



RESEARCH PAPER

No. 128

FEBRUARY

2009

**CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME:
THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON IN CENTRAL ASIA**

GUSTAVO DIAZ MATEY
(RIEAS Research Associate)

ANTONIO ALONSO MARCOS
(CEU-San Pablo University, Spain)

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES

(RIEAS)

1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece

RIEAS URL:<http://www.rieas.gr>

RIEAS MISSION STATEMENT

Objective

The objective of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) is to promote the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration, international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as well as policy making on national and international markets.

Activities

The Research Institute for European and American Studies seeks to achieve this objective through research, by publishing its research papers on international politics and intelligence studies, organizing seminars, as well as providing analyses via its web site. The Institute maintains a library and documentation center. RIEAS is an institute with an international focus. Young analysts, journalists, military personnel as well as academicians are frequently invited to give lectures and to take part in seminars. RIEAS maintains regular contact with other major research institutes throughout Europe and the United States and, together with similar institutes in Western Europe, Middle East, Russia and Southeast Asia.

Status

The Research Institute for European and American Studies is a non-profit research institute established under Greek law. RIEAS's budget is generated by membership subscriptions, donations from individuals and foundations, as well as from various research projects. The Institute is autonomous organization. Its activities and views are independent of any public or private bodies, and the Institute is not allied to any political party, denominational group or ideological movement.

Dr. John M. Nomikos
Director

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES

(RIEAS)

Postal Address:

1, Kalavryton Street

Alimos

Athens, 17456

Greece

Tel/Fax: + 30 210 9911214

E-mail: rieas@otenet.gr

Administrative Board

John M. Nomikos, Director

Charles Rault, Senior Advisor

Darko Trifunovic, Senior Advisor

Andrei Korobkov, Senior Advisor

Research Team

Andrew Liaropoulos, Senior Analyst

Maria Alvanou, Senior Analyst

Andreas G. Banoutsos, Senior Analyst

Panos Kostakos, Senior Analyst

Ioannis Michaletos, Senior Analyst

Aya Burweila, Senior Analyst

International Advisors

Richard R. Valcourt, Editor-in-Chief, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Shlomo Shpiro (PhD), Bar Ilan University

Prof. Daniel Pipes (PhD), Director, Middle East Forum

Prof. Miroslav Tudjman (PhD), University of Zagreb and Former Director of the Croatian Intelligence Service

Prof. Radoslav D. Gacinovic (PhD), Research Center for National Security (Serbia)

Col (ret) Virendra Sahai Verma, Former Military Intelligence Officer from India

James Bilotto, CBRN Chief Operating Officer

Prof. Anthony Glees (PhD), Director, Center for Security and Intelligence Studies, Buckingham University
Prof. Vasilis Botopoulos (PhD), Chancellor, University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus)
Prof. Peter Gill (PhD), University of Salford
Andrei Soldatov (MA), Journalist, Editor of Agentura.ru (Russia)
Chris Kuehl, Armada Corporate Intelligence Review
Zweiri Mahjoob (PhD), Centre for Strategic Studies, Jordan University
Chrysanthos Lazaridis, Diktyo (Network) 21
Meir Javedanfar (PhD), Middle East Economic-Political Analysis Inc.
Nick Larigakis, Director, American-Hellenic Institute
Daniele Ganser (PhD), Basel University
Prof. Siegfried Beer (PhD), Director, Austrian Centre for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies
Prof. Herman Matthijs (PhD), Free University of Brussels
Christopher Deliso (MPhil), Balkan security & politics analyst & Director, Balkanalysis.com
Prof. Michael Wala (PhD), University of Munich
Prof. Wolfgang Krieger (PhD), University of Marburg
Michael Tanji, Director at Threatswatch.org - (OSINT)
Prof. Ioannis Mazis (PhD), Ionian University
Robert Nowak (PhD Cand), Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Bureau of the Committee for Special and Intelligence Services (Prime Minister's Chancellery)
Lauren Hutton (PhD), Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)
LTC General, Prof. Iztok Podbregar (PhD), University of Maribor, Former National Security Advisor to the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Former Chief of Defense (CHOD), Former Director of the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency, Former Secretary of the Slovenian National Security Council.

Research Associates

Ioannis Konstantopoulos (PhD), Intelligence Studies
Liam Bellamy (MA), Maritime Security (Piracy)
Gustavo Diaz Matey (PhD), Spanish Intelligence Studies
Spyridon Katsoulas, (PhD Candidate) Greek-American Relations
Ioannis Kolovos (MA), Illegal Immigration in Greece
Naveed Ahmad (MA), South-Central Asia and Muslim World
Ioannis Moutsos (MA), Independent Journalist
Nadim Hasbani (MA), Lebanon-Syria and North African States
Nikos Lalazisis (MA), European Intelligence Studies

RESEARCH PAPER

No. 128

FEBRUARY

2009

**CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME:
THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON IN CENTRAL ASIA**

GUSTAVO DIAZ MATEY
(RIEAS Research Associate)

ANTONIO ALONSO MARCOS
(CEU-San Pablo University, Spain)

Introduction

The cooperation between different intelligence services has greatly increased since the end of the Cold War, and it is very probable that its importance will increase even more at the beginning of the 21st century because, as it has been pointed out in many forums, security threats are not only changing, but they are also multiplying considerably, which naturally affects the question of cooperation between different intelligence services. In the first place, the scale of the objectives has considerably increased for intelligence services; at the present time there are more threats to deal with. Henceforth, correctly detecting and analyzing the so-called “new threats” may require an increase of cooperation between different intelligence services of different countries. Such cooperation is at the same time imperative for the operational implementation of multilateral answers to new security changes. Robert Steele correctly puts it by affirming that in the past the threat to be faced was relatively stable and easy to identify, as it was characterized by bloc fights. Such a threat required an effective capacity to recollect any available information, being essential the recollection of pieces for the “puzzle” within the work of intelligence services from both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, present threats nowadays in the international system are much more vague, demanding an adoption of methods of intelligence services.

However, the perception of threats that hangs over the security of a State greatly differs depending on the actor. Thus, the analysis of risks and opportunities that the new international situation presents from the point of view of intelligence alliances will be much more different for the countries in Central Asia than for the Western countries.

Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the United States has established stronger cooperation ties in order to fight against the terrorist threat for both defensive and offensive reasons. In its extensive fight against Al Qaeda they have tried to count on the benefits of experience and knowledge of other foreign intelligence services (Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, and Libyan). The former director of the Spanish National Center of Intelligence (CNI), Jorge Dezcallar, publicly confirmed that the cooperation level since 9-11 has substantially increased.¹ In this sense, one of the main theses of this analysis is that countries with a limited regional position will be able to see their regional options multiplied to an exponential degree due to a change in the international sphere and a “new” game in which greater powers such as the United States, China, Russia, and the countries of the European Union see themselves involved. Thus the necessity of unique information that the countries of Central Asia can supply places them, as we will see, in a situation very different from the one in the years of the Cold War.

Sharing knowledge is the first step to a harmonization of view points as far as the perception of threats is concerned, to the end of formulating and implementing common policies, in order to be able to face both the new threats at the beginning of the 21st century and the traditional ones that still persist nowadays in a more effective way. This way, we are more and more conscious that the cooperation between intelligence services is needful as it supplies great satisfactions for us in the field of the fight against terrorism, among others. We saw this last November with the arrest of the bloodthirsty “Txeroki”, leader of the terrorist organization ETA, fruit of the collaboration between France and Spain, as French Interior Secretary Michèle Alliot-Marie pointed out, “*This arrest shows once more the excellent collaboration between France and Spain in the fight against Basque terrorism.*”²

Nevertheless, let us not deceive ourselves, the alliances of intelligence already existed during the Cold War, but with 9-11 and the military operations against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan these alliances have been strengthened, not only with a new political push on the part of the Americans, as with the War on Terror (GWOT) the establishment of operation and trust links will be essential ingredients for the fight against these kinds of threats that the 21st century presents.³ But also complemented with new “members” from the Middle East and certain countries from Central Asia, these sometimes result in strange alliances.⁴ This is due to the fact that certain countries outside the Western sphere will always have a greater infiltration capacity in terrorist groups of an Islamic character than those in Western countries. This is because of the “weakness” of human intelligence in American intelligence services in regions such as Central Asia.⁵

This way, contradicting what could be more logical at first sight, the smaller countries (such as the five republics of Central Asia) are actors to keep in mind whose services, on many occasions, the great powers cannot do without. In this essay, we will

¹ El Pais, Spain, 28 April 2002.

² Official statement of the French Republic, Paris, 17 November 2008 in: http://www.ambafrance-es.org/article.php?id_article=3049

³ Lefebvre Stéphane, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Cooperation”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, (2003)

⁴ For instance, Libyan intelligence agencies assisted the West in the fight against terrorism post-9=11. Richard J. Aldrich, “Dangerous Liaison: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances,” *Harvard International Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, (Fall 2002), p. 51.

⁵ Robert Baer, (2002): See *No Evil: the True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism* New York, Crown Publishers, 2002.

try to present how the new situation in the international sphere after the end of the Cold War has radically changed the game of intelligence alliances. If it is true that this is a subject very much debated in Western countries, the repercussions of this situation in the countries of Central Asia have been scarcely analyzed. In this sense, this analysis attempts to present the risks and opportunities which intelligence alliances since the end of the Cold War offer in this area. To that end we will try to give an overview as rigorous as possible about both the conception of intelligence alliances nowadays and its repercussion in the area of study; this is the Central Asian region (formed by five ex-Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). However, before starting this analysis we consider it convenient to give a brief description about how this regional subsystem is articulated.

These States from Central Asia, through their cooperation in matters of intelligence in this new international scene, can see their comparative advantages strengthened and also their geopolitical importance of a regional character. However, the main obstacle for it is the very same conception of intelligence in these types of countries, much more centered on the suppression of the internal opposition and in the control of its own population than in the perception of external strategic threats. In this sense, this essay attempts to be an example of how intelligence services and their correct definitions can be an excellent democratic indicator or a State.⁶

1. Central Asia as a regional system.

Following M. Sheehan's thesis, we can affirm that Central Asia constitutes a "security complex"⁷, which represents a group of States whose interests and aims are sufficiently interlinked in such a way that the security of each State can be understood if it is not related to the rest of the States of the complex. The underlying element of such a complex would not be the search of shared interests but shared rivalries.

The regional system is not only affected by the internal dynamics of trust/distrust, but also by a series factors (both internal and external) that modify those dynamics which must be kept in mind, such as the change in the economic and military power or the disappearance of former conflicts and the appearance of new ones. Without understanding the regional dynamics we cannot understand how external influences that we will eventually study affect them. The conjunction of dynamics and factors supplies for us a frame within which we can make predictions in that security complex. The combination of those four elements (cooperation and rivalry or conflict dynamics, on one hand, and internal and external factors, on the other), as a result, gives us four possible situations, excluding those where foreign powers disappear or play an irrelevant role in the region.

The first scene would be that in which the internal dynamics of the region are those of conflict and would combine with the rivalry between foreign powers in the region by influencing in it. The result would be a fragile stability where each republic from Central Asia would be influenced by a different actor. The lines of division between the different republics would be more clearly marked.

⁶ Díaz Matey, G. "Toward an inclusive definition of intelligence", *Intelligence and prospective magazine* 4, (2008)

⁷ Sheehan, Michael (2005): *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, pp. 49-50.

The second scene would be characterized by the combination of cooperation dynamics between the States of the region with the rivalry between foreign powers. As a consequence we would get an improvement in regional security during a short period of time, as rivalries between external powers could infect the local one.

The third scene would be that composed of regional dynamics of cooperation and a predisposition of external actors to cooperate. It is the ideal situation to respond together to the challenges that affect the region.

	Internal Factors	
External Factors	1	2
	3	4

As characteristics of this subsystem we could point out the following:

1. - It is formed by five republics with unequal capacities, in some cases almost disproportionate, as it is in the case of the territory, population, GDP, or military expenses.

2. - These inequalities in the elements that traditionally define power (territory, population, wealth) provoke these States to tend not to cooperate amongst themselves but to compete and establish a series of rivalries, so there are two countries that aspire to be a regional power (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and try to influence in the political decisions (either in matters of security, civil liberties, or exports) of the other three countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan⁸). It is the practice of balance of power by which a State seeks to counterweigh another State that represents the greatest threat, though it might not be the most powerful in the system.⁹

3. - We can also find another practice described by the neo-realists denominated “bandwagoning”, which consists in getting in line with the most powerful state.¹⁰ This would be the other side of the previous practice; that is, it would be the balance of power seen from the small countries’ perspective.

4. - We can also find the “bandwagoning” when other external actors enter into the scene, such as Russia, China, or the USA, as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan give up, in some aspects, under the pressures of these great international actors that try to make some type of influence in the region.

5. - Another characteristic of this region is what the neo-realists call “buck passing”, which is when the threatening appearance of another more powerful State emerges, a State can adopt a passive attitude, transferring its responsibility to act upon other States also affected by the same threat.¹¹

⁸ The Turkmenistan case must be considered aside, as President Niyazov’s traditional policies took him from neutrality to isolation. Because he died in December 2006, he was succeeded by Berdimujamedov, who has taken certain liberalizing steps, seeking alliances abroad, financial support in the neighboring countries, and former allies.

⁹ Walt, Stephen M. (1987): *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

¹⁰ Sodupe, Kepa (2003): *The theory of International Relations at the beginning of the 21st Century*. Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco, p. 90.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

6. - The five republics have a series of challenges and threats in common. Apart from the environmental and geographic determinants and apart from the socioeconomic circumstances, we have a generalized administration corruption, sharpened by several instances of illegal trafficking and organized crime, and the proliferation of Muslims, separatists, and terrorists. They are challenges and threats that take advantage of the mistakes of these state structures or directly avoid them, which cannot be understood from a strictly state logic.

We could say, in a few words, that these international actors assume a rationalist logic, with the actors being marked by the achievement of one objective: to look after their interests, the first of which is survival itself. Nevertheless, there is another parameter which will help us at the time to understand certain movements of their respective politics (on both a national and international level, many times interwoven): they are guided by an eagerness of their rulers to keep their positions and to enrich, at their expense, a person-minded objective.

We have several examples of the latter. With regard to the continuity of the positions, the most representative figure would be the late President of Turkmenistan, the only one that can be defined by the moments as a life-long President, as he held the office from the independence of the country to the time of his death. The colleagues of his Central Asian surroundings have also made constitutional reforms to be oriented toward his presidential post *sine die*, generating a cult to the leader that would serve as an instrument for it.¹² Askar Akayev tried that too, but he had to flee out of the country in March 2005 after the elections branded as fraudulent by the electoral observers of the OSCE and after a colorful revolution.¹³

On the other hand, with regard to personal enrichment these rulers have taken advantage of the concession of licenses for the most diverse businesses to make a fortune, especially those related to hydrocarbon and telecommunications; the paradigmatic case would be here Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of the President of Uzbekistan who, besides being a popular pop singer, is the owner of interesting and profitable businesses, which makes her a firm candidate to succeed her father in a not-too-distant future, as political expert Alexei Malashenko indicates.¹⁴ This way, with the increasing corruption of political elites, such long-expected transitions to the economy of free market and democracy have failed; and if in 2001 there was some hope with regard to the Kyrgyzstan case¹⁵, today, after three years of revolutions and sociopolitical instability, that hope has vanished and we find a State fragmented by mobs, a failed State where organized crime reigns¹⁶, where there is a north-south break more and more

¹² Again the case of the President in Turkmenistan is paradigmatic. He was appointed several times by the Parliament "*Turkmenbashi*", that is, father of all the Turkmenistan people. He gave new names to cities and even months of the year and the days of the week, making reference to the events of his personal life.

¹³ Orozobekova, Cholpon: "Making Kyrgyzstan's Constitutional Reform Stick", *Institute for War and Peace reporting, Reporting Central Asia*, n° 472, 21 November 2006, in: <http://www.iwpr.net>; Alonso Marcos, Antonio: "Kirguistán, 2007: Opportunities and challenges.", *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 13, January 2007, in: <http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci>

¹⁴ Kamtsev, Dmitry: "Professor Aleksei Malashenko: Gulnara Karimova is one of preferable candidates for successor to the president of Uzbekistan", *Ferghana.Ru news agency*, 9 June 2005, in: <http://enews.ferghana.ru>.

¹⁵ Postel, Eric G. y Nevenchanny, Yuri: "Kyrgyzstan: A Jewel of Central Asia", *Pangaea Partners*, August 2001, in: <http://www.pangaeapartners.com>.

¹⁶ "Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State", *International Crisis Group, Asia Report*, n° 109, 16 December 2005, in: <http://www.crisisgroup.org>; "Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution", *International Crisis Group, Asia Report*, no. 97, (4 May 2005), in: <http://www.crisisgroup.org>.

open every day, and where nepotism has taken the structures of power again.¹⁷ For this reason it is interesting to see what role the different intelligence services that substituted the Soviet KGB in this region carry out.

The inequalities are truly broad with regard to the territory (Kazakhstan, with 2,717,300 km² occupies an extension of almost 20 times that of Tajikistan, with 143,100 km²), the population (nearly 16,000,000 in Kazakhstan against just 5,500,000 in Kyrgyzstan), the GDP (in thousands of millions of American dollars, 167.6 in Kazakhstan versus 10.5 in Kyrgyzstan), or the military expenses:

Country	Tanks	Armored Cars	Planes	Helicopters
Kazakhstan	630	1000	131	125
Kyrgyzstan	210	298	58	11
Tajikistan	40	195	-	4
Turkmenistan	570	1354	218	10
Uzbekistan	370	909	139	42

Source: “Military potential of the Central Asian member states of the CIS (2007)”, in: <http://news.ferghana.ru>. Amounts expressed in American dollars.

	Expenses Defense 2007	GDP Percentage	GDP in 2007 (thousands)	GDP in 2006 (thousands)
Kazakhstan	1220	1.2	101.5	77.9
Kyrgyzstan	40.4	1.3	3.1	2.6
Tajikistan	52.2	1.8	2.9	2.5
Turkmenistan	113.6	0.6	18.9	15.6
Uzbekistan	902.4	4.8	18.8	15.5

Source: “Military potential of the Central Asian member states of the CIS (2007)”, in: <http://news.ferghana.ru>. Amounts expressed in American dollars.

The military expenses increase from 2006 to 2007 was 50%, which gives us the idea that this region is giving priority to these aspects of politics, especially keeping in mind that its economic increase fluctuated between 9-10%. As it can be observed, those who invested more in equipment renovation were Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because, due to their aspirations, they are interested in the modernization of their army. The Turkmenistan case is different because its expense is almost exclusively focused on paying the personnel (the renovation of its equipment is placed in the hands of the Ukraine in exchange for gas). Those who spend less are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,

¹⁷ Saidazimova, Gulnoza: “Three Years On, Kyrgyz President Taken to Task for Rampant Nepotism”, *RFE/RL*, 10 July 2008, in: <http://www.rferl.org>.

which are more dependent on foreign powers that own military bases there (Russia and the USA, but also India in Tajikistan).¹⁸

The fact that countries within the same region do not keep certain homogeneousness does not say anything in itself; it does not imply that relationships of rivalry should necessarily be developed. In fact, in the core of the European Union, countries as small as Luxemburg and as big as Poland, seeking even economic and political integration, live in harmony with each other.

The inequality is not significant in itself; it is, however, if we add to this information that the logic that rules is not that of cooperation (there is no Central Asian integration movement, as those in favor of institutions and idealists of International Relations would desire¹⁹) but that of rivalry, of a struggle for dominion over the other.

These inequalities make different the interests that the several States seek after. Thus, whereas some aspire to neutrality and isolationism (Niyazov's Turkmenistan would be the case), or simply the political stability or the economic development (such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan), others seek to impose upon their neighbors, either through their immense territory or population (as is the case with Kazakhstan), or by owning the most numerous army of the region and having great amounts of individuals of their ethnic group disseminated through adjacent territories (which is the case of Uzbekistan).

The disparity of interests, becoming antagonistic and incompatible on some occasions, makes the organizations in which they come together unsuccessful. There certainly are, as we will later see, some international organizations of a regional character which try to face common subjects (such as the common management of water or the establishment of a Free Zone of Nuclear Weapons-CANWFZ) or that would even aim at a greater economic integration (the Central Asian Cooperation Organization or the Central Asian Economic Union). As Mearsheimer states, realists:

*"...believe that institutions cannot make the States stop behaving like those who maximize power in the short term. For realists, institutions reflect the calculations that a State makes based on its own interest, especially with regard to relative power; as a result, the decisions of the institutions unfailingly reflect the 'equilibrium of power.' So then, institutions do not have significant independent effects on the behavior of the States. However, realists acknowledge that sometimes great powers find institutions useful (especially alliances) to maintain or even increase their portion of world power."*²⁰

In this specific case, we should agree with neo-realists, because institutions here only serve to evaluate the state of regional leadership.

Once we have contextualized the regional subsystem and how interests of the different actors articulate, we can begin to analyze the challenges and opportunities that the change in the intelligence alliances in the post-Cold War offer.

¹⁸ "Thus, whereas the growth of GDP of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia in dollar terms is expected to be no less than 9-10%, growth of their military expenditures will amount to 48%". "Arms spending of post-Soviet Central Asian countries rose by 50% in 2007", *Ferghana.Ru news agency*, 23 January 2007, in: <http://enews.ferghana.ru>.

¹⁹ Mearsheimer, John J.: "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, Vol. 19, n° 3, (1994-1995), pp. 5-49; Mearsheimer, John J.: "A Realist replay", *International Security*, Vol. 20, no. 1, (1995), pp. 82-93.

²⁰ Mearsheimer, John J. *op cit.*, p. 82

2. The common perception of threats as the first step to cooperating in matters of intelligence.

As a general rule, intelligence services often cooperate with each other when the benefits of such cooperation are mutual and overcome, for both, the risks that such cooperation involve because, let us not forget it, it turns out to be very risky. In the end, the cooperation among intelligence services happens when the potential benefits are bigger than the expenses thereof. Then a “quid pro quo” takes place, a mutual benefit due to exchanges of information or analysis. Thus, the cooperation between intelligence services of different countries is anything but strange.²¹ A clear distinction at the time to categorize intelligence alliances concerns the distribution of power which is established in the agreement. Depending on who dictates what material must be relocated and what material must be shared, a relationship of power or any other will be established. A third distinction can be established according to the level of formality which is used in the agreement, having, in one extreme, “ad hoc” exchanges, and in the other the traditional intelligence alliances, such as the alliance of intelligence between the British and Americans, more permanent.

Intelligence services cooperate amongst themselves for several reasons, the most common one being the fact that no agency can do everything and take them all everywhere.²² Different priorities about the perception of threats according to the fixed objectives in external policies imply different approaches and alliances. In the same way, the differences of power distribution lead to differences of power relationships between the several members of the alliance. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that, as William Johnson rightly points out, no matter how close this collaboration between the several intelligence services may be, the politics of different countries are never the same, by which, besides the fact that the international sphere of cooperation between intelligence services are normal, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the rivalry between them is the essence of the functioning of these services.

The aforementioned “quid pro quo” is, on rare occasions, egalitarian, and the benefit that can derive from them by the different parties implied is not always the same.²³ We can find examples of the patronage system in the relationship between the United States and Southern Vietnam in the Vietnam War; the United Kingdom and its several colonies; or the Soviet Union and its satellites during the Cold War. In none of these cases has an egalitarian situation tried to be obtained; rather, on the contrary, the subordinated country uses its regional accesses and its specialized experience for the benefit of the superior one. Nevertheless, in these types of relationships the most modest countries can harm the biggest countries very much, manipulating the information they share (works of disinformation), and maximizing their comparative advantages in a beneficial way for their interests, both regional and national. This way, certain intelligence services, due to their geographical position, to the composition of their personnel or even their ability, maintain their comparative advantage, which they will be able to exploit in an effective way, though the great powers may have a greater

²¹ Richelson Jeffrey T., “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence* 4, no. 3, (2007), p.308

²² Arthur S. Hulnick, “Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 5, no. 4, (1991–1992), pp. 455–465.

²³ Clough, Chris, “Quid Pro Quo: The challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17, (2004), p.602

number of resources. We cannot forget that in this sense the game of intelligence is very delicate, and that even the most powerful countries with more resources can be left exposed to the counter-intelligence of countries which are, in theory, more modest.

As we have been verifying, the cooperation between intelligence services, though essential, is not easy.²⁴ Keeping in mind all of these variables, the States prefer to establish alliances between intelligence services in a formal way because the protection and security that is broken down from formal alliances is much higher; *sensu contrario*, informal alliances present a degree of uncertainty that on many occasions is intolerable to the States.²⁵ As Michael Herman correctly states, when analyzing intelligence, alliances must keep in mind that the States always prefer to establish alliances in a bilateral way rather than multinational alliances because the latter involve a greater number of States, and because in a bilateral alliance the possible options can be controlled in a more effective way, thus facilitating confidence and, then, the possibility of maximizing the results in a more effective way.²⁶

This way, *cooperation* can take place on several levels, analyzed by the implied agencies and the degree of cooperation (*granularity*)²⁷ between the several agencies. This term was established by the American Clough Chris and it is applied to the different degrees of cooperation between agencies. As long as the cooperation is divided into levels and is considered somewhat complex, it is something imperfect that does not correspond to scientific patterns of effectiveness and efficiency according to the degree of cooperation, because the true intentions and impulses (derived in many cases from the very particular personalities of the officers implied, not because of the grade of friendship and confidence between them) of the different participants play a key role. What is clear is that we can state that the cooperation will become effective when, under the existence of a common perception of threat, the benefits of cooperation overcome, in some way, the risks.

The majority of intelligence services throughout the world use alliances with their foreign counterparts to maximize their interests, in order to arrive and obtain essential information for correct decision-making, which in other ways they would not be able to obtain, or to establish relationships with countries or non-State entities where diplomacy cannot reach. Never before has it been necessary to develop and increase relationships and contacts between intelligence services of different States. Such an important objective as this must be attained through a maintenance of a permanent link that allows the planning and execution of all of the tasks oriented to the achievement thereof. The subsequent end will be to elaborate, as a whole, a series of actions that, rightly undertaken, will help the States to face certain threats and that, if not done, will most surely interfere in the governability of certain processes that belong to their exclusive responsibility.

As we have said at the beginning, the exchange of information and intelligence between services in order to be able to face the several threats that hang over the international scene is growing more and more important. The “new threats” have been highly conditioned by the development of tendencies generated at the beginning of the

²⁴ Westerfield Bradford, “America and the world of intelligence liaison”, *Intelligence and National Security* 11, no. 3, (July 1996), pp.548

²⁵ Jeffrey T. Richelson, *op cit.*, pp. 317–318; Michael Herman, (1996): *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 200–220.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 207–208.

²⁷ Clough, Chris, *op cit.*, p.602

21st century; especially the technological revolution and globalization, which have transformed the nature of traditional transnational threats and have given rise to the new ones. The worldwide situation has evolved in such a way that many activities which were previously considered as individual patrimony of the States, have been globalizing, making a plot of activities that require a closer, more competitive and more complex relationship between the countries, weakening, at the same time, the concepts of near-absolute sovereignty that predominated up until some decades ago. The economy, finances, justice, the law, and attempts to avoid the degradation of the environment and many more activities, have adopted the many ways of globalization and, at the same time, the same happened with terrorism and organized crime in their different facets. This obligates those that support the necessity to maintain the democratic system and the freedom of our societies to globalize the defenses as well.

Likewise, developing a human capacity of intelligence to fight against these threats takes a considerable period of time, a period of time which as a general rule the Western democracies do not have. For this reason the use of shared human capacities of intelligence of the several countries will be essential to correctly face these threats. For that reason trust between the different services is essential, if it is true that the difference of technology (technological gap) is vast at the present between the different countries and thus makes, as the United States point out, very hard to maintain full-time services (full-time partnerships). Sharing “Raw Data” or data without being analyzed will be one of the bases for the correct development of the cooperation of the different intelligence services.

The “new” types of transnational threats are making use of the new improvements in civil communication for their communications; they are available means for the civil population in general, and its monitoring and detection are very complicated, due to its generalized use. Due to the limitations of technical intelligence (*technit*) the cooperation between systems of different countries in facing the expenses and maximizing the capacities will be an essential element for the right orientation of the old systems developed during the Cold War toward the requirements of the new threats that this century presents. The acceptance of the pacific resolution of the conflicts within democracies and the increase of the cooperation between the democratic States does not raise doubts about the future of intelligence services in the 21st century; on the contrary, it increases their necessity to be able to act in a world fortunately more global but, unfortunately, more open to proliferation, expansion and internationalization of risks, dangers, and threats as well.

Focusing more closely on the subject we are dealing with, the main threats suggested to Central Asian States do not come from other State actors. The factors that cause instability in Central Asia are mainly: the lack of energetic sources and other natural resources (among them, water), the inter-ethnic rivalries and the conflicts between mobs, the problems derived from the poorly-defined State borders accompanied by the nationalist or separatist tendencies, the intervention of foreign powers, problems of socio-economic depression, the scarce quality of democratic institutions (to which I would add the near-absence of a democracy that guarantees the essential rights and liberties), the impunity of organized crime and illicit traffic (drugs, weapons, explosives, women, children...) and the increase in radical Islam, as in the case of groups such as the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan or *Hizb ut Tahrir*. These States are, therefore, conscious of the fact that the main threats that put the *status quo* at risk are differ from the traditional threats; they are of a different nature. Today, the main

threats come from non-State threats, from groups that embody ideologies such as separatism, extremism, and terrorism.²⁸

What is new about this kind of “enemy” that challenges the *status quo* defended by the States? Basically, its nature and way of acting: it is not about well-defined bodies (by a territory, population and a Government), but it would be about a more ample and multiform threat. This new type of “enemy” requires new paradigms and new answers on the part of the States, and not, precisely, help from them, as some States that contributed to the protagonism of terrorist groups in the international system have done:

*“We must also keep in mind that non-State groups that nowadays affirm their right to exercise violence on an international basis seem to aspire in every case to establish new States, or to obtain the control of the existing ones, and that the sympathies that exist toward them in an ample sector of the society of states, reflects sympathy toward those objectives.”*²⁹

The explosions in Tashkent and the incursions in the Kyrgyz region of Batken, both in 1999, marked the starting point of cooperation between the countries from Central Asia against the threat coming from the Islamists which is promoted by foreign Islamic organizations that finance the construction of mosques and Muslim houses of worship inspired by radical and extremist ideologies.³⁰

It seems hardly probable that a short-medium term war confrontation between the Central Asian republics or between some of them and another country (Russia, China, the USA, or Iran) as a series of mechanisms and organizations that help to solve the differences that may arise between them in relation with the subjects such as the management of natural resources (mainly water and hydrocarbon) have been established, if it is true that differences exist between those initiatives pushed directly by the Central Asian States (though foreign States may also participate) and those directed by external actors (which generally tend to be used to make their presence valued in the region). They are international organizations which deal with subjects not only related to the military, but also those dealing with the economy, culture, and Human Rights.

Allison and Jonson point out that in spite of there being certain dynamics of cooperation in the region (which can be seen in the creation of organizations such as the *Central Asian Economic Community*, the *Turkic Union*, the *Economic Cooperation Organization*, the *SCO*, and the *CIS*), it seems that the dynamics of conflict are much deeper and in spite of the regional dynamics of cooperation in Central Asia it seems that the dynamics of conflict are more rooted. These dynamics of conflict are due to the existence of inter-ethnic rivalries, water management, the Islamic challenge, deteriorated social conditions, and rival national strategies with regard to economic and

²⁸ Nevertheless, *Hizb ut Tahrir* aspires to be a state figure, to build a new form of the State, though not through military or violent means (at least not at first). In this essay, we will consider *asymmetric conflict* that one established between the Islamic group *Hizb ut Tahrir* and Central Asian States, because of the different nature of the actors intervening in it, such different capacities, and such different strategies. See Alonso Marcos, Antonio: “*Hizb Ut-Tahrir* (HT) in the Valley of Fergana.”, *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 9, October 2005, in: <http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci>. See also Alonso Marcos, Antonio: “Analysis of the speech *Hizb ut Tahrir*”, *Athena Intelligence Journal*, Vol.3, N. 2, April-June 2008, in: <http://www.athenaintelligence.org>.

²⁹ Bull, Hedley (2005): *The anarchic society: A study about the order in world-wide politics*, Madrid, Catarata, p. 320.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

external politics, for which the cooperation in matters of security has not given the expected good results.³¹ Following Allison we can distinguish in this region forums and organizations of security mainly sponsored by Central Asian republics or by external powers.³²

The frameworks sponsored by the States from Central Asia promote the regional cooperation and reflect an effort to attain consensus in matters of main concern about them. Nevertheless, the rivalries and inequalities between the local powers hinder such efforts. Examples of this first type of forums are the EEC, the *Eurasian Union*, the CLCA, the CANWFZ, and the already-mentioned “6+2” group.

In the first half of the 1990’s none of the countries, apart from Russia, dared to develop security structures with countries from Central Asia as it was considered that it was a zone of natural influence, especially through the *Eurasian Economy Community* (EEC), successor of the failed *Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan*, and of the CIS and some of its derived organs such as its anti-terrorist Center or the Agreement of Collective Security. But at the end of the decade, Russia ceased to be a reliable manager of the security of the region, so other countries promoted security initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) of NATO, the SCO (with its RATS), the *Turkic States Grouping*, or the ECO. Moreover, the role that organizations such as the OSCE and the UN play must be kept in mind.

3. The struggle for regional leadership: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

These States gained access to the independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, passing from a hierarchical system (the SSRU) to an “anarchical” one (the international system) in which they have to struggle for the power in the zone. Though on occasions disputes arise between them in an attempt to make a greater influence in the region, they seek, as a general rule, to maintain the *status quo*.

This struggle for regional leadership has been seen in several aspects on numerous occasions. In the first place, the movements of approaching great powers have been read from this viewpoint. The United States have a “democratic agenda” for the countries of the zone, and backed the regional Kazakhstani leadership, as a type of compensation for its denuclearization, for its immense economic potential and for being a source of hydrocarbons; but its close links to Russia, which it considers its buffer state, its insurance against possible destabilizations in Central Asia (a region which at the same was considered a natural border with Afghanistan, Iran, and China), prevented considerable improvements in this field. Afterwards, they looked at Uzbekistan, supporting Karimov’s regime. Bush’s discourse about the war on terror, and especially against the Islamic radicalism, was easily assimilated and redefined by President Karimov,³³ who used it to his own benefit to suppress any initiative of the opposition to his regime.³⁴

³¹ Allison, Roy and Jonson, Lena (eds.) (2001): *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, Washington, Brookings Institution, pp. 13 and 19.

³² Allison, Roy: “Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy Cooperation in Central Asia”, in: Allison and Jonson, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

³³ Speech by Karimov, 26 September 2001, in: <http://2004.press-service.uz>.

³⁴ Murray, Craig: “The War on Terror Must Not Become a Cover to Support Repressive Regimes”, 24 October 2003, in: <http://www.craigmurray.co.uk>.

The American military intervention in the north of Afghanistan benefitted Karimov to weaken and surmount the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan (IMU). However, the United States conditioned the economic help to the advance in matters of democratization and respect of Human Rights. The fact that Karimov did not keep his part of the agreement provoked the American Congress to suspend support, but the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, fulfilled them with part of the long-term budget from his own Department.

However, the events in Andijan, in May 2005, implied a point of reflection, so Uzbekistan forsook the West, and threw itself in the arms of those powers that did not ask for an explanation about how to solve its affairs in the internal realm, though they might involve flagrant violations of Human Rights. Thus, Karimov sought Russia and China's support, which meant its strengthening as a regional leader.

In second place; multilateral forums: we have an example of this in the Kazakh president's initiative called the CICA (*Conference on Interaction and Conference-Building Measures in Asia*), which is a mechanism to generate means of confidence for the regions, or also in the Karakh initiative of the creation of a Central Asian Economic Union. The creation of GUUAM (initiative of security pushed by the United States which at first grouped Georgia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia) is proof of this.

In third place, on a bilateral level: here the attempts to impose its criteria are blatant, as Kazakhstan does on an economic level.³⁵ Interventions of Uzbek security services (read, secret services) in Kyrgyzstan have taken place, as it was in the case with the murder of imam Rafiq Qori Kamoluddin's, who managed the mosque Al-Sarahsiy, in the city of Kara-Suu, close to the city of Osh, where he permitted the actions of members of the Islamic movement *Hizb ut Tahrir* or the case of Uzbek journalist Alisher Aaipov's murder.³⁶ In Tajikistan, a country with Persian roots, some Uzbek agents have been arrested under the accusation of espionage;³⁷ Uzbek secret services have also been accused of perpetuating attacks, concerning which Uzbek authorities have kept silence; these accusations are not new, but they are part of a large history of Uzbek entries in Tajikistan³⁸ taking advantage of the porosity of the Uzbek-Tajikistani border, in spite of having been undermined in 1999.

The occasions of cooperation, therefore, have been rather scarce, as the signing of an agreement to strengthen border control to stop drug trafficking³⁹; agreement, on the other hand, ineffective enough, as the date published by the Office of International Affairs of Narcotics and the fulfillment of the Law of the American Department of State show, due, in a greater degree, to corruption by officials.

³⁵ Saidazimova, Gulnoza: "Kazakhstan: Nazarbaev's Regional Tour Shows Growing Economic Influence", *RFE/RL*, 14 September 2007, in: <http://www.rferl.org>.

³⁶ "Director-General condemns murder in Kyrgyzstan of Uzbek journalist Alisher Saipov", 29 October 2007, in: <http://portal.unesco.org>. "Prominent journalist killed in southern Kyrgyzstan", *Ferghana.ru News Agency*, 25 October 2007, in: <http://enews.ferghana.ru>.

³⁷ Saidazimova, Gulnoza: "Central Asia: Uzbek Security Service Steps up Work in Neighboring Countries", *RFE/RL*, 25 August 2005, in <http://www.rferl.org>.

³⁸ "World: Asia-Pacific: Tajikistan accuses Uzbekistan of plotting Tajik revolt", *BBC News*, 12 November 1998, in: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

³⁹ "Kazakh, Uzbek security services sign anti-drug action plan", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 1 May 2006, in: <http://www.turkishweekly.net>.

The Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) was established on April 30th, 1994 with the Agreement of the creation of a common economic space between the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, which extended a previous Agreement that created a common economic space between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In December 1995 the CAEC decided to deal with security matters, forming to that end a Mixed Council of Ministers of Defense.

This Council created in 1996 the *Centrazbat*⁴⁰, a maintenance battalion for tri-party peace to coordinate military exercises, air defense, and defense equipments. This *Centrazbat* has performed exercises together annually with the initiative of NATO's PfP. They have been trained to take part in multinational maintenance operations for peace and humanitarianism, besides strengthening the inter-military relationships of the region.

In 1998 Tajikistan joined the CAEC, and these four States signed an agreement in April 2000 about the cooperation in the fight against terrorism, extremism, and trans-border crime. In December 2001 the four heads of State decided to transform the CAEC into the CAEI (*Central Asian Economic Organization*) at the Tashkent summit.

The latter constitutes an initiative properly Central Asian, but, as Lela Jonson points out, one of the breaks of this battalion is the fact that the Uzbek army can be more a source of fear rather than confidence, being for Jonson an option to put this *Centrazbat* under the control of another non-Central Asian State. The solution supplied by Jonson would be another source of problems, as it could not be put but in Russian hands, increasing the already excessive influence of the Kremlin in the zone.

4. Three weak actors: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan.

The only way out that is left to the other three States is to join with the regional leader to not feel them completely in defense against other great powers, suffering in the best way possible the abuses to which they can be submitted by the superior powers.

The turbulent Kyrgyzstan has been changing its external policies in the last four years, ceasing to rely on Russia to seek American help and returning to the arms of Russia. This has turned out as an alternative submission to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the latter being the most important as the majority of the southern half of its population is of the Uzbek ethnic group. Thus, for example, it has changed its policies of religious freedom before the threats of its Uzbek neighbor, as its permissiveness in that territory was directly affecting it, as it was demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in 1999 and 2004 in Tashkent.

In the meantime, Tajikistan cannot but contemplate how almost indolent the Uzbek security services are with their presence in its territory, disguised among its civil population.

Turkmenistan is trying to break little by little its isolation and is dealing with matters of interest for both aspirants to be a regional leader⁴¹, but mainly with Uzbekistan, with which it signed numerous agreements last year in matters of cultural, economic, commercial, customs, agricultural cooperation, and an Agreement for the

⁴⁰ <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.

⁴¹ Akhmadov, Erkin: "Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan: Latest Sign of Growing Regional Cooperation in Central Asia", *CACI Analyst*, 31 October 2007, in: <http://www.cacianalyst.org>.

strengthening of friendship and cooperation relationships⁴², apart from a series of high-level visits that seek to strengthen the relationships between both⁴³. Moreover, this country seeks to approach the countries that, in themselves, exploit the sources of hydrocarbon, that is, Kazakhstan⁴⁴, Iran,⁴⁵ and Russia⁴⁶.

5. Three great powers interested in the zone.

There are many countries interested in this region either because of its energy sources or its strategic localization. However, there are three great powers which vehemently try to enter this renewed “Great Game”: Russia, China, and the United States. This interventionist impulse is mainly motivated by two factors: energy and security. This region is rich in hydrocarbons and it constitutes a geo-strategic enclave of great importance (Russia’s soft underbelly, China’s Western door, the bridge between Europe and Asia, and its proximity to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran).

We can understand the importance of this region for Russia just by looking at the first country that Presidents of Russia visit at the beginning of their mandate⁴⁷. The Russian Federation wishes to maintain its hegemonic influence in the region, an aspiration which it has never resigned, though on occasions it has sought for it or at least disguised it, as it happened after 9-11, when the United States asked for permission from these republics to establish bases in its territory or go across its air space. At that moment Russia did not protest at all, which does not mean that it was pleased, as it could previously be seen, because, though President Putin held a coherent position in his support, the situation changed in March 2003 when he strongly criticized the intervention in Iraq.

Russia has its influence in the zone in several ways. The most evident one is of a cultural kind: it is not possible to take its presence in the zone for more than 150 years away at once; it is enough to point out that Russian is a well-known language for the majority of Central Asians (even in some regions it is the only known language by its inhabitants). It also has an influence through the creation of international forums, such as the CIS, established in December 1991, and its Agreement of Collective Security (constituted as an Organization in the year 2002 and its acronym became OTSC); either it does so directly, or in a bilateral way. Or even sometimes in a not-so-very Orthodox way, that is, carrying out actions against the opposition (as they were accused of in

⁴² “New Era Dawns on Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan Relations”, *nCa News and Commentary*, 18 October 2007, in: <http://www.newscentralasia.net>.

⁴³ “President of Turkmenistan Ends His Visit to Uzbekistan”, 10 March 2008, in: <http://www.press-service.uz>. See also “Uzbekistan is Looking West, Turkmenistan East”, *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 14 March 2008, in: <http://www.turkishweekly.net>.

⁴⁴ “Kazakhstan/Turkmenistan: Resource-Rich Central Asian Duo Seeks Cooperation”, *Eurasia Insight*, 31 May 2007, in: <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

⁴⁵ *Text of Joint Turkmenistan-Iran Statement*, 20 June 2007, in: <http://www.newscentralasia.net>.

⁴⁶ Dubnov, Vadim: “Turkmenistan, Russia and the West: two's company, three's a crowd”, *RIA Novosti*, 26 April 2007, in: <http://en.rian.ru>.

⁴⁷ Komsomolets, Moskovsky: “Russia: President Dmitry Medvedev will make his first foreign visits to Kazakhstan and China”, *Ferghana.Ru news agency*, 22 May 2008, in: <http://enews.ferghana.ru>.

Kyrgyzstan⁴⁸) or by bribing agents of the security service such as Valery Patsula, Vladimir Berejnoj, Dmitriy Grib, and Maksat Mamyrganov⁴⁹.

In the fight against terrorism, extremism, and separatism, objectives that are shared with the other members of the Shanghai Organization Cooperation (SCO), important steps have been made. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Russia banned fifteen organizations by declaring them as terrorist⁵⁰, and later the SCO published a list in which the extremist groups were included, among them being *Hizb ut Tahrir*, which were to be persecuted within the territory of the member countries⁵¹. SCO ratified in July 2007 a list of extremist religious organizations which had already been banned in the territory of the States of the organization in the year 2006⁵². However, the list has not been fully published, which adds more uncertainty to this measure and is very unpopular in assimilating terrorist groups with those that are not so⁵³.

But without a doubt, where this “*bandwagoning*” is most evident is in the OTSC. On October 7, 2002 it became an organization with the signing of a Treaty between Germany, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.⁵⁴ With the *letter of Chisinau* a new thrust was given to the initiative of Russian security for the ex-Soviet zone, trying to avoid the flirting of these countries with NATO through, mainly, the PFP. In Southern Caucasus, which directly borders with Russia, this situation is much more complicated, as it has been seen in the case of Georgia, where the situation has finally ended up exploding.⁵⁵

In principle, its members committed themselves to providing themselves with capacities that guarantee the collective security. To that end they created the Collective Forces of Quick Reaction, whose Combined Headquarters is in Moscow (though it is expected that there will be another three regional headquarters in Belarus, Armenia, and Kazakhstan). It has 1500 soldiers (3 battalions deployed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), apart from the military base present in Tajikistan (motorized division 201 for border control) and the air base in Kant (Kyrgyzstan).⁵⁶

As it often happens in this region, the organizations, which have identical purposes and objectives and which start mechanisms destined to analyze similar tasks (the fight

⁴⁸ Djuraev, Ulugbek: “Russian Secret Services Ready to Combat Kyrgyz Opposition”, *Axis News*, 27 April, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>.

⁴⁹ Karimov, Daniyar: “Leonid Bondarets: Kyrgyz court named Russia and China enemy states”, News Agency “24.kg”, 2 May 2008, in: <http://eng.24.kg>.

⁵⁰ ““Blacklisted” terrorist groups may not appeal designation”, *Interfax*, 15 March 2007, in: <http://www.interfax.ru>.

⁵¹ “SCO Summit: Crackdown Highlights Failings on Human Rights: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Should Not Undermine Rights in Name of Security”, *Human Rights Watch*, New York, 16 August 2007, in: <http://hrw.org>.

⁵² Minnick, Wendell: “SCO most concerned by Hizb ut Tahrir”, *Defense News*, 8 June 2007, in: <http://www.defensenews.com>; later published in <http://www.khilafah.com>.

⁵³ “SCO Summit: Crackdown Highlights Failings on Human Rights: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Should Not Undermine Rights in Name of Security”, *Human Rights Watch*, New York, 16 August 2007, in: <http://hrw.org>.

⁵⁴ In June 2006 Uzbekistan joined in, after the events in Andijan; Socor, Vladimir: “Uzbekistan Accedes to Collective Security Treaty Organization”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 27 June 2006, in: <http://www.jamestown.org>; “CSTO readmits Uzbekistan as full-fledged member: Putin”, *People’s Daily Online*, 24 June 2006, in: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn>.

⁵⁵ “US spies really ‘surprised’ by Georgia invasion of South Ossetia?”, *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 12 August 2008, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>.

⁵⁶ “Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)”, in: <http://www.eurasianhome.org>

against extremism, separatism, and terrorism; border control; the fight against organized crime and illegal trafficking; etc.) overlap. This is due in a greater degree to the fact that each of these organizations really serves the interests the country that dominates such an organization. That is why they overlap, for example, the CSTO and the SCO in Central Asia. This took them to sign a *Memorandum* of understanding between both organizations in 2007⁵⁷.

However, as numerous analysts point out, these organizations have more of a political value rather than practical, by which its efficiency is called into question at the time to fight against organized crime, or terrorists, in spite of making some progress, such as the “Canal” operation, which tries to stop the narcotic traffic from Afghanistan.

The Popular Republic of China owns the two interests in the region which we have previously mentioned (hydrocarbons and security). With regard to the first question, it is logical that this giant in full development demands enormous energy sources. Thus, it has closed numerous agreements to exploit deposits in Kazakhstan and to import Turkmenistan gas.

With regard to the subject of security, we cannot forget that one of the greater headaches for this power is what is denominated as the three evils: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Its most western province, Xingjian, is the paradigm of the confluence of these three evils, as we could see after the attack performed by the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkistan at the beginning of the celebration of the Olympic Games in Peking.

Having seen its interests, it acts in the region through several means. It acts in a bilateral way, especially in the resolution of border disputes, which the CICA also helped. And it also does so through the SCO. In the core of this organization, having always Russia’s approval, the countries from Central Asia get help to modernize the equipments of its army and to receive special training, apart from the cultural and economic cooperation, which are also important at the hour of exercising its influence in the zone.

Within the SCO, the organisms with more performance and stability are the secretary (directed from 2001 to 2006 by the Chinese Zhang Deguang, and from January 1, 2007 by the Kazakh Bolat Kabdylkhamitovich Nurgaliev) and the Regional Anti-terrorist Center, better known by its acronym in English (RATS), first established in Bishket and then in Tashkent.

Within its diplomatic action, the countries which hosted American bases were forced to strain their relationship with the United States and to do everything possible to expel them from their territory, taking advantage of the opportunity created after the events in Andijan in May 2005, when the United States tried to put pressure on the Uzbek Government to open an independent and impartial Commission of Investigation about the question. That same August, the SCO approved a Declaration in which they thanked the United States for the Taliban defeat, and it was stated that their presence was not there now because the situation in Afghanistan had been stabilized.

For that reason, they put pressure on Uzbekistan so that they required the United States to abandon the K-2 and Kyrgyzstan required the renegotiation of the price to rent the base in Manas. Being conscious that the base in Bishkek is now more essential than

⁵⁷ *Memorandum of Understanding between SCO Secretariat and CSTO Secretariat*, 5 October 2007, in: <http://www.sectSCO.org>.

ever to support the fight against terror in the not-yet-established Afghanistan, Bakiyev's new Government was required to pay 100 times more. The final agreement, on July 14, 2006, involves an increase in the rent payment of the base that passes from 2.5 million dollars to 20. This sum is included in a package of compensation measures that reaches the amount of 150 million dollars, by way of taking off and landing and the purchase of local fuel and technical support, besides the donation of three Mi-8 helicopters of Russian manufacture.⁵⁸

In the military realm, it is interesting to see a series of combined military exercises which China has carried out with these countries, either within the frame of the SCO or in a bilateral manner.⁵⁹ But it is particularly striking to see how the combined exercise in 2007 called "Mission of Peace 2007" was developed. In it a huge amount of arms and excessive personnel (more than 6500) were used, keeping in mind that it was for freeing a city from Xingjian taken by terrorists, case taken from reality, as it happened in the border city of Karasuu, between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and which provoked the suppression of the Uzbek army.⁶⁰ The exercises were developed in two different regions: the Chinese in Xingjian and the Russian in Chelyabinsk. To the difficulties that can arise in any military exercise, we must add to them those of combined military exercises, among which the most important is the language, the protocols of action, and the military culture.

These multilateral exercises have their precedent in the combined Chinese-Kyrgyzstani exercises carried out between the 10th and 11th of October 2002, focusing their attention, again, on the terrorist threat in the border region between both countries. Another combined bilateral exercise was carried out with Kazakhstan (whose code name was "Tianshan-I 2006"), between the 24th and the 26th of August, 2006. It is to be noted that Russia did not intervene in these military maneuvers, which could have been due to the frame of good relationships that these two great powers tactfully maintain.

This zone is also interesting to the **United States** for the reasons already mentioned of energy and security (as a zone of key access to other scenes such as the Middle East, China, or Europe). But to this others must be added, such as the defense of democracy and Human Rights. As Ariel Cohen states, in these moments of the fight against terrorism the United States has a dilemma in Central Asia, where its commitment to democracy (along with the objective to finish off terrorism), finds its touchstone in those authoritarian regimes.⁶¹

The declarations of Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State of the United States, during her tour through those countries in October 2005, show the growing interest of her country to stay in the zone. The United States is interested in counting on the collaboration of the States of the zone to develop a plan to extend democracy and its fight against terror, which will allow them to install non-permanent bases in their own

⁵⁸ "U.S. military to pay US\$20 million in rent for base in Kyrgyzstan, official says", *Khaleej Times Online*, 21 July 2006, in: <http://www.khaleejtimes.com>.

⁵⁹ Since 2002, it has carried out 17 combined exercises with armies from other countries. See McDermott, Roger N.: "The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007", *The Jamestown Foundation, Occasional Paper*, October 2007, in: <http://www.jamestown.org>, p. 12.

⁶⁰ McDermott, Roger N.: "The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007", *The Jamestown Foundation, Occasional Paper*, October 2007, in: <http://www.jamestown.org>.

⁶¹ Cohen, A.: "The Great Game Returns", *GEES*, 4 November 2005, in: <http://www.gees.org>; Cohen, A.: "The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia", *The Heritage Foundation*, 25 January 1996, in: <http://www.heritage.org>.

territory and free access to their air space. In a former discourse by Rice in the American University in Cairo, she exposed her preference that it should be the native population itself which requires democratic changes in their respective Governments, as democracy cannot be imposed from above but must emerge from below.⁶²

This is the reason for different initiatives oriented toward generating and promoting the civil society in countries with dictatorships to impulse a change of Government that may bring another pro-American and supporter of democracy and free market, and beginning the necessary reforms to modernize such a country. For that reason the U.S. is accused of being behind the so-called “revolutions of colors”, which has demoted the Government in several countries of the former Soviet orbit with the purpose of putting to the front of the new Government someone pro-American or at least pro-Western.⁶³

An active and supported presence of the U.S. in the zone makes the cooperation with Russia more difficult, because the latter cannot stop looking at the zone as “its” zone of influence, and that prolonged presence would sooner or later involve a growing American influence in these countries. According to Celeste Wallander, the relationships between *the United States and Russia can be affected by two questions:*

1. - For the success/failure of the United States in the defeat of terrorist networks in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

2. -For the continuity of the seeming common interest against European Asian terrorism.

The model of the “soft underbelly” is the one that worked out up to the present time in the relationships between the United States and Russia. It consists in pointing the region of Central Asia as the Center of general instability and vulnerability. But this focus is too limited and potentially self-destructive, because it focuses on military aspects. To this model should be added that of the “Silk Route”, which makes reference to an increase in the economic and commercial cooperation, avoiding the model of the “Great Game”⁶⁴, in which the external powers (mainly Russia, China, and the United States) compete for economic, political, and military interests seeking to control transport routes and the property of natural resources, getting into a game where nobody wins, in spite of the promotion of several regional and international organizations.⁶⁵

Precisely, as Evan A. Feigenbaum, from the Office of the Department of State of the United States for the Affairs of Central and Southern Asia, points out, Central Asia is important for the United States’ interests, for a series of reasons: 1.-For the assertive reappearance of Russia in its neighborhood. 2.-For the appearance of China as a decisive regional and global actor. 3.-Iran’s influence, both in this region and worldwide 4.-The question of energetic security in a moment in which prices are high and demand will continue to increase. 5.-The promotion of democracy between the governments and elites which do not share the same enthusiasm. 6.-Afghanistan’s future

⁶² Rice, Condoleezza: “Remarks at the American University in Cairo”, 20 June 2005, in: <http://www.state.gov>.

⁶³ President Islam Karimov’s interview granted to the magazine *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, taken by Viktoria Panfilova, 14 January 2005, in: <http://tribune-uz.info/eng>.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 101-102.

⁶⁵ Jonson y Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

7.-The debates about and with Islam 8.-The challenge of international terrorism 9.-The economic development in the midst of overwhelming poverty⁶⁶

Besides, this zone has been declared of high interest for the American Intelligence agencies, as it is declared in the *Annual Threat Assessment* which the Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, presented in February 2008⁶⁷, because he considers that this zone gives oxygen to the alliance formed by Iran, Venezuela, and Russia to create an alternative to post-Bretton Woods' system. Moreover, he continues to consider that region as fertile ground for Islamists to round up future terrorists.

This interest has been translated in a series of economic helps to the region in the form of inversions, development help and military cooperation programs, which was distributed in the following way:

“Funding for the five Central Asian countries decreased by nearly 24 percent from FY 2006 to FY 2008. Much of the decline comes in Uzbekistan, where the government has worked actively to limit U.S. assistance related to reforms, and in Kazakhstan, whose oil wealth lessens the need for our assistance. Assistance is instead focused on the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where there are opportunities to consolidate stability and promote democratization.” Summary and Highlights International Affairs Function 150: Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request⁶⁸.

The military campaigns developed by the American army in Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted the new military capacities; it also revealed that the American forces could be better taken advantage of for a global projection of them. And, of course, it also made clear that certain scenes such as Central Asia were vitally important for Washington. Both campaigns reflected certain parallels with the present Resolution in Strategic Affairs (RSA) that reaffirmed the importance of that area as a potential theater of strategic operations⁶⁹.

As Donald Rumsfeld recognized, the American army must be able to move its troops quickly, being warned in short time, to places where unpredictable contingencies against extremists and other enemies may arise. Moreover, they must be troops formed with flexibility, able to have access to an ample diversity of areas, to enjoy a welcoming attitude on the part of countries in which the operations will be developed, and to be able to operate under circumstances that may arise. Therefore, the U.S.'s relationships with the countries of the zone are based on a tactical alliance, in the short-term, dictated by the immediate necessities occasioned by the war on terror.

According to Elizabeth Wishnick, in highlighting the U.S.'s anti-terrorist fight, they are facing the symptoms before the causes of instability in Central Asia. This contributes to the radicalization of political movements of opposition and discredits both the process of democratization and the American commitment with it. Instead of that, the U.S. should face the problems that have to do with “human security”, which make the population more vulnerable to the action of terrorist movements.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Feigenbaum, Evan A.: “Turning the Page” in U.S.-Turkmenistan Relations”, *US Department of State*, 17 September 2007, in: <http://www.state.gov>.

⁶⁷ McConnell, J. Michael: “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, 5 February 2008, in: <http://graphics8.nytimes.com>.

⁶⁸ in: <http://www.usaid.gov>, p. 17.

⁶⁹ Blank, Stephen J.: “After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia”, *Strategic Studies Institute*, 1 July 2005, in: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>.

⁷⁰ Wishnick, *op. cit.*

About the question if the U.S. is performing a task in the zone that is contributing to the democratization of the Central Asian republics or if it is being taken advantage of by Islamists, Michael Scheuer clearly states that it has been harmful to the stabilization of the zone and very profitable to extremism.⁷¹

This kind of asymmetric attack (a terrorist group against a State) made the U.S. perceive a threat that was posed for its national security (for its way of life, prosperity, and, potentially, liberties), the existence of States that were not able to stop terrorist groups, but irresponsibly, defended and supported them.⁷²

In spite of the ups and downs that the U.S.-Central Asia's relationships suffer, a commitment to continue the war on terrorism is kept. In July 2006 the operation "Regional Cooperation-2006" was developed in Bishkek with the participation of the U.S., Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The exercise focused on knowing how to react to air pollution and floods produced by terrorist explosions in a chemical plant and in a dam.

It also maintains links with the regions through combined military exercises within the PfP-NATO frame⁷³. The Combined Exercise "*Cooperative Nugget*" was developed in August 1995 and June-July 1997 in Fort Polk (Louisiana). Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took part in the 1995 exercises, whereas Kazakhstan joined its neighbors in 1997. They used land forces to improve their techniques for peace maintenance, including working with refugees⁷⁴. In March and May of 2000, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan took part in some exercises but this time in Germany and Colorado⁷⁵. The objective of the Combined Exercise "*Cooperative Osprey*" was to improve the inter-operation of the partaking nations and train military personnel in operations of peace support. In August 1996 the U.S., Canada, and Holland joined 16 countries of the Partnership for Peace, where Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan were included, while they were maneuvering in North Carolina. The exercises included operations with amphibian vehicles in a coastal zone, tactics, and procedures. In March 2001 six countries from NATO, among them the U.S., joined 13 associate countries; among them were Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to perform training exercises in Nova Scotia⁷⁶.

Though the U.S. was not especially interested in becoming a client of resources in the Caspian Sea, the production of petroleum will affect world-wide prices thereof, in which the U.S. is interested. Even if the final quantity of production is much less than that offered in the estimations, there continues to be interest. Moreover, from these sources American allies in Europe and Asia can be benefitted.

Its military strategy and energetic strategy go hand in hand, and in both of them there is a key word, diversification. It does not want to risk everything in only one thing,

⁷¹ Scheuer, Michael: "Central Asia in *Al-Qaeda's* Vision of the Anti-American Jihad, 1979-2006", *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, no. 2, May 2006, in: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org>, p. 9.

⁷² Bush, George W.: "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People", 20 September 2001, in: <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.

⁷³ Butler, Kenley: "U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian States", *James Martin Center for Non proliferation Studies*, in: <http://cns.miis.edu>.

⁷⁴ Ide, Douglas: "Cooperative Nugget", *Defense Technical Information Center*, in: <http://www.dtic.mil>. "NATO/PfP Exercise Cooperative Nugget '97", Allied Supreme Commander, in: <http://www.saclant.nato.int>.

⁷⁵ Sluder, Linda: "NATO exercise fosters junior officer teamwork", 15 May 2000, *U.S. Army European Headquarters*, in: <http://www.hqusareur.army.mil>.

⁷⁶ "NATO exercise Cooperative Osprey '96 begins", Allied Supreme Commander, in: <http://www.saclant.nato.int>; Exercise Cooperative Osprey 2001", February 2001, in: <http://www.nato.int>.

so it will always look for alternative routes both for gas and petroleum pipelines and for air corridors necessary in intervening at any time anywhere in the world where it is necessary to give a hard answer before an aggressor or a serious threat. More specifically, apart from seeking to maintain good relationships with Turkey, it will rather have an air corridor in the Caucasus that will allow them to get to Central Asia and once in Asia it will seek to establish bases in order to stabilize Afghanistan, or intervening in other future scenes, as could be the case in Iran.

At the time to talk about intelligence alliances it is necessary to point out that there are two clearly intrinsic cooperation benefits. That way a nation no doubt can, through cooperation, acquire information which otherwise would be impossible to get. In the same way one of the main objectives for a nation to be interested in acquiring information resides on being able to make a certain influence on certain nations, either through itself or other countries. A useful piece of information in intelligence alliances can be obtained through multiple forms: the cooperation with another nation always involves an extent in the spectrum that is covered before specific objectives. This way, smaller nations, sharing costs, are able to face a greater number of vital questions for their national security. Another type of benefit derived from intelligence cooperation includes the achievement of a greater level of political, military, and international influence. Sharing information can derive into the achievement of a diplomatic action (or abstinence of action). In the same way, information can be shared to reaffirm an ally's position. In the end, as we have seen, intelligence alliances through a crypto-diplomacy can imply the substitution of relationships with countries with which they do not have proper diplomatic relationships.

6. Multi-vector diplomacy and games of alliances.

In our area of study, we can see that “buck passing” in several moments. Here we have some of them: first, before Afghanistan's threat, which hosted terrorists in 2001, the Central Asian republics turned to the U.S.'s aid; later, in 2005, after the events in Andijan, the U.S. was considered a threat and it was made known that their presence in the region was no longer necessary because the victory against the Taliban had brought stability to the region, seeking Russia and China's protection.

This game of alliances would not have been possible if it had not been due to what is known as “multi-vector diplomacy”, which consists in cultivating not-too-deep relationships but with multiple actors. This is the methodology followed especially by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

In the same way, the Copenhagen school also states that, as an answer to anarchy to the international system, “communities of security” have risen after the Cold War in some parts of the world for which security is preferably perceived in non-military terms⁷⁷. The SCO, the present predominant organization in this zone, could be considered one of them as it is a group of States which has attained a certain sense of “community”, of institutions and practices ample and strong enough as to convince itself that the resolution of problems can be attained through pacific means. “Security communities” can be of a combined kind (if the several States give up the leadership of making decisions to just one State) or of a pluralistic kind (if each State maintains its

⁷⁷ Buzan, Barry and Waeber, Ole (2003): *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Power*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 19.

sovereignty and controls its decisions). Though the SCO' members maintain their sovereignty, there are two powers (China and Russia) which rule the organization and they even get to influence other Republics so that they make decisions in their External Politics, as it was the example of the American retreat of the Uzbek base K-2. Therefore, this security community would be closer to a combined kind.⁷⁸

In spite of the fact that neo-realism considers the States as an essential factor, R. Keohane defends that such a theory provides a good analysis frame of the action in world-wide politics, by either a State or a non-State actor.⁷⁹

One way or another, since the middle of the 1990s in the last century, the Central Asian States have tried to diversify their political relationships in matters of security, in order not to be completely dependent on Russia. That is why the countries of the region have approached other powers such as Turkey, Iran, and China, besides the U.S. and other Western countries.⁸⁰

As we have seen up to this point, the external influences of other powers affect the regional configuration of this "security complex" characterized by having its own dynamics, concerns, and opportunities.⁸¹ Though such a "complex" is easy to be recognized, it is also true that there are elements which will allow the extension of such a frame beyond the borders of the five States toward the north of Afghanistan, the south of Russia, and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Some authors consider that Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus form an inseparable entity as the constitution of GUUAM showed. And on a sub-regional level we can also identify more reduced "security complexes" such as the case of Fergana Valley or the Caspian Sea.

Buzan suggests that relationships in this "complex" turn around two categories: friendship and enmity, generating this way a series of divisor lines between the components of this "complex". These two categories could be better translated for this region as trust/distrust, which, as we have seen in former chapters, turn around two main axis-States, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

7. The Western viewpoint: the problems of alliance with non-democratic States.

After the Cold War many of these alliances were, for different reasons, degraded, suspended, or even terminated⁸². The identification of a common enemy made the interests converge, but with the end of these common enemies, interests stopped being similar and turned out to be divergent, dispersing by way of close relationships between services. Even so, at the beginning of the Clinton Administration a great emphasis was put on economic intelligence as the great priority for the States after the Cold War ended. But, as it has been later proved, there are still other more important priorities which occupy the first line in the agendas of the intelligence services of several

⁷⁸ Sheehan, *International Security*, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

⁷⁹ Keohane, Robert O.: "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) (1986): *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 193.

⁸⁰ See Jonson and Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁸¹ Jonson, Lena and Allison, Roy: "Central Asian Security: Internal and External Dynamics", in: Allison, Roy and Jonson, Lena (eds.) (2001): *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, Washington, Brookings Institution, p. 6.

⁸² Kenneth M. Pollack, 'Securing the Persian Gulf: Washington Must Manage Both External Aggression and Internal Instability'. *Brookings Review*, Fall (2003): 21.

countries.⁸³ With the development of the asymmetric threats proceeding from the authoritarian and extremist Islamic countries, intelligence services must readjust themselves to new realities. The intelligence services of Western democracies must start to acknowledge the importance of the cooperation to not only deal with weapons of mass destruction (or WMD), but also with actors which use or try to obtain them, as authoritarian States (“rogue states”) and non-State entities.⁸⁴ With the increase of terrorist attacks on the part of the Islamists, intelligence alliances will play an essential role at the hour of fighting against two of the main threats of the 21st century: terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

At the hour of dealing with the Islamic terrorist threat in particular, democratic States will have to necessarily develop a certain type of alliance with authoritarian and non-democratic States, countries which own much more useful and effective human capacities as to deal with these types of threats themselves but that, nonetheless, can become in the long-term a clear potential threat⁸⁵. This subject must really be kept in mind at the time to support, finance, and train countries and actors that in the future may become a future threat, as has already happened with the support of the *mujahidin* that fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and that years after, thanks in part to the training received by Western countries (particularly the U.S.), have become a threat to the West. The danger for this situation to be repeated is due to a failure of the Western democracies to foresee the increase of asymmetric wars.

Neither can we forget the displeasure and distrust that intelligence services present to the citizens in general due to past errors and topics. This will be one of the most compromising points at the time of collaborating with non-democratic regimes and figures. Intelligence services are always in the first line of defense before the threats that beset the country. Without ever losing sight of a correct integration of intelligence services within the services of the democratic game, even nowadays it is a pending course within these systems. Intelligence services are then no longer part of the machinery of the State, and as such they must serve the citizens that, at the end of the day, support them with their tax dollars. The acceptance of a pacific resolution of the conflicts within the democracies and the increase of cooperation between the democratic States do not cast doubt on the future of intelligence services in the 21st century but, on the contrary, it increases their necessity to be able to act in a world more and more global but also more and more open to proliferation, expansion, and the internationalization of risks, dangers, and threats.

Choosing Allies.

The main question that has traditionally existed in intelligence alliances has been the distrust of the products of other intelligence services⁸⁶. One of the main problems that presents a collaboration of intelligence services is the reluctance which they present at the hour of sharing data gathered in the field without being analyzed, or “raw data”. Intelligence services share already-elaborated analyses, so the receptor must rely on the

⁸³ John Danker, “Economic Espionage Increases, Threatening National Security”, *Insight on the News*, (1994), p.38

⁸⁴ John M Deutch and Jeffrey H. Smith, “Smarter Intelligence” *Foreign Policy*, Jan.-Feb. (2002), p. 67

⁸⁵ Daniel Goure, ‘Nuclear Deterrence, Then and Now’, *Policy Review* (2002), p.51

⁸⁶ Hall Gardner, ‘Aligning for the Future: Assertive Unilateralism or Concert of Powers?’ *Harvard International Review* 24, No.4 (2003), p.62.

sources and the transmitter's good faith. The several alliances are mainly established to minimize the weakness of the very systems; for example, the United States has used the intelligence alliances to fill its deficit in human intelligence (HUMINT), using its great advantage in matters of technical intelligence (TECHINT).⁸⁷ In this sense, at the time to fight against new threats that are in taking shape in this century, human intelligence will be essential in fighting against them. The need of a greater emphasis on human intelligence will involve the need for a greater emphasis on alliances between intelligence services in order to get the information that the very services would not be able to obtain by themselves.

It is necessary to point out that the consolidation of international organisms of a diverse nature and end, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or NATO, which play the lead in missions of peace, of interposition between parties in conflict or have in common the same politics on security and defense, demand the necessity that intelligence services transcend their exclusively national character, to cooperate between them and form, even, in the long-term, supra-national intelligence services. The prevention of conflicts, crisis management, reaction before crisis, and operations of pacification and maintenance of peace are produced, more and more in a greater number, in a field of international collaboration, so that the possibility to count on adequate intelligence that may allow for the successful development of these tasks becomes a requirement.

When talking about multinational organizations or coalitions, agreements about information are designed to fulfill particular situations on most of the occasions. If it is true that this tendency will continue to be necessary in the following years, new kinds of action will be imposed before the change of the international situation and the development of the revolution in communications. Therefore, it will be essential to develop more standardized action methods to facilitate a more effective cooperation at the hour of giving support to military operations in a multinational environment, in a similar way to the already-existing methods in NATO.

Conclusion: Towards the conception of intelligence services as a democratic indicator.

The non-Central Asian powers interested in this region maintain cooperation in matters of intelligence for different reasons depending on the country concerned. But what do these non-Central Asian States use their intelligence services for? It seems that the axiom is confirmed that the greater their democratic quality is, more efforts they set aside to fight against new threats (terrorism, illegal trafficking, and organized crime, among others), and less to the internal repression and political persecution of their opposing forces. If we put the data from *Freedom House* and the IDH from the PNUD together, we will see that Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are the countries where there is more liberty and more development, whereas the situations in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are much harder on every level. A different case is Uzbekistan, where there is some economic development but not democratic.

Thus, we hear news that says that Uzbekistan's intelligence services have been accused of having produced a video in which *Radio Free Liberty-Radio Europe* was

⁸⁷ Berkowitz, Bruce. 'Information Warfare: Time to Prepare'. *Issues in Science and Technology*, Winter (2000), p.39.

slandered, to the end of discrediting it.⁸⁸ Or we can also find that Turkmenistan secret services are ordered to monitor each communication made via Internet⁸⁹ or to make “black lists” of “enemies” of the regime; or the secret serves organizing death squads to eliminate political adversaries⁹⁰ or investigate the opposition’s financial sources, especially if they come from abroad⁹¹; though we also see them involved in proper tasks such as the confiscation of the consignment of drugs or the fight against tax evasion⁹², or the investigation of not-so-clear affairs⁹³. At the end of the day, intelligence in non-democratic countries does not serve as information, but rather the suppression and legitimization of the regime. Therefore, from all that has been stated, we can come to the following conclusions:

1. These countries use their intelligence services not for the good of the State, but so that the present rulers will continue in their posts.

2. Their intelligence services serve, apart from their rulers directly, other nations which depend on them as a privileged source of information and, on occasions, as a means of infiltration.

3. Western democratic nations also need “scarcely or not-at-all democratic” services, which, on occasion, make use of no-so-hygienic techniques, in order to guarantee, as far as possible, their own safety.

⁸⁸ “Hour-long TV broadcast against journalists named commissioned work of Uzbek security service”, *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 18 August 2008, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>.

⁸⁹ “Turkmen secret services totally control internet access in the country”, *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 8 March 2007, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>.

⁹⁰ Osborn, Andrew: “Kazakh opposition politician 'killed by government death squad'”, *The Independent*, 15 February 2006, in: <http://www.independent.co.uk>.

⁹¹ Djuraev, Ulugbek: “Russian Secret Services Ready to Combat Kyrgyz Opposition”, *Axis Globe*, 27 April 2006, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>.

⁹² “Prime Minister of Kazakhstan called special services to more actively reveal firms engaged in tax evasion and to arrest their heads”, *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 6 August 2008, in: <http://www.axisglobe.com>.

⁹³ “Parliamentary committee has charged SNB, MVD and General Prosecutor’s Office to investigate arrest of 11 citizens in Istanbul”, *Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway*, 6 April 2006, in: <http://eng.gateway.kg>

About the Authors:

Gustavo Diaz Matey is a RIEAS Research Associate based in Spain and Antonio Alonso Marcos is a Researcher at the CEU-San Pablo University in Spain.

RIEAS Publications:

RIEAS welcomes short commentaries from young researchers/analysts for our web site (**about 700 words**), but we are also willing to consider publishing short papers (**about 5000 words**) in the English language as part of our publication policy. The topics that we are interested in are: transatlantic relations, intelligence studies, Mediterranean and Balkan issues, Middle East Affairs, European and NATO security, Greek foreign and defense policy as well as Russian Politics and Turkish domestic politics. Please visit: www.rieas.gr (**Publication Link**)