

THE MANY FACES OF A JOINT LIFE ENERGY: STRATEGIES AND PROBLEMS

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Introduction

The energy supply continues to be a priority for politics as it did in the past century, except that in the new geopolitics of energy the techniques of hoarding are absolutely changed, as they need to adapt to a changeable consistency of the balance between states. The modernization of the vision is expressed by the tendency not to take possession of the places rich in hydrocarbons, but rather to establish such relationships that enable a shift from property to concession and from concession to the purchase of production. In what we can define as an optimization of supply, it is important to understand that the enormous expenses required for a war of conquest are not compensated by the proceeds that the exploitation of wells will yield. In this light we could rank the general behavior of Turkey. The Turkish state could have pragmatically decided by now to allocate its resources towards essential priorities for its growth, rather than financing a bloody conflict with the Kurds, which deprived enormous economic resources from the state coffers in the mid-last century. At this point what scenarios could emerge by the intensification of the economic relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey? Will these relations succeed in solidifying a pan-curd feeling, able to bring unity of Kurdistan?

The Geopolitical role of Turkey in the various fields of energy

Turkey in its constant search for energy resources will pursue to establish relations with the realities of the region, considering the state's need to deal with its internal instances, as well as with the ones of its European trading partners, with who it has entered into binding treaties of coexistence. Its natural geographical position works in its favor, turning the state into a strategic energy hub, extolling at present its vectoriality. In fact, the realization of TANAP (1) will bring the Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe. So Turkey will become the main Eurasian energetic hub. Also, the Turkmen gas could exploit this Turkish vectoriality which, thanks to Erdogan's clever political move, is enhanced by restraining the creation of installations of liquefaction of gas on the Black Sea and its transport through the Bosphorus by tankers.

The Turkish geographical location becomes a geopolitical treasure when you think that on its south-eastern borders there is Iraq, gas and oil exporter, which appears more and more dynamic despite its political instability. The autonomous region of Kurdistan (KRG) is in northern Iraq and Ankara and Erbil have already close business relationships that now go beyond any question of identity, possibly bearing any unwanted consequences for the Turks. Paradoxically the fluidity of the governance of the Middle East area puts the Kurdish area as the most solid reference point detectable in the territory.

The KRG is therefore perceived as the most politically reliable zone. As a result, it is seen as a market not only of energy supply, but also as a market outlet for Turkish manufacturing activities, to the point that the business volume of Turkish exports has reached 10 %. The huge unknown factor of the Syrian chaos, into which is crumbling the "grand illusion" of the West to use Jihad after having isolated the "good" from "bad", explains the increase of the autonomy that the government of Damascus looks at PYD (2) , so to meet the defense needs of its borders. The Syrian wing of the PKK offers to fight against ISIS, a military organization cohesive and tightly bound in allegiance to social principals and principles of identity. The move of Damascus tends paradoxically to offer autonomy in exchange for loyalty.

At this point the position of Ankara sways between the recognized need for peaceful borders that had raised hopes for adhesion to the Solution process of Imrali and the always dreaded fear of a re-consolidation of the united Kurdish front. The economic interests of Turkey concentrated within the boundaries of “its” Kurdistan, are of great importance and affect not only the gas or oil but also the hydropower which saw the construction of a system of 22 dams on Tigris and Euphrates, capable of feeding as many as 19 power plants and of conveying considerable amounts of energy to international markets. In this scenario, the balance between costs and benefits will determine from time to time the position of the AKP against this part of Kurdistan, also in view of the fundamental importance of the Anatolian region in a Middle East scenario that despite the diverse folds of wars and negotiations, looks up to the decision of the conference of "five States" on the Iranian nuclear issue.

KRG and Autonomy, Risks and Conveniences

The privileged relationship between Ankara and Erbil finds its precarious balance despite the complexity of the situation which sees Turkey oust the Baghdad government and enjoy the fruits of the support wisely given during these years, to the autonomy of the Kurdish region. The relations between Turkey and the KRG are having a further opportunity to become stronger with the approval of the passage of the pipeline and oil. The one needs the other. Turkey offers to the KRG, which is the producer and the seller, the vectorial markets, giving it an opportunity to evade at the governmental control of Baghdad. Indeed, Turkey has the chance to meet the needs of its consistent growth and the satisfaction of being, given the current difficulties, the only region with consolidated political stability. Therefore, this allows her to be the only potential secure market as well as an international energy hub, reaching almost simultaneously to its traditional European direction, but also to the east, towards a China eager to respond to the needs of its double-digit growth.

Endnotes:

- 1) Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
- 2) Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat