Firstly, a diplomat is known that he is not going to tell outright lies and, indeed, he will not. This creates an opportunity to feed the enemy with distorted information, for example about intentions of diplomat’s country towards the target that in any other case may be not believed. Also, the target may underestimate to what extent the diplomat’s government concerns its interest and he is predisposed to support them. So the deceiver try to present itself friendly and conciliatory, in order to be easier to engage deception. The diplomatic activity requires conveying messages and the deceiver can exploit it to gain an advantage over the target. How can it use diplomacy to facilitate its efforts? The target can enhance the frequency of the bilateral relations (more visits to the country, frequent communication about different staff) and cultivate a friendly smooth climate between itself and the target. In this way, the deceiver tries to appear compliant and willing to consent to target’s claims, achieving two things. It enhances credibility and the target is not much suspicious about the information receives and it diverts target’s attention from detecting military preparations. The same time, in deceiver’s domestic, the intelligence agencies and the military prepare a surprise attack.<sup>4</sup>

Among the types of information channels, there are the “the agents-of-influence”. They get close to important government officials and influence their views and actions with respect to major issues. So, the target is supposed to be unaware of the loyalty of the agent-of-influence. The most likely situation involving this kind of agents falls between the poles of total awareness and ignorance of the agent’s loyalty. For instance, an agent might be known to have some sympathy for a foreign government or its ideology, but the degree of sympathy might be underestimated and

it might not be understood that the agent was under the foreign government's control. Such agents pose problems for counter deception similar to those in diplomatic channels.<sup>5</sup>

## References

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 18-19
4. Ibid., 21-23;
5. Ibid., 24-26

## 1.6 DECEPTION METHODS

A state uses a variety of methods to deceive the potential target. Execution is as important as planning. In deception operations, the deceiver resorts to different ruses to misdirect and deceive the enemy either by hiding a real situation or presenting a false one. There are techniques used to conceal a true situation and respective ones used to show an artificial reality.

### *DISSIMULATING METHODS- hiding reality*

**MASKING:** Masking is one of the methods that the deceiver uses to hide its real capabilities. The deceiver tries to conceal the discreet features of an object either by sheltering it from target's observation (radars, satellites, photo reconnaissance) or by mixing these features into the environment. In this way, this blend allows the object to go unobserved.<sup>1</sup>

**DAZZLING:** Dazzling is used again to hide a real situation. It involves increasing ambiguity by overloading an adversary's decision-making process or sensors with unimportant information or noise. Background noise makes intelligence gathering and decision-making harder to begin with, so deliberately making background noise increases ambiguity and makes perceiving reality that much more difficult. False bow waves, which were painted on many warships during the world wars to confuse an attacker about how fast the ship was travelling, is one form of dazzle. The Germans in the First World War used dazzle by giving their reserve units the same numerical designation as their operational units. Therefore, the same unit appeared to be in two places at once.<sup>2</sup>

**REPACKAGING:** Repackaging requires either adding or abstracting characteristics of an object to resemble another one. The deceiver just tries to modify an object so as the original pattern be similar to a new one. For example, engineers try to modify an aircraft to resemble an armor-clad, by adding the appropriate equipment and subtracting parts from the initial pattern.<sup>3</sup>

### ***SIMULATING METHODS- fictional reality***

**MIMICRY:** The method of mimicry, tries to mimic the characteristic of another object in order to emulate it. The deceiver tries to make one object appear to be something else. To transform the real by offering a false copy of the real transforming what is to be hidden. Mimicry tends to hide by displaying a pattern that resembles in all necessary ways perceived reality; tanks camouflaged as trucks, airplanes painted to blend with the ground when seen from above, or with the sky when seen from below.<sup>4</sup>

Usually, there are two situations that mimicry can be implemented. The first is to feint a retreat and the second one is to feint an attack. Attacks can also be mimicked, either as feints or demonstrations. Feints are conducted near where a real attack will occur and may come into contact with the enemy. Demonstrations are conducted in areas where no real attack is planned and do not come into contact with the enemy. The British, for example, staged a demonstration on the morning of 23 October 1942, to distract the Germans from their attack that initiated the Second Battle of El Alamein.<sup>5</sup>

**INVENTING:** This practice suggests displaying the false by creating new features from the beginning to make an entirely new object that resembles a false one. For instance, we construct an image of a battleship, so the target's radars can identify a battleship. In fact, we can say that we feed the enemy a placebo that resembles an actual medicine.<sup>6</sup>

**DECOY:** A decoy is designed to show a false, additional target, which the deceiver wants the enemy to attack. In other words, we misdirect the enemy, providing alternative targets. The supportive point is that, even the target may know that the deceiver uses decoys, cannot distinguish the real from the false.

In fact, even just a rumor that decoys exist, when none in fact do, can make the attacker's task far more difficult and uncertain. Decoys were also commonly used during the Second World War.<sup>7</sup>

**CAMOUFLAGE:** Camouflage is a broadly common way of deceiving, not only in military operations, but also in the nature. The purpose of camouflage is to increase ambiguity by hiding an object, a person or an activity by blending them into

surroundings with physical and technical means. Also, camouflage, besides its security function, can be used to misdirect the enemy.<sup>8</sup>

**DISINFORMATION:** Disinformation is another kind of ruse that is taken place, mostly at the strategic level. Disinformation aims to reinforce an existing belief and decrease the target's ambiguity, making it certain and wrong. The deceiver uses the channels that have access and passes false or true information, according what serves its interests in each time, to the target. According to Whaley, disinformation is a mean of concealing the verbal and written pieces of information, whereas camouflage and diversion are means to cover more technical data. There are several means to use as a disinformation channel, such as rumours, radio, newspapers, secret agents or diplomacy.<sup>9</sup>

**CONDITIONING:** Finally, one more pattern to deceive an intended enemy is conditioning. We try to create a pattern of behavior, so that the target develops an expectation that later can be exploited. For instance, we are presented to have a powerful navy, so the target expects us to use it to launch an attack at its coasts and we, in turn, will exploit this expectation.<sup>10</sup>

## References

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2. Macdonald, 106-107
3. Bennett and Waltz, 26-27
4. Macdonald, 100-106
5. Whaley, 7
6. Bennett and Waltz, 27
7. Macdonald, 96-100
8. Ibid., 93-96
9. Ibid., 107-115
10. Ibid., 115

## **1.7 DECEPTION CYCLE**

The deception cycle, actually, models the theory and puts it into a basic communication framework, depicting how the channels, the perceptions, the feedback and the components of the strategic deception process interact. In this section, we present this model and we examine how its core components work. Before moving on, let's see the general scheme. In every deception campaign, there are two players, the deceiver and the target. The deceiver chooses the goal and tries to deceive the target in order to achieve it. He selects what perceptions will reinforce, the communication channels and the methods he is going to use. The target receives the story, analyzes the data with its own means and reconstructs the story, coming to a conclusion, that is either taking the bait or not and this results to a respective way of behavior. Again, the deceiver, based on feedback and the target's behavior, he acts respectively; he can withdraw from the deception campaign or maintain it with potential adjustments or the whole procedure ends with detection of deception. We portray the deception cycle step by step and we scrutinize each stage carefully, as each one is of great importance in deception operations.

### **OBJECTIVES**

The first step is to decide the objective goal. The deceiver must determine what his objective will be; in other words, what he wants. Generally speaking, in international affairs the most common objective is the competitive advantage. In military affairs, and especially in strategic deception, the competitive advantage can be translated into concepts that range from survival to achieve a strategic surprise. However, objectives are differentiated depending on situation. In wartime, the objectives are more or less clear. What is aimed, in most cases, is strategic or tactical surprise in battlefield. This is very distinct, as war itself does not give margins to alternatives. The deceiver wants to attack in a place and manner that the enemy does not expect. However, in peacetime the circumstances are more resilient. A government's objectives may concern important issues of foreign policy, matters on military staff or countering threatens in both domestic and abroad. We see then that peace provides a nebulous state of play. For example, a state in the face of threaten from an enemy may choose to exaggerate the display of capabilities in order to deter further claims and prevent a potential attack or achieve concessions that, otherwise, he couldn't. Also, the deceiver may conceal its real might and present itself weaker than he really is to settle down the adversary that he is not threaten for him, in order to achieve a future strategic surprise. Moreover, there are some cases that a country faces complex domestic situations. For instance, in Operation TRUST the objective for the Soviet government was to be protected from the anti-Bolshevik regime and set in motion clandestine events to detect its followers and execute them. Similarly, a non-state actor, such as

terrorist organization, may wish to appear less threatening than they really are to reduce government's efforts to combat it.<sup>1</sup>

## **PLAN**

After defining the objective, the next step is to shape a plan. The plan must be very detailed, rigorous and comprehensive to set forth the idea effectively. Firstly, the deceiver must determine what he wants the adversary to do. The deceiver must have in mind the actions required by the target in order to achieve the object. In other words, the planners, according to the objective, must provoke a respective behavior. The next issue is how the deceiver is going to sell the deception product. First of all the deception planners must designate what perceptions they are going to reinforce and exploit in order to make the target act in the desired manner. Reinforcing the preconceptions makes the story plausible and the chances the target to act respectively are enhanced. In an information framework, identifying the actions required by the target, determining the perceptions that will induce the target to take these actions and developing the deception story that will lead the target to these perceptions represent the transformation of knowledge into information that will be presented to the target's military and intelligence analysts as well as decision-makers.<sup>2</sup>

## **METHODS**

Once the deception story has been approved, the deception planners can begin to identify the packing that is how they are going to sell the product-story to consumer-target. The planners are able to choose among a variety of methods, such as decoys, camouflage, dazzling, mimicking, disinformation. Each deception operation is different from another, so there is no a standard doctrine of ruses. Each operation requires a different respective ruse. However, we can mention that, usually, active operations, such as exaggerating capabilities or revealing facts, either fictitious or true, require active methods, such as decoys and mimicking and passive operations, such as concealing capabilities and data, require passive ones, such as masking or dazzling, that deny the access to observables. Other deceptive practices can be electronic warfare, such electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy, or information operations, such as computer networks attacks The deception methods, therefore, will determine the observables; what the target he is going or not to see.<sup>3</sup>

## **CHANNELS**

Afterwards, once the deception is executed it must be delivered to the target in some way. The communication channels play the role of transport. The most common channels used in deception operations are diplomats, double agents, spies, public media, such as newspapers, radio, television as well as internet. The deceiver fills the channels with data (forged documents) but the feeding may be distorted. All the selected channels are vulnerable to noise barriers and delays, which may distort what the target will see. For example, an agent may interpret a document incorrectly or the transit of a satellite photo reconnaissance may be delayed in transit due to technical problems. This is why the deceiver must control as many channels as possible in order to adjust methods when such problems are aroused. The more channels the deceiver controls, the bigger the possibility for the target to take less distorted information and data and what the deceiver wants him to be fed.<sup>4</sup>

## **TARGET'S OBSERVATION**

The next step in the process is the target's observations. The data are delivered, through the channels, to the deceiver. As we said, what the deceiver has received may be slightly different from what the deceiver delivers to him, as noise barriers or delays may affect the flow and the content of information. Apart from this, the target may have different methods of collecting and analyzing data, he may consider credible channels that the deceiver does not or the target's sensors may be unable to detect the observables. Anyway, the target is going to observe what is available to him, trying then to construct a story.<sup>5</sup>

## **STORY CONSTRUCTION**

The target, according to his observations, he reconstructs the deception story. It is important to state that, in this stage, the main amount of work is done by intelligence analysts, so the target, in this specific time, is the intelligence community. What the analysts are to do is to make the puzzle with the available pieces and seek for unavailable ones to shape a whole picture. This is something easy to say but in practice there are many factors that affect negatively this procedure. Firstly, the target may have other priorities and, consequently, he may ignore data as unimportant. Also, many pieces of information will not be delivered to the target or they are going to be received distorted and the deceiver cannot control all the possible factors that may affect the target's story construction. We must not forget that always there is a certain extent of uncertainty in all deception campaigns.<sup>6</sup>

## **PERCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING**

Now, the leading role belongs to decision makers. Information and data regarding the reconstruction of the deception story are delivered to the high levels, the state's leadership, again through channels and noise barriers. The leader examines the deception story, and most pieces of information provided by the intelligence agencies, and fit them with what he is acknowledged of forming his own preconceptions and expectations. The perfect scenario is that in the end of the day the deceiver will affect the leader's convictions and create misperceptions. The leadership starts to become quite certain, decisive and it is about to pick an alternative.<sup>7</sup>

## **FEEDBACK**

At this stage, the target reacts to the whole picture the deceiver provides and acts respectively. The target's response can be desirable to the target in many ways. He can attack or defend or concentrate the forces in the wrong place time, giving the deceiver the opportunity to achieve surprise, such as the Operation Fortitude, where the Germans concentrated their forces to Pas de Calais instead of Normandy, where the real invasion was occurred. Inaction or delay might be another response. The deceiver wants the target to delay his response to deceiver's behavior. Also, Handel states that the target may act wasting his resources and time in irrelevant points. This kind of behavior assimilated in the principle of misdirection. However, these responses can be a method to penetrate the deceiver, provided that the target has detected the deception. The target may choose to implicate in a battle to show that he has taken the bait and then he may achieve a strategic surprise, becoming the abuser.<sup>8</sup>

The deceiver, now, makes a decision to respond according the target's behavior. He can maintain or adjust the campaign if he judges that, in this way, he will achieve the objective, for example tactical surprise or the target detects the deception and the deceiver abandons the project.<sup>9</sup>

The success or failure of deception must not be measured by whether or not the target believes, or is confused by, the signals, nor even by his actions. What does really matter is to evaluate the effects on subsequent observable events. For example, the deception in the case of the invasion of Normandy, Allies misdirect the enemy that Pas de Calais would be the real point of attack and the German took the bait. This does not ensure any success nor makes the deception project effective. What made it successful was that Allies achieved a surprise and the misdirection methods facilitate the invasion, gaining an advantage over the enemy. What we must not forget, however, is that deception is a force multiplier and we cannot rest in deception to win a war. Deception is a special tool and we must treat it like that.

## References

1. Godson and Wirtz, 26-28
2. Bennett and Waltz, 50-51
3. Russell and Glenn, 28
4. Daniel and Herbig, 9-10
5. Bennett and Waltz, 54-55
6. Ibid., 55
7. Ibid., 57
8. Godson and Wirtz, 31-32
9. Bennett and Waltz, 57-58

## 1.8 DECEPTION FORMS

There are two basic forms of deceptions. The first is to deceive an opponent concerning one's own capabilities and the second to deceive concerning intentions.

### 1.8.1 INTENTIONS

Deception, concerning intentions, in most cases, tries to conceal the real objectives and of the deceiver, through secrecy and security (dissimulation mode) or through active methods, by diverting the enemy's attention from the real set of intentions to another (simulation mode). However, a well-planned deception operation should combine these two practices. The active type of deception must be based on the successful concealment of the real intentions and denial of all information channels and data that provide relevant information, combined with a number of 'decoys intentions' and disguise false ones, feeding him with alternative expectation and ambiguity.<sup>1</sup>

A state can pretend to attack or start a war in order to blackmail the rival leadership to gain an advantage over it or to achieve concessions. Also, secrecy and security can include the concealment of plans for an attack or the desire to maintain the status quo while preparation of war is in progress, usually to achieve strategic surprise. However, some times this 'intention-game' can be proved counterproductive, as it can lead to an undesired war, the enemy may increase his own military strength or become more aggressive.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout military history, we found a plenty of examples concerning intention-orientated deceptions. In planning their attack on Egypt in collaboration with the British and French in 1956, the Israelis deliberately created a ‘decoy- intention’ to attack Jordan by concentrating their forces near the Jordanian border and by increasing retaliation against Jordan.<sup>3</sup>

During operation Mincemeat, the Allies provide the Germans alternative plausible intentions of attack, such as Greece, France and Sardinia, although the Germans knew that the attack would be launched in Sicily, whose attention was diverted by the actual point of the assault. Similarly, in operation Fortitude, the Allies tried to focus Germany’s attention to Pas de Calais, using disinformation, to make the fiction intention pretty plausible. The outcome was for Germany to anticipate an attack on Pas de Calais, concentrating its forces there, even after a few days after the invasion of Normandy was under way.<sup>4</sup>

During peacetime or before the outbreak of operation, it is feasible for a state to conceal its intention to attack. However, after the onset of war and as the hostilities and military operations are in progress, the initiation to attack in different direction is unquestionable. In the latter situation, deception is of vital importance, as it must instill in the enemy’s mind the fictitious expectations concerning one’s inevitable and the actual intentions to consider about and take action, accordingly.<sup>5</sup>

### **1.8.2 CAPABILITIES**

A state can also delude the enemy concerning its own capabilities. The first practice is to exaggerate about capabilities in order for a state to be appeared stronger than it really is. The second is to conceal and minimize the extent of a state’s real capabilities in order to create the impression that it is incapable of executing certain offensive plans. These two variants can coexist in a deception operation, as a state may wish to conceal certain capabilities and inflate others.<sup>6</sup>

### **EXAGGERATION**

When a state pretends to have larger than existing capabilities, usually aims to deter a stronger adversary, as it is too weak to confront it in a straight battle.<sup>7</sup> The Cold War offers a striking example of deliberate exaggeration of capabilities. During the first years after 1945, Nikita Khrushchev was proclaiming that the Soviet ballistic program was quite superior over the respective American, regarding design, testing and production of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The he superiority was real, concerning also satellites launching and space program. However, there was no direct connection between the space program and the military deployment of ICBMs, but Khrushchev’s lies made this ostensible superiority seem real. As he stated: “We now have all the rockets we need; here now exists a range of missiles with the aid of which it is possible to fulfil any assignment of operational and strategic importance”.

The western intelligence community could not obtain precise data about the soviet equipment and ICBMs strength. The Soviets took care of the ICBMs infrastructure, hiding the missiles from hostile radars and reconnaissance flights, otherwise the bluff would be revealed.<sup>8</sup>

Another example is the exaggeration of the actual strength of Luftwaffe by the Germans from 1936 onwards, mainly on France and Britain. The Germans displayed air shows, using the latest models of aircrafts to those airfields, casually reported high production rates for sophisticated aircrafts that had not, in fact, any operational use, remaining in an experimental stage. The inflated strength had been attributed to the Luftwaffe, combined with the fear about German aggression, helped Germany to exercise political pressure to the West, gaining considerable concessions.<sup>9</sup>

Also, fascist Italy in the 1930s made an attempt to overstate its military capabilities. Mussolini tried to present to the superiors the advantages of the Italian air force, in terms of both quality and quantity. Indeed, Italy tried to exaggerate the actual number of the Italian aircrafts. It claimed most of the international records for flying and the leadership made statements that the Italian air force could control the Mediterranean. However, it was proved that the Italian air force was not adequately efficient, concerning the equipment and operational capabilities as well as ill-mannered, like the Italian navy.<sup>10</sup>

Thus the exaggeration of capabilities may provoke distortions. For example, the fictitious German air superiority led the British and French to increase investment in air power and defense systems and, by the time the war broken out, they were in better situation to deal with Germany. The Americans redoubled their efforts to overtake the handicap with Soviet Union, concerning the military deployment of ICBMs. Not only that, but also the deceiver may ignore the enemy's corrective countermeasures and fall for his own bluff, taking action based on a past real or superficial balance of capabilities.<sup>11</sup>

## **CONCEALMENT**

The second form of deception aims to conceal the real capabilities and minimize the deceiver's actual strength to achieve strategic and tactical surprise on battlefield.<sup>12</sup> An example of this method is the secrecy maintained by the USSR until 1941, concerning its military capabilities. On the eve of Barbarossa, German intelligence had underestimated the soviet capabilities by as much as 120 divisions, something owe to the total secrecy regarding Soviet arsenal and preparations leading to poor German intelligence.<sup>13</sup>

Concealing the real strength helped Israel to win the war in 1967 against the Arabs. Between 1956 and 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) concealed their actual operational alertness and the number of the aircrafts. The extended use of camouflage,

combined with denial to Arab intelligence services to get accurate information about Israel's actual military strength, as well as delivering false information to the Arabs that Israeli forces were incapable of conducting effective military operations, made the Arab attack, unaware of the actual strength of Israeli arsenal and operational capabilities.<sup>14</sup>

Intentions and capabilities are closely intertwined in the conduct of war. Convincing an adversary that one lacks certain capabilities may also convince him because of the same absence of such capabilities, the deceiving party may also have no intention to carry out a given type of operation. For example, on the eve of Yom Kippur, the Egyptians spread rumors that their anti-aircraft missile system had been short of certain spare parts, due to the expulsion of the Soviet advisors in June 1972, and therefore they were not ready to initiate a war.

### References

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3. *Ibid.*, pg. 319
4. *Ibid.*, 318
5. *Ibid.*, 320
6. Bennett and Waltz, 30
7. Handel *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, 320
8. Pringle, 60-61
9. Handel *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, 321
10. *Ibid.*, pg. 322-323
11. *Ibid.*, pg. 325
12. *Ibid.*, pg. 325
13. *Ibid.*, pg. 326
14. *Ibid.*, pg. 325-326

## 1.9 PREREQUISITES OF SUCCESS

There are some minimum prerequisites that define not only whether the deception will be successful, but also the deception planning and executing itself. In other words, they are the fuels that set the machine in motion.

➤ *Strategic coherence.* First of all there must be strategic coherence in organizational, strategic and tactical level, which means a solid flexible coordination from the high level of policy-makers to the lowest level of military authorities, with each level having its own distinctive role. The deceiver must have a concrete plan, determine the objectives, what it wants to the outcome to be and, having these into account, it must choose the respective plan. No confusions are permitted in deception planning, otherwise the consequences may be condemnatory. Moreover, needless to say that security is the linchpin of deception planning. The deceiver should protect its real intentions, capabilities as well as the operation itself, otherwise there is danger of detection of deception and, then, penetration against the deceiver. So, to avoid this undesired outcome, it is mandatory to have good counterintelligence infrastructure to obtain and discover information about the adversary's try to do the same. Also, in peacetime the planning must be based on longevity, since strategic planning requires consistency and not usual amendments. On the other hand, in wartime the plans may change, according the circumstances, however the core pattern remains the same. Such changes are inevitable, as the war is a dynamic and not a static situation. Finally, in the framework of coordination, it is necessary the collaboration between intelligence and security branches. Discrepancies, regarding jurisdiction and intelligence process, between FBI and CIA are a common phenomenon. This is something that impedes the organizational function and can lead to delays in evaluation of data or making decision, especially with the intense presence of bureaucracy. Cohesion, by definition, requires that all the departments must, eventually, follow a common strict line in the way they treat the external threat and, perhaps a more centralized security and intelligence infrastructure would be useful.<sup>1</sup>

➤ *Plausibility of lies.* Another factor conditioning the success of deception is make the intended lie plausible and this is likely to happen if the deceiver have an extended knowledge about the adversary; the latter proposition is a prerequisite for the former. Plausibility depends on target's thinking. The same story that seems plausible to the deceiver may not be proved a strong decoy and the enemy may not take the bait. This is happens, because the target has a different set of translating and deciphering information from the target's respective. So, the deceiver must figure out the target's perceptions, culture, capabilities in order to construct a plausible ploy to deliver. According to target's features the deceiver is going to provide a lies that fit these features in order to provoke a specific behavior and actions that benefit the deceiver. The lie gains more credibility if it is verified by multiple sources. The more the sources that verify the lie, the grater

credibility it gains and the more likely for the deception to succeed. Also, deceiver's capabilities can enhance the plausibility of an alternative option. The intended action must be supported by the appropriate motives as well as capabilities and appeared to be of vital interest, otherwise the campaign is doomed to fail and vulnerable to detection. For example, in 1943, the Allies were planning a fictitious invasion in France in September, as a part of a set of deception operation, named 'Cockade'. However, Germany, did not take the bait, as the Allies hoped, to implicate in costly air battles, as German intelligence estimated that the resources, material and personnel of Britain was not sufficient enough to launch an attack.<sup>2</sup>

➤ *Information channels.* The deceiver must have access to as many information channels as possible to ensure that the data and the pieces of information will reach the target. The control of information channels is of vital importance in both planning and operational perspective. Firstly, the deceiver's intelligence can reduce the amount of discrepant data the target may receive, although total secrecy is unavoidable. However, the more distorted information reach the adversary, the more likely is to detect the deception, especially if the target is blind-thinking. So, the uncontrolled channels are a source of danger for the deceiver. The utility of channel's control is, also, to monitor the target's response via information that these sources provide to the deceiver. The deceiver can, also, create news channels to feed the enemy with data. An example is the corpse that Britain used, which carried forged documents that the Allies would launch an attack in Sardinia and Greece rather than Sicily, the actual point of invasion.<sup>3</sup>

➤ *Target's predispositions.* We have stated before that reinforcing the target's perceptions facilitate the deceiver to achieve its goals. Anyway, it is better to practice this method rather than refrain from it, as any deception operation based on these propositions rarely failed. Supporting the target's existing conviction offers the advantage of surprise; the enemy expects the deceiver to do A and the latter does B. Not only that, but we must not forget that preconceptions resist change and the contradictory data are assimilated to the existing beliefs. However, there are some exceptions where changing the target's perception is required. This may happen when the target is not predisposed to a certain pattern of expectation, so there is no something to reinforce. There are situations where the target adopts a vigilant attitude. In this case, the adversary feels relax and remains moderate as it has plenty of time to evaluate the incoming information and come to a conclusion. So the deceiver must exploit this tendency and deliver data to change the target's opinion. The victim, unless it is in the very early or late stage to evaluate the incoming information, is going to consider all the available clues and, probably, choose the alternative that serves the deceiver purpose, as it is not predisposed enough to resist reconsideration, it would otherwise reject or ignore. Another mode is creating a pattern of expectations. The deceiver sets up a certain pattern of behavior, conditioning the target to expect something he hadn't considered before. The target has the illusion that the adversary follows certain

regular patterns of behavior, so the latter has the opportunity to disregard this expectation and achieve surprise.<sup>4</sup>

➤ *Feedback*. Maybe the most important single factor that can ensure the success is the target's feedback. Deception occurs in the victim's mind and, eventually, the victim's responses determine if the deception will be successful or unsuccessful. It is of vital importance the deceiver must know whether the target has accepted the deception story delivered to it as well as if it has taken the bait, in order to determine its expectations. Deception is a dynamic process and the final outcome depends on how the target reacts and overreacts. The deception methods should be modified and the intelligence community must know what the target is, actually, being told, either by observing the target's responses or setting up a direct feedback information channel.<sup>5</sup>

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## CHAPTER 2: COUNTERDECEPTION AND TECHNOLOGY

### 2.1 THOUGHTS ON COUNTERDECEPTION

The U.S. Department of Defense defines counter deception as: "Efforts to negate, neutralize and diminish the effects or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation." Counter deception aims to discern the adversary's real intentions and capabilities as well as what the deceiver wants the target to do.<sup>1</sup>

The aspects of counter deception are aimed at detecting, characterizing and penetrating foreign deception operations. There are three dimensions of counter deception:

❖ *Awareness*. By awareness we mean the observer's predisposition and readiness to identify any spatial data that indicate threats and opportunities, or what in business we call "SWAT analysis". From intelligence aspect, awareness allows the analyst to recognize that a situation presents the adversary both the opportunities and incentives to resort to deception.<sup>2</sup>

❖ *Detection and Exposure.* This dimension concerns the collection and analysis of incoming information in order to determine what the deceiver is trying to make the target believe and do. The objective is the reconstruction of deceiver's deception plot from the available information and data sets.<sup>3</sup>

❖ *Discovery and penetration:* In that level, the potential victim focuses on revealing what is real. Intelligence collection and analysis assets are tool to sort out the relevant from the irrelevant clues to determine what the adversary's actual intentions and capabilities are.<sup>4</sup>

Generally, there is pessimism about detection of deception. The majority of the analysts suggest that it is, almost, inevitable to discover a deception operation and, consequently, a surprise attack. Indeed, the most deception operations led to strategic and tactical surprise, with several factors to contribute to this outcome.

Many problems occurred during the intelligence process. The basic challenge is to predict the enemy's actions, something pretty difficult. In order to make solid judgments and assumptions, intelligence analysts must have an intimate grasp of the adversary's culture and capabilities, its political and psychological frame of mind and what information it has at its disposal about the defender, in order, then, to assess what the danger of a surprise attack is or estimate the risk of such an outcome. However, such detailed knowledge is rarely available. The analysts must put the data obtained together to shape a view, by choosing what pieces of information should discard and use, verifying the credibility of sources and give priority to data considered important. This difficult task gets more intense, as the procedure of gathering information is vulnerable to misguided data.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, during the analysis of information, there are some psychological and organizational errors that lead to intelligence failures, such as misperceptions, group pressures, prevalence of pre-existing mindsets or discrepancies between the majority and the minority position held. Particularly, erroneous estimations are very common due to the reluctance to consider alternative explanations. Intelligence analysts tend to choose the first hypothesis that seems more accurate, being intolerant to assess alternative hypotheses or reassess the evidence that may fit to another hypotheses as well. Also, many organizational obstacles decelerate the process, with the most common situation to be a discrepancy, regarding the responsibilities, among the agencies, such as CIA, DIA and NSA, even FBI.<sup>6</sup>

Another problem that often arises during the analysis framework is the 'cry-wolf syndrome'. Jan Coldman defines it as "the desensitization of observers after previous warnings have been issued without threatening consequences". In other words, it is a repetitive pattern that suggests a nonthreatening explanation, such as large-scale routine activities that indicate a neutral posture.<sup>7</sup> A relative example is the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. The South Koreans were not prepared and had not alerted their forces that the North Koreans would plan an impending attack, so the

adversary's short-term final preparations were misinterpreted as military exercises rather than bona fide combat deployments. Moreover, there had been reports indicating that N. Korea was about to launch an attack but, despite the repetitive warnings and evidence, the leadership treated the data as 'business-as-usual'. So, we see that even the surveillance can be effective, there are problems in assessing information and making correct judgments.<sup>8</sup>

Unlike the major deployments of troops and equipment which almost never can be entirely concealed, the short term preparations have a good chance of being concealed and even if detected, there will often be minimal time in which to alert or redeploy forces for the imminent attack, still less to issue warning judgments at national level. Such tactical warning is, usually, an operational problem for the commander.

Another problem is the gradual appearance of indicators. Usually, the enemy's preparations for an attack are a slow process, spread over weeks and months. Consequently, the warning indicators, also, appear gradually, especially when the enemy is making an effort to deceive its victim by getting it accustomed to the preparation process. This gradual evolution makes it harder for the victim to identify meaningful indicators, since they do not look exceptional in context.<sup>9</sup>

## **2.2 PRINCIPLES OF COUNTERDECEPTION**

### ***SELF-AWARENESS***

According to Sun Tzu, a state must be aware of its own capabilities, merits and deficiencies if it wishes to have any chance of success in battle. Self-knowing and awareness trigger off the sense of vigilance and suspicion that something either goes wrong and seems strange or that things are going just a bit too perfectly. A potential deception target not only must know what knowledge and information are available to it, but also it has to consider the origins of this knowledge. Is what we know based on facts or preconception? If it is a product of perceptions, there is possibility for the leader to be gulled, as the deceiver, usually, tries to reinforce the victim's biases.<sup>10</sup>

### ***KNOW THE ENEMY***

The other side of a coin is to know the enemy. That means the leadership must take care of obtaining vital information about enemy's intentions and capabilities, as well as the means he has at his disposal he may use to conceal or exaggerate them. Deep knowledge of the adversary's culture and mentality makes possible to begin breaking down ethnocentric biases and see the situation from the adversary's perspective, trying to put in the penetrator's mind, something that ease, to a certain extent, the race against detecting deception.<sup>11</sup>

### ***KNOW YOUR SITUATION***

This principle focuses on the necessity for continually evaluating the environment for the cues indicating deception will have to be considered as a major factor when formulating strategy, considering options, making decisions or taking action. Changes in leadership, motives, political goals, military doctrine or technological capabilities could all have an impact on the likelihood of deception, so it is essential for the leader to recognize when such changes affect his assumptions, expectations and beliefs.<sup>12</sup>

### ***CHANNEL CONTROL***

It is important to control multiple channels in unmasking deception. Since most of those channels represent second-hand sources of information, the likelihood that the data will be distorted increases. Also, it is important to consider the source, since it is a way to avoid erroneous beliefs.<sup>13</sup>

Although surprise in military history has seldom failed, there are some proposed measures a state can take in order to try to unveil such campaigns.

Michael Handel proposes a guideline of precautionary actions that an intelligence community should take into account to avoid being gulled.

To begin with, a state should not rely its efforts and knowledge on one source or information channel. It is imperative that any corroboration of incoming data must come from as many verifiable sources as possible. Multiple sources can reveal crucial material that one source alone may not, especially if it is manipulated by the deceiver. It is rational to assume that a piece of information confirmed by multiple channels is more likely to be real compared to confirmation by a single source. Of course, this premises that the intelligence services must control as many channels as possible, to avoid or prolong, in time, any distorted data. An example is Germany's exclusive reliance on spy network in England, controlled by the Allies.<sup>14</sup>

Another issue it has to do with the intelligence personnel. Handel believes that the authorities must test the agents' trust constantly, for example by occasional direct interviews. Also, delivered information that, although may be correct, arrive too late to be of any use (for example before an impending attack), may arise suspicion.<sup>15</sup>

A third important aspect to consider, according to Handel, is the enemy's capabilities and intentions. From an aspect of information collection and analysis, it is easier to obtain information about capabilities rather than intentions, since capabilities provide material evidence, which is easier to access, while intentions are easier to conceal. However, these two are intertwined. The build-up of capabilities may be an indication about the enemy's intentions. For example, when a current situation is followed by

unusual and intense preparations, perhaps the enemy prepares to launch a surprise attack.<sup>16</sup>

Emphasis should be given in one of the most exploitable features of each leadership, perceptions and beliefs. In order to overcome the prejudices, we must raise the cost of 'suboptimal strategies' that are to choose and adopt the first hypothesis that seems to be closest fit the evidence and upsetting the mindsets that make confirmation bias pernicious. Instead, an intelligence analyst should examine alternative hypothesis that may be consistent with the available evidence.<sup>17</sup>

Rule based forms of reasoning that employ critical thinking skills and formal analytical methods play an important role in building a 'prepared-mind' framework. Cognitive factors like fantasy, creativity, imagination visual recognition, associative memory as well as intuition contribute to countering deception. Intuition helps to see the significance of anomalies, discern patterns and bonds between data sets, as well as discover previously unidentified options. It is considered integral part of awareness, detection and exposure dimensions of counterdeception.<sup>18</sup> Maybe some clues of the incoming data seem to fall too neatly into a pattern that exclude other possible courses of action. This possibility is synonymous with one of the Handel quotation that: "under certain circumstances, the more perfectly an intelligence puzzle fits together, the greater the danger of a possible deception is". The ability to put the trifles together intuitively is vital to recognizing a deception operation. Some events that seem irrelevant at the time they reported may be proved, later, of paramount importance.<sup>19</sup>

Among the large amount of incoming data sets, a false incongruity looks, at first glance, like a congruity; so much so that it must be treated with equal seriousness. However, because it is extraneous to the suspected underlying deception, it can be identified and discarded during the analytical process in the same way that true discrepancies are identified. So, the analyst can either track the actual incongruities or discard the false ones.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, a potent means to ferret out an opponent's deceptive plan and operation is penetrating his organization and controls it from inside. Counterespionage is a practice that involves agents and sensors that intrude into hostile intelligence agencies to influence and penetrate their programs and actions.<sup>21</sup>

### **2.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE**

Undoubtedly, the advent of technological innovation the last century has modified many fields in our life. New computing systems, sophisticated cell-phones, drones, all these have facilitated the function of different sectors, such as communication and transportation. This progress affects, as well, the military environment, and particularly, the military intelligence and deception. The opportunities and method of deception have been modified, as technology offers, for examples new means, sources

and channels for information delivery, as well as advanced techniques and tools for surveillance. However, in the face of a sophisticated technological era, is it feasible to employ a deception campaign? Can the new means of surveillance and information, such as satellites, render the concealment of capabilities fruitless? In fact, both deception and counter deception are benefited from the new information age. The arsenals are involved, the information channels are evolved as well as the method of surveillance, but the same is true about deception and counter deception practices.

To begin with, the channels that deliver information to deception targets tend to be multiplied, as sensors, communication networks and media outlets are predominating in global coverage. In addition, the convergence of video, voice and text in digital formats have facilitated the flow of data to different consumers. This is going to benefit the deceiver, as it will have easier access to large public population and targets as well as these channels will deliver a plenty of porting elements of independent data to potential victims. Moreover, the deceiver will be able to use these channels to more precisely target systems. On the other hand, there are benefits for the intelligence community in the try to counter or detect deception operations. The expansion of open channels and independent means will increase the likelihood of detecting incongruities that may insinuate the presence of deception.<sup>22</sup>

There are three dimensions, concerning the potential information and communication channels for deception planners. There are cover radio stations as well as associated Internet sites through which a state can dissimulate and alter transmitted and server location to avoid penetration. This is a kind of black propaganda. Second, there are accessible channels composed of community media, like TV or non-profit radio to feed small organization and individuals a variety of data, either credible or not. Finally, the Web log sites provide alternative journalistic outlets for both people and organizations to provide reportage and opinions from particular perspectives.<sup>23</sup>

The new technologies in the fields of sensing, communications, computation, presentation (virtual reality) and cognition offers the chance for revolutionary modification and, even, breakthroughs in current deception practices. Technologies in these areas hold the potential to enable new counter deception sensing and analysis methods to counter a deception operation. The current technologies reinforce the operational quality deception capabilities, while disruptive technologies provide opportunities for strategic surprise, closing the handicap between the deceiver and the victim. The primary contribution to deception are in the areas of altering physical phenomena and information, while the counter deception opportunities regard the enhanced sensing, information channels and information processing to support cognition.<sup>24</sup>

Specifically, nanoscience concerns the construction of materials, devices and systems at atomic and molecular level. It provides refined material properties to control

signatures of physical objects across the electromagnetic spectrum, reducing observables, while modifying the distinct features to resemble different patterns. These tools, along with nanoelectromechanical systems (NEMS) for robotic deployments and direct attacks on sensors to disrupt, misdirect and deceive sensors. The counter deception applications, concerning sensors networks, will be able to counter conventional CC&D of physical objects, allowing, for example, coating and net to adapt to surroundings or making objects transparent through laser sensing.<sup>25</sup>

Quantum science will provide new capabilities to make the discrimination of camouflaged and concealed targets more explicit and computing systems more effective, concerning cryptanalysis. For instance, the practice of steganography will facilitate the concealment of information within public sources.<sup>26</sup>

Also, biology allows genetic engineering of life forms, enabling the reduction and transformation of biometric signatures to enable human physical changes to support deception and human biological tagging to support counter deception. An example, is the genetic probes and biosensors for specialized detection of biological materials in samples or vapors, something that can result in the detection of chemical materials and weapons.<sup>27</sup>

Technology itself means nothing. Both the deceiver and the victim make use of technology means they have at their disposal to attack and defend. Once, only the USA and the USSR were making use of reconnaissance satellites. However, many states introduced them to their arsenal later, such as China and Israel. The outcome of the widespread knowledge about satellite reconnaissance is a common view that there is not any opportunity of concealing capabilities or military preparations. However, even this may be true, to a certain extent, does not always against the employment of deception. For instance, commercial satellites will optimize their operations, so they can take maximum advantage of sunlight hours and cloudless days.<sup>28</sup>

Another example is the case of North Korea. During a negotiation period, the USA revealed to Korean authorities images of Korean development of nuclear weapons. Although that could be considered a 'security gap', soon the leadership and intelligence community fixed that distortion by tunnelling into mountainsides almost all the amount of the artillery and missile infrastructure. Moreover, India dealt with such situation in past, when it is asked from the U.S. government to cancel an impending underground missile test, as a result of satellites photographs. However, Indian capability to conceal its preparation led, later, the USA to lack of hard evidence about the program and an erroneous estimate that the test was called off.<sup>29</sup>

Technology, is more a matter of manipulation. Both the deceiver and the target can exploit machines to overcome any difficulties and get advantage over the enemy. Throughout the centuries, the countries have followed the progress concerning the

type of weapon systems and the technology that has affected the conduct of war. From the spears and shields of ancient times, to knights, rifles and later to modern arsenals with snipers and grenades, nuclear missiles and cyberwar, nations have been along with these innovations and adopt new means to their military doctrines. Not only they follow the technological military progress, but also they have tried to overcome their enemies in a kind of 'arm race'. The Soviet Union gained a counterintelligence advantage when it shot down airplanes in the 1950s. Then, the USA developed effective and less vulnerable assets, such as space-based intelligence collectors. Also, to the extent that collection systems employ commercial technologies, counter collection can involve, building up or threatening the companies that produce them.

It is interesting to mention the issue of technology from a slight different perspective, that of social engineering. Social engineering, a context of information security, refers to psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. The key-factor in this theory is that there is no such thing as total security. Even the most sophisticated breakthroughs cannot ensure 100%, for example, that a solid system of surveillance will prevent penetration. The reason for that is that the weakest feature is not the machines but the human factor. If individuals and, in a larger scale, organizations are manipulated in certain ways, then we can overcome the enemy's possible technological superiority.<sup>30</sup> Speaking on deception terms, a state that resorts to deception to achieve a surprise can conceal a part of its military preparation until it attacks or all the preparation for a part of the time, but a total concealment of all the preparation for the onset of a deception campaign until the surprise is almost impossible. Consequently, that means that the adversary will, more or less, detect some activity and its intelligence analysts will have some warnings indicators. But even a timely detection of unusual activities does not doom deception to failure. We stated before that leaders tend to be reluctant to accept pieces of information that is contradictory to their pre-existing beliefs. Hitler was convinced that the Allies would launch an attack at Pas de Calais instead of Normandy, despite the verbal, oral and materialized evidence for the opposite. So, leader's perceptions can counterbalance an effective surveillance or any security leaks, through the level of dissemination information from lower echelons to the superiors.

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## **CHAPTER 3: OPERATION BARBAROSSA**

### **3.1 THE PRE-WAR ENVIRONMENT**

Operation Barbarossa was the code name for the invasion of Germany in the Soviet Union, which begun on 22 June 1941. It was a surprise attack that Hitler was meticulously planning for over a year before the attack.<sup>1</sup> Although the outcome of the operation was, eventually, against Germany, with its setback in December 1941, suffering from heavy casualties, until then the Hitler's plan was proved effective. This success was a by-product, to a large extent, of the German deception campaigns and intelligence operations prior to invasion, something that enhanced the initial impact on Soviets.

History abounds in examples of strategic surprises, but the surprise attack that achieved Germany over the USSR in 22 June, 1941, known as Operation Barbarossa, has of unique significance, as it may be a single case that the leadership of a country ignored so many warnings for imminent attack, pinpointing one of the greatest problems of military intelligence, concerning the problems emerged when information contradict deeply rooted perceptions. But why Stalin thought that a German attack would be impossible in the specific period? How much did the German deception operations reinforce Stalin's mistrust and why did not he consider Churchill warnings? Most important, why did not he consider the data received by intelligence agencies?

The relations between the countries were hostile, for a long time before the German surprise attack. The two countries were the lost parts of the World War I and they were trying to rally. Hitler, as a part of his ambitions, wanted to attack the USSR, as he thought there would be a change in status quo and the Soviet Union would have, soon, aggressive claims to become a regional hegemony. For this reason, the attack had to be imminent, before the Russian forces had been reorganized.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Stalin knew that, in the place of the World War II, a war between the USSR and Germany was inevitable and, early in 1940, he identified Germany as its main enemy and began to accelerate its military preparations to be ready for a potential war. The phenomenal preparedness results to confidence that the USSR was ready to cope with whatever the Germans were going to do, even if they would resort

to surprise attack, something inconceivable in Soviets mind, as they would believe that it is not feasible to conceal the deployment of the main force and military preparations for a surprise attack for a long period without being detected and the Soviet intelligence was pretty good to that.

In August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow known as the [Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact](#) shortly before the [German invasion of Poland](#) that triggered the outbreak of [World War II in Europe](#). A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union on the division of the eastern European [border states](#) between their respective "[spheres of influence](#)": the Soviet Union and Germany would partition Poland in the event of an invasion by Germany, and Russia would be allowed to overrun the Baltic states and [Finland](#). The conclusion of this pact was indeed followed by a [Soviet invasion of Poland](#) that led to the annexation of the eastern part of the country. The pact stunned the world because of the parties' earlier mutual hostility and their conflicting [ideologies](#). As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union maintained reasonably strong diplomatic relations for two years and fostered [an important economic relationship](#). The countries entered a [trade pact in 1940](#) by which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such as oil and wheat, to help Germany circumvent a British [blockade of Germany](#).

Speaking on strategic terms, the Soviet Union, during the interwar, was trying to heal its wounds from the defeat in WWII. Stalin, aware of the rising German power and Hitler's imperialistic intentions, set in motion events to make the country mighty and, especially, to restructure the Red Army. He took the total control of the Communist regime and began a program of industrialization of economy, followed by a mere reassessment of the military doctrine. Prior to German invasion, the soviet military doctrine was defensive-orientated, despite the trends in favor of a more aggressive attitude. The evolution of German military offensive strategy made clear to Soviets that the priority should be the defense and security, through which the Red Army could be reorganized and adopt an offensive character. The transition period, however, should be taken place under total secrecy and the upcoming build-up of soviet military capabilities should be concealed from Hitler. For this reason, Stalin deployed a deception campaign, which Soviets called 'maskirovka', which concerns counterintelligence operations along with denial and deception campaigns. To reach the objectives, Soviet deception plan included a heavy presence of defense strength along the borders, combined with dissimulation of vital information, such as the disposition of the Red Army mechanized corps. The deployment of 'maskirovka' made clear that Soviet intelligence had warnings, particularly at operational level, of Hitler's intentions. In fact, the concealment of soviet capabilities, relatively, succeeded. The soviet sources used complicated radio games to confuse the Germans as to Red Army intentions and capabilities.<sup>3</sup> Although the German assessment of soviet capabilities were, generally, correct, mainly in the first months of the campaign, there were many flaws, due to the effective soviet dissimulation methods. The reconnaissance flights from the German air forces provided little, if any, credible data, due to the strong security, and the pieces of information that Luftwaffe or agents

delivered to high echelons did not result in adequate judgments. In addition to this, the German intelligence underestimated the capabilities of Soviet forces. Particularly, a report in February 1941 stated that the Soviet air forces as well as land forces were, in terms of quantity, quality and operational value, inferior to respective German. The underestimation of Soviet strength concerned, also, the aircraft strength and production. Totally, the Germans came to a conclusion that the soviet production was one-third of the real one and that the strength of air force was less than a half than actually was.<sup>4</sup>

Despite these wrong estimations, Hitler believed that any weaknesses could be counterbalanced by superiority in balance and equipment. These assessments did not hinder Hitler's ambitions to invade the USSR. Hitler's strategy was based on doctrine of 'lighting war' (blitzkrieg), a method of warfare whereby an attacking force spearheaded by a dense concentration of armored and motorized of mechanized infantry formations with close air support, breaking through the opponent's line of defense by short, fast, powerful attacks and then dislocating the defenders, using speed and surprise to encircle them. Hitler was seeking decisive results through offensive operations, especially through battles of annihilation. Surprise was an essential component of this strategy, as the invasion in the Soviet Union proved. Particularly, the surprise attack in the USSR included the near annihilation of the total Soviet air force by simultaneous attacks on airfields. On the ground, four panzer groups encircled surprised and disorganized Soviet forces, followed by marching which completed the encirclement and defeated the trapped forces.<sup>5</sup>

Once Hitler decided to invade the USSR, it was sure that this was going to happen through a surprise attack. The problem, however, that Hitler faced was that it was impossible to conceal all the military preparations, such as the movements of troops near the Soviet borders, and mobilize his martial means, until the launch of the attack. It was unrealistic for Hitler to believe that Soviets would not receive any warnings for the German's moves, let alone, having to deal with the best intelligence community of Soviets. Hitler knew that, especially, during long-term preparations, security leaks were unavoidable as well as total secrecy, so he had to find a way to support his campaign of invasion, without thwarting the surprise and provoking a pre-emptive strike.<sup>6</sup>

The solution to this problem was a deception campaign. The safeguarding of surprise was the incentive that motivated Hitler to resort to a series of stratagems, something not strange to him, as cunning and maneuver were appealed to him and deception was institutionalized during the Barbarossa build-up.<sup>7</sup> The concept was how Hitler could justified a large movements of forces near the eastern front.

### **3.2 THE GERMAN DECEPTION PLAN**

Hitler took advantage of operation in the western front and exploited Stalin perceptions about Germany's intentions and capabilities to employ consecutive misdirection ruses. The first institutionalized try was the invasion of Britain. In July 16, 1940, Hitler ordered an amphibious attack on Britain, with the code name Sea Lion. However, during the autumn, such an invasion was improbable, due to the unfavorable weather conditions and the Hitler's intent to exert pressure on Churchill

with other political means. Nevertheless, the operation Sea Lion was proved an effective deception theme.<sup>8</sup> Stalin believed that Hitler would not conduct a war in two fronts and even if he was planning to attack the USSR, he was going to do it after the victory over England. Furthermore, the Soviet military headquarters estimated that Hitler would probably resort to a protracted and not a lightning war, because the latter form was impossible to succeed against a vast territory with, numerically, big army and such a practice would offer, only, temporal tactical advantages in battlefield.<sup>9</sup> Apart from that, Hitler used the non-aggression pact in 1939 to appease Stalin's worries about German intentions. Stalin's desire to avoid a war with Germany led him to the sign of the non-aggression pact in 1939, known as Ribbentrop-Molotov covenant. This facilitated Hitler's plans to invade Poland, while offered a warranty of peace. Stalin relied on the pact to convince himself that, actually, Hitler would abide by the piece covenant, whereas Hitler he was going to use it as a decoy to reduce Stalin's suspicion and invade in the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, this perception facilitated, to a great extent, the Germany's preparation for Barbarossa.<sup>10</sup>

Operation Sea Lion was a striking example of German exploitation of Stalin's beliefs that Germany was preoccupied with Britain to undertake Barbarossa. Initially, the massive build-up near the soviet front was presented as a part of Wehrmacht and Abwehr preparation to invade England. For example, a part of build-up was explained as a training maneuver, held well out of range of British bombers and reconnaissance aircrafts. The transition of German troops in Eastern Europe seemed to serve operational exercises for the invasion in Britain, out of British surveillance. The constant development of German troops near the Soviet borders provoked some suspicions to Stalin, but Hitler, in order to calm him, claimed that the large movement aimed to mislead the British about the Sea Lion. In fact, the OKW generate a 'double-bluff scenario' that the presence of Wehrmacht near the Soviet territory was a tool to deceit Churchill that the real Hitler's intention was to invade the USSR and that the attack in England was cancelled. So Barbarossa would be used, ostensibly, as a deception campaign against England, while, actually the Sea Lion was the true deception plan.<sup>11</sup>

The Sea Lion misdirection ruse was reinforced by several additional German initiatives. For instance, Hitler's personal negotiations with General Francisco Franco, which were published, targeted to focus the Soviet's attention on the development of war with England.<sup>12</sup> Also, Hitler's initiatives to be, fictitiously, implemented in Iberian Peninsula (Felix) and continental France (Attila) was just a mean to divert Stalin's attention from the actual intention to attack the USSR to the West. Furthermore, the Germans wanted to conceal their actual intentions using operational decoys. The preparations of German forces in Scandinavia and France, combined with respective naval in May 1941, were presented as threshold of Operation Sea Lion. Also, the presence of German troops in Yugoslavia and British ones in Greece, along with escalation of German preparation in North Africa in April and May, diverted Stalin's attention away from the development of German forces in Poland. In addition to this, in Directive No. 23 of February 6, 1941, Hitler ordered that the heaviest possible losses be inflicted on the British and the High Command of the Air Force (OKL) stepped up the ongoing bomber offensive of the winter of 1940-41. The bomber offensive, accordingly, became a deliberately misleading operation whose

purpose was to give the impression that an attack on the British Isles was planned for 1941. Harpoon was an elaborately staged deception intended to make it appear that a German invasion of Britain would take place about August 1, 1941. In Harpoon, the German units in Norway, Denmark and France went through the motions of preparing an amphibious operation against Britain.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, Hitler, justified the German implication in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Balkans, as a contingency shield against any possible Russian countermeasures. Specifically, on 18 December, Hitler specified that Operation Barbarossa was just a defensive theme consisted of precautionary measures in case of soviet aggressive behavior. Not only that, but by March 1941, this deployment was presented as a necessary measure in response to apparent Russian build-up and later the Wehrmacht considered it a cover action for the invasion in Balkans. We can say that the involvement of Germany in Balkans was proved pretty valuable. After the decision to invade the Soviet Union, Hitler wanted to have the region under German influence to prevent interference by the British, using the projected Barbarossa operations. The presence of German battalions in Eastern Europe would reduce Stalin's suspicion about Hitler's intentions for an upcoming attack in the USSR, offering the alternative occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia, prerequisite of which was the military presence and involvement in eastern European territory. The German operation in Balkans was opportunistically available to misdirect Stalin about the build-up of German forces in Poland. The German implication in Balkans succeeded to reduce Stalin's ambiguity about the actual point of attack and conceal the German intentions. The 'Balkan alternative' coerced Britain to settle 60,000 troops into Greece, as a verification of German concern on the war with Britain. Moreover, Hitler excused the transition of German forces in Poland, Hungary and Romania as a supporting operation of the Balkan war.<sup>14</sup>

Within the misdirection concept of an invasion on Britain, Hitler deployed another several demonstrations. Late in 1940, German troops were implicated in conflicts with British shipping in the Mediterranean and Malta. Also, operations Alpine Violent and Sunflower concerned the support of Italian forces in the Albanian front and North Africa, respectively, diverted Stalin's attention away from Poland, making him confident about the war with England in the Mediterranean.<sup>15</sup>

The need for total secrecy made the Hitler extend the deception to German troops as well as to German society, with the Propaganda Branch of OKW, in conjunction with the Foreign Intelligence Office, to be integral component of the campaign. The key point for Hitler was to misinform his forces and German public about Germany's intentions, something that would, indirectly, influence the Soviet government. To prevent possible security leaks in operational level and in the framework of precautions of the soviet surveillance, the Propaganda Branch, in coordination with the High Command of the Air Force, was ordered to deliver false information to German troops in the eastern front that their role was to prepare for an imminent invasion in Britain and that their presence there served the reduction of British suspicion. The importance of this 'troop-delusion' became of vital importance the final weeks before the surprise attack, when the concentration of troops in Soviet land could not be concealed and there was a need to reduce suspicion. The army had to

deal with the heavy task of secretly transferring an additional 77 divisions by June 22, 1941, as well as shifting most of the original 44 divisions closer to the borders. Also, from May 25 to June 22, 1941, the Germans moved 75 divisions in eastern Poland. The explanation was that the concentration was part of keeping Russia on leash, preventing a soviet strike that may hinder the war with England. This perception gained ground as a ‘fictitious by-product’ of the non-aggression pact in 1939.<sup>16</sup> The Ribbentrop- Molotov covenant facilitated Hitler’s project to misinform both the German public and troops. There was a common held view in diplomatic community that Germany would not launch an attack without the use of ultimatum.<sup>17</sup> What is more, Hitler cultivated bilateral relations with Stalin. The Russo-German relations the period before the attack were economically prosperous, while the trade between the two countries was fluctuating in high rates. The trade involved mainly Russian imports of German raw materials, such as oil, for machine tools, military industrial manufactures as well as negotiations over delineations of frontiers, so the Propaganda Branch spread rumors about Russo-German friendly relations, especially after the signature of the Ribbentrop- Molotov covenant.<sup>18</sup>

The strategy of delusion had another domain of implementation, that of German domestic. In German society, the German people had to be persuaded, through propaganda and misinformation, about the inevitable war with Britain. The Propaganda Branch had orders to manipulate the public towards the view that the Wehrmacht planned to invade Britain. Characteristically, on the civilian radio, the Propaganda Branch used musical request programs, on which German soldiers sent in requests for popular songs, to indicate that elite troops were on the western front, with lower quality defensive formation in the East. Also, the German press was releasing articles reinforcing the misdirection campaign that the invasion in England was a matter of time.<sup>19</sup>

The grand scale of deception can be made clear if we consider that even the military headquarters did not know that they were going to attack the USSR, only days or even hours before the scheduled attack. Up to June 20, 1941, there were, ostensibly, little if any, German troops in the eastern front. In the middle of April 1941, Germans had only four infantry divisions on the east Prussian- Lithuanian borders. Very few of the echelons were aware of the actual Hitler’s intent to invade the USSR and this secrecy became more intense as the time was passing, because the key was more to justify the presence of 150 divisions near Russia rather than conceal them. With little time to remain, tactical deception was of crucial importance. The movement of troops was taking place mainly in darkness and during the day hours the soldiers were remaining inept, using camouflage to go unnoticed. In this way, the land forces, in conjunction with Luftwaffe, achieved tactical surprise.<sup>20</sup>

### **3.3 THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT**

The deception campaign Hitler employed would not success without Stalin’s erroneous interpretation of incoming information. Stalin’s attitude towards the constant warnings that a German attack was a matter of time facilitated, to a great extent, the misdirection themes of German intelligence and, eventually, the surprise attack.

The Soviet Union had one of the best and most effective intelligence networks, concerning the collection and analysis of information, so the warnings that analysts delivered to Stalin were, at least, credible and accurate. The problem, however, was that the Soviet leader used to play the role of the intelligence analyst, interpreting the data himself and discarding whatever piece of information did not fit his preconceptions. Given the fact that Hitler's intention to invade the USSR was known to Soviet intelligence during the German preparation of Barbarossa, it is precarious to allege that the invasion was, indeed, a total surprise, perhaps only in Stalin's mind, so we can talk about a 'perception blunder' rather than an intelligence one.

In order to achieve his objective, Hitler exploited a series of Stalin's perceptions, whose common point was that Germany would launch an attack in the USSR, at least not before defeating Britain. It is truth that Stalin believed that a conflict with Germany was inevitable. However, he estimated that it was not going to happen before 1942. The Soviet Union was in a face of restructuring and the Red Army was not yet prepared to confront effectively the German forces. This was one the Stalin's motives to buy time, something that care of which by the non-aggression pact in 1939.<sup>21</sup> The strategic military judgment was that Hitler would not conduct a war in two fronts and an attack in the USSR would occur, definitely, after the end of war with Britain.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, before attacking the Soviets, Stalin estimated, Hitler would, firstly, ensure oil and coal basins from Middle East and Ukraine, so the implication of such conflict would be a prelude for the invasion. Actually, Hitler reinforced this belief offering Stalin multiple alternatives of Germany's target, such as the war with Britain, the implication in Balkans and Africa, something that made Stalin to underestimate the Germany's capabilities. Furthermore, the Soviet military headquarters estimated that Hitler would probably resort to protracted and not lighting war, since the latter form would offer only temporal tactical advantages in battlefield, being unfavorable against a larger enemy, in terms of territory and personnel.<sup>23</sup>

The improbability of a two-front war led Stalin to a second-stage perception that the Red Army would be, over time, to capable to deal with Wehrmacht and any kind of German military operation, even a surprise attack. In fact, even on the eve of Barbarossa, the Soviet Army was sufficiently prepared for a German attack but prepared for a wrong war. Firstly, the Soviet military echelons assumed that it was impossible for Germany to conceal a massive movement of troops in Russian borders from soviet surveillance, so a surprise attack was something inconceivable. Indeed, this estimation was quite rational and Hitler did not try to conceal the German build-up near the USSR, but rationalize it.

Moreover, Stalin believed that any German attack would occur after the use of ultimatum, a common view held in diplomatic community. This belief was a by-product of Stalin's miscalculation that firstly, Germany was incapable of conducting a surprise attack and, also, that Hitler rationalized the massive build-up of German troop in the eastern front as a deception campaign against England. The latter explanation, along with the desire not to provoke Germany to attack first, made Stalin completely stubborn in front of blatant evidence of an imminent German attack.<sup>24</sup>

Between July 1940 and 22 June, more than ninety reports were delivered to Stalin, indicating the German's preparations for an imminent attack.<sup>25</sup> The soviet intelligence

community was expanded throughout Europe, the members of which (Red Orchestra, Cambridge Five) intruded in the higher governmental, ambassadorial and military echelons in Germany, Britain and many others European residencies, from where they could obtain information about Hitler's intentions and military preparation. So, the pieces of information must be considered credible. However, Stalin tended to discard or misjudge those data sets, according to his preconceptions, to avoid an imminent conflict with Germany.

As early as the end of June 1940, data about Hitler's intentions to invade the USSR had been delivered to Stalin. The Information Department of Intelligence Directorate (DMI) issued intelligence summaries every month from July 1940 to June 1941, signed by the chief of RU, Filip I. Golikov. All these reports were disseminated to all levels of echelons, from the governments to the officers of troops. From June 15, 1940, the RU counted constant troop movement from the western border to the eastern one. In particular, during July, the RU agents reported 860 troops moving to East Prussia, former Poland and Austria as well as 54 divisions in former Poland and 7 infantry divisions in Warsaw.<sup>26</sup> On September, the RU detected 102 divisions in the West and 72 in the East, with the numbers to decrease in March 1, 1941 to 92 and 61 respectively, convincing Stalin that the Hitler's priority was Britain. In March 11, there was a report stating that the German aircrafts were doubled to 10,980 since October. However, Stalin disregarded this evidence as disinformation. Stalin, also, overlooked reports about Luftwaffe and panzer forces locating to Poland and he ordered his generals to refrain from any action that would provoke a German strike.<sup>27</sup>

The counterintelligence community ran several operations against foreign missions in Moscow, such agent penetrations, telephone taps, and installation of listening devices or recruiting members of those missions. In this way, many data relevant to German intentions for an imminent attack in the USSR had been obtained. The soviet counterintelligence received reports of confidential discussions among the Germans, as well as reports of discussions between the Germans and their Italian, Hungarian and Finnish allies, all of which pointing the likelihood of an attack in the Soviet Union. Microphones planted in Finland, producing transcripts with reports that Finns would collaborate with the Germans against the USSR, while the Second Directorate continued to receive reports from its agents located in various foreign embassies. However, there is no suggestion that any of pieces of information NKGB obtained, influenced Stalin's perceptions that Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union, since he was preoccupied with the operation Sea Lion and the conflict with England.<sup>28</sup>

Stalin, also, believed that Churchill wanted to embroil the USSR in a war with Germany, a belief that was reinforced after the Munich agreement in 1938. That was another cause that led Stalin to consider British warnings as provocation, being reluctant to accept any piece of information that warned him that Hitler will attack the Soviets. In April 1941, Churchill warned Stalin that Hitler intended to invade in the Soviet Union, a warning come from an agent. Again, on July 1940, Churchill made another alert to Stalin that the German invasion was more than plausible, but, one more time, the warning fell through. Stalin considered Churchill's warnings as propaganda and an attempt to induce the USSR in a war with Germany. It was not only Churchill who provided such information to Stalin.<sup>29</sup>The British intelligence

network used a spy circuit throughout Europe, consisted of agents, double agents as well as German defectors who intruded in German embassy, confirming that Hitler was planning to attack the USSR in spring 1941. For example, an SIS agent in Helsinki confirmed that German military officers held orders to attack Russia in spring.<sup>30</sup>

Warnings and reports were delivered in Stalin by several RU sources, located in residencies throughout Europe.

## **BERLIN**

Berlin was the most effective Ru residency, providing a large number of reports. Ariets, a producer, was assigned to the Information Section of the German Ministry of foreign affairs and he reported that Hitler had given orders to his headquarters to prepare for war with the USSR. Not only that, but in February 28, 1941, Ariets gave more details that three army groups prepared to advance on Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev and the attack set for May 20. Despite the accuracy of the data, they never receive adequate information. This residency had few doubts concerning the German's intentions.<sup>31</sup>

## **LONDON**

The officers of this residency covered the effects of German air raids on British armaments production, rail transport and seaports. They submitted reports on British anti-aircraft measures, techniques of German bombings and British Army's orders of battle and organization of defense against a possible German invasion.<sup>32</sup>

## **PARIS**

The RU resident in Paris was a military attaché, General Ivan A. Susloparov. Reporting to them were two illegal residents, Henri Robinson (code name: Harry) and Leopold Trepper (code name: Otto and member of the Red Orchestra). Robinson submitted a deal of info on the movement of German troops to the East and their defensive construction along the Atlantic coast. On April 4, 1941, he stated that the Germans were no longer considering the invasion in England. Trepper informed Susloparov, in June 21, that the Wehrmacht command has completed the transfer of its troops to the Soviet frontier and in June 22 would attack the USSR. Stalin judged this report as English provocation.<sup>33</sup>

## **SWITZERLAND**

The illegal network in Switzerland was under Alexander Rado (code name: Dora), a Hungarian cartographer and military intelligence agent. On February 21, he sent a report to Ru Moscow that Germany has 150 divisions in the East and the offensive will begin at the end of May. The report of 2<sup>nd</sup> stated that all German motorized divisions on the Soviet border are in constant readiness.<sup>34</sup>

## **BUCHAREST**

The spy network in Bucharest was headed by Colonel Gregory M. Yeremin (code name: Yeshchenko). This residency's sources were German a German embassy press

officer, Kurt Völkisch (code name: AVS) and his wife, Margarita (code name: LTsL). Völkisch was in contact with the German embassy in Bucharest and he was aware of all the activities carried out by the Germans in Romania. He has acquaintances among responsible officials in the German Foreign Ministry and earned their confidence. On March 1, 1941, Völkisch described a visit to Berlin, where many spoke of an impending invasion in the USSR. The report in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense gives the full text and repeats the dominant view of a German attack. What is important is that the report made clear that a large scale military operation against the British Isles was considered unlikely, because such a venture was too risky and was associated with heavy losses. On March 13, Kopets, another Bucharest Ru residency source, reported that an SS officer replied that there were no longer plans for invading England. Völkisch, also, reported that during meetings in Vienna, Göring and Antonescu had discussed the Romanian role in the forthcoming war with the USSR. Also, on March 26, Colonel Yeremin sent in a report from another source, Nemesh, a retired Romanian staff officer. This report added weight to those from Völkisch on German plans for war with the USSR. Nemesh stated that the Romanian general staff had precise information that in two or three months Germany will attack the Ukraine Gerstenberg, one of the Völkisch' best sources, spoke that a Russo-German war is likely to start in June. Finally, Völkisch reported, on May 28, that preparations for the military action of Germany against the USSR were proceeding.<sup>35</sup>

## **BUDAPEST**

Report available from this residency dated June 15, 1941. It cited agent Slovak as the source. It stated that German troops from Belgrade were leaving for Poland, while those in central Romania were moving to the soviet frontiers. Also, Slovak, reported that the Germans would complete their military deployment by June 15.<sup>36</sup>

## **PRAGUE**

On April 15, 1941, the Prague intelligence residency reported that, according to an individual in a circle of persons close to the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, it was known that in the leadership of Germany there had been a discussion of an invasion in the Soviet Union. The date had been provisionally set for May 15<sup>th</sup>. The preparations for the attack would be masked as large-scale military deployment for a decisive blow in England. The RU agent in Prague, Vladimir Vrona, was the source of a report stated that Hitler would attack the USSR in the second half of June.<sup>37</sup>

Every each warning and reports from agents, ambassadors and Stalin's peers were misinterpreted as English and German provocation or, even, soviet tries to mislead Stalin about German intentions. Stalin's reluctance to view the warnings from a different perspective and accept a different explanation was so rigid, that he resorted to execution of higher military headquarters that provided data, contradictory to his perceptions. After the purge of the Red Army, he ordered the execution of a large part of soviet military staff, such as division commanders and colonels, as well as his intelligence analysts, remodelling, in this way, the structure of NIO (Foreign Intelligence Service) and NKVD/NKGB (State Security Intelligence Apparatus). The new organization was composed of analysts who reflected Stalin's own prejudices. This 'new edition' intelligence practice was to deliver Stalin pieces of information

that reinforced his existed perceptions. That new regime prospered easily and quickly, something not strange, if we consider that any alternative explanation of incoming reports by the intelligence analysts would lead them to death. So, Stalin allowed a new intelligence regime to grow up around him that confirmed his beliefs. The data that indicated Hitler's intentions to attack the Soviet Union were not disseminated to Stalin or they delivered to him with an indication of British provocation. The new intelligence practice was just an actual pointing of facts with a favorable, to Stalin, intelligence assessment.<sup>38</sup>

The case of agent Golikov is exemplified<sup>39</sup>. Golikov was the chief of Soviet military intelligence and he used to classify the incoming information under two headings: 'reliable sources' and 'not confirmed sources'. Under the former category, he placed the reports that reinforced Stalin's beliefs that Hitler was planning to invade Britain and not the Soviet Union, while under the second category were the reports concerning Hitler's actual intention and preparations to invade the USSR. For example, on March 20, 1941, Golikov signed a summary of all the reports, regarding a specific subject, entitled 'Opinions on the Organizational Measures and Variations of Combat Actions of the German Army against the USSR'. However, before the dissemination to the higher echelons, the judgment of the document was abide by Stalin's thoughts. Golikov highlighted that the reports that indicate an imminent German invasion were come from British sources, aiming to embroil the Soviet Union in a war with Germany in the spring of 1941. The report presented three possible versions of the German invasion: a) from Lublin to Kiev, from Romania and from East Prussia, b) an invasion of Ukraine and c) the settlement of three army groups at Leningrand, Moscow and Kiev. Of course, any of these alternatives, according to Golikov, would be taken place after the defeat of England. Golikov's report based on information from a variety of sources, analyzing, in detail, the German plan for attacking the Soviet Union, appearing, however, Stalin that before the Anglo-German war, nothing of the above was going to happen. Golikov's reports, up to the day of invasion, was in the same wavelength. During April 1941, he documented the settlement of German troops to the eastern front, while in May a report noted the increase of German forces in western and eastern fronts, while on May 31, a special report referred that Germany was intensifying the preparation for the operation Sea Lion.<sup>40</sup>

On 25<sup>th</sup> April, MI reached to a written conclusion about German military movements towards the USSR. Beyond the build-up of troops near Russia, which was a common practice, MI reported the construction of German airfields and improvement of transportation systems as well as the evacuation of the families of the German officials from Poland. However, Stalin was choosing to believe only the reports that confirmed his own perceptions. He rejected the Richard Sorge's report, an NKGB agent, located in Japan, that 150 German divisions were settled near Russia in order to attack, while, at the end of March, a polish secret organization had reported that Germany would launch an attack on 15 April.<sup>41</sup>

A plenty of reports were delivered to Soviets, with some of them to be, erroneously, accurate:

- August 27, 1940: RU report from Paris: “The Germans have turned down an offensive against England. Preparations, apparently continuing for such an eventuality, are merely intended to hide the movement of German forces to the East, where there are already 106 divisions”.<sup>42</sup>
- March 14, 1941: A German major tells a military attaché: “We are completely changing our plan. We are moving east, to the USSR. We will take from the USSR grain, coal, oil”.<sup>43</sup>
- March 20, 1941: Summer Welles informs Ambassador Umansky that the USA has authentic information that “it is the intention of Germany to attack the USSR”.<sup>44</sup>
- April 4, 1941: Harry reports from France that the Germans are no longer considering the invasion in Britain, but they will continue the bombing of the country.<sup>45</sup>
- April 6, 1941: Dora learns from highly placed government officials in Berlin that they expect the campaign to begin on June 15.<sup>46</sup>
- May 5, 1941: Richard Sorge passes a microfilm of telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott, German ambassador in Tokyo, saying: “Germany will begin a war against the USSR in the middle of June 15”.<sup>47</sup>
- June 13, 1941: Sorge: “I repeat: Nine armies with the strength of 150 divisions will begin an offensive at dawn of June 22”.<sup>48</sup>
- June 19, 1941: Willy Lehman, a Gestapo agent of the RU, reports that the attack will come on June 22, at 3:00 a.m.<sup>49</sup>
- June 20, 1941; The Kosta network of the Sofia residency reports that the war will begin on June 21 or 22.<sup>50</sup>
- June 21, 1941: KhVS (Gerhard Kegel of the German embassy in Moscow) reports that Germany will attack on June 22 between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m.<sup>51</sup>

Moreover, important data about the German’s preparations were derived from the Enigma machine. The Allies have been making efforts to crack this cryptanalytic German system that reveals crucial operational information about Hitler’s intentions

and data of tactical value. On 3 May, the Enigma revealed that a part of Luftwaffe's forces was directing to Cracow. Between 14 June and 22 June, the Enigma disclosed information that was of no doubt that the German invasion in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there were additional messages from Enigma that indicated that the staff of Luftlotte was given orders to be ready to commence operations from 17 June as well as targets for the first raids.<sup>52</sup>

The warnings Stalin received were, also, of an ambassadorial level. On 25 December 1940, the Soviet attaché in Berlin delivered to Stalin a summary of the Hitler's Directive No. 21 of 18 December 1940 (Operation Barbarossa).<sup>53</sup> On 1 March 1941, a US attaché in Berlin informed the American government about the Hitler's detailed plan to invade the USSR and the USA, respectively, passed this piece of information to a soviet ambassador.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, ambassador Dekanozov was providing information that revealed the reinforcement of Soviet borders with German forces, telegrams to Molotov, highlighting the increase of German strength in soviet area, as well as trains moving from the West to East, carrying military equipment.<sup>55</sup> In June 1941, the German ambassador Von Schulenburg informed the Soviet International Affairs Department the Hitler's plan to invade the USSR on 22 June, with Stalin to misjudge it as disinformation and propaganda.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, the Swedes made accurate judgments and sent them to Moscow.<sup>57</sup> The Yugoslav Military Attaché in Berlin informed the Soviets about the Germans' plans, the ambassadorial authorities of Vichy informed the Soviet embassy about the mobilization of German divisions and the US government warned the Soviet Ambassador in Washington that the invasion would be taken place within two months.<sup>58</sup> Also, the SIS representative in Geneva had verified, from German official contacts, pieces of data that Hitler would launch an attack in May.<sup>59</sup>

Information about German plans was, also, available in operational military level. The soviet border troops had been working diligently to provide information on the growing German menace since the summer of 1940. On June 12, an outpost of the Ninety-second Border Troop Detachment at Peremysh1 reported that a field telephone cable on the soviet side of the river San appeared to have emerged from the river. The troops, then, detected a cable with four leads running into the water at the shoreline on the German side and on the Soviet side the four leads went in four directions. Also, there were footprints, leading to the water line. The incident was reported by Lieutenant General Maslennikov. The representatives agreed that the cable ran from the German side to the Soviet one. This case, like those of the petroleum samples, the machinery for adapting western railcars to the soviet gauge and the camouflaged river-crossing equipment should have made clear that the Germans intended to invade the USSR in the very near future.<sup>60</sup>

Even Hitler himself tried to reassure Stalin about his intentions, with two personal letters:

**December 31, 1940**

Dear Mr. Stalin,

I am using the occasion of sending New Year's greetings and my wishes for success and prosperity to you and the people of Soviet Russia to discuss a series of questions that were raised in my conversations with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dekanozov.

The struggle with England has entered a decisive phase, and I intend not later than the summer of the coming year to put an end to this rather drawn-out question by seizing and occupying the heart of the British Empire—the British Isles. I am aware of the difficulty of this operation but believe that it can be carried out, for I see no other way of ending this war.

As I wrote you earlier, the approximately seventy divisions that I must keep in the Government General are undergoing reorganization and training in an area inaccessible to English aviation and intelligence. I understood from my discussions with Messrs. Molotov and Dekanozov that this has aroused in you understandable anxiety. Beginning in approximately March, these troops will be moved to the Channel and the western coast of Norway, and in their place new units will be assembled for accelerated training. I wanted to warn you of this in advance.

In addition, I intend to use these troops to force the English out of Greece, and for this it will be necessary to move them through Romania and Bulgaria. Those troops that will carry out the invasion of England from Norwegian territory will continue to utilize transit rights through Finland. Germany has no interests in Finland or Bulgaria, and as soon as we achieve our goals in this war, I will immediately withdraw my troops. . . .

I especially want to warn you of the following. The agony of England is accompanied by feverish efforts to save it from its inevitable fate. For this purpose they are fabricating all possible foolish rumors, the most important of which can be crudely divided into two categories. These are rumors of planned invasions by the USSR into Germany and by Germany against the USSR. I do not wish to dwell on the absurdity of such nonsense. However, on the basis of information in my possession, I predict that as our invasion of the British Isles draws closer, the intensity of such rumors will increase and fabricated documents will perhaps be added to them.

I will be completely open with you. Some of these rumors are being circulated by appropriate German offices. The success of our invasion of the Isles depends very much on the achievement of tactical surprise. Therefore, it is useful to keep Churchill and his circles in ignorance of our precise plans. A worsening of the relations between our countries to include armed conflict is the only way for the English to save themselves, and I assure you that they will continue efforts in this direction with their characteristic slyness and craftiness. . . .

For a final solution of what to do with this bankrupt English legacy, and also for the consolidation of the union of socialist countries and the establishment of a new world order, I would like very much to meet personally with you. I have spoken about this with Messrs. Molotov and Dekanozov.

Unfortunately, as you will well understand, an exceptional workload prevents me from arranging our meeting until the smashing of England. Therefore, I propose to

plan for this meeting at the end of June—beginning of July 1941 and would be happy if this meets with your agreement and understanding.

Sincerely yours,

Adolf Hitler<sup>61</sup>

### **May 14, 1941**

Dear Mr. Stalin,

I am writing this letter at the moment of having finally concluded that it will be impossible to achieve a lasting peace in Europe, not for us, not for future generations, without the final shattering of England and her destruction as a state. As you well know, I long ago made the decision to carry out a series of military measures to achieve this goal.

The closer the hour of a decisive battle, however, the larger the number of problems I face. For the mass of the German people, no war is popular, especially not a war against England, because the German people consider the English a fraternal people and war between them a tragic event. I will not conceal that I have felt the same way and have several times offered England humane peace terms, taking into consideration England's military situation. However, insulting replies to my peace proposals and the continuing expansion by the English of the field of military operations with the obvious intention of drawing the entire world into war persuade me that there is no other way out of this situation except for an invasion of the Isles and the decisive destruction of that country.

English intelligence, however, has very cleverly begun to use the concept of "fraternal peoples" for its own purposes, applying it to its own propaganda, not without success.

Consequently, opposition to my decision to invade the Isles has drawn in many elements of German society, including individual members of the higher levels of state and military leadership. You are certainly aware that one of my deputies, Mr. Hess, in a fit of insanity, I suppose, flew to London, taking this unbelievable action, to the best of my knowledge, to awaken the English to common sense. Judging by information in my possession, similar moods have struck several generals of my army, particularly those who have distinguished relatives in England descending from the same ancient, noble roots.

In this connection, a special warning is raised by the following circumstance.

In order to organize troops for the invasion away from the eyes of the English opponent, and in connection with the recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops, about eighty divisions, are located on the borders of the Soviet Union. This possibly gave rise to the rumors now circulating of a likely military conflict between us.

I assure you, on my honor as a chief of state that this is not the case.

From my side, I also react with understanding to the fact that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also deployed a sufficient number of your troops on the border.

In this situation I cannot completely exclude the possibility of an accidental outbreak of armed conflict, which given the conditions created by such a concentration of troops might take on very large dimensions, making it difficult if not impossible to determine what caused it in the first place.

I want to be absolutely candid with you.

I fear that some one of my generals might deliberately embark on such a conflict in order to save England from its fate and spoil my plans.

It is a question of no more than a month.

By approximately June 15–20 I plan to begin a massive transfer of troops to the west from your borders.

In connection with this, I ask you, as persuasively as possible, not to give in to any provocations that might emanate from those of my generals who might have forgotten their duty. And, it goes without saying, try not to give them any cause. If it becomes impossible to avoid provocation by some of my generals, I ask you to show restraint, to not respond but to advise me immediately of what has happened through the channel known to you. Only in this way can we attain our mutual goals, on which, it seems to me, we are clearly in agreement.

I thank you for having agreed with me on the question known to you and I ask you to forgive me for the method I have chosen for delivering this letter to you as quickly as possible.

I continue to hope for our meeting in July.

Sincerely yours,

Adolf Hitler<sup>62</sup>

All the warnings Stalin received were either ignored or misinterpreted as provocation propaganda or try to embroil the USSR in a war with Germany to the benefit of England and France. The German deception plan facilitated Stalin's reluctance to accept the alternative of an attack in the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup>

Making an evaluation of Operation Barbarossa, we can say that was successful. Hitler managed to justify the massive build-up of German troops near soviet borders, offering Stalin the decoy of the Anglo-German war. In fact, the deception key was to delay the soviet response to recurrent warnings. Once Stalin rejected the incoming information about the imminent invasion from early 1940, the late-June alerts were of no strategic or operational value, as Stalin, eventually, did not forestall the attack.

However, the German deception campaign and, consequently, the surprise attack offered, only, temporal tactical advantages and, definitely, they were not enough for Hitler to achieve a complete victory. The impact of deception was clear in the first phase of the invasion, when the German ground and air attacks destroyed the soviet organizational command and control, paralyzing every level of command, from the infantry platoon to the Soviet High Command in Moscow. After some tactical victories in battlefield, the Red Army was reorganized and counterattacked, repelling the Wehrmacht, with the climax to be the Battle of Moscow. The German military forces and equipment were not prepared to deal with the severe Russian winter and

the bigger, in terms of personnel and reserves, Red Army. However, the unfavorable outcome did not diminish the effectiveness of the deception plan which owns its success, to a great extent, to Stalin's desire to play the role of the intelligence analyst.

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## **CHAPTER 4: THE YOM KIPPUR WAR**

### **4.1 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS**

The Yom Kippur War, otherwise called the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was a war battled by the coalition of Arab states, guided by Egypt and Syria against Israel, from October 6 to 25, 1973.

The onset of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 surprised Israel and put the nation's security in peril. Actually, by the war's end the Israeli armed forces managed to overcome the initial shock, putting Egypt and Syria under military risk. Yet this did not so often the stun that still dazed the country in after the end of hostilities.

According to Israeli echelons, Israel was thought to be pretty much "invulnerable", in terms of intelligence and military operational capabilities. That optimism was, quickly, disseminated as an outcome of the war. The intelligence community was accused of not evaluating the explicit incoming data that Egypt and Syria intended, clearly, to go to war on 6 October 1973.<sup>1</sup>

In October of 1972, President of Egypt, Sadat, alongside his peer of Syria, Assad, chose to go on war with Israel, setting up an Arab military coalition to accomplish a surprise strike.<sup>2</sup> The goals of Arabs and, particularly Egypt, were clear. Firstly, the Arab nations needed to restore their national honor and distinction, which were relinquished after the astonishment assault of Israel in 1967 and the retreat of the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, Egypt, in case of a military success, would have a political bargaining weapon to make Israel renegotiate. Finally, Egypt needed to compel Israel to mellow its attitude, concerning the retreat of the Sinai. The recovery of the pre-1967-war domain, from Israel, was, presumably, the most important target that affected Sadat to resort to a war.<sup>3</sup>

The planning of war was pretty tough. Keeping in mind that Egypt wanted to dodge devastation, respective to 1967, the deception strategy should be planned fastidiously with the Egyptian military staff to break down the advantages and shortcomings of Israeli strengths. The evaluation of the Egyptian General Staff showed five points of interest of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): arms supplies from the USA, high prevalence of innovative weaponry frameworks, western patterns of training, air predominance and, at long last, the capacity to battle in any case. In this way, the judgment was that deception operation would be utilized for restricted, fleeting goals.<sup>4</sup> Then again, there were, additionally, deficiencies in Israeli military doctrine. The Israeli forces were unequipped for managing a long war, particularly with long lines of communications, and being amassed in time and space to deal with menaces from different distinctive directions. This vital circumstance implied, for all intents and purposes, that from the Golan Heights to the Suez Canal implied 72-hour redeployment for a defensively armored brigade.

Considering all these information, the Egyptian strategic plan was condensed under the following assessments:

- Surprise attack to pre-empt the Israelis.
- Massive force on as wide a front as could be allowed to scatter any endeavor at a counter-assault.
- Maintenance of an air defense line over the ground forces at all times to keep the IAF (Israeli Air Forces) of the backs of the ground troops.
- Force Israel to waste resources between isolated geological battle regions.

- Blunt any Israeli counter-assaults with the use of weapons for defensive attitude and operating from defensive positions
- Force Israel to suffer from overwhelming losses
- Guarantees that Egyptian army would have at its disposal the most sophisticated arsenal to deal with the respective Israeli.<sup>5</sup>

Firstly, Egypt attempted to overcome its shortcomings. For instance, the headway of their thick air defense system eastwards to the Suez Canal seriously constrained the Israeli Air Forces' ability to operate in the Sinai. Moreover, the improvement of a water plane strategy for rupturing the high berms Israel had developed along the channel's eastern dike encouraged the crossing of Egyptian reinforcement. Likewise, the fortification of infantry with anti-tank rockets gave a quick reaction to the rush strategies utilized by Israeli tanks. Egyptian forces needed to fix two noteworthy drawbacks. Firstly, there was a weak point of any amphibious operation. A strong Israeli defense along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal may hinder the intersection and keep the catch of bridgeheads. The second essential issue was the IDF's capacity to dispatch a pre-emptive counteroffensive amid the operation's preparatory stage. So the Egyptian assault would plan to moderate the protective occupation of IDF and forestall a pre-emptive strike, analogous to that of the Six Days War.<sup>6</sup>

To feed Israel with data, concerning the Arab's expectations and abilities, Egypt needed to survive the Israeli intelligence and respite the early warning system that grounds its security on four components: a) deterrence b) early warnings to prepare and respond on time, c) solid standing air force and d) fast determination of the battles by pre-emptive strikes.<sup>7</sup>

There were three aspects of the Israeli early warning system. Firstly, it was a collection data system went for infiltration of the foe's decision making process. In addition, there was collection and analysis ability to find and recognize the early warning indicators and, finally, the framework offered satisfactory early warning space that is the span of time between coming to conclusions, concerning a looming risk or war and raising the alert.<sup>8</sup>

The Egyptians planned to shorten the time span between the minute that the Israeli should understand that war was inevitable and the minute that the Egyptian armed force had finished the foundation of adequate bridgeheads to make any IDF reaction superfluous.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, it was fundamental that the deception campaign focus on the operational level instead of strategic, on the grounds that objectives connected with operational deception were ill-suited to overcome the Egyptian shortcomings and they may worsen it. Along these lines, Egypt attempted to concentrate all the more on the concealment of the assault than to trick the Israelis. The Egyptians' first priority was

to persuade the Israelis that a war in the near future would not be beneficial and, definitely, they would not intend to resort to it, but they were going to take care of regional issues through bargains. Actually, Egypt attempted to delude Israel about its goals, as a way to reduce the suspicions about the genuine intent of a surprise assault. The second dimension of the Egyptian deception plan was to offer Israel a plausible rationalization of the massive build-up in Sinai and Golan Heights, since it was impossible for Egypt to keep the expansive development of troops unnoticed, particularly from Israeli intelligence, which was considered as the best in the world, without emerging suspicion, so a deception campaign was undertaken.

#### **4.2 THE EGYPTIAN DECEPTION CONCEPT**

The Arab society, culture and the high noise level of Arab politics increase the vagueness, concerning the actual intentions of leaderships. This characterizes the Middle Eastern society, in where the verbal articulation of imagery is equally important with the actual underlying meaning. In practice, this implies that a considerable number of political acts gain more credibility for their typical worth or emotive impact. The propensity to represent effect is itself a critical reason behind the high noise level of Arab governmental issues. Thus, ambiguity-increasing results can be exceptionally hard to unmask, as the indications of the actual intentions get to be covered amidst a confounding cluster of articulations. It is a tough task to figure out whether a situation is a piece of a bigger arrangement or constitutes a generally secluded demonstration of an individual or group declaring their own particular perspective. In view of this high noise level, Middle Eastern deception strategies based on the concept of cover.<sup>10</sup>

The Arab media were a force multiplier of the high noise level of Arab politics. Firstly, they were exceptionally politicized. Radio and daily papers were intensely censored, controlled agents of Arab governments and exercised disinformation. Also, they were inclined to exaggeration due to dialect and tradition of aggressive reporting that emphasizes the dramatic. Likewise, the Arab press had a very much created conspiratorial viewpoint, making and articulating an increased sensitivity to plots.<sup>11</sup>

Egypt and Syria were ready for a coordinated attack on Israel, once President Sadat chose to go to war in 1972. The entire campaign based on thwarting the Israeli reaction to the Arab build-up and prevent an Israeli pre-emptive strike whenever before the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1973, explaining away the massive deployment long enough to postpone an Israeli mobilization.<sup>12</sup>

powers and the failure to arrange and lead of any kind of coordinated the deception theme was a mix of Israeli and western patterns. It was intended to use images of the Arabs, focusing on the inability to protect confidential information, a general inertia of the Arab military activity. The plan was to confound the Israeli and western

analysts, providing them with a plausible fictitious alternative as to what the gigantic deployment of personnel and equipment along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights really meant. Basically, the system included the increment of noise level with which Israel needed to deal with. One way was through repetitive false alerts. By Egyptian accounts there were three such cautions in May, August and late September, 1973. The impact of this turmoil was to create a cry-wolf syndrome by a particular repetitive military pattern. The Israelis forces, as indicated by al-Sadat, were activated twice, dividing the public's opinion about Egyptian's and Syrians' real intentions. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff felt that the Arab build-up was serious enough to warrant a general preparation, though the Director of Military Intelligence argued that it was not. This feeling of rightness inclined Israeli knowledge to make the same appraisal in October, which was what the Egyptians needed. On the other hand, these, intentionally planned, deployments occurred in a context of escalation over the previous years. In December 1971, it was ordered a general mobilization as a prelude to a restricted assault over the Suez Canal. As indicated by al-Sadat, that assault was cancelled due to the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan War. After a year, a smaller crossing was arranged, including a parachute drop behind Israeli lines. That time, the Commander of the Egyptian strengths, General Mutrammad al-Sadiq, refused to comply with an order to dispatch an assault, contending that the army was not well prepared. The outcome in both cases was to set up an ostensible pattern of activity: build-up to crisis and afterwards fast de-escalation. They made an abnormal state of menace appeared to be a standard process.<sup>13</sup>

To reinforce the perception that Egyptians were not able to conduct a war and they were working for diplomatic arrangements, the build-up of troops was intended to assuage Egyptian critics. The Israelis suspected that Egyptian forces would be so inert and incompetent that just a small number of troops would cross the Canal. Additionally, Israelis believed that Syrian and Egyptian forces would not be coordinated in any militarily way, that Arab powerlessness to maintain secrecy would give more than satisfactory warning and that an adequate air cover was prerequisite for an Arab strike.<sup>14</sup>

The deception theme was implemented in various ways. After Soviet counsellors were expelled in July 12, many stories were spread, such as that Soviet equipment in Egypt was quickly disintegrating and that Egyptian reserves couldn't proficiently run radar and missiles locations. Different reports talked about soviet disappointment with the preparation level of both Egyptian and Syrian troops while the Syrians were unhappy with soviets and missilery. These stories were underlined by reports come from Egypt, portraying a fictitious reality, that the Egyptians and soviet staff, for example, specifying rock-tossing episodes including Soviets or sudden forces disappointments at Soviet officers' clubs.<sup>15</sup>

The topic of Arab inertia was supplemented by stories focusing on the way that al-Sadat had submitted himself to looking for a political arrangement. Once more, there was incredible plausibility in these stories: al-Sadat had, in fact, made various gestures, demonstrating his intention for a diplomatic solution. In particular, stories were circled about al-Sadat goal to go the U.N. to introduce the Egyptian case, or, then again, that he wanted to go to Europe on some kind of top secret diplomatic mission. The Syrian authorities consented to meet with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim to consult about the U.N. Determination 242. The whole venture aimed to give the impression of a developing diplomatic method to compel the Israelis to relinquish from the Sinai territory, under the political weight.<sup>16</sup>

For Arabs, the crucial issue was to give a persuasive clarification for the big development of troops and equipment to the outskirts. In late September, the transition of troops, armor and artillery started. The official cause for that massive military deployment was that of the annual fall military exercises, which themselves were, by then, a regular phenomenon. The Egyptians were diligent enough to bewilder the issue. The ammunition was not sent and the tracks were void, since the essential quantity had been moved up by rail during the May preparations. Besides, the ammo was hidden in underground storage locations, so that its actual sum quantity could not be, promptly, determined. Troops were advancing, during the day, for activities and, then, they came back to their barracks. However, as indicated by Ahmad Ismai'il, just the half of the units returned every night, allowing the continuous development of mass of men at the front. The activities themselves were given reputation, yet this was combined with different stories that were explained by recommending that they were intended to prevent expected student rioting in light of the 'no war, no peace' situation. Once more, these stories were presented plausible. This general picture of 'regular exercises' was supplemented by stories of divisions inside of the Egyptian High Command. The troops were misinformed into accepting that it was indeed, a training activity. After the war, Israeli questioners found that 85% of all Egyptians caught had no prior knowledge of the assault.<sup>17</sup>

As far as it is known, deception did not stand at the center of the Egyptian military doctrine abstained from making the concept of a surprise an important condition for launching an assault. Likewise, in the Syrian case, we can barely find instances of systematic deception methods. Thus, all things considered, the attention was on covering the genuine intent behind the Syrian and Egyptian military preparations. The Egyptian deception campaign was based on the Soviet concept of 'maskirovka', which epitomizes the surprise at the strategic, operational and tactical level. At the center of the plan stood the endeavor to convince the Israelis that the data sets about the military preparations they would gather were joined with the 'Tahrir 41', an expansive scale routine military exercise. Likewise, Egypt wanted to deceive its adversary instead of increasing the ambiguity, since the last approach did not fit a situation of

sharp transition from peace to hostilities. The notice of alternative would alarm the watchdog instead of letting him lie still.<sup>18</sup>

### **PASSIVE DECEPTION**

The main means to reach a high level of concealment is compartmentation. For example, the commandants of the Second and Third Army discovered that Tahrir 41 was, merely, a cover for the genuine war that would start five days later, just on October 1, the date that the exercise began. The Egyptian political echelons were, additionally, kept oblivious, as well as the Arab nations, including the closest associates. The hardest issue was to inform the USSR. On one hand, given the Egyptian and Syrian reliance on soviet military and diplomatic aid, the Kremlin needed to get an official message before the onset of hostilities. On the other hand, a pretty early notice could yield soviet pressures to refrain from a war and arise suspicions to the USA and Israel that an Arab assault was a matter of time. The solution for Egypt was to inform the USSR, as it was unavoidable, however too late to emerge any American and Israeli reaction. The exact day and hour were delivered to the soviet ambassador in Damascus just on October 4. The KGB station chief in Cairo revealed that the Kremlin, had comprehended that the war was unavoidable just two days prior to the attack. Likewise, Egypt needed to cover the idea for a joint assault with Syria, as Egyptian analysts realized that Israel knew that only a coordinating strike with Syria would be conceivable. A senior Egyptian general proclaimed, on April 22, that there was not any normal contact point between Egypt and Syria. Generally, Egypt attempted to construct a fictitious reality, where the vast contrasts in the Syrian and Egyptian military and political attitude would not permit a coalition against Israel. Additionally, the concealment of technical and military preparations was of pivotal significance; it meant the concealment of Arab's capabilities and intention to assault Israel. That was something demanding, as it was difficult to hide a huge troop movement for Israeli intelligence and technical surveillance. Thus, the key was to justify the presence of forces in Sinai and Suez Canal. To accomplish this, the key was a defensive line of surface-to-air rockets (SAMs) over the Suez Canal extending into the Sinai desert, to cover the Egyptian armed force as it crossed the canal. In addition, with the utilization of anti-tank weapons and rockets, Egypt formed a defensive posture, attempting to appease Israel that its aims were not hostile but just an attempt to defend its territory. Israeli insight, then arrived at a conclusion that Arabs were developing a resistance line, while the Scud rockets were judged as an Egyptian way of deterrence of possible Israeli assaults on Egyptian populace centers. Finally, the Egyptians ensured the concealment of the real time and place of the surprise attack by misleading their own powers, as very nearly all of the military headquarters realized that the military exercises were a piece of the military activity 'Tahrir41'. Just in the day of the assault, the Egyptian armed forces were requested to dispatch an assault.<sup>19</sup>

## ACTIVE DECEPTION

The dynamic measures meant to convince Israel that Egypt's military preparations were not for war but rather a standard military activity. The first type of deceptive messages annulled the value of the early warning indicators that were gathered by Israel, by expanding the impact of the cry-wolf syndrome. Four such sorts of means can be mentioned:

- The Tahrir exercises: Since 1968, these activities had been done routinely. Some were skeleton exercises, others tactical or staff activities and some were a mix of the above. Their need was to prepare the armed forces for war, but on the other hand, was led to make the Israelis acquainted with accumulation of hostile forces close to the front line.
- The (de)mobilization of reserve soldiers: Since mid-1973, 22 exercises of mobilization and demobilization of reserve units had been directed. This enabled the Egyptians both to adequately be mobilized and get the Israelis usual to this practice.
- The advancement of forces to the front line: The greater part of the forces that was to carry out the intersection of five infantry divisions had been routinely sent in positions since 1970. The deployment of extra troops as structure in late September 1973 was irregular, since in prior Tahrir exercises such deployments occurred as well.
- Repetitive alert exercises of the EAF (Egyptian Air Forces): Starting September 22, when the Egyptians began moving forces to the front, the EAF conducted a series of crisis military activities. The IAF responded by raising the state of alarm. The Egyptian activities went for testing the Israel's reaction to such a move furthermore as well as get them used to the irregular action of the EAF.<sup>20</sup>

The second type of deceptive messages went for creating a 'business-as-usual' routine in Egypt:

- Tahrir 41 would be over on October 7. On October 9, the Egyptian armed forces came back to routine activity, including the renewal of courses in the War College and in the School of Staff and Command. The residents of Alexandria were informed that the trains were ordered to bring back the brigades that were routinely deployed in their own. This is a striking example of the 'cry-wolf syndrome'. This normal preparation of Egyptian troops presented to Israeli intelligence as a standard reality and the recurrence of such an action did not excuse an urgent warning or judging it as a prelude for an assault.

- The Egyptian media reported the demobilization of reserve units that were assembled on September 27, however just 20,000 went home. The rest, who were more vital for the war exertion remained in service.
- The creation of a routine activity climate along the front line was accomplished by special groups (the Israelis called them 'lazy ones') who used to stroll close to the canal without weapons, half-dressed, swimming in the water and angling. The Egyptians, likewise, abstained from shutting the Morgan oil field on the western side of the Suez Bay before the war, regardless of the likelihood that it would be assaulted.
- Moreover, the standard military and diplomatic activity was maintained. The cabinet Ministers paid the War Minister a routine GHQ visit. Many ministers were abroad when the war began. President Sadat told a foreign minister that he intended to partake in the UN General Assembly amid October.
- Also, Egyptians offered cooling clarifications for the unpredictable military movement. The development of Egyptians destroyers, which were to hinder the Bab al Mandab straits on October 6, was explained in the media by friendly visits of the Egyptian navy to Port Sudan and Aden. The Syrian media reported that President Assad expected to pay a nine-day visit in eastern Syria, beginning on October 10. The Arab media, primarily the Egyptian Middle East News Agency, reported a growing tension in the Golan front, in a way to clarify the Syrian concentration of forces there.<sup>21</sup>

The third category of deceptive messages that were conveyed by the Egyptians included pieces of data that presented their army as ill-prepared for war. The clearest expression can be found out in the open statements of the time, particularly in the speeches of Sadat. An examination of Sadat's speeches demonstrates that, since June 1973, an all the more mollifying tone supplanted the threats against Israel. The Egyptian leader talked in July about action in the UN as intent to put an end to the consequences of the hostilities. The clearest case was the discourse that he gave on the third annual day of Nasser's demise, on September 28. Opposing to past practices, Sadat overlooked the issue of war and gave a discourse that his Chief of Staff characterized as 'serene', limited different from his speeches of the past few months. According to UP Agency news-thing of December 11, 1972, a mystery report that was delivered in Cairo indicated that just 40% of the army's arsenal and 60% of the EAF planes were in operational status. The Financial Times gave an account of December 16, 1972, that the Egyptian forces not only lacked capabilities and operational plan to conduct offensive operations, but also they were incapable to defend the nation and resort to countermeasures against an Israeli assault. However, there were suspicions that these pieces of data were an intentional disinformation campaign. For instance, they recommended that if these press reports were a piece of a genuine deception campaign, the Egyptians had to intensify the preparations for war, however they ceased in the spring. Also, in Egyptian memoirs, they are not presented as a major

aspect of a deception campaign. Additionally, given the effort made by the Egyptian leadership in raising the soldiers and individuals' morale toward the war, such a disinformation campaign may have a negative effect on the public's morale. The way that the misleading bits of data were delivered to Israeli intelligence, reflects some deficiencies of the campaign. The messages were conveyed to Israel, mainly, by via the open media. Besides, the western media carried the reports about the insufficiencies of the Egyptian troops; data about Syrian-Egyptian discrepancies were distributed by the Lebanese press (notoriously known as a disinformation channel) and the Egyptian media reported about the mobilization and demobilization of reserve personnel. The Egyptians did not make use of any sophisticated means, for example, double agents or secure codes, to give their campaign a high level of credibility. Had the Egyptian had extending knowledge about the level of Israeli penetration, they may have been much more sceptical about their ability to accomplish a surprise attack. Subsequently, since they needed such information, the main path by which they could guarantee that Israeli intelligence would get their deceptive messages was the use of transparent open methods for transmission. They did not set up remote nets or communication channels, yet the messages were conveyed to adversary through general communication networks along with pure and unwitting operators and users.<sup>22</sup>

Apart from that, the Arabs set in motion events to increase the noise barriers and misdirect the Israeli government. They used a Palestinian strike on a Jewish travel camp at Shonau in Austria as a diversion ruse. In particular, a group calling itself 'Falcons of the Palestine Revolution' hijacked a train bound for the camp, they took hostages and requested that the Austrian government close the camp. The "Birds" were indeed a unit of the Syrian organized Palestinian group, the al-Sa'iqh. As a consequence, many analysts regarded the Shonau assault as a Syrian diversionary strategy, intended to draw the Israeli attention and intelligence effort away from the Middle East itself. It, also, provided a plausible excuse to the Syrians by permitting them to clarify their military build-up as a countermeasure to a possible Israeli attack. The Iraqi crisis alongside the assault in Shonau contributed to misdirection of Israeli intelligence away from the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.<sup>23</sup>

Although look at the Egyptian deception plan reveal a wide range of concealment activity with no operational and tactical dissimulation. Starting in 1968, the Egyptians held repetitive military staff activities (Tahrir), taken place once or twice per year. The activities involved movements of units to the front, crossing the Suez Canal, destroying the hostile forces and capturing the Sinai Peninsula and, occasionally, the Gaza Strip. The Egyptians covered the breakout of war in the last drill, called 'Tahrir (liberation) 41'. Few days before the onset of Egyptian operations, Egyptian troops on the Canal acted in a most unmilitary way: walking down to the shore without weapons or helmets, angling and goofing, making the impression of most utmost tranquillity on the front. Furthermore, Egyptians moved into diverse steps, according to Tahrir

concept. They transported bridging and fording equipment to the canal under the misrepresentation of military activity. Likewise, second-echelon divisions and brigade that not positioned permanently on the canal's bank, were progressed to the front as a component of a military maneuver prior to the activity. This use of a drill as concealment for the Egyptians' real intentions was the main element of the deception operation on the military level. It employed radio transmissions, since the Egyptian planners, accurately, accepted that Israeli intelligence would be eavesdropping. Besides, instead of wasting efforts to seal the Israeli collection channels or use them to encourage bogus information, Egyptians chose an alternative way, being uncertain about the extent of Israeli scope. They directed the misinformation at their own forces by disguising reality and sustaining the same main story of 'activity Tahrir 41'. The logic behind this idea was simple: the more the cover story predominated among Egyptian troops and military headquarters and the more the individuals acting as unwitting agents, the greater the likelihood that Israeli intelligence sources would be accept the story's veracity.<sup>24</sup>

The main part of the deception strategy was intended to disguise the operational plan, to accomplish the component of surprise. The disguise included full participation with the Syrians, leaving a most of the Egyptian government ministers oblivious. Moreover, General Zeira, the Israeli Chief of insight, asserted that all the information sets spilled to Israel were a piece of the deception plan and they were intended, exclusively, to lead the Israeli authorities and the intelligence analysts astray from Sadat's real plans. According to Michael Handel, the Egyptians concentrated, solely, on dulling the Israeli's alertness so that they could shock Israel. The development of the Egyptian intersection forces took place in its defense layouts in preparation for a decisive battle and included the concentration of forces in depth to counter a surprise IDF assault. The regular artillery layout, and also the reinforced one, had been situated along the line in the early stages of the preparations as part of the routine defense system.<sup>25</sup>

All exercises at the operational and strategic level focused on the effort to shroud the war plan, especially the phase of Suez intersection. The chosen hour was the when the sun was in Israeli lookout's eyes, with the crucial operation of the genuine intersection to be carried out during the night hours, and, later under a thick smoke screen, wanted to minimize the probability of wreaking havoc on the intersection forces by Israeli troops, particularly the IAF. In addition to this, they made use of smoke screens, mostly to cover the bridging operations and the forces engaged in the intersection of the canal.<sup>26</sup>

### **4.3 THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE**

In the same period that Egypt was making evaluations, analyzing the strengths and shortcomings of Israeli powers about the situation, the Israeli military and general

staff made a few judgments, concerning the tense situation and the Arabs' intentions. Firstly, there was a conclusion about Egypt's goal to retreat the western Sinai and Syria's plan to retake the Golan Heights, so there was a probability for these two Arab nations to go to open war. Additionally, Israel realized that the USSR and in addition USSR were against a prospect of an Arab-Israeli war and they discard the hostilities as a solution for their dissents. Besides, the Israelis assessed that Syria would not go into war unless entered Egypt. So, a coordinated assault was more conceivable, as neither Egypt nor Syria could manage Israeli forces alone. Second, the Israeli Board learnt from a senior Egyptian source that Egypt needed to retake the whole Sinai, but they would not enter the war until they received the warrior planes MiG-23 to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud rockets to use them against Israeli towns in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Egyptian infrastructure. Since Egypt did not get the MiG-23, and Scud rockets had arrived only from Bulgaria in late August and the preparation of Egyptian ground forces would take four months, the AMAN anticipated that war with Egypt was not imminent. The Egyptian leadership was aware of its military and operational vulnerabilities and it would not risk an assault that would be doomed to fail. This hypothesis, as part of "the Concept», prejudice led the Israelis to dismiss a plenty of warnings.<sup>27</sup>

Israeli intelligence community focused more on Egypt's intentions than capabilities. Putting the "Tahrir41" exercise on a latent pattern and clarifying any abnormal activity as a standard drill, the Egyptians managed to deactivate Israel's ability to understand the significance of the activity and events that could no longer be concealed. The intelligence summaries and the meeting protocols at the decision making level show that the very moment the activity cover story was the definite reasonable explanation, consequently serving to invalidate the real importance of all the early warnings that had, actually, been detected. Furthermore, this "calm" explanation about Egyptian intentions influenced the IDF's assessments of what was the situation in the Syrian borders. That is to say, notwithstanding, the alarming signals were perceived as coming from Syria, no large-scale offensive was expected from Damascus either, as the Syrians would not go to war without the Egyptians and Cairo was occupied just with its preparations for an activity.<sup>28</sup>

Doubtless, DMI issued a warning as early as 1970 that the Arabs may dispatch a sudden assault. The Israelis were aware of Arab's use of the concept of "maskirovka" or that Arab armed forces embraced the soviet pattern of going to war from a peacetime exercise. In any case, in 1973 the explanation of regular military exercises did not appear all of a sudden, since over the six years before the war the Egyptian forces had repeatedly conducted such drills.<sup>29</sup>

Israeli intelligence analysts and decision makers were delivered evidence of Egyptian assessments concerning the inferiority of Israeli forces, especially in the air. Despite

the fact that the pieces of information about Egypt's relative weakness were precise from 1971 through 1972, the effect that the huge shipments of military equipment from the Su had on Egyptian military capability was not evaluated. Depending heavily on the assessments of the Egyptian general staff, Israel's underestimated the effect of an anti-missile system on the capacity of the Israeli war.

In spite of the fact that Israeli intelligence had obtained all the technical information about the recent Egyptian and Syrian weapon system, these data were not considered important. Rather, they were incorporated into existing perceptions, concerning the inability of Arabs' military infrastructure and Israeli inadequacy in both military and intelligence framework. Some proofs about the Egyptians' intent to achieve a surprise attack was salient, uncontroversial and unequivocal, making it capable of penetrating the noise barriers and discrepant political and strategic preconceptions. For example, on October 1, the intelligence headquarters in the Southern Command got an extensive amount of reports that indicate unusual Egyptian activity along the Suez Canal. Various officers called, repeatedly, for reinforcement of the front line.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, in the morning of October 1, a report arrived, affirming that, on October 1, Syria alongside Egypt would dispatch a full-scale assault. On October 3, the chief of the MOSSAD presented to Prime Minister Meir his evaluation that Arab preparations were a prelude to an assault and not only a routine activity.<sup>31</sup> On the night of October 4, photos from an air reconnaissance mission unveiled an extensive fortifying of Egyptian powers along the canal and the forward development of crossing equipment towards three distinct areas of the front. Simultaneously, soviet commercial aircrafts were distinguished as they evacuated the families of soviet ambassadors from Cairo and Damascus and units of the soviet fleet close to Alexandria and Port Said started to move out.<sup>32</sup>

Additionally, there was blatant evidence of Egypt's capabilities, derived from military photo reconnaissance, something that could prompt estimation about Egypt's capabilities, as well. On Thursday, 4 October, an Israeli aircraft conducted the first aeronautical observation mission over the Canal Zone subsequent since the end of September 9. Evidently, the Israeli Defense Forces had definitely decreased the air surveillance missions all together not to exasperate tension and due to the risk of anti-aircraft cannons and rocket batteries. A big batch of aerial photos were produced and assessed on the night of October 4. The photographic imagery demonstrated that Egyptian artillery deployments had increased from 800 to 1,100 in 10 days. Tank developments had effectively taken up positions behind the Canal side earth bulwarks. Further, an uncommon concentration of bridging equipment was visible. A scrupulous appreciation of the imagery, prepared by 6:55 am on 5 October, expressed that the Egyptians had taken up an emergency deployment and were in a position to dispatch an assault. In any case, an appraisal of the reconnaissance evidence, later that morning, considered the likelihood of renewed hostilities to be low. Nevertheless, the

intelligence derived from these photos gave the Israelis irrefutable evidence that the Canal Zone was vulnerable against an immediate assault.<sup>33</sup>

On the eve of the war, the tactical vision of the mounting menace, plainly, permeated the strategic thinking of Israeli's decision makers, who already were sceptical of the likelihood of an impending war. The perception of threats in both strategic and tactical levels resulted in various precautionary measures on October 5 and 6, such as, the "C" state of alert, as well as the fortification of troops positioned in Sinai and Golan Heights, or the increase of manpower in north front.<sup>3</sup>

From intelligence perspective, Israel failed to prevent the surprise attack, making wrong estimations about the Egyptian and Syrian intentions and capabilities. The most critical obstacle was the unethical action taken by the chief of DMI, Major General Zeira. Zeira's behavior reduced, significantly, the alarm values of incoming warnings. Firstly, Zeira ignored a solid warning cautioning by Mossad's best HUMINT source. The source, in a meeting, held in Europe on October 5, told Zamir that war would break the following day. The most important piece of information the source conveyed to Israel before the war included President Sadat's beliefs, regarding the conditions, under which Egypt could dispatch an assault.<sup>35</sup> As indicated by this bit of data, Sadat believed that Egypt and Syria would start a war, if the diplomatic efforts to take Israel back to the 1967 borders, according to UN Resolution 242, failed. As far as military equipment, Egypt needed receive warrior squadrons and Scud missiles from the Soviet Union in order to counterbalance the Israeli superiority, concerning the air force and the advanced arsenal and assault the Israeli hinder land, preventing, the same time a pre-emptive strike.<sup>36</sup> However, this warning did not get any consideration. Although he was well-informed, Zeira neglected to inform his commander, the Chief of Staff, Elazar, despite the fact he participated in all the three meetings held in Israel, having access to this raw data.

The clearest-cut case in which Zeira's conscious actions hampered Israel's warning responses occurred less than 21 hours prior to the outbreak of the war. The previous day, AMAN identified preparations for emergency evacuation of dependents of soviet advisors from Egypt and Syria with Zeira to be in favor of first AMAN's estimation that the soviets were aware of intention of Egypt and Syria to launch an attack on Israel and needed to protect their citizens.<sup>37</sup> On October 5, at 5:00 p.m., the SIGNINT unit of AMAN picked up a message which indicated that Syria evacuated the soviet experts because it was decided to dispatch a war against Israel, along with Egypt. When the issue came to DMI, Zeira he banned the dissemination of the report. It was, finally, sent to consumers just on Saturday, at 7:30 a.m., when it had, lost all its warning and operational value.<sup>38</sup> Likewise, AMAN had developed certain methods for intelligence collection to be practiced only in emergency circumstances. When Zeira's superiors questioned the operational value of these methods, Zeira affirmed that they

would be used properly. Lieutenant General Ehud Barak, the IDF Chief of Staff, between 1991 and 1995, affirmed that, until October 5 or 6, the intelligence community did not use all the available sources. Moreover, Zeira was asked, after October 1, to activate these special means, but he refused.<sup>39</sup>

Zeira's reluctance to disseminate further pieces of information stemmed, to a certain extent, from the overconfidence to the ability of the IDF to defeat the Arab army, even without a strategic warning. The Israeli triumph over the Arabs in the Six-Day War in 1967 made Israel underestimate the capabilities of Egypt and overestimate the Israeli respective ones, considering the military and intelligence infrastructure superior to the Arab one. This feeling was shared by policy makers and military generals, however its effect was particularly grave when it came to intelligence officers. Zeira expressed vividly this kind of arrogance when he clarified why he did not disseminate to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense the message which received on the evening of 5 October and which reasoned the Soviet advisors' evacuation as a plain evidence Arabs' intention to go to war. His statement is trademark: "I did not find it necessary to alert the Chief of Staff at 11:00pm and to tell him: there is such information, and to add what we wrote later, that the source was not so reliable and there are mistakes and we think the same. And it should be remembered that the whole IDF is in its highest state of readiness ... and we all stand with a finger on the trigger. This was, I presume, the feeling of the Chief of Staff, and mine also during that night. This was not a situation of 'out of the blue' that everyone went home, and we have to alert. So the Chief of Staff would have seen it, and I assume he would have said: OK, but Gorodish has ... Benny Peled has all the pilots in the bases, Haka has ... Everyone stands with his finger on the trigger? Fine".<sup>40</sup>

Major General Zeira tried to adjust reality to his perceptions. His confidence and arrogance were reflected in his estimations amid 1973. On January 20, he signed an assessment which predicted that the situation was unlikely to continue and this was inconceivable that Egypt would renew the hostilities in order to cross the Suez Canal and occupy part of the Sinai land. Likewise, he asserted that would be a mistake to raise the state of alert. Aside from overconfidence, Zeira lacked professional experience in intelligence analysis, since the Collection Department and IDF in USA, where he worked, did not prepare him for the work of political and military intelligence analysis.<sup>41</sup>

Additionally, he made an ostensible consensus inside of the Research Branch. As became known after the war, AMAN's analysts did not speak in one voice and some of them assessed that Arab military arrangements were prelude for war. But, since AMAN's attitude was to provide consumers a single 'research assessment', the estimation that policy makers got included no reference to debate inside the Research Department and portrayed a wrong impression that every one of AMAN's members

had share the same opinion. The refusal to disseminate certain warnings to the appropriate parties made the most crucial bits of data unavailable to Defense Minister, Dyan and Chief of Staff, Elazar, exactly when they needed to decide whether or not to mobilize the reserved armed forces.<sup>42</sup>

In October, 1973, AMAN was responsible for providing an early warning before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, yet it failed to predict, precisely, when Egypt and Syria would strike Israel. This failure became known as the Yom Kippur surprise attack. AMAN provided their consumers with exact reports about the Arab's sufficient capabilities to launch an attack, while Israel acquired, no less than, eleven vital warnings that the intensity of military preparations near its outskirts had not to defensive posture, but they intended for war. Also, in mid-September, Israel got its first solid warning about an impending war. It was delivered by a HUMINT source, informing that Sadat had chosen to initiate a war at the end of 1973 and that Assad was informed of this decision and assured to assault Israel, simultaneously, on the Golan Heights. As indicated by these data, the Syrian made this decision after soviet advisers assured him that if Egypt and Syria assaulted Israel at the same time, the Syrian forces would totally occupy the Golan Heights in 36 hours. However, the warning did not provoke any mobilization in AMAN.<sup>43</sup>

Months before the war, Israel had much of the relevant information about Egyptian and Syrian war preparations and as they were intensified, solid data began to flow, failed to seed incongruities in AMAN'S conception. In April 1973, the agency reported that 18 Libyan Mirage and 16 Iraqi Hunter had arrived in Egypt and that others, from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were about to arrive.<sup>44</sup>

AMAN analysts were more familiar with Egypt's and Syria's war plans. In mid-April 1972 provided its consumers with a report with maps of the Egyptian military preparations. On September 7-8, AMAN reported that the Syrian forefront had been reinforces with infantry brigades and that the state of readiness of its air force based had been raised. After three days, air photos revealed that 130-140 tanks and 35 ordnance batteries had been added to the regular deployment of the Syrian cutting edge. AMAN interpreted this as motivated either by President Assad's arranged visit to Algeria or in preparations for an Israeli operation in countering against Syrian-supported terror acts.<sup>45</sup>

On September 25, in a meeting held on Israel, king Hussein of Jordan informed Prime Minister, Golda Meir that the Syrian units were in position for assault. On September 28, a source reported that Syrian land forces were on 50% alarm and, in coordination with air forces, they had taken up an operational position, expressing that Syria was not yet prepared for war. Additionally, at the end of September, U.S. intelligence sources and CIA warned Meir and Defense Minister Dayan of an impending war and that Syrians went for control of Golan Heights.<sup>46</sup>

On October 3, AMAN reported that Syrians had advanced two squadrons of SU-7 attack-fighters from their rear base in T4 to forward airfields, they had propelled a bridging-laying tank regiment to the front, they had deployed 31 SAM batteries and they had taken emergency measures, for example, the preparations of shelters and healing centres. However, the predominant view among AMAN's top analysts was not in favor of raising the alarm state. At a General Staff meeting on October 1, Zeira expressed the belief that that Syrians were deterred by the IDF's ability to defeat their army. During the first days of October, Syrians did not believe that they can launch an attack in the Golan Heights, due to their weakness in the air. AMAN's last report portrayed numerous evidences of Syrian war preparations, but also stated that the likelihood of an independent Syrian action remained low.<sup>47</sup>

The first piece of information about Egyptian military developments to the front was delivered to Israel on September 25. After three days, AMAN reported that the condition of readiness in the Egyptian forces had been raised. On October 1, Israel got the first of a series of solid warnings of Egypt's intent to go to war. A MOSSAD HUMINT source reported that the large scale Egyptian intersection activity began on September 30, would turn into a genuine intersection of Suez Canal, the following day, in conjunction with Syrian forces. AMAN's judgment was that all the fortifications and mobilization of troops were connected with the military activity Tahrir41. On October, AMAN reported that around 120 trucks, conveying water-crossing equipment, spanning apparatus and vessels had been moved from west Cairo towards the eastern desert amid the night of October 1-2. After two days, AMAN reported that Egyptian soldiers were ordered to break the Ramadan quickly. Likewise, air photography elucidation of a foray of October 4 enabled the agency to report reinforcement in Egyptian military concentrations along the Suez Canal and the Egyptian Army was in an emergency deployment. Once more, a MOSSAD source warned that the actual Arabs' aim was to assault Israel, and that the Egyptian army was in full condition of alert, with the operations to begin as an activity that would be transformed, as indicated by all signs, into a genuine assault.<sup>48</sup>

Another variable that contributed to Israeli intelligence failure was the AMAN's monopoly, held by the Research Branch, in making assessments. Inside AMAN, the Research Branch predominated the alternative centers for intelligence evaluation, for example, naval and air intelligence, the intelligence bodies of the three commands, or combat intelligence. Senior army officers, for example, were dependent on AMAN's assessments, at last to some extent, due to the monopoly AMAN held on raw intelligence. Inside the intelligence community, AMAN held the monopoly of intelligence analysis. Neither the MOSSAD, nor the Foreign Office had any analytical apparatus and, while the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister, could made sufficient assessments on their own, they were dependent on AMAN's 'exclusive informal legitimacy' regarding information assessment, in military issues. Therefore,

no organ or single individual in Israel's security structure could question AMAN's estimations of the situation amid the days before the war.<sup>49</sup>

In addition to this, AMAN's working technique drove purchasers to misperceive the true nature of the agency's judgments. In general, an intelligence assessment can be presented to decision makers in two ways: as an archive which integrates contradictory interpretations of the situation into a single report, and (b) as multiple interpretations which reflect contradictory estimates on a specific issue inside the organization. As became known after the war, AMAN's investigators did not consent and some of them presumed that Arab military preparations were for war. But since AMAN's concept was to provide consumers with a solitary supposition, the estimation that decision makers received incorporated no reference to debates inside the Research Department and depicted a wrong impression that every one of AMAN's staff had the same opinion.<sup>50</sup>

Finally, there was another dimension that made the Israeli government and AMAN to discard the pieces of information that opposed to 'The Concept' and was not in favor of a pre-emptive strike, despite the evidence of an imminent war. The Israeli strategy was, generally, if war was imminent, Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was accepted that Israel's intelligence agencies would give, in the worst case, around 48 hours, notice preceding an Arab assault. The warnings that Israeli intelligence provided were sufficient and precise, but, while Elazar, in a meeting with Prime Minister Meir and Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, proposed a preemptive strike, Meir chose to discard such a prospect, because in case of a pre-emptive assault, Israeli would not get any help from the USA. Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply, and particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. Although it was asserted that a pre-emptive strike could not guarantee success against a well-dispersed Egyptian Air Force and risked jeopardizing Israel's principal asset, its own combat planes, against an unknown missile defense before the war had even started, the danger of lack of American supplies reinforced Israel's inception. Henry Kissinger told Meir not to attempt a pre-emptive strike, because the USA would not be eager to help Israeli efforts. So, given the fact that without the American assistance the outcome of the war was not, definitely, in favor of Israel, Meir decided to wait for a Syrian-Egyptian strike and then to response. In fact, the USA, did not want to intervene in the conflict, since it was possible that the war to escalate in a conflict between the USA and the USSR, by pressing the soviets to coerce the Arabs to terminate any military preparation for an attack and, later the hostilities. Besides, the CIA and State Department had reduced their previously high assessment of the probability of war only because the Israelis had not been concerned by the Arab build-up.<sup>51</sup>

Making an assessment of the Yom Kippur war, we can assert that deception, employed by Egypt and Syria was successful, but it was not enough to give Arabs a total military victory. From a purely military point of view, the first and most important Arab success was to achieve absolute military and tactical surprise. While this was helped by a rather small degree of mistakes made by the Israeli intelligence

and the political and military leadership in Israel, the larger size of praise must go to the very complex deception plan was executed by the Egyptians. They managed to convince the Israeli government that the intense military activity in the west of the Canal in the summer and autumn of 1973 was nothing of a series of training exercises and maneuvers. Both Egypt and Syria, in the end had only limited territorial gains in the Sinai front, while Israel gained more territory in the Golan Heights than it held before the war. Also given the fact that Israel could keep African soil west of the canal, the war helped convince many in the Arab world that Israel could not be defeated militarily, and thus strengthened the peace movements.

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## **ASSUMPTIONS**

The need for deception is going to be present, as history offers a plenty of examples from ancient times to nowadays. In particular, deception facilitated the states, to achieve surprise attacks, which is the result of a deception campaign, being a force multiplier of military and intelligence operations. Cases, such as Barbarossa, the Yom Kippur war, the invasion of Normandy and many other historical instances, indicate that deception can be a pretty effective tool in a leadership's agenda.

The incentives of deception will not be disappeared, as the need for surprise attacks remains high. Deception is, still, an attractive method to facilitate the achievement of surprise, as a surprise attack can compensate a state's weaknesses. When the stakes are high or the opponent is superior in terms of military strategy and capabilities, a deception operation can twist the plot and achieve some tactical advantages that, otherwise, would be impossible to be accomplished. Speaking in terms of economy, deception is a low-cost solution: it demands little effort, few personnel involved and less money invested, as well as it resulted in fewer casualties compared to a straight battle. So, we have the maximum benefit with the minimum cost. History abounds in

examples of leaderships that resorted to deception to counterbalance the military inferiority. For instance, the planners of Operation Barbarossa and the Yom Kippur War aimed to attack their opponents in a way, time and place, so as the rival party to be unready to respond. Also, statistics reveal that when the deception is present, the percentage of surprise attacks is bigger.

### **Is deception inevitable?**

There is pessimism about the detection of deception. If we do a flashback in military history we can find that when deception occurred there were warnings and information indicated the existence of deception, or, at least, an abnormal pattern, with these warnings to be, many times, early. However, this was not enough to provoke an adequate mobilization. Firstly, the factor of perception and misperceptions plays an important role. Reinforcing the existing perceptions, and therefore creating misperceptions, is a common practice of a deception campaign. Either the leaders or the intelligence analysts are prone to discard any alternative hypothesis that contradicts their existing beliefs. This 'assessment drawback' can cause a series of repetitive distortions in intelligence process. The collection and analysis of information, many times, serves the leader's interests. The intelligence judgment of a situation or an incoming report or warning is interpreted according to what the leader wants to hear. As a result, the dissemination of pieces of information aims to satisfy the leadership's preconceptions.

In addition to this, there are deficiencies inside the intelligence communities. The information gathering is not always effective, as many crucial data never delivered for further assessment. Also, the analysis of information provokes, many times, discrepancies among the intelligence services about the division of responsibilities. Also, some organizational obstacles can render the process laggard.

As a component of intelligence infrastructure, a deception campaign cannot guarantee a victory in a war, but only temporal tactical advantages. Many times, the whole strategy of a state, the friction or a better qualified enemy, in terms of military equipment and strategic mentality, determine the outcome of a war or large-scale hostilities and counterbalance the successful effects of a deception operation. Hitler failed to conquer the USSR, despite the initial success of the surprise attack. Likewise, it was proved that Egypt could not defeat the Israeli military forces, even with the use of deception.

### **The era of technology**

The modern sophisticated means of surveillance, reconnaissance and, generally, technological means have increased for both the deceiver and the deceived party. However, the outcome of such operations does not depend exclusively on the deceiver's initiatives but also on target's intelligence community and perspectives.

The obstacles and malfunctions within intelligence agencies as well as the political and governmental misperceptions can facilitate the deceiver's actions. Also, it is important to highlight the significance of the human factor. One estimation is that deception will be get easier to detect and more difficult to practice, as the technological means of surveillance will be in favor of detection of deception or that the new communication channels that deceiver will have, may be used by the victim to reverse the deception against the penetrator. On the other hand, some forms of deception and penetration may be rendered obsolete in expense of emerged ones.

### **The specter challenge**

Probably the toughest issue, concerning deception, is the non-state actors that make use of it. The nightmare of international community, especially after the 9/11, is that the terrorist organization may obtain nuclear weapons. The fact that terrorist groups, illicit organizations, such as Mafia or cartels, and paramilitary organization have not a particular territory means that their attacks may be come from anywhere. These special groups use deception, to a great extent, because their survival depends on it. They focus on denial, to protect their illegal activities and, even, existence, as well as on operational surprise. They seek total concealment in order to operate effectively. To unveil such operations is really a big challenge. The illicit groups do not have the resources to exercise strategic deception, so they resort to tactical one. The detection of this type of deception is pretty difficult. The cover has strategic significance for such operations. Illicit organizations deploy denial to delude the authorities about their activities or to conceal its entire existence and the more illicit the group, the biggest the need for denial.<sup>1</sup>

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### **GLOSSARY**

<b>Abwehr</b>	German Military Intelligence Agency (WWII)
<b>AMAN</b>	Israeli Military Intelligence Service
<b>Cambridge Five</b>	Ring of spies, recruited by Soviets in United Kingdom
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency (US foreign intelligence agency)
<b>DIA</b>	US Defense Intelligence Agency

<b>DMI</b>	Soviet Information Department of Intelligence Directorate
<b>EAF</b>	Egyptian Air Forces
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation (US internal security service)
<b>GHQ</b>	General Headquarters
<b>GPU</b>	State Political Directorate of the USSR
<b>GRU</b>	Soviet military intelligence service
<b>HUMINT</b>	Human Intelligence- spies, interrogation and agents
<b>IAF</b>	Israeli Air Forces
<b>ICBM's</b>	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
<b>IDF</b>	Israeli Defense Forces
<b>KGB</b>	Soviet secret intelligence and security service
<b>Luftwaffe</b>	German Aerial Warfare
<b>MOSSAD</b>	Israeli overseas intelligence service
<b>NKGB</b>	Soviet secret police, intelligence and counterintelligence agency- forerunner of KGB
<b>NKVD</b>	Soviet law enforcement agency- forerunner of KGB
<b>NEMS</b>	Nanoelectromechanical Systems
<b>NSA</b>	US National Security Agency
<b>OKL</b>	Oberkommando der Luftwaffe- Command structure of the German air forces
<b>OKW</b>	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht- part of the command structure of the armed forces
<b>RAF</b>	UK Royal Air Force
<b>Red Orchestra</b>	Term used by Gestapo for anti-Nazi/pro Soviet espionage ring in Western Europe
<b>SAMs</b>	Surface-to-air Missiles

<b>TECHINT</b>	Technical Intelligence
<b>UNSCOM</b>	United Nations Special Commission

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### **About the Author**

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