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**CONCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE:  
INTELLIGENCE AS A DEMOCRATIC INDICATOR**

***Gustavo Díaz Matey***

*(Lecture of International Affairs in de Department of International Affairs at Complutense University, Madrid; He was the co-founder of the Mediterranean Council of Intelligence Studies (MCIS) and EUINT. He holds a PhD by the Complutense University on the intelligence services facing the 21<sup>st</sup> century threats, and a MA on Security and intelligence studies, by Salford University, he is a Senior Research Fellow of RIEAS; also a Senior Research Fellow of UNISCI at the Complutense University, Madrid Spain)*

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**# 1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece**

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## **RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS)**

*# 1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece*

*Tel/Fax: + 30 210 9911214, E-mail: [rieasinfo@gmail.com](mailto:rieasinfo@gmail.com)*

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Abstract

In these years of change that the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century brings, it would be convenient to find the correct relationship between intelligence and democracy. In democracies, the free flow of information is paramount, and its negation is always the exception. In a democracy it is important to correctly understand the functions and limitations of intelligence services. It is important to get understood the practices and the different dimensions of intelligence with the aim to break, or at least lighten, the existing tension between the secrecy within the intelligence services and the democratic practices within the society which these services, as part of the country's mechanism, should serve. Let us not lose sight that the intelligence services, in a democratic system, should fit in legal limits and the respect of democratic dialogue, with a clear vocation as a service to the citizen, who is, at the end of the day, the one who pays for it with their taxes.

Thus this justification of the functions of intelligence in democracy goes through a correct understanding of the same. From the beginning, intelligence has been a fascinating topic for movie directors; and the audiences have confirmed that this will always be a current topic. Furthermore, the fictitious representations of international politics have played an outstanding role in the concept that the citizen has of this kind of organizations. This type of inter-relationship between the citizen and the intelligence services is important in any democratic country to be able to adapt these services to the democratic sphere of public scrutiny, never losing sight of the limitations that these services represent. However, these arguments have another lecture. What happened with intelligence in non-democratic countries? How has it been used, and how is it understood?

This is the main purpose of this paper, because by trying to answer these questions we will be capable of use intelligence and its use as a democratic indicator in situations

such as the freedom of speech, regular elections, or the freedom of the press among many others. However, we should first formulate what is understood by intelligence.

## Introduction

In the last few decades we have seen the development of the idea of democracy as the pillar for a State's development. From the thought that democracies do not make war to each other up to the importance of the juridical security as a basis for inversion and the consequent economical development. However, what has been happening with the economical crisis and the tensions among the countries within the euro zone or the situation in China with a progressive aperture in the economical area and, at the same time, and stagnation in the political area nuance these arguments and make us recall on the fact that in Social Science we are far from the absolute truth and they also as well highlight that the democratic values are much more than voting every four or five years. Where does, then, the democracy value reside? It is clear that not only in the citizen's voice, also in the security of being aware of what can come through. In the Institutions' transparency and in the possibility of regulate and supervise the acts of the State organs by the residents through mechanisms and institutions built up to that purpose.

That way, the control of the intelligence services can be considered as a clear democratic indication. This will be, consequently, the main objective of this investigation: to defend the importance of the control and the taxation of the activities of the intelligence services as an indication of the democracy level of a country as well as analyze the mechanisms that allow it to be possible, taking into account the secrecy barrier surrounding everything related to State intelligence issues.

In these years of change that the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century brings, it would be convenient to find the correct relationship between intelligence and democracy. In democracies, the free flow of information is paramount, and its negation is always the exception. In a democracy it is important to correctly understand the functions and limitations of intelligence services. It is important to get understood the practices and the different dimensions of intelligence with the aim to break, or at least lighten, the existing tension that exists because of secrecy within the intelligence services and the democratic practices within the society which these services, as part of the country's mechanism, should serve.<sup>1</sup> Let us not lose sight that the intelligence services, in a democratic system, should fit in legal limits and the respect of democratic dialogue, with a clear vocation as a service to the citizen, who is, at the end of the day, the one who pays for it with their taxes.<sup>2</sup>

Thus this justification of the functions of intelligence in democracy goes through a correct understanding of the same. From the beginning, intelligence has been a fascinating topic for movie directors; and the audiences have confirmed that this will always be a current topic. Furthermore, the fictitious representations of international politics have played an outstanding role in the concept that the citizen has of these types of organizations. 'There exists a clear distinction between the authentic operations of the intelligence services and those represented in works of fiction'. In words of an American intelligence officer: 'The spy movies are as much a reality of intelligence as *Donald Duck* is of real life'. Also, during a long period of time, the newspaper media has given these services a bad reputation; intelligence is neither *James Bond*, nor is every action by intelligence undercover.<sup>3</sup>



This type of inter-relationship between the citizen and the intelligence services is important in any democratic country to be able to adapt these services to the democratic sphere of public scrutiny, never losing sight of the limitations that these services represent. Many countries have been conscious of this need to make the practices of intelligence understandable to their citizens and, during centuries, diverse schools have existed throughout the world that represent different cultures and approaches to these types of questions in different countries.<sup>4</sup> However, these arguments have another lecture. What happened with intelligence in non-democratic countries? How has it been used, and how is it understood?

This is the main purpose of this paper, because by trying to answer these questions we will be capable of use intelligence and its use as a democratic indicator in situations such as the freedom of speech, regular elections, or the freedom of the press among many others.

However, we should first formulate what is understood by intelligence to later advance to de definition of the nature of the priorities of a country and with them, to shell the perception of threats for the same in order to understand what is needed to be protected. At the end, that would be the main function of the intelligence services of any country, which try to increase certainty above the reality, with the goal of contributing the best knowledge to those who make decisions and that clarified the objectives of any intelligence service making a clear distinction between those who want to remain in power and those who want to protect and service to the people and with that be able to understand the activities of the intelligence services and its oversight as a clear indicator of democracy.


## 1. What is intelligence, and how is it understood? (The essence and the form)

It is out of the scope of this paper to define intelligence in depth; because it is a well-studied topic, despite its lack of a common definition of the term.<sup>5</sup>

But understanding that intelligence is, foremost, a socio-political phenomenon will help us to avoid looking for the solution to a problem that has already been dealt with. In the same way, in order to look for an extensive definition of intelligence in agreement with an ample vision of security, it will be necessary to move beyond the limits of international relations, with the purpose of including a greater number of sectors of security.<sup>6</sup> Even though it is true that it has traditionally been said that intelligence is a uniquely State activity, today we see the development of what has been called the “governability of security.”<sup>7</sup>

It can be said that intelligence in its traditional sense is information, a passive practice; no one gets hurt by it, at least not directly. Some nation-states, though, view Covert Actions (CA) as a necessary tool in national security affairs, and therefore see it as a form of intelligence. CA is a unique method for implementing national security policies, as it differs strikingly from passive intelligence, which is essentially the collection and delivery of analysed information to those formulating and implementing policies. To sum up, CA is all about making things happen, while intelligence in its traditional sense consists of making the right decisions about what may happen.<sup>8</sup> So for our objectives intelligence will be understood in its essence in two ways: as information and as prevention, as we can see in this chart.

## The Essence of Intelligence



**Source:** Díaz Matey G. “Hacia una definición inclusiva de inteligencia”, *Revista de inteligencia y prospectiva* 4, (2008)

At the hour of approaching the term “intelligence”, we can affirm that it possesses two differentiated parts that make up its essence. *The nature* of the concept of intelligence, which has not changed since ancient times, based on information and prevention and which consists in providing useful information that can be of service in the decision-making process. Both the actions destined to protecting the very information of the efforts of knowledge of the “other”, and actions destined to maximizing one’s own interests, in an undercover way (See Figure 1). On the other hand, the *character of the term*, which can be revolutionary and on occasions can be seen influenced by the changes which, throughout all time, its activity has suffered: by cultural and technological changes, professionalization, or centralization of the type of personnel that it requires, among others.

Intelligence, therefore, is a part, and not the only part, of the machinery of support to the decision-making process, from the side of information, but it differs from the other parts, because of its secretive characteristic.

Intelligence exists because a few players try to obtain information reserved for others and to hide their own. For their part, the secret organizations try to avoid strategic surprises, to provide lasting experts, and to withstand political decisions. In conclusion, this way, once a first methodological approach is realized of the term and a series of definitive characteristics of the same and for the purposes of this analysis are limited, it is important to understand intelligence as information relative to the capacities,

intentions, and activities of powers, organizations, and foreign 'people' or those nationals who support them.<sup>9</sup> Now the term 'hostility' is introduced, a fundamental concept for the existence of any intelligence service. That is to say, the need of intelligence is derived from the existence of:

-Conflicts of interests in international relations.

-The perception of a certain number of threats for the national security of a country.<sup>10</sup>

Intelligence, in the end, is established with the goal of improving the one's own possibilities before the enemy or competitor, by means of defense or interests understood as fundamental. The problem, as we will see, resides mainly in the perception that is held of what is understood by threats, enemies, and competitors. The differences between these perceptions in a democratic country and in a non-democratic country are clear.

Following the chart about the essence of intelligence, we are going to analyse and compare the different use of the parts which compose the essence of intelligence to see how intelligence is being used (or at least should be used) in a democratic and in a non-democratic country. In this sense, we will combine the analysis of the different perceptions of threats and the decision-making process in both cases, following the use of intelligence as prevention (analysing counterintelligence and covert action) and how all of these influence the conception of intelligence in both cases to conclude if the use of intelligence could be used as a democratic indicator.

## 2. The perception of threats and the decision makers

The formation process of foreign policy does not continue to be exclusively logic of 'rational choice' that analyses the situation with the goal of maximizing the benefits.<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, national interest is far from objective, being conditioned by the subjective perception of the decisive politicians about what is considered beneficial for the country; which depends, as well, on the ideas of the role that it should have in the world.<sup>12</sup> This explains the different positions in the international sphere of the different players.

Therefore, the starting point that determines the importance or the weight of an intelligence service in a country will come limited by the determination of the international objectives and the identification of the adversaries, in a few words, by the will of the international weight that this wishes to occupy; that is to say, its conception of their national role. It was Kalevi J. Holsti, who, in his article from 1970<sup>13</sup>, followed by numerous authors in posterior studies about the 'role theory',<sup>14</sup> defined the national interest as *the ideas of the decisive politicians about the role of that their State should carry out in the international issues; that is to say, what type of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions are appropriate for their country, and what functions they should carry out within the international system.*

For this the needs of information should be limited and centered. As Lock Johnson points out: *'the various leaders of different countries will have different points of view about the foreign policy which a country should develop and with this, different objectives for the same, therefore, a distinct perception of the different threats for that country in that concrete moment'*.<sup>15</sup> To that end it is necessary to define the nature of the priorities of a country and with them, to shell the perception of threats for the same. Therefore the perception of threats depends on the actor. This way, as they are defined and prioritized, international threats for the security of a country will be oriented to intelligence services. In this sense, the greater the perception of a threat of an interior

character, (as political opposition or ethnic group) the greater the repressive character will be of a country's intelligence services and therefore, less democratic; priority will come established by a correct election of those whom it is most important to cover.

This is basically the main function of the intelligence services of any country, which try to increase certainty above the reality, with the goal of contributing the best knowledge to those who make decisions. However, certainty in today's world is being undermined by the proliferation of information and knowledge, and therefore the capacity to make decisions. This erosion of certainty is accelerated by the rapid technological, social, and cultural changes.<sup>16</sup>

In this sense, the height of the asymmetrical threats does not mean that the States do not compete among each other, for resources, position, and power. Up until today, the principal mission of State intelligence is to help in the decision-making process at a State level, forecasting the risks and threats that loom over a country. Nevertheless, in the moment that dissidence is perceived as a threat, and the maintaining of power the political objective, the use of intelligence will be weakened, moved away from national interest and focused on partisan or particular interests. The intelligence capabilities are always limited and the assumption behind this argument is that policy uses the governmental resources to keep the power instead to leave the country in a better situation and its citizens in a more secure environment.

Some time ago, in a conference organized by the chair of intelligence services of the university Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, I was invited to give a talk about the relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence. Sharing a table, next to me, was the ex-director of the Portuguese intelligence services and a diplomat, a member of a political party that had yielded its services to the Ministry of the Interior. This diplomat affirmed that '*intelligence should be of service to politics*'; and in principle, this affirmation is true, but it should be understood very carefully, since intelligence should be of service to the nation, not to the partisan interests of the current politicians. To a great extent, it is this very affirmation that has led to the greatest scandals in intelligence in the latest years, both inside and outside of Spain.

### 3. Intelligence as prevention: the use of Covert action (CA) and counterintelligence

For many observers, and especially for critics, secret intervention is synonymous with intelligence and loomed large in Cold War debates about the legitimacy and morality of intelligence organisations and their activities. Since September 11, Washington's agenda for taking the offensive to the United States' enemies has rekindled such arguments. The shock of mass violence witnessed in 9/11 has forced a shift towards this new thinking in which Covert Action (CA) was seen as an essential element of this active approach. Though it has been this new approach by the US that has re-invigorated discussions on CA, the topic of CA in general is not limited to the US alone. It must be noted that the conceptions of CA can markedly differ between States, particularly those that are democratic and non-democratic. To truly get an understanding of what CA really means, one must first explore in depth the various uses and understandings of it through recent history. Only after this has been done can an analysis of the role of CA be made within the broader realm of intelligence and security affairs.

The more prominent definitions of CA are predominantly from the United States, dating back to the celebrated 1948 National Security directive 10/2 which authorised the CIA to engage in: propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including

sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures, subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. More recent US government statements cover most of these activities though some of the language has altered (notably the demise of 'subversion'). In US law CA became defined as: 'an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include... traditional counter-intelligence... diplomatic... military... (or) law enforcement activities'.<sup>17</sup> One commonly accepted aspect of these definitions is that they refer to actions abroad. But, this is so mainly because the particular conception of the intelligence Community within the United States is based in its facing of external threats but in today's environment with clear implications in internal dimension.

We know about CA in the same way that we learn about other intelligence activities, through authorised and unauthorised disclosure: memoirs, journalism, defectors, archives, whistle-blowers and judicial investigation. The veracity and integrity of these sources may differ, though there are generic questions to be posed about the agendas and intentions of those who provide us with information about CA.<sup>18</sup> One question is whether we know more about CA than intelligence gathering and analysis. A second is whether we know more about certain kinds of CA than others, especially the more dramatic. Some covert operations have been easier to discover because they failed. For many governments the concept of plausible deniability has been integral to the activity; therefore, one must consider the possibility that we may be learning more about unsuccessful operations than successful ones, and that when we are learning of secret interventions from unreliable sources, we may in fact be the target of disinformation or propaganda.

## Old Lessons and New Challenges

CA today faces new challenges which can only be dealt with after first comprehending the relevant lessons of history. The role of CA in the international context is undoubtedly a crucial one. It has been used with regularity in recent history, yet not all of these operations are publicly known. Nevertheless, the numerous openly known successful and unsuccessful CA operations conducted particularly during the Cold War provide an excellent analytical treasure trove for the understanding of CA in the international setting. The very fact that details of CA operations have been leaked also poses challenges to the conduct of similar operations for the present day. The information age has made the conditions for plausible deniability, an essential element of CA, an even more difficult endeavour for governments engaged in the use of such operations. These realities force governments as well as intelligence and security establishments to acknowledge that absolute secrecy and total information control may well be an impossible task as we have seen recently with the WikiLeaks disclosures and the Snowden case.

In the past, governments believed that secret operations would remain exactly that, secret, or at the very least not leaked whilst they were in power, thereby allowing them to place less of an emphasis on the potential public reaction to the unveiling of CA operations. This new heightened level of sensitivity to the public, limits governments in their selection of CA options, which, depending upon various factors, can be potentially advantageous or disadvantageous to national security interests.

The main emphasis of studies on CA has often been on intelligence's observable international effects; in crude terms, whether it has been good or bad for international society, using the common sense yardsticks of whether it has promoted or discouraged responsible government behaviour, good inter-state relationships, the minimisation of tension, cooperation for internationally valuable purposes, and the avoidance of war. At the height of the Cold War CA was justified by the US as a quiet option and as a tool for fighting the Soviet Union in the absence of conventional military combat, to be used where diplomacy was insufficient and force was inappropriate. Enveloped in secrecy, few *Americans* were aware of most CA programs; one prominent example being that Washington's role in supporting Afghan fighters against the Soviet Union was not unveiled until well after combat ended. For critics of such operations, Western CA undermined the legitimacy of Western (especially US) intelligence if not indeed Western foreign policy (particularly US) during the Cold War. For the supporters of such activities, CA represented (usually) discreet forms of intervention that obviated more violent methods. The US in particular has always considered CA a useful adjunct to military force during wartime (as seen in Afghanistan or Iraq in the last years), yet the various instances of failure in such operations have resulted in negative consequences.

We ought not to get deeper in the debate about the use and the utility of covert actions, arguing that in an increasingly open world, intelligence's emphasis would shift away from collection and towards analysis, and that there would be more emphasis on 'intelligence-as-information', drawing on more open source material, and less on 'intelligence-as-secrets', mainly because the argument from the analysis of CA is that CA is understood as a way to defend the national interest and in a external way, taking conception of others. In this sense, CA always depends on a clear set of objectives, an accurate understanding of the conditions in which it will take place, and how the objectives will have been achieved, are all subject to human interpretation.

Another important difference in the use and abuse of intelligence is the tool of accountability, in democratic countries even when a lack of transparency in these types of operations makes democratic accountability difficult, and correspondingly affects the level of public support and consent for such ventures. Citizens expect that intelligence sector activities will protect and support liberal democracy rather than undermine it. Although secrecy is a necessary condition of the work, intelligence professionals are expected by the national citizenry to be accountable, act in the public interest, and in conformance with a society's moral values. Lacking a direct means to confirm that this is so, the public tends to suspect that what is secret must be perverse. This is especially true in the case of foreign intelligence collection and CA, where the purpose and moral criteria for specific activities is poorly understood and rarely articulated.

Democratic government in theory is expected to rest on openness and participation, rule of law, privacy, and mutual trust, conditions with which the requirements and practices of intelligence are often at variance. Nevertheless, an explicit statement of the ethical principles that guide decisions in intelligence 'monopolies' could help to enhance public trust in the work of intelligence services. This is especially important following the findings of the Hutton and Butler Reports in the United Kingdom; the Joint Congressional Inquiry in the United States; and the Flood Commission in Australia, over the role of intelligence in the Allied decision to intervene militarily in Iraq in 2003.<sup>19</sup>

One should also distinguish between counter-intelligence activities and security measures, as security measures are defensive in nature, applied as protection against the elements which counter-intelligence seeks knowledge of.<sup>20</sup> The world of counter-

intelligence is not simply defensive though; it can be used in an offensive manner, making the *other* to crumble from within. In this sense, counterintelligence will be analysed in this paper to argue that the fine line between security and operational effectiveness is another brick in the huge difference between the uses of intelligence in a democratic system in a non-democratic one. At the end, this will suppose another point to use intelligence as a democratic indicator. However, to achieve it one must first accurately understand the true meaning of counter-intelligence.<sup>21</sup>

Counter-intelligence can be defined as intelligence gathered about an adversary's intelligence activities and capabilities to unmask and inhibit adversarial intelligence operations and capabilities.<sup>22</sup> This can involve various types of action to prevent or neutralise hostile intelligence successes against national interests. However, a perverse use of this part of the preventive part of intelligence would end again in preserving the power and to seek dissidence, once again identifying the enemy within.

The first responsibility of counter-intelligence is to protect information. The protection of acquired knowledge is a vital function of any intelligence organisation, yet no amount of extensive security and stringent assessment checks will guarantee that an employee will observe the rules. Almost anywhere in the world, the potential amount of counter-intelligence is vast, and produced for the national interest, both within the country and in all the foreign areas to which a country's interests extend. It would also be logical to assume that if a person has access to any piece of information then it can in all likelihood be compromised. Major concerns in counter-intelligence relate to how organisational responsibilities, both in democratic and non-democratic countries, adversely affect professional skills and institutional culture, as well as the fragmentation that leaves large gaps in the Intelligence Community's overall counter-intelligence coverage.

In an environment in which, there do not exist correct balances between counterintelligence and security measures, this is another important indicator that the use of intelligence is once again a direct consequence of the perception of the threat, in non-democratic cases coming from within.

## Conclusion: Towards the conception of intelligence as a democratic indicator

It seems that the axiom is confirmed that the greater their democratic quality is, more efforts they set aside to fight against new threats (terrorism, illegal trafficking, and organized crime, among others), and less to the internal repression and political persecution of their opposing forces.

Using the situation of Central Asia as an example, if we put the data from *Freedom House* and the HDI from the PNUD together, we will see that Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are the countries where there is more liberty and more development, whereas the situations in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are much harder on every level. A different case is Uzbekistan, where there is some economic development but not democratic. Thus, we hear news that says that Uzbekistan's intelligence services have been accused of having produced a video in which *Radio Free Liberty-Radio Europe* was slandered, to the end of discrediting it.<sup>23</sup> Or we can also find that Turkmenistan secret services are ordered to monitor each communication made via Internet or to make "black lists" of "enemies" of the regime; or the secret serves organizing death squads to eliminate political adversaries or investigate the opposition's financial sources, especially if they come from abroad; though we also see them involved in proper tasks

such as the confiscation of the consignment of drugs or the fight against tax evasion, or the investigation of not-so-clear affairs.<sup>24</sup>

At the end of the day, intelligence in non-democratic countries does serve as information and prevention of dissidence, focusing on internal threats and legitimization of the regime and keeping the power. Therefore, after analyzing the concept of intelligence in both a democratic country and in a non-democratic one, we have established important differences, from which we can state that intelligence could and should be used as a democratic indicator. As a country uses its intelligence not for the good of the State, and its national interest, but so that the present rulers will continue in their posts, serving as a tool of the ruler's interest directly and the perception of threats come from within the state and not from abroad, the intelligence services will be a repressive instrument, used with no difference from the political police or an internal information system to prevent dissidence and freedom.

To recap, intelligence oversight is a fundamental tool, not only *to control intelligence* and to keep it in the democratic system, but also to keep it inside legality. The use of intelligence as a democratic indicator will be just another dot to quantify the welfare of a country and, in the end, to quantify the security of a country's citizens, not the security of the country, because we cannot forget that intelligence serves the security of the people and not the other way around.

## Endnotes:

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<sup>1</sup>Shulsky, Abram, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the world of intelligence*, Brassey's 1991.

<sup>2</sup> "El CNI quiere convertir el espionaje en disciplina universitaria", in: [www.larioja.com](http://www.larioja.com), February 6, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> West, Nigel: "Fiction Fiction and Intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 19, N° 2 summer 2004, pp. 275-289.

<sup>2</sup> Stempel, John and Pringle, Robert: "Intelligence and the cinema", *Intelligence and National Security* Vol 15, N° 1, 2007, p.115.

<sup>3</sup> In fact, the CIA does not occupy more than 15% of the total intelligence community within the United States.

<sup>4</sup> Hindley, Meredith. "Teaching intelligence project", *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 15, N° 1, 2000; see also: Johnson, Loch K. "Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies", *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 22, N° 3, 2007; Watt, D. Cameron "Intelligence studies: The emergence of the British school", *Intelligence and National Security* Vol 3, No. 2,(1988, p. 338; Jackson, P. "Intelligence and the state: An emerging 'French school' of intelligence studies", *Intelligence and National Security* Vol 21, No. 6, 2006; Olivier Forcade and Sebastien Laurent, *Secrets d'E' tat. Pouvoirs et renseignement dans le monde contemporain*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005)

<sup>5</sup> Díaz Matey, G. "Hacia una definición inclusiva de inteligencia", *Revista de inteligencia y prospectiva* 4, (2008)

<sup>6</sup>Buzan, B. *Security: A new framework for analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Johnston, L., & Shearing, C. D. (2003): *Governing security explorations in policing and justice*, London: Routledge; Schreier, F., & Caparini, M. (2005): *Privatising security law, practice and governance of private military and security companies*, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); Shearer, D. (2001): *Private Military Companies and Human Security - Privatising Protection*, *The World Today* 57, (8), 29.

<sup>8</sup>Steiner, James E.: "Restoring the Red Line Between Intelligence and Policy on Covert Action", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 19, (2006), p.163

<sup>9</sup>Abram N. Shulsky (revised by Gary J. Schmitt), *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002 pp.1-3,y 171-176. Shulsky is one of the greatest expositors of this point of view that intelligence tries to collect others' secrets and protect its own.



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<sup>10</sup> Loch K. Johnson, "Preface to a theory of strategic intelligence", *International journal of intelligence & Counterintelligence* 16, 2003, pp. 638-663; Taplin, Winn L "Six General Principles of Intelligence", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 3, n° 4 Winter 1989, pp.475-491.

<sup>11</sup> This has been demonstrated by authors like Allison, in her study on the U.S. decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis. Allison, Graham T. Y Zelikow, Philip (1999): *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2<sup>a</sup> ed., New York, Longman. See also Webber, Mark and Michael Smith: "The Making of Foreign Policy", in Webber, Mark and Smith, Michael (2002): *Foreign Policy in a Transformed World*, Harlow, Pearson, pp. 53-54.

<sup>12</sup> Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W. and Sapin, Burton: "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics" (originally published in 1954), en Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W. and Sapin, Burton (2002): *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*, New York / Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 48-49, 75; Wendt, Alexander (1999): *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 234; Breuning, Marijke, "Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rethoric and Policy Behavior in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom", *International Studies Quarterly* 39, n° 2, (June 1995), p. 237.

<sup>13</sup> Holsti, K. J.: "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 14, n° 3, (September 1970), pp. 233-309.

<sup>14</sup> Cox, R. W., y Jacobson, H. K., (1973): *The anatomy of influence; decision making in international organization*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Aggestam, Lisbeth: "A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU", en Aggestam, Lisbeth y Hyde-Price, Adrian (eds.), (2000): *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*, Houndmills / Nueva York, Macmillan / St. Martin's; Chafetz, Glenn; Jonsson, Christer y Westerland, U.: "Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis", en Jonsson, Christer (ed.) (1982): *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*, Nueva York, St Martin's; Le Prestre, Philippe (ed.) (1997): *Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition*, Montreal / Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press; Walker, Stephen G. (ed.) (1987): *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Durham, Duke University Press; Walker, Stephen G.: "Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy", en Herрман, Charles F., Kegley Jr., Charles W. y Rosenau, James N. (eds.) (1987): *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Londres, Harper Collins; WISH, Naomi Bailin: "Foreign Policy Makers and their National Role Conceptions", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 24, n° 4 (1980), pp. 532-553.

<sup>15</sup> Loch K. Johnson, "Preface to a theory of strategic intelligence", *International journal of Intelligence and counterintelligence* 16, (2003), pp 240.

<sup>16</sup> Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 102-88, 14 August 1991; Shulsky, Abram (1993), *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, London, Brassey's, p. 84. The CIA's definition is: 'An operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.' CIA (1995): CIA, Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Washington DC, CIA, p. 38, quoted in Rudgers, David: 'The Origins of CA', *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, No. 2 (2000), p. 249.

<sup>17</sup> Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 102-88, 14 August 1991; Shulsky, Abram (1993), *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, London, Brassey's, p. 84. The CIA's definition is: 'An operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.' CIA (1995): CIA, Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Washington DC, CIA, p. 38, quoted in Rudgers, David: 'The Origins of CA', *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, No. 2 (2000), p. 249.

<sup>18</sup> Scott, Len: "Secret Intelligence, CA and Clandestine Diplomacy", *Intelligence and National Security* 19, No. 2, (Summer 2004) p. 322.

<sup>20</sup> United States. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. Report of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (December 2002). Senate-House Report No. 107-792, Report No. 107-351. Philip Flood, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, 20 July 2004. The Rt. Hon. The Lord Butler of Brockwell, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, House of Commons 898, 14 July 2004. Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly CMG, House of Commons, 28 January 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Dictionary of U.S Military Terms of Joint Usage, Military Regulations. U.S. Army Regulation 310-25 <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar310-25.pdf> pp.56.

<sup>22</sup> Kalaris George and Mc Coy Leonard, "Counter-intelligence for the 90s", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence*, Vol.2, n°2, (1987), pp.179

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<sup>23</sup>William E. Odom “Fixing Intelligence”, 2003 Yale University Press, New Haven and London

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<sup>25</sup> Djuraev, Ulugbek: “Russian Secret Services Ready to Combat Kyrgyz Opposition”, *Axis Globe*, 27 April 2006, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>; Osborn, Andrew: “Kazakh opposition politician 'killed by government death squad'”, *The Independent*, 15 February 2006, in: <http://www.independent.co.uk>; “Turkmen secret services totally control internet access in the country”, *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 8 March 2007, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>; “Prime Minister of Kazakhstan called special services to more actively reveal firms engaged in tax evasion and to arrest their heads”, *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 6 August 2008, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>; “Parliamentary committee has charged SNB, MVD and General Prosecutor’s Office to investigate arrest of 11 citizens in Istanbul”, *Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway*, 6 April 2006, in: <http://eng.gateway.kg>

### **About the Author**

**Gustavo Díaz Matey** is a *Lecture of International Affairs in de Department of International Affairs at Complutense Univesity, Madrid; He was the co-founder of the Mediterranean Council of Intelligence Studies (MCIS) and EUINT. He holds a PhD by the Complutense University on the intelligence services facing the 21<sup>st</sup> century threats, and a MA on Security and intelligence studies, by Salford University, he is a Senior Research Fellow of RIEAS; also a Senior Research Fellow of UNISCI at the Complutense University, Madrid Spain.*

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